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of Anomean Eunomius caused an emphatic response of Orthodox writers, 
mainly Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa. Eunomius formulated two 
ways of theology to show that we can know both the substance (ousia) and 
activities (energeiai) of God. The Orthodox Fathers demonstrated that we can 
know only the external activities of God, while the essence is entirely incom-
prehensible. Therefore the 4th-century discussion on whether the Father and 
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Preface
Looking at the philosophical and theological traditions, one can see that 
man has been constantly trying to describe the Absolute. Those attempts 
have always been confronted with the problem of how to speak about the 
reality which is somehow known to man, but also remains beyond the reach 
of human intellect. That is why negative theology seems indispensable in 
such attempts to describe the one who remains mysterious despite all efforts 
to describe him. Negative speaking on God exposes many fundamental 
problems of epistemological and linguistic nature. It urges one to reconsider 
the limits of human knowledge, the capability of the human language to 
express the reality, since man has to use words to express the Unsayable.
The tradition of negative theology is so prolific because it is not only a 
theoretical issue of naming the First Principle, but it is intrinsically linked 
with the human experience of the Absolute. Negative theology is then almost 
a fundament of the mystical tradition, and it seems that God that unveils 
Himself when He is experienced is most often described in negative terms.
But negative theology is not an outdated view of the past ideas. It seems 
that it is still alive and present in the currents of modern thought. When 
presenting the complicated situation of contemporary philosophy of religion, 
J.A. Simmons points out that this field of study is in the state of crisis and 
seeking the new directions.1 Negative theology is recognized as one of the ba-
sic problems which must be confronted in the study of philosophy of religion, 
and therefore the study of traditions of this way of speaking on God is also 
given as the proposition of a new direction and exploration of new frontiers.2
In this study, we shall examine the negative theology of a period which 
was of utmost importance for shaping the Christian doctrine – the 4th 
century. It was the time of looking for new concepts and possibilities of 
expressing Christian dogmas, and negative theology was certainly one 
of them. The most important debate of that period, started by Arius, 
1 Cf. J.A. Simmons, Old Questions and New Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, 
in: Contemporary Debates in Negative Theology and Philosophy, ed. N. Brown, 
J.A. Simmons, Palgrave Macmillan 2017, pp. 1–4.
2 Cf. ibid., pp. 12–13.
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concerned the problem of the status of the Son of God: whether He was 
equal to the Father or rather an inferior and first created being. It seems 
that negative theology also played an important role at the early stage of 
the controversy. There were writers who used negative and positive the-
ology to support their positions. It will be seen during the course of this 
study that positive or negative claims of God on the one side of the conflict 
almost always caused the opposite claims on the other side. However, to 
understand the role of negative theology in this discussion, it is necessary to 
show briefly the development of negative theology starting from the most 
obvious point of reference for Christian writers, namely the Holy Scripture. 
Although the Bible is ambiguous on this topic, we observe the constant 
growth of the importance of negative speaking on God in the 2nd and 3rd 
centuries. Nonetheless, the 4th century seems crucial to the understanding 
how negative theology settled for good in the Christian thought.
There is certainly an important role of negative argumentation on in-
feriority of the Son of God in Arius himself, which will be investigated 
together with the Orthodox response. But there was a significant shift of the 
debate when the Anomeans (Aetius and Eunomius) started to spread their 
opinion that the essence of God can be known. Especially Eunomius was 
the one who skilfully argued on this claim and provoked the response of 
Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa. There is no need here to describe 
the complete timeline of this phase of the discussion since we have many 
studies which explain well the sequence of writings,3 but for the purpose 
of this study, it seems necessary to recall the basic facts.
The timeline of the discussion between Eunomius, Basil of 
Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa
Most of all, it is worth remembering that Eunomius and his teacher Ae-
tius were not Arians in the strict sense. In their own lifetime, they were 
recognized as a separate group which was most radical since they claimed 
that the Son has the substance which is different and dissimilar with that of 
3 The most important of them is certainly: T. A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-
Arianism, Cambridge 1979, pp. 299–543. Cf. also: M. DelCogliano, Basil of 
Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names, Leiden, Boston 2010, pp. 3–14.
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the Father. Therefore, they are rather Neo-Arians, and in their own times, 
they were also called Anomeans (from ἀνόμοιος - dissimilar).
The first Anomean writing was Syntagmation by Aetius, but that text 
had a formal structure and was complicated; therefore, it was not popular 
and did not play any important role during the conflict.4 Eunomius was a 
disciple and secretary of Aetius since the late 340s.5 There is still a debate 
among scholars as to when the first work of Eunomius: Liber Apologeti-
cus was created. We can assume that the most accurate date – 359 – was 
proposed by Thomas Kopecek, who also claimed that it was presented at 
the Council of Constantinople.6 However, both Basil and Gregory objected 
that Apology was never presented, but rather written, and Eunomius only 
claimed that he had presented it because he wanted to convince the readers 
that he provided answers to Orthodox arguments.7
Basil of Caesarea wrote his Contra Eunomium because the heteroousian 
doctrine significantly spread out after the success of the Council in 359. 
There is also a disagreement among scholars as regards the date of its 
creation. Having reconsidered various opinions, Mark DelCogliano claims 
that it was written after the accusation of Valens, and, therefore, the most 
probable date is 364 or 365.8 However, T. Kopecek points out that af-
ter the Council in 359, the next Council in Constantinople accepted the 
4 Cf. L. R. Wickham, The Syntagmation of Aetius, JTS 19 (1968), pp. 533–537.
5 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 12.
6 F. Diekamp was the first who tried to establish the date on which Apology was 
written. He claimed that it was presented at the end of 360, when Eunomius 
was recalled by the gathering in Constantinople (F. Diekamp, Literargeschichtli-
ches zu der Eunomianischen Kontroverse, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), 
pp. 1–13). T. Kopecek claimed that Apology was presented at the synod at 
Constantinople at 359, where Eunomius was as a deacon with his teacher Aetius 
(T.A. Kopecek, op. cit., pp. 299–306). In his edition of extant works of Euno-
mius R. P. Vaggione claims that Apology was written in 360–361, because it 
must have been created before Basil’s response in Contra Eunomium in 364 (R.P. 
Vaggione, Introduction, in: Eunomius, The Extant Works, New York 2002, 
p. IX). R. Willing also agrees on this date (R. Winling, Introduction, in: Grégoire 
de Nysse, Contre Eunome, SC 521, p. 28).
7 Basil, Con. Eun., I, 2 (SC 299, pp. 149–157); Gregory of Nyssa, CE I, 61–66 
(GNO I, 43–45).
8 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 14.
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homoiousian symbol of 359 and deposed all homoousian bishops, includ-
ing Basil’s mentor Eustachius of Sebasta, from offices. Those events prob-
ably induced Basil to write Contra Eunomium, so taking into account the 
internal and external testimonies, T. Kopecek sets its date as 360 or 361.9
The response of Eunomius was written after he had been expelled to the 
island of Naos in 370, where he started to work on his Apologia apologiae. 
Two books of the work were ready in the year of the death of Emperor 
Valens in 378.10 T. Kopecek suggests that Eunomius took advantage of the 
interregnum to attack his opponent.11 We are not sure whether this work 
contained two or even as many as five books,12 but we have only fragments 
of the first three books, thanks to the quotations made by Gregory in his 
Contra Eunomium.
At the end of 379, Anomeans began the missionary activity in the diocese 
of Gregory in Nyssa, and after he returned from the Council of Antioch 
in the autumn of 379, he encountered the successive spreading of their 
doctrine. Therefore, when Gregory gained access to the text of two books 
of Apologia Apologiae, he started to write the response as Basil died in 
379. The answer to the first book was published at the end of 380.13 The 
situation also alarmed Gregory of Nazianz, and, therefore, he presented his 
Theological Sermons between 14 of July and 24 of November 380.14 The 
second book of Gregory’s Contra Eunomium was finished before May of 
381, because we know that he presented two completed books of his work 
to Gregory of Nazianz and Hieronymus.15 In 381, Eunomius probably 
published the third book of Apologia Apologiae, and Gregory answered 
before 383.16
9 Cf. T. A. Kopecek, op. cit., pp. 362–372.
10 Cf. F. Diekamp, op. cit., pp. 9–10.
11 Cf. T. A. Kopecek, op. cit., p. 441.
12 Cf. ibid., p. 442.
13 Cf. F. Diekamp, op. cit., p. 11.
14 Cf. T.A. Kopecek, op. cit., p. 496.
15 Cf. Hieronymus, De viris illustribus 128 (PL 23, 753 A).
16 M. Cassin, Contre Eunome III: Introduction, in: Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eu-
nomium III. An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies, 
Leiden, Boston 2014, pp. 4–5.
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The situation changed in 381, and after Theodosius’s edicts against Eu-
nomians in 383/394, the entire movement was outlawed.17 But Anomeans 
were still strong, especially in Antioch, where their rise began, and, 
therefore, in 386, John Chrysostom presented five speeches against their 
doctrines.18 After Eunomius’ death in 394, it slowly began to lose its cohe-
siveness, and vanished, not only because of the death of its main figure, but 
also thanks to Emperor Theodosius, who was committed to strengthening 
Nicene Orthodoxy.19
The status of research on negative theology and  
the problem of ἐνέργεια in the 4th century
Although since the late 1970s, scholars have recognized the importance 
of Eunomius, Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa to the understanding 
of the 4th century theological debate,20 there was very little interest in the 
influence of the discussion on rapid development of Christian negative 
theology. The figure of Gregory of Nyssa was recognized as especially 
important, but there was but little recognition that his negative theology 
was shaped as the response to Eunomius. In her important book on nega-
tive theology in the Platonic tradition, Deidre Carabine only briefly states 
that the negative theology of Gregory of Nyssa “cannot be divorced from 
complex theological background of the 4th century,”21 but she only men-
tions the Arian conflict without any specification of the negative theology 
of Arius. Eunomius is also only mentioned and the author does not speak 
about the importance of the concept of God’s activity as the way to the 
knowledge of his substance.
Probably, the most extensive study on the topic was done by Raul Mort-
ley, who in the second volume of his work From Word to Silence extensively 
discusses the use of the negative theology of Eunomius, Basil and Gregory of 
17 Cf. T.A. Kopecek, op. cit., p. 519.
18 Cf. ibid., p. 529.
19 Cf. ibid., pp. 542–543. Two sons of Theodosius: Arcadius and Honorius also 
continued their father’s attitude towards Eunomians.
20 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 15.
21 D. Carabine, The Unknown God. Negative theology in the Platonic Tradition: 
Plato to Eriugena, Eugene 1995, p. 234.
Nyssa.22 However, he concentrates his analysis of Eunomius on the logical 
problems of the language and shows that the Neo-Arian was in fact an active 
participant of the contemporary philosophical discussion on the meaning of 
negation, and in some cases, he was even a precursor of the late Neoplatonic 
discussion on positive and privative negation.23 Although those problems are 
certainly present in Liber apologeticus, I would argue that they do not play 
the most important role in Eunomius’ theology. Besides, it does not seem 
plausible to call somebody who claims that we can comprehend God’s es-
sence a negative theologian. An analysis of the structure of Eunomius’ work 
will show that the concept of the activity of God, which is generation of the 
Son, is far more important for him. If we look at negative theology from 
Gregory of Nyssa’s point of view, we also see that the problem of ἐνέργεια 
has a more profound meaning for negative theology, since the claims made 
by Eunomius brought about his elaborate answer as to impossibility of 
knowing the substance of God by means of His activities.24
Therefore, the problem of understanding ἐνέργεια and its relation to 
οὐσία is extensively discussed in the fourth chapter of this book. For-
tunately, this topic has been lately a point of interest of scholars, and 
we have two important studies published by David Bradshaw25 and 
22 It is also worth mentioning his very important article on the role of negative 
theology in Arius: R. Morley, Alien God in Arius, in: Platonism in the Late 
Antiquity, ed. S. Gersh, Ch. Kannengeisser, Notre Dame 1992, pp. 205–215.
23 R. Mortley even states that: “…probably the best way to understand Eunomius 
would be to write a philological commentary on him, treating all his vocabulary 
as if it came from Proclus, Syrianus and Dexippus.” (R. Mortley, From Word to 
Silence, vol. 2: The Way of Negation, Christian and Greek, Bonn 1986, p. 147).
24 R. Mortley’s thesis on the negative theology of Basil the Great is rather con-
troversial since he concludes that: “Basil’s negative theology is little more than 
an enhanced sense of the transcendent, or a form of piety.” and he call it “the 
negative theology of the amateur” (op. cit., p. 170). He has a higher opinion 
on the the negative theology of Gregory of Nyssa (op. cit., p. 171), but he also 
states that: “There is no science of negation in Gregory” (op. cit., p. 191).
25 D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West. Metaphysics and the Division of Christen-
dom, Cambridge 2004. The publishing of this book provoked a wide discussion 
on the problem of Divine activities, especially in Orthodox circles, since the 
doctrine of energies is the core of Orthodox theology, cf. C. Schneider, Beyond 
Agnostisism and Pantheism, in: Divine Essence and Divine Energies, ed. C. 
Athanasopoulos, C. Schneider, Cambridge 2013, pp. 9–13.
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Jean-Claude Larchet.26 The study of D. Bradshaw shows well the philo-
sophical background and development of ἐνέργεια, but he only briefly 
mentions the importance of the claims of Eunomius, and, therefore, he 
seems to underestimate Gregory’s response.27 The book by Jean-Claude 
Larchet, on the other hand, more widely discusses Christian sources and 
the obvious fact that for the Church Fathers, the problem of ἐνέργεια was 
the exegesis of the Holy Scripture rather than exploration of philosophical 
sources.28 Hence, although both studies seem to give a complete view of 
the topic, none of them recognizes Eunomius’ dual theology. Thus, we 
found it important to present more broadly both sources of the tradition 
in the first part of the fourth chapter of this study to provide a background 
for the understanding of Eunomius’s methods. The most important figure 
of the discussion of ἐνέργεια is of course Aristotle since he invented the 
term and used it for the first time to describe the activity of God. Although 
D. Bradshaw’s study is very profound in presenting Aristotle’s ideas, it 
is also worth mentioning a very important book by Johnathan Beere in 
which he proposes a new interpretation of ἐνέργεια in Metaphysics.29
Terminological remarks
Before we go any further, we must make some remarks on the terminology 
the reader will encounter throughout this study. Especially, in the case of 
ἐνέργεια, we face the problem of a proper translation which would render 
the full signification of the term. Johnathan Beere points out that there is no 
English term or phrase that describes the meaning of ἐνέργεια. In the case of 
Aristotle, there are two traditional translations of this term: “actuality” and 
“activity.”30 The problem was also recognized by the scholars who studied 
26 J.-C. Larchet, La théologie des énergies divines. Des origines à saint Jean 
Damascène, Paris 2010.
27 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 156–161.
28 I find the chapter discussing the usage of ἐνέργεια in the Septuagint and New 
Testament especially important (op. cit., pp. 83–93).
29 J. Beere, Doing and Being. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s “Metaphysics Theta”, 
Oxford 2009.
30 Cf. J. Beere, op. cit., p. 159. D. Bradshaw also makes a similar remark, cf. 
Aristotle East and West, op. cit., pp. 14–15.
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the works of Eunomius and the Cappadocians. It is sometimes rendered in 
a Latin transliteration as “energy” or in translations as “action” or “activ-
ity.” But it seems that currently in the studies concerning the thought of 
Aristotle and Christian writers, the term “activity” has been recognized as 
the most proper; however, it does not convey the full depth of the Greek 
original.31 Nevertheless, in our study, apart from Greek ἐνέργεια, “activity” 
will be consistently used.
Another terminological remark concerns a more general problem of un-
derstanding and naming negative theology. Many scholars use the term 
ἀπόφασις describing the negative theology of early Christian authors such 
as Clement of Alexandria or Gregory of Nyssa.32 The case of the latter 
is significant since for Gregory of Nyssa, the term ἀπόφασις has mainly a 
positive meaning and refers to something “clear,” “determined.”33 This is in 
accord with what D. Carabine claims in her book on negative theology. 
She points out that until Proclus and development of the negative language 
in the 5th century, we cannot properly speak about apophatic theology. 
Earlier occurrences of the negative language could be seen as a simple 
negation or privation (στέρησις, ἀφαίρεσις). In the writings of Proclus, es-
pecially in the rigorous analysis of the First Hypothesis of Parmenides, 
he established ἀπόφασις as the method of negative theology.34 Therefore, 
31 In his translation of the extant works of Eunomius, R. P. Vaggione uses the 
term “action” (e.g. LA 20, 8, in: Eunomius, The Extant Works, p. 58). In their 
translation of Basil’s Contra Eunomium Mark DelCogliano and Andrew Radde-
Gallvitz propose to use “activity” (St. Basil of Cesarea, Against Eunomius, 
Washington 2011, p. 77). When commenting on the translation of ἐνέργεια in 
the works of Gregory of Nyssa, Giulio Maspero says: “Following Daniélou, it 
would seem that the best choice for translating ἐνέργεια is ‘activity’ rather than 
‘energy’.” (G. Maspero, Trinity and Man. Gregory of Nyssa “Ad Ablabium”, 
Leiden, Boston, 2007, p. 39).
32 In the case of Clement, it can be seen in the very title of Fiskå Hägg’s book: 
Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism, Oxford 
2014. In the case of Gregory, the use of the term is very common cf. e.g. 
M. Ludlow, Gregory of Nyssa, Ancient and (Post)modern, Oxford 2007, p. 232; 
M. Larid, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith. Union, Knowledge, and 
Divine Presence, Oxford 2004, pp. 180; 198; 211 etc.
33 Cf. G. Maspero, op. cit., p. 31.
34 Cf. D. Carabine, op. cit., pp. 184–185.
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although the use of the term “apophatic theology” is common, one must 
be alert and does not attribute apophatic theology in its fully grown version 
to those early authors.
The problem of philosophical sources
The last introductory problem concerning the figure of Eunomius and his 
opponents as well as all Christian writers is the extent to which they used 
Greek philosophy. This issue almost always provokes a debate between 
scholars concerning many Early Christian figures, but as regards the 4th 
century, it seems to be particularly complicated. As we will see, from both 
sides of the Arian debate, there were constant accusations of being a phi-
losopher, logical chopper, technologos, etc. Both the Arians and the Ortho-
dox certainly referred to a Greek legacy. A good example is the doctrine of 
Eunomius, who is the central figure in our investigation. Eunomius has been 
commonly perceived by scholars as a Neoplatonist.35 During our discussion, 
we will see that this position may be challenged because of fundamental 
disagreements and rejection of the Neoplatonic doctrine which we find in 
Eunomius and this is best seen in the crucial problem of the activity of God. 
He strongly opposed the view that any activity of God could be identified 
with the substance. The claim that was made already by Aristotle, but in 
the strongest manner confirmed by Plotinus in his theory of two activities. 
But this does not mean that he rejected philosophical teaching as such. 
He, for example, quotes and accepts the definition of time from Timaeus36 
because it well serves his purpose at this stage of demonstration, but some 
chapters later reject the notion of a receptacle as pagan and foolish.37 This 
is of course only an example, but if we try to estimate Eunomius’ attitude 
35 The most significant opinion on the matter was presented by R. Mortley, who 
stated: “Eunomius’ philosophy has its roots in the Greek philosophy of the pe-
riod: it makes for more use of Neoplatonic logic than does Patristic philosophy 
in general.” (R. Mortley, op.cit., p. 138). Similar although less strong claims 
were made by: J. Danielou, Eunome l’Arien et l’ exégèse néo-platonicienne du 
Cratyle, in: Revue des études grecques, 69, 1956, p. 428; B. Sesbuë, Introduc-
tion to l’Apologie d’Eunome, SC 305, pp. 191–195; A. Meredith, Studies in the 
Contra Eunomium of Gregory or Nyssa, Oxford 1972, pp. 62–72.
36 Cf. LA 10, 5–6 (Vaggione pp. 44–45).
37 Cf. LA 16, 4–6 (Vaggione, pp. 52–53).
towards Greek Philosophy on the basis of his texts, we must conclude that 
he felt free to use some of the doctrines while rejecting others.
Therefore, this is not the problem of which philosophical writings he 
knew, but rather how he used those which he had read and what was his 
purpose in any given passage. It seems that we may make similar claims 
with respect to other Christian writers who also freely used philosophy 
when it helped them to understand and explain the faith. Therefore, we 
entirely agree with Johannes Zachhuber’s conclusion concerning the use of 
philosophical texts by Gregory of Nyssa. The main problem with Gregory 
is that he did not collect the excerpts of philosophical writings like Clem-
ens and Eusebius, while at the same time, he was one of “the more philo-
sophically minded Church Fathers.”38 Thus, his writings are certainly full 
of echoes and references to philosophical sources which were incorporated 
in his system. But in the case of Gregory, as well as many other figures of 
the 4th century, we have very little data as to their philosophical education, 
and we remain uncertain whether he could have known certain works. 
As J. Zachhuber rightly notes: “uncertain does not mean non-existent.”39 
Therefore, if the writers we examine themselves freely used philosophical 
sources, any trace of resemblances suggests that they could have read a 
given philosophical work. Therefore, J. Zachhuber seems to be right in his 
claim that working on Gregory he will: “freely adduce parallels from late 
ancient philosophers without committing [himself] to the assumption that 
Gregory must have read any particular book.”40 Such a methodological 
assumption seems profitable, since it allows to concentrate on the thought 
of the discussed author, while recalling philosophical sources where they 
are necessary to understand the presented doctrine.41
38 J. Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa, Leiden, Boston 2014, p. 9.
39 Ibid., p. 11.
40 Ibid., p. 12.
41 It must be noted that some of the works of philosophers were more available 
and more common. Among those were surely those which were also widely used 
in philosophical schools of the period. The list of such works used in curricula 
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1.  The origins of Christian Negative 
Theology
1.1  The ambiguity of the Holy Scripture concerning the 
knowledge of God
God reveals Himself in the Old Testament, tells Abraham and Moses who 
He is, and what He demands. God also gives His law and orders how He 
should be worshiped. In other words, God makes Himself known to man, 
while His nature remains hidden. It is often revealed in symbols: He is 
present in the burning bush, in the cloud, and the pillar of fire, but those 
are merely symbols which reveal His power and glory, while at the same 
time, they somehow hide the mysterious essence of God. This fact was 
recognized and widely commented on by the Church Fathers. They paid 
special attention to the figure of Moses, who was closest to seeing God’s 
nature since “the Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks 
to his friend.” (Ex 33: 11). However, in other passages, the Book of Exodus 
clearly states that he was unable to see the face of God. During the two 
encounters with God on Mount Sinai, he sees only the cloud (24: 15–18), 
and to the demand of Moses, God answers that “you cannot see my face; 
for man shall not see me and live.” (Ex 33–20) Therefore, hidden in a cleft 
of rock, he sees only the back of God who passes by (Ex 33: 17–23). As 
we will see, those verses played a very important role in the evolution of 
Christian mysticism and they were used especially by Gregory of Nyssa to 
show incomprehensibility of God. For the Church Fathers, however, the 
knowledge of God is never a theoretical issue. Knowing God rather means 
being closer to him and ascending the mystical path. Man cannot worship 
God of whom he knows nothing. So the first step always belongs to God, 
who reveals Himself to man. It is very significant that in the Old Testament 
all the greatest revelations took place before great journeys. In the case of 
Abraham, it was going out of the Chaldean city of Ur (Gen 12: 1–4). In the 
case of Israel, it was going out of Egypt. Abraham heard the voice of God, 
and Moses saw the burning bush and heard the voice. A revelation of God 
always provokes one to leave the place and go forward. Along the road, 
man gets closer to God and step by step his knowledge of God goes deeper. 
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But the road never ends in seeing God face to face. He reveals Himself, 
invites to know Him better, but still remains unknown.
One of the strongest negative statements of the Old Testament is linked 
with the struggle for monotheism. God has a transcendent nature and, 
therefore, there is a strong prohibition of making any image of Him.42 The 
God of Israel is so different from pagan idols that there could be no likeness 
between Him and those idols. Therefore, any representation of God could 
be misleading and give a false image of His nature. God stays beyond any 
human imagination and thought, and his ways and thoughts are far remote 
from man. (Is 55: 8–9.) There is no one like God in His Holiness.43 On the 
one hand, God reveals Himself, but on the other, He stays beyond any like-
ness to any other concept of God which can appear in human imagination. 
Therefore, the Old Testament leaves the question of knowing God open. 
On the one hand, Israel was aware of God’s presence and care, but on the 
other, closeness to God was reserved for some figures, and even they were 
unable to see Him face to face. God, then, despite all what He revealed, 
will remain the “hidden God,” who hides His face to man.44
The New Testament brings almost the same ambiguity of knowing and 
the lack of knowledge of God. However, this dialectic approach is ex-
pressed in a new manner. The incarnation of Christ is the only source of 
true knowledge of God. Since “no one has ever seen God,” any cognition 
is possible by “the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has 
made him known.” (J 1: 18)45 The revelation brought by the Incarnated is 
limited, and the nature of God will always be hidden since He “dwells in 
unapproachable light, whom no man has ever seen or can see” (1 Tim 6: 
16). So the human nature of Christ reveals and also in some aspect hides 
the nature of God, and the true vision of God which is non-symbolic and 
direct is reserved to the afterlife. St Paul points it out very clearly in a pas-
sage of 1 Corinthians: “For now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face 
42 Ex 4: 6, 20: 23; Deut 4: 15, 5: 8–10, and Lev 26:1. See also, D. Carabine’s com-
ment on the topic, op. cit., p. 198.
43 I Sam 2: 2; Hos 11: 9 and Ex 15: 11.
44 For all references of “hidden God” and its meaning in the Old Testament, 
cf. S.E. Balentine, The Hidden God, Oxford 1993, pp. 49–79.
45 On the impossibility of seeing the Father, see also J 6: 46; 1 J 4: 12.
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to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know fully even as also I was 
fully known.” (1 Cor 13: 12). All human desires and longings to know 
God will be achievable in the afterlife, and it is the essence of the reward 
for the faithful.
St Paul also writes about God’s knowledge of the Greeks. The fragment 
of the Letter to Romans is so important that it needs a more in-depth analy-
sis, since, as we will see, it will reappear in the discussion on the activities 
of God. The Greeks achieved the knowledge of God which is sufficient to 
admit that He should be worshiped. Since they did not do that, this knowl-
edge is the reason of accusation. God manifested Himself to the Greeks 
(ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν), but this was not the kind of revelation which 
was granted to Israel; it was not a voice that was heard or a symbol that 
was seen, but rather God showed Himself in His creation.
“For the invisible things (ἀόρατα) of him since the creation of the world are clear-
ly seen (ποιήμασιν νοούμενα), being perceived through the things that are made 
(ποιήμασιν).” (Rom 1: 20)
This passage was always interpreted as admittance that man is able to have 
the knowledge of God thanks to natural reasons. The works of God are an 
explicit testimony of his divinity (θειότης) and his everlasting power (ἀΐδιος 
αὐτοῦ δύναμις). So the only things to be known are God’s attributes, which 
can give some insight of who He is, but they do not show his essence. As we 
shall see, this point will become very important for Clement of Alexandria 
and later for the 4th-century discussion on the knowledge of God, because 
St Paul himself admits that the knowledge of God is the knowledge of what 
comes from him and not of his nature.
A second important topic of this passage, which will be present in the 
Arian controversy, is the relation of the knowledge of God to the ability 
to worship Him. The Greeks possessed enough knowledge to praise the 
glory of God, and St Paul accused them of not doing so; moreover, they 
kept that knowledge to themselves (Rom 1: 18). They deserved the wrath 
of God because “knowing God (γνότες τὸν θεὀν), they glorified him not as 
God, neither gave thanks…” (1: 21). For the Apostle, the relation between 
the knowledge of and worshiping God goes both ways. The knowledge of 
God should lead to worship, but a lack of such worship also has disastrous 
consequences for further knowledge. That is why their reasoning became 
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vain and their hearts were darkened.46 Since their knowledge did not make 
them worship true God, instead of being wise they became foolish, because 
they continued to worship idols. In the eyes of St Paul, this simply meant 
that they “exchanged the truth of God for a lie.” (Rom 1: 25) This pas-
sage, thus, clearly shows that for the Apostle the link between knowledge 
and worship is fundamental and the two are never separated, which will 
be seen in the discussion on the troublesome Anomean question of whether 
“You worship what you know, or what you do not know.” Therefore, 
Neo-Arian accusations of the Orthodox were of much greater importance 
than we would admit from the present perspective, and the participants in 
the polemic certainly could refer their discussion to the Bible, which shows 
the topic in such light.
The question of the possibility of knowing God can be seen as the ques-
tion of the limits of knowledge. God can be known to some extent, and 
such knowledge is indispensable for worshiping and reaching God. On the 
other hand, it is also evident that man with his limited powers of intellect 
cannot know God as much as he wants to. The texts of the Old and New 
Testament leave the question open. Christian writers, who search the Bible 
for answers to the question whether the knowledge of God is possible, may 
have found answers confirming both positions. The Holy Scripture contains 
the knowledge of God, who reveals Himself while at the same time provides 
very strong evidence of his incomprehensibility.
1.2  Philo of Alexandria – transcendence and negative 
theology
The writings of Philo of Alexandria are among the earliest examples of 
using negative theology as the primary way of speaking of God. Although 
his doctrine was based on the Pentateuch in the Septuagint version com-
mented in the spirit of Platonic philosophy, his influence was not significant 
for the Jewish or pagan tradition. His writings, however, were crucial to 
Christian theology, and his influence is especially seen in the development 
46 Rom 1: 21. ἀλλ᾿ ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ 
ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία·.
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of the Alexandrian patristic tradition.47 Moreover, there is a resemblance 
between Philo’s account of creation of the universe and early Arian claims 
on the created character of the Logos,48 and we also must remember that 
Gregory of Nyssa himself found a quotation from Philo in Second Apology 
by Eunomius.49
The fundamental statement of Philo’s philosophy is the identification 
of the Platonic One with the God of the Old Testament.50 Here, for the 
first time in Ancient tradition, we observe speaking about the God of the 
Scripture in the language of philosophy. The God of the Scripture is the 
Creator of the Universe, and the act of creation of this kind was unknown 
to Greek philosophy, which saw the Universe as eternal. For Philo, the 
Creator is completely different and separated from the creations, and to 
emphasize his entirely different nature, he presents God as the only Uncre-
ated (ἀγένητος) being. This distinction underlies the criticism of idolatry, 
because being creations, the Sun and the stars could no longer be treated 
as having the divine power and causing the events on Earth.51 God is also 
naturally the sole agent, and in relation to Him, the creations are always 
passive and receptive.52 God is then unlike any idols and, therefore, cannot 
47 The treatises of Philo were preserved thanks to Christians not Jews. (A. Louth, 
The Origins of Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys, Oxford 2007, 
p. 17). The fact that his doctrine was not acknowledged in the Jewish theology 
shows that Philo was probably a representative of a minority of the Alexandrian 
Jewish community (D. Carabine, op. cit., p. 195).
48 Cf. H. A. Wolfson, Philosophical Implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism, 
DOP, vol. 12 (1958), p. 11.
49 Cf. CE III, 5, 24 (GNO II, 168, 11–18).
50 Eric Osborn notes that Philo’s understanding of God resembles monism of Eu-
dorus of Alexandria, who understood the One as the basis for all beings, and 
because it is the only principle of all it is beyond any properties (E. Osborn, 
Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge 2005, p. 114).
51 Spec. I, 13, 1–3. “Some have supposed that the sun and moon and the other 
stars were gods with absolute powers and ascribed to them the causation of all 
events” (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 7, pp. 106–107).
52 Cher. 77 “What deadlier foe to the soul can there be than he who in his vainglory 
claims to himself that which belongs to God alone? For it belongs to God to act 
(ἴδιον μὲν δὴ θεοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν), and this we may not ascribe to any created being. 
What belongs to the created is to suffer (ἴδιον δὲ γενητοῦ τὸ πάσχειν)” (Colson/
Whitaker, vol. 2, pp. 54–55).
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be cognized like gods made by humans. So, naturally, the only Uncreated 
must be incomprehensible: “The Unoriginated [ἀγένητος] resembles noth-
ing among created [γένεσις] things, but so completely transcends them that 
even the swiftest understanding falls far short of apprehending Him and ac-
knowledges its failure.”53 The God of the Scripture is, then, not only unlike 
anything in the sensible world, but he also resists any likeness, comparison, 
or similitude. He cannot be perceived by sense and intellect:
“Do not however suppose that the Existent [ὄν] which truly exists is 
[καταλαμβάνεσθαι] apprehended by any man; for we have in us no organ by which 
we can envisage it, neither in sense, for it is not perceptible by sense, nor yet in 
mind [νοῦς]. So Moses the explorer of nature which lies beyond our vision [ἀειδής], 
Moses who, as the divine oracles tell us, entered into the darkness [γνόφος] (Exodus 
20:21), by which figure they indicate existence [οὐσία] invisible and incorporeal, 
searched everywhere and into everything in his desire to see clearly and plainly 
Him, the object of our much yearning, who alone is good. And when there was 
no sign of finding aught, not even any semblance [ἰδέα] of what he hoped for, 
in despair of learning from others, he took refuge with the Object of his search 
Itself and prayed in these words: ‘Reveal Thyself to me that I may see Thee with 
knowledge (Exodus 33:13).’”54
Despite man’s effort God stays beyond our capabilities; He is without form 
since He is incorporeal and His substance is invisible. Getting closer to Him 
means entering into darkness. Philo exploits Moses’s ascend onto Mount 
Sinai, which will be later so important to Christian tradition, especially for 
Gregory of Nyssa. As Jean Daniélou points out, the exegesis of Moses’s 
ascend shows that the Holy Scripture remains the basis for Philo, but he 
explains the words of the Bible using a philosophical language.55 Philo says 
that the substance (ὀυσία) is incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος), and all the 
powers of the human soul are not enough to grasp Him.56 Finally, man 
can only gain the highest form of knowledge which is: “to apprehend that 
the God of real Being is apprehensible by no one [ἀκατάληπτος] and to see 
precisely this, that He is incapable of being seen (ἀόρατος).”57
53 Som., I, 184 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 5, pp. 394–395); see also Cong. 133–34 
(Colson/Whitaker, vol. 4, pp. 526–527).
54 Mut. 7–8 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 5, pp. 144–147).
55 Cf. J. Daniélou, Philo of Alexandria, tr. J.G. Colbert, Cambridge 2014, p. 115.
56 Cf. Post. 13–14 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 2, pp. 334–337).
57 Post. 15 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 2, pp. 336–337).
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Despite claims of absolute incomprehensibility of God’s essence, Philo 
also says that we can know Him thanks to his actions as the Creator and 
Governor of the Universe. Here, we encounter one of the most difficult frag-
ment of his doctrine – the teaching of the Powers (δυνάμεις).58 The substance 
of God, transcendent and impossible to comprehend, is simultaneously 
present and recognizable in creations. Philo often speaks about two main 
powers: Kingly and Creative,59 but he also mentions three other: Injunctive, 
Prohibitive, and Gracious.60 The structure of powers is hierarchical, and 
they play an important role in the ascent of the soul towards God, being at 
the same time subsequent levels of knowledge. When the faithful ascends 
towards God, he first encounters the prohibition of sin (Injunctive Power), 
then obedience of the Law (Prohibitive Power), and then repentance in the 
face of mercy (Gracious Power); next he acknowledges the sovereignty of 
God (Kingly Power); and he finally discovers creative love (Creative Power). 
The knowledge of God is, then, an essential part of Philo’s doctrine, where 
the way of the Powers constitutes a positive way (small mysteries) and the 
knowledge of the cloud becomes a negative way (higher mysteries).61 But 
what the initiate really knows when he approaches those powers? Philo 
claims that this is not the knowledge of the powers themselves, which stay 
incomprehensible, like the essence of God, but rather of activities which 
are the effects of those powers. We can see it in the following fragment of 
De posteritate Caini:
“This meant that all that follows in the wake of God is within the good man’s 
apprehension (καταληπτά), while He Himself alone is beyond it (ἀκατάληπτος), 
beyond, that is, in the line of straight and direct approach, a mode of approach 
by which (had it been possible) His quality would have been made known; but 
58 Jean Daniélou (op. cit., pp. 116–117) underlines that for Philo, there are two 
ways of knowing God. First way depends on Gods actions as Creator and second 
is possible thanks to ideas (logos) which are given to the soul by illumination of 
Logos. The first one is more important to our study since it is deeply connected 
to the division between God’s essence and his Powers, and activities and will be 
discussed in chapter 4. Daniélou also underlines that the teaching of the Powers 
of God stays the most difficult to interpret (op. cit., p. 117).
59 Abr. 121 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 6, pp. 62–63).
60 All five of them are driven from symbolic explanation of the Arc of Covenant 
cf. Fug. 95–104 (F Colson/Whitaker, vol. 5, pp. 60–67).
61 Cf. A. Louth, op. cit., pp. 21–25.
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brought within ken by the powers that follow and attend Him; for these make evi-
dent not His essence but His subsistence from the things which He accomplishes.”62
Philo then says clearly that the only outcome of man’s effort is the knowl-
edge of the subsistence (ὕπαρξιν) of God and that He is the Creator of the 
Universe.63 So, not knowing the Face of God, Moses knows “what is behind 
God” (Ex 30:23), and when God comes before him, he will know the wake 
(ὀπίσθια) of God. “Wake of God” is for Philo the symbol of what God’s 
action establishes in the world. Despite the lack of clarity and symbolism of 
Philo’s ideas for the first time, we can see how the division between essence 
and power is used to express the possibility of knowing God. There seems 
to be no separation between power and action yet, but in his discussion of 
powers, Philo clearly points out that they must be taken into account when 
we try to see the Creator and Governor of the Universe because otherwise 
we must admit that we can gain the knowledge of the essence of God, who 
stays incomprehensible. Powers, then, are necessary as a consequence of 
God’s incomprehensibility, and as such, they seem to have a philosophical 
rather than biblical origin. Tracing differences between Philo and Clement 
of Alexandria, David T. Runia points out that for the former δύναμις is a 
philosophical term “which allows the exegete to explain and expound activ-
ity of God as it is manifested in creation and humanity.”64 So the primary 
function of Philo’s use of the concept of power is to secure incomprehen-
sibility of God’s essence rather than to open up the possibility of knowing 
it. As we shall see, when discussing the meaning of this concept in Clement 
of Alexandria, Philo’s claims on the remoteness and unknowability of God 
are much more radical than those of his Christian successor, who was so 
profoundly influenced by him.
62 Post. 169 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 2, pp. 428–429).
63 Post. 166–167 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 2, pp. 426–427).
64 D. T. Runia, Clement of Alexandria and the Philonic Doctrine of the Divine 
Power(s), VCh, vol. 58, no. 3 (Aug. 2004), p. 275. The author also shows that 
although Philo is primarily an exegete, in Pentateuch, which he comments, the 
term δύναμις is almost non-existent and Septuagint uses ἰσχύς (strength) rater to 
describe metaphorical expressions on the strength of God’s hand. While Philo 
refers only to Pentateuch, Clement of Alexandria quotes various texts from 
the Psalms and the New Testament, which shows a more biblical character of 
Clement’s δύναμις (Ibid., p. 260).
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1.3  The apologetic usage of negative theology  
in the 2nd century
The Bible’s ambiguity on whether we can know God is still present in the 
2nd century AD. However, the defence of the Christian religion in the Ro-
man Empire brought about a new background to it. Apologists must face 
pagan religions and answer serious accusations of atheism, immorality, and 
even cannibalism. Since Romans refuted anything that was new, including 
new religions, Christian writers try to argue that Christianity is nothing 
new. The only possible way to do it was to find something in ancient pagan 
cultures that could be seen close to Christian beliefs. As Benedict XVI notes, 
Christians did not see any connection between Christianity and pagan re-
ligions, but they saw such a link in philosophy.65 In a way, such connec-
tion was obvious since, as we have seen above, St Paul himself suggested 
that Greek philosophers found God by means of reason. Their fault was 
only not giving worship and thanks to such Deity. However, showing that 
Christianity was a philosophy was not enough – it was presented as the 
only true philosophy. St Justin Martyr is probably the best example of such 
argumentation. He claims without hesitation that Christianity is “the only 
sure and useful philosophy.”66 As A.J. Droge points out, the background of 
this claim could be found in the writings of various Greek philosophers of 
his time, who viewed philosophy after Aristotle as the history of corruption 
and decay. Posidonius of Apamea claimed that philosophy was given to 
humans by gods in primordial times, but later became corrupt and lost its 
unity by splitting into various schools.67 But the most interesting similar-
ity can be found in Numenius of Apamea, who not only viewed himself 
as the restorer of the dogmatic teaching of the Platonic Academy, which 
65 Benedict XVI shows the unity of theology and philosophy in early Christianity, 
which is so deep that it could be seen even in Christian art. Cf. Benedict XVI, 
The Nature and Mission of Theology, tr. Adrian Walker, San Francisco 1995, 
pp. 13–16.
66 Dial. 8, 1, 4–6 (PTS 47, p. 84; tr. Halton, p. 15).
67 Cf. A.J. Droge, Self-definition vis-à-vis the Graeco-Roman World, in: Cambridge 
History of Christianity, vol. 1. Origins to Constantine, ed. M.M. Mitchell, F.M. 
Young, Cambridge 2008, p. 235. A.J. Droge also sees the same idea in Antiochus 
of Ascalon.
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was abandoned by Plato’s successors, but also argued for the barbarian 
sources of philosophy (especially Platonism and Pythagoreanism). The true 
philosophy of Plato can be restored only by tracing it back to Pythagoras 
and from Pythagoras to the most ancient barbarians.68 Numenius precedes 
Justin in claims of the origins of philosophy in Pentateuch asking: “What 
is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek?”69 Justin similarly claims that 
Plato took many ideas from Moses, especially on evil, fate, free will,70 and 
on the creation of the universe.71 He even found in Pentateuch the teaching 
about the triad of gods which was in a sense Trinitarian.72 Christian teach-
ing is then something older than all the Greek writers who ever lived.73 It 
is also described as the restored philosophy of ancient times unfolded by 
various philosophical schools which deviated from the truth. Justin shows 
this clearly when he recounts his philosophical journey through various 
schools (Stoic, Peripatetic, Pythagorean, and Platonist), which ended in his 
conversion to Christianity – the true philosophy.74
It is significant that Platonism of young Justin, which could be seen in 
the famous scene of meditation by the sea, was corrected by the old man 
who used Moses and prophets, but the young Platonic was converted to 
Christianity, not Judaism.75 Christianity is truer than philosophy not only 
because it is older, but it is founded on true revelation of Christ whose teach-
ing contains the true knowledge of God. Justin describes the Incarnation of 
Christ as theophany and epiphany, and also transforms some pagan models 
to describe it.76 Without doubt, he wants to show the Incarnated as the one 
who reveals and teaches the true knowledge of God that is proclaimed by 
Christians. Therefore, Justin, as well as other Apologists, claimed that the 
68 Ibid., p. 236.
69 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. I, 150, 4. Τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτον ἣ Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων 
(SC 30, p. 153; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 334).
70 1 Apol. 44, 1 (Minns/Parvis, pp. 192–193).
71 Ibid. 59, 1–5 (Minns/Parvis, pp. 232–233).
72 Cf. A.J. Droge, p. 234.
73 1 Apol. 23, 1 (Minns/Parvis, pp. 138–139).
74 Justin, Dial. 2, 6, 36–43 (PTS 47, p. 73; tr. Halton, pp. 6–7).
75 Cf. A.J. Droge, op. cit., p. 231.
76 Cf. C.H. Talbert, The Development of Christology during the First Hundred 
Years, Leiden, Boston 2011, pp. 21–22. Justin Christology is also often perceived 
as “an appropriation of the Stoic logos thought” (pp. 98–99).
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knowledge of God is possible and was very careful not to rely too much 
on using negative terms in showing how Christians know Him. Such an 
approach could be seen already in the Letter to Diognetus, where Christ 
is presented as the one who provides the knowledge of God: “For, who of 
men at all understood before His coming what God is?”77 Arguing against 
the accusations that Christians are atheists, Justin claims that it was Christ 
who taught them the true worship of true God.78
Nevertheless, there is one place where negative theology seemed to be 
indispensable. It helped to distinguish the true Christian God from the false 
pagan gods, which often appears in a wider perspective of the accusation 
that Christians are atheists and negative theology is used in the writings 
of Apologists almost exclusively in this context.79 The same accusation of 
atheism is for Justin not only an occasion to indicate Christ as the source of 
the knowledge of God, but also so-called Christian “atheism” is in fact the 
rejection of pagan deities, who are corruptible and in need of man’s care. 
On the contrary, the Christian God does not need any material offerings 
and is “called by no proper name.”80 Justin repeats this statement in Second 
Apology, but this time the lack of the proper name of God is derived from 
the fact that he is unbegotten:
“However, the Father of all has no given name, since he is unbegotten. For who-
ever is addressed by some name has as older than him the one who gave him the 
77 Ep. ad Diog. 8, 1 (SC 33, pp. 70–71; tr. ANF, vol. 1, p. 28).
78 Justin, 1 Apol. 13, 3 (Minns/Parvis, pp. 110–111); 23, 2 (pp. 136–137).
79 D.W. Palmer underlines that the proper understanding of the usage of negative 
theology in the writings of Apologists of the 2nd century is possible only with 
regard to the goals of their works and claims: “When modern scholars have 
given attention to the apologists’ use of negative theology, they have frequently 
fitted it into a systematic framework, which is not in keeping with the method 
and purpose of the apologists themselves” (Atheism, Apologetic, and Negative 
Theology in the Greek Apologists of the Second Century, VCh, vol. 37, no. 3 
(Sep. 1983), p. 236). R. Mortley challenges Palmer’s opinion. He argues that 
Justin the Martyr’s theology confirms that negative theology was not limited to 
refuting the false pagan gods, but also had a more systematic formulation (cf. 
R. Mortley, From Word to Silence, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 33–34).
80 1 Apol. 10,1, 6. τῷ μηδενὶ ὀνόματι θετῷ καλουμένῳ (Minns/Parvis, pp. 96–98; 
tr. ANF, vol. 1, p. 165).
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name. But ‘father’ and ‘god’ and ‘creator’ and ‘lord’ and ‘master’ are not names, 
but appellations derived from his beneficence and works.”81
Thus Justin claims that those words are mere expressions (προσρήσεις), 
and they rather describe the deeds and works of God (τῶν εὐποιϊῶν καὶ 
τῶν ἔργων). What is interesting in the context of the Arian controversy is 
that Justin clearly thinks that the term “unbegotten” has a strong negative 
meaning. The name “Christ” also refers to the one who is unknown:
“This name also has an unknown meaning, just as the designation ‘god’ is not 
a name but a notion implanted in the nature of human beings about something 
difficult to set forth.”82
Such a negative statement that name “Christ” has in fact an unknown 
significance (ἄγνωστον σημασίαν) is rather surprising when formulated by 
one of the Apologists, who want to defend the truth and fullness of Chris-
tian revelation. Although man cannot know its significance, it is somehow 
implanted in human nature as an opinion (ἔμφυτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
δόξα). Therefore, it is not of human origin and this opinion could be seen as 
an earlier formulation of the theory of names, which was the key doctrine 
of Anomeans during the Arian controversy.
It is not clear whether Justin builds negative theology here, or simply 
wants to refute the accusations aimed at Christian beliefs, but we can ob-
serve a similar pattern in the writings of other Apologists.83 Tatian argues 
that God is neither visible nor comprehensible by human skill, and he 
has no name; therefore, the Apologist is not willing to worship anything 
which is created by God (stars, elements), or by man (idols).84 The most 
systematic rejection of the accusation that Christians were atheists was 
81 2 Apol. 5(6), 1, 1–2, 3. ̓́ Ονομα δὲ τῷ πάντων πατρὶ θετόν, ἀγεννήτῳ ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστιν· 
ᾧ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὄνομά τι προσαγορεύηται, πρεσβύτερον ἔχει τὸν θέμενον τὸ ὄνομα. τὸ 
δὲ πατὴρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ κτίστης καὶ κύριος καὶ δεσπότης οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ 
τῶν εὐποιϊῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσρήσεις (Minns/Parvis, pp. 284–285).
82 2 Apol. 5(6), 3, 5–8. ὄνομα καὶ αὐτὸ περιέχον ἄγνωστον σημασίαν, ὃν τρόπον καὶ 
τὸ θεὸς προσαγόρευμα οὐκ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πράγματος δυσεξηγήτου ἔμφυτος τῇ 
φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα (Minns/Parvis, pp. 286–287).
83 J.R. Lyman sees the similarities in stressing God’s otherness in Justin and Ire-
naeus, cf. Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, 
Eusebius, and Athanasius, Oxford 1993, p. 26.
84 Tatian, Or. ad Graec. 4, 1–3 (PTS 43/44. p. 13; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 66).
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presented by Athenagoras in his Plea for the Christians. He divides the 
answer to the charge into the consideration of theoretical and practical 
atheism.85 For him the charge of atheism is irrational since Christians dis-
tinguish God from matter and thus it can only be seen by reason.86 In such 
claims, Christians are in agreement with the philosophers, chiefly Pythago-
ras, who said that God was an “ineffable number,” and Plato, who also 
thought that the maker of the universe had been uncreated God.87 Such 
God must be perceived as “uncreated, impassible and indivisible; therefore, 
not consisting of parts.”88 Rejecting the accusations of practical atheism, 
he uses standard arguments that Christians do not worship idols because 
they are creations made by man. He also makes a distinction between the 
statues of gods and gods themselves, and claims that the gods of myths are 
perishable and, therefore, they cannot really exist.89 The gods worshiped 
by the Greeks are corporeal and, therefore, they have humanlike passions 
(such as anger and desires), whereas true God is incorporeal and free from 
passions.90 Athenagoras also uses the Stoic belief of final conflagration of 
all things, which results in the destruction of all material deities. As D.W. 
Palmer points out “negative theology is used to counter not only the gods 
of Greek myth, but also the philosophical interpretations of myth and Stoic 
religious philosophy.”91 The most interesting use of negative theology in the 
context of any possible knowledge of God is that of Theophilus of Antioch, 
who addressed his apology to pagan Autolycus. He asked Theophilus to 
describe to him God in whom he believes; therefore, he starts his discussion 
with the presentation of the Christian idea of deity. True God can be seen 
only by the man whose soul is pure, and the eyes of the soul can see only 
85 Libellus pro christianis 4–12 (SC 379, pp. 82–111).
86 Libellus pro christianis 4, 1–2 (SC 379, pp. 82–84).
87 Libellus pro christianis 6, 1–2 (SC 379, pp. 86–88).
88 Libellus pro christianis 8, 3. (SC, 379, pp. 94–95; tr. ANF, vol 2, p. 132). Later 
on, in conclusion, he adds that: “It has been adequately shown by me that we 
are not atheists, since we believe in one God, uncreated, eternal, invisible, im-
passible, incomprehensible and illimitable, comprehended by mind and reason 
alone…” (10, 1; SC, 379, pp. 100–101; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 133).
89 Libellus pro christianis 19, 1–2 (SC 379, pp. 130–132).
90 Libellus pro christianis 21, 1 (SC 379, pp. 138–139).
91 D.W. Palmer, op. cit., p. 245.
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when the man is free from sin and evil deeds.92 God cannot be seen with 
the eyes of the flesh and, therefore, “the appearance of God is ineffable 
and indescribable.”93 But seeing Him through the eyes of the soul does not 
provide any positive knowledge: “For in glory He is incomprehensible, in 
greatness unfathomable, in height inconceivable, in power incomparable, 
in wisdom unrivalled, in goodness inimitable, in kindness unutterable.”94 
If there is any knowledge which is possible, it can only be based on what 
is derived from God. Thus, Theophilus writes:
“For if I say He is Light, I name but His own work; if I call Him Word, I name 
but His sovereignty; if I call Him Mind, I speak but of His wisdom; if I say He 
is Spirit, I speak of His breath; if I call Him Wisdom, I speak of His offspring; if 
I call Him Strength, I speak of His sway; if I call Him Power, I am mentioning 
His activity (δύναμιν ἐάν εἴπω, ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ λέγω); if Providence, I but mention 
His goodness; if I call Him Kingdom, I but mention His glory; if I call Him Lord, 
I mention His being judge; if I call Him Judge, I speak of Him as being just; if  
I call Him Father, I speak of all things as being from Him; if I call Him Fire, I but 
mention His anger.”95
Theophilus then testifies that at this early stage of Christian reflection on 
God to know His nature is possible through His attributes. He also seems 
to suggest that even the attributes of God are only vaguely known to us. 
We rather know how an attribute is connected with the corresponding 
activity in created world. Saying that God is light we rather say something 
about how it is visible in His works, calling Him word means rather His 
sovereignty, etc. Among those attributes, we also find the Power of God 
92 Ad Autol. I, 2, 3 (SC 20, pp. 60–61).
93 Ad Autol. I, 3, 2–3. τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ θεοῦ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀνέκφραστόν ἐστιν (SC 20, 
pp. 62–63; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 89).
94 Ad Autol. I, 3, 4–6. δόξῃ γάρ ἐστιν ἀχώρητος, μεγέθει ἀκατάληπτος, ὕψει 
ἀπερινόητος, ἰσχύϊ ἀσύγκριτος, σοφίᾳ ἀσυμβίβαστος, ἀγαθωσύνῃ ἀμίμητος, 
καλοποιΐᾳ ἀνεκδιήγητος (SC 20, pp. 62–63; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 89).
95 Ad Autol. I, 3, 2, 6–13. εἰ γὰρ φῶς αὐτὸν εἴπω, ποίημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· εἰ λόγον εἴπω, 
ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω· νοῦν ἐὰν εἴπω, φρόνησιν αὐτοῦ λέγω·πνεῦμα ἐὰν εἴπω, ἀναπνοὴν 
αὐτοῦ λέγω· σοφίαν ἐὰν εἴπω, γέννημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· ἴσχυν ἐὰν εἴπω, κράτος αὐτοῦ 
λέγω· δύναμιν ἐὰν εἴπω, ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ λέγω· πρόνοιαν ἐὰν εἴπω, ἀγαθωσύνην 
αὐτοῦ λέγω· βασιλείαν ἐὰν εἴπω, δόξαν αὐτοῦ λέγω· κύριον ἐὰν εἴπω, κριτὴν αὐτὸν 
λέγω· κριτὴν ἐὰν εἴπω, δίκαιον αὐτὸν λέγω· πατέρα ἐὰν εἴπω, τὰ πάντα αὐτὸν 
λέγω· πὺρ ἐὰν εἴπω, τὴν ὀργὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω (SC 20, pp. 62–64; tr. ANF, vol. 2, 
pp. 89–90).
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(δύναμις), which is known thanks to God’s activity (ἐνέργεια). Theophilus 
does not specify the kind of activity and does not explain what he means 
by this particular one. But it is important to note that like other enlisted 
attributes, activity is a comprehensible effect of the incomprehensible power 
of God. Theophilus repeats this in the fifth chapter and provides various 
metaphors to show that since human eyes cannot see the invisible God, He 
is beheld and perceived through His providence and works.96 Man cannot 
even look upon the Sun, so it is all the more difficult to see the glory of 
God.97 However, it is possible indirectly, like the existence of the soul, which 
can be recognized only by seeing the movements of the body. Similarly, 
seeing a ship sailing in the sea, one presumes that there is somebody who 
steers her. The government of the world and providence of God are also 
compared to an earthly ruler who is not seen by everybody, but everybody 
presumes his existence by his laws, ordinances, forces, and statues.98 The 
Apologist also provides a very interesting metaphor of a pomegranate, 
which is composed of the rind containing many cells with seeds inside. In 
the same manner, the whole universe is like those seeds contained in the 
spirit of God.
“As, therefore, the seed of the pomegranate, dwelling inside, cannot see what is 
outside the rind, itself being within; so neither can man, who along with the whole 
creation is enclosed by the hand of God, behold God.”99
All those metaphors are presented to prove that direct cognition of God is 
impossible, but still we are able recognize Him vaguely by the effects of His 
works. In the next chapter, Theophilus describes the beauty and harmony 
of creation which is a visible testimony of the glory and greatness of God,100 
and after a short exposure of the need for believing in such great God who 
creates man, he passes to typical criticism of idolatry. It is worth mention-
ing that he also attacks major Greek thinkers including Plato, Stoics, and 
96 Ad Autol. I, 5, 19–20. Apologist asks how Autolycus cannot admit the ex-
istence of such God seeing his works and power: Τὸν δὲ θεὀν οὐ βούλει σὺ 
νοεῖσθαι διὰ ἔργον καὶ δυνάμεων (SC 20, p. 68).
97 Ad Autol. I, 5, 9–10 (SC 20, pp. 66–69).
98 Ad Autol. I, 5, 6–8 (SC 20, p. 66).
99 Ad Autol. I, 5, 10,14 (SC 20, p. 66; tr. ANF, vol 2, p. 90).
100 Ad Autol. I, 6, 1–7, 1 (SC 20, pp. 70–73).
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Epicureans. He claims that they were atheists and doing that he intends to 
defend Christians accused with the same charge.101
D.W. Palmer notes that the use of negative theology by the Apologists of 
the 2nd century was significant, and its source was undoubtedly contempo-
rary Middle Platonism, but at the same time, it was very selective.102 Their 
intention was not to give the systematic teaching about the nature of God 
and of how we can conceive it, but it rather served a particular purpose of 
defending Christianity. However, it is also noticeable that the difficulty of 
knowing God is contrasted with Christian Revelation. Thanks to the teach-
ing of Jesus, this difficulty is overcome, and Christians not only know the 
truth about God but also know better how to worship Him and gain final 
happiness in the afterlife. There is yet another aspect which is important. 
The Apologists underlined that God’s glory and greatness is visible in His 
creations and in the way they are governed by providence. Such reasoning 
which leads from the works of God to God Himself, from the creations to 
the Creator helped to distinguish Christian God from false gods. Even if 
pagans are unable to accept the Christian belief, they surely should conceive 
on philosophical ground that the harmony of the Universe leads to the ac-
ceptance of its Maker and Governor.
1.4  Clement of Alexandria – the unknown Father revealed 
in the Son of God
In the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Christian theodicy was finally 
freed from the strictly apologetic context and acquired a more systematic 
shape. He, of course, wanted to preach the Gospel to the Greeks, but 
he intended to do it by making a methodical inquiry into the nature of 
God. Eric Osborn proposes to read Clement’s understanding of God in the 
light of the prologue to the Gospel of John, especially verse 1:18,103 which 
shows two aspects of God’s nature. God was not seen by anyone; thus, 
He is unknown, but the Son of God made Him known to mankind. This 
verse not only raises the question of how God can be known, but states 
101 Ad Autol. II, 4 (SC 20, pp. 102–104); III, 2, 6 (SC 20, pp. 206–208); III, 6 
(SC 20, pp. 214–216).
102 Cf. D.W. Palmer, op. cit., pp. 251–252.
103 Cf. E. Osborn, op. cit., pp. 111, 113.
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strictly that He is unknown and can be revealed only by the Son of God. 
Therefore, the writings of Clement of Alexandria are important for our 
study since the question is raised in the context of the relationships of the 
Divine Persons and a distinction between theology and economy. Analys-
ing Clement’s exegesis of J 17:21–26, Eric Osborn says that the Father of 
the Church speaks of God beyond God (the Father), God within God (the 
Son) and God beside God (the Son of God incarnated), and that he turns 
to philosophy in an attempt to shed some light onto the dilemma of one 
God being two Persons.104
The key to understanding Clement’s use of negative theology is his ref-
erence to the hypotheses of Plato’s Parmenides and their explanation pre-
sented by Middle Platonists. Parmenides is a dialogue with the reputation 
of being the most difficult to understand.105 However, there are two main 
hypotheses on the nature of the One in the second part of the dialogue. The 
first one is the principle of unity which transcends all plurality to such an 
extent that it refuses every predicate. We cannot even say of it that it ex-
ists.106 The second one is the unity of parts, which contains in it the “seeds of 
contraries – a principle which, if we grant it existence, proceeds to pluralize 
itself indefinitely in the universe of existent unities.”107 In the interpretation 
of Middle Platonists, those two hypotheses were seen as two Gods who are 
two main principles of reality. Fiskå Hägg says that there were three main 
thinkers who forged the Middle Platonic doctrine of the divine: Alcinous, 
Numenius, and Atticus, and that the latter is often regarded as the most 
104 Ibid., pp. 112–113.
105 In the 5th century AD, Neoplatonic Proclus reported that there were four 
interpretations of Parmenides: two metaphysical and two logical (cf. H.A.S. 
Tarrant, Plato’s First Interpreters, New York 2000, p. 185). This dialogue 
constantly focuses scholars’ interest, and new interpretations are proposed. 
C.C. Meinwald mentions two common types of approach (Good-bye to the 
Third Man, in: Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R. Kraut, Cambridge 
1992, pp. 366–367). Recently, a new interpretation was proposed by Graham 
Priest (The Parmenides: a Dialetheic Interpretation, in: Plato, The Electronic 
Journal of the International Plato Society, 12, 2012, p. 1).
106 Parm. 141 E-142 A (Hermann, pp. 124–125).
107 E.R. Doods, The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of Neoplatonic One, 
CQ 22 (1928), p. 132.
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typical representative of their doctrine.108 Unfortunately, the most typical 
does not mean the clearest. There have been some differences among schol-
ars about how to understand his teaching on first principles. We will come 
back to Middle Platonists in the next part of our study, but for now, it is 
important to note that the relation between the two principles is unclear.109 
In Chapter 10 of Didaskalikos, Alcinous treats God as the third of first 
principles (two others are matter and ideas). He argues that there must be 
divine intellect that thinks the ideas. But this divine intellect is twofold. The 
intellect which thinks of the ideas is an active intellect, but there must also 
exist the intellect which transcends any substratum and this highest princi-
ple is the same with the unmoved mover of Aristotle.110 First, the intellect 
thinks of itself (contemplates itself), and this is the most supreme activity, 
which is motionless and directed towards the second intellect. Such God 
is simultaneously characterized by Platonic terms and forms the combined 
notion of good from the Republic, and Philebus, with the demiurge from 
Timaeus. He is characterized by two fundamental attributes of ineffabil-
ity (ἄρρητος) and eternity (ἀΐδιος) and lesser ones like being self-perfect 
108 H. Fiskå Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apo-
phaticism, Oxford 2014, pp. 93–97.
109 Eric Osborn strongly opposes A.J. Festiguière’s interprétation of the Medio-
platonic teaching on the First Principles (La révélation d`Hermès Trismégeste, 
IV, Le dieu inconnu et la gnôse, Paris 1986, pp. 92–140). He notices that the 
example of Clement’s usage of the Middle Platonic teaching shows the clarity 
of their interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides (E. Osborn, op. cit., pp. 121–
122). Referring to the doctrine of Alcinous, Fiskå Hägg notes that: “there is 
little doubt that there exist in the Didascalicus two conflicting views on the 
nature of the first God, most probably due to the complication from differ-
ent sources” (F. Hägg, op. cit., p. 105). What he calls conflicting views for E. 
Osborn is the “ultimate duality” and reciprocity of the first principles, where 
the first god cannot exist without the other (E. Osborn, op. cit., pp. 115; 122). 
I will follow E. Osborn’s interpretation in my inquiry, because it seems clearer 
and better explains the Middle Platonic doctrine.
110 Didasc. X, 164, 10–27 (Wittaker, p. 22). As A.H. Armstrong points out, this 
is the first time when Aristotle’s concept of the Prime Unmoved Mover was 
incorporated into Platonic theology (The Background of the Doctrine that 
Intelligibles Are Not Outside the Intellect, in: Les sources de Plotin, Entretiens 
Hardt, vol. 5, Vandoeuvres, Geneva, 1960, p. 402).
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(αὐτοτελής), ever-perfect (ἀειτελής), and all-perfect (παντελής).111 Alcinous 
also says that the first God can be also characterized as the divinity (θείοτης), 
essentiality (οὐσιότης), truth (ἀλήθεια), commensurability (συμμετρία), and 
good (ἀγαθόν). All those attributes are not distinct because they characterize 
the same object.112 The first way of understanding God is a negative one 
(ἀφαίρεσις), since He is ineffable, and can be grasped partially by intellect 
only when all categories of Aristotle are denied of Him. Therefore, intellect 
cannot form any scientific knowledge on Him, and can grasp Him only in 
an intuitive way.113 Therefore, any description of the first hypothesis of 
Parmenides can be applied to Him, since He transcends all opposites such 
as good/bad, qualified/unqualified, part/whole, etc. The negative way is 
ἀφαίρεσις – an abstraction, which means that all attributes must be denied 
of the first God to reach Him.114 God is also without parts, without motion, 
and without body. The former two negative descriptions are also based 
on the arguments from Plato’s dialogues,115 while the third one is made by 
Alcinous himself. The second God – second Intellect – is the place where 
ideas dwell because ideas are the thoughts of this intellect. Since there is 
intellect, there also must be the object of intellect. As E. Osborn puts it: “if 
God is nous there also must be noeton.”116 The second intellect has all the 
properties of the second hypothesis of Parmenides. It generates all beings 
is in motion and is connected with both the sensible and the intelligible.117
The doctrine of incomprehensibility of God in Middle Platonism brings 
about new conceptions in the development of Plato’s teaching. As Fiskå 
Hägg points out, Plato himself never used the term “ineffable,” but this 
expression is the central point of Alcinous’ negative theology.118 Although 
111 E. Osborn, op. cit., p. 119.
112 Didasc. X, 164, 31–42 (Wittaker, p. 23).
113 E. Osborn, op. cit., p. 120.
114 Didasc. X, 165, 5–15. (Whittaker, p. 24). The negative way is supported by 
the way of analogy (Alcinous uses for illustration the analogy of the Sun – 
Republic 507 F) and the way of preeminence (here, he refers to the description 
of ultimate Beauty – Symposium 201 A).
115 God without parts refers to Parm. 137 C; Soph. 245 A, immobile to Parm. 
138 B - 139 B; Resp. 380 D-F.
116 E. Osborn, op. cit., p. 122.
117 Ibid., p. 116.
118 H. Fiskå Hägg, op. cit., p. 120.
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there are doubts whether this theology can be called truly apophatic, he 
himself calls his method ἀφαίρεσις and explains it using a geometrical ex-
ample of getting to the point by cutting off the plane, surface, and line.119 
The problem is whether the use of such method is sufficient to admit that 
the First God is perceived in a truly negative way.120 Nevertheless, Alcinous 
admits that there is a possibility to know God by an intuitive way, and 
he does not hesitate to call Him substance or being. There is yet another 
aspect which allows to treat the negative theology of Alcinous and Middle 
Platonism in general as a less radical version of negative theology, because 
the first God is placed within the realm of intellect, not above it.121
For Clement of Alexandria, negative theology seems to have a more im-
portant role to play when man tries to reach God. The aphaeretic method 
is used in the famous fragment of Stromata in the context of the soul as-
cending to God. He evokes pagan mysteries which start with purification 
and are followed with the teaching aimed at preparing an adept for the 
next stage. The higher mysteries grant a higher kind of intuitive knowledge 
(νοήσις), which consists in seeing rather than reasoning.122 For Christians, 
purification means the confession of sins, but next steps are similar: they 
must engage in reasoning which would lead to the first concept (πρώτην 
νόησιν). Such reasoning is in fact cutting off subsequent elements in an 
119 Didasc. X, 165, 16–19. Ἔσται δὴ πρώτη μὲν αὐτοῦ νόεσις ἡ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν 
τούυων, ὅπως καὶ σημεῖον ἐνοήσαμεν κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, 
ἐπιφάνειαν νοήσαντες, εἶτα γραμμήν, καὶ τελευταῖον τὸ σημεῖον (Whittaker, 
p. 24). “The first way of conceiving God is by abstraction of these attributes, 
just as we form the conception of a point by abstraction from sensible phe-
nomena, conceiving first a surface, then a line, and finally a point” (tr. Dillon, 
p. 18).
120 D. Carabine refers to a discussion about the origin and significance of this 
method in Alkinous between A.H. Wolfson who states that Middle Platonist 
took this method from Euclid and J. Whittaker, who sees its Pythagorean 
origin. There is also a question of how it refers to Aristotle’s understanding 
of abstraction (D. Carabine, op. cit., pp. 76–78).
121 D. Carabine, op. cit., p. 51.
122 Strom. V, 11, 71, 2 (GCS 15, pp. 374; 5–6). See also, A. Van den Hoek, Good 
beyond Knowing: Clement of Alexandria and Discourse on God, in: God in 
Early Christian Thought, ed. A.B. Mc Govan, B.E. Daley, T.J. Gaden, Leiden, 
Boston 2009, p. 43.
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abstract fashion. It is the rejection of bodily properties: depth, width, and 
length, which leads to a point which must be conceived non-materially as 
a mental point (νοεῖται μονάς).123 Finally:
“If, then, abstracting all that belongs to bodies and things called incorporeal, we 
cast ourselves into the greatness of Christ, and thence advance into void (ἀχανὲς) 
by holiness, we may reach somehow to the conception of the Almighty, knowing 
not what He is, but what He is not (οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν, ὃ δὲ μή ἐστι γνωρίσαντες).”124
In another fragment, Clement shows a similar usage of the method of 
dialectic, which also allows to follow up step by step to the most ultimate 
substance (τὴν πάντων κρατίστην οὐσίαν).125 Dialectic can lead to true wis-
dom, but for Christians, even this method is impossible without the help 
of the Divine Logos, who purifies the soul from the remains of ignorance 
caused by sinful life. Only Christ can show the Father to whom He pleases, 
and the ultimate seeing of God comes from the Son of God alone.126 God 
is also beyond any of human categories, because He is “neither a genus, 
nor a species, nor an individual, nor a number, and on the other hand is 
neither an accident nor that to which an accident pertains.”127 God is then 
beyond any kind of human knowledge,128 but in all those fragments, we can 
see the ambiguity of Clement’s claims on the knowledge of God. On the 
one hand “The First Cause is not then in space, but above both space and 
time, and name, and conception. Wherefore also Moses says, ‘Show your-
self to me’, intimating most clearly that God is not capable of being taught 
by man, or expressed in speech, but to be known only by His own power 
(δυνάμει)” – meaning that God is incomprehensible, but at the same time 
God can be known thanks to grace given through Christ: “For inquiry was 
obscure and dim; but the grace of knowledge is from Him by the Son.”129 
Incomprehensibility then can somehow be overwhelmed by grace, which 
makes it possible to see God who is above all knowledge.
123 Strom. V, 11, 71, 2 (GCS 15, pp. 374; 11).
124 Strom. V, 11, 71, 3–4 (GCS 15, p. 374, 11–15; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 461).
125 Strom. I, 28, 177,1 (GCS 15, p. 109, 8).
126 Strom. I, 28, 178,1 (GCS 15, pp. 109; 20–25).
127 Strom. V, 12, 81, 5 (GCS 15, p. 380, 18–20; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 463).
128 In the Protreptic, Clement uses negative theology in the Apologist way ex-
plaining that He is beyond any idols (E. Osborn, op. cit., p. 123).
129 Strom. V, 11, 71, 4 (GCS 15, pp. 374; 22–25; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 461).
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This fragment is also crucial for the entire tradition of Christian theology 
because Clement makes a distinction between the essence and power of God 
and admits that it is possible to know God by His power. This seems to be 
the first step to what in the 4th century would become knowing the ener-
gies of God. But for Clement himself, this distinction, which is consistent 
with the theory of creatio ex nihilo, explains not only the transcendental 
character of the essence of God, but also shows that He is very close to the 
creations. In His essence, He is remote, but is very close and accessible to 
us in His power.130 As we know, Clement refers to Philo’s conception of the 
Powers of God, but he significantly modifies it.131 David T. Runia notes, on 
the example of multiple quotations from the Holy Scripture, that for Clem-
ent “the term dynamis is biblical and represents the concept shared by the 
Scripture and the philosophers.”132 The fragment of Stromata quoted above 
shows that Clement prefers to speak of one power rather than many pow-
ers of God, and one of the reasons for this is to secure a proper character 
of our knowledge of God. He admits that God has many names, and we 
can call Him One, Good, Being, Intellect and the Father, but none of those 
names should be taken as His definitive name since they all only indicate 
the infinite power of God.133
There is, however, yet another significant change in the doctrine of Divine 
Power. David T. Runia suggests that although for both Philo and Clement 
God is present in His Creations by His Power, Clement has a more positive 
attitude when describing its role in keeping us away from the remote essence 
of God. Referring to the mysterious expression of δυνάμει δύναμις from 
Stromata II, 5,5, David T. Runia suggests that Clement wishes to emphasize 
the presence of God in the form of the Logos who is our instructor and 
guide.134 It could be seen in the above-quoted text referring to the ascent 
of Moses, where a long fragment on transcendence and incomprehensibil-
ity of God ends with the following phrase: “but the grace of knowledge is 
130 A. C. Itter, Esoteric Teaching in the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria, 
Leiden, Boston 2009, pp. 168–169.
131 Cf. D. T. Runia, Clement of Alexandria and the Philonic Doctrine of the 
Divine Power(s)…, op. cit., pp. 261–263.
132 Ibid., p. 260.
133 Strom. V, 12, 82, 1–2 (GCS 15, pp. 380; 25–81; 5).
134 D.T. Runia, op. cit., p. 266.
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from Him by the Son.”135 This is a characteristic difference between Philo 
and Clement. While the former connects the powers with the creation and 
presence of God in the cosmos, the latter uses the power to describe how 
we can know unknowable God in the Divine Logos – the Son of God. This 
indicates that for Clement the ultimate manifestation of the power and ac-
tion of God is not the Creation and Governing of the Universe, but the act 
of Incarnation and the salvific activity of Christ.136 This shift of perspective 
to the Christian one also includes the conviction that man can experience 
to much broader extent the divine power as an active agent in his life. That 
is why while for Philo one of the main functions of divine powers was to 
secure incomprehensibility of God’s essence, for Clement (although this 
aspect is still present) another role of power is more important – an in-depth 
connection between the power and the Logos perceived in a new Christian 
way. As the expression and realization of the divine power, the Logos now 
overrides incomprehensibility by means of grace.
The primary concept in Clement is thus reciprocity of the Father and Son. 
Eric Osborn underlines that the same duality of the first cause is found in 
Middle Platonists, such as Moderatus and Alcinous. They also understood 
their first principle as having a dual nature, both simple and transcendent, as 
well as multiple and inclusive. Later, in the Neoplatonic system of Plotinus, 
those aspects were separated to make up two different hypostases, but for 
Clement, such twofold nature of the first principle perfectly fits Christian 
theology, having its sources in the prologue of the Gospel of John.137 Such 
a view on the nature of God is also the reason why Clement’s apophatic 
statements are much weaker than those which we will see in the writings 
that sprung from the confrontation with Eunomius. But Clement saw no 
need for such a tight formulation of relations between the Father and the 
Son as it was later forced by the radical claims of Anomeans, and Middle 
Platonism was a great tool for explaining reciprocity of the Father and the 
Son as a twofold account of the divine mind.138 In his writings, he describes 
God with the term οὐσία as Middle Platonists did. He also goes a step 
135 Strom. V, 71, 3–5 (GCS 15, p. 374, 23–24; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 461).
136 D.T. Runia, op. cit., pp. 267–270.
137 Cf. E. Osborn, op. cit., p. 107.
138 Ibid., p. 109.
46
further because he seems to be closer to the famous Platonic expression of 
the First cause as beyond being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας).139 But in his writings, 
he does not explicitly pose the question, which is so crucial in the discus-
sion with Eunomius, about the possibility of knowing the essence of God.
1.5 The incomprehensible Father in Origen
Before we turn to the Arian conflict at the beginning of the 4th century, 
it is necessary to have a quick look at yet another phase of the shaping of 
early Christian doctrine of God which could be observed in the writings of 
Origen. Although he is not recognized as having influence on the develop-
ment of negative theology, his statements about the knowledge of the Father 
and the Son are very important because of their influence on the theology 
of Arius and all of the Alexandrian tradition. Origen is also a very impor-
tant participant in the discussion between Greek philosophy and Christian 
dogma. Traces of that discussion are to be observed in Peri archon, which 
can be interpreted as a Christian answer to the Platonic accusation that 
they believe in God as having a corporeal nature.140 Origen seems to be 
aware of the discussion going on in philosophical schools on the nature of 
light,141 whether it is corporeal or not, but what is more important he uses 
the example of light to show that man cannot comprehend God. Clearly 
referring to the Sun Simile of the Republic, Origen writes:
“For whatever may be the knowledge which we have been able to obtain about 
God, whether by perception or reflection, we must of necessity believe that he is 
far and away better than our thoughts about him. For if we see a man who can 
scarcely look at a glimmer or the light of the smallest lamp, and if we wish to 
teach such a one, whose eyesight is not strong enough to receive more light than 
139 Cf. H. Fiskå Hägg commentary on the use and meaning of οὐσία by Middle 
Platonists and Clement (op. cit., pp. 164–179) and his commentary on Clem-
ent being close to famous Plato’s statement in the Republic 509 B (op. cit., 
p. 175).
140 Such interpretation was proposed by J. Dillon, who argues that the under-
standing of God as light in Peri archon shows complicated relations which 
Origen had with contemporary Platonism. Cf., The Knowledge of God in 
Origen, in: Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman World, ed. R. van den 
Broeck, T. Baarda, J. Mansfeld, Leiden: Brill 1988, p. 221.
141 Cf. J. Dillon, op. cit., pp. 222–223.
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we have said, about the brightness and splendour of the sun, shall we not have 
to tell him that the splendour of the sun is unspeakably and immeasurably better 
and more glorious than all this light he can see?”142
Origen then admits that human mind cannot grasp the essence of God, and 
no object present in human cognition can give man a means to grasp His 
nature. But this does not make him turn to negative theology and use of 
negative language. It seems that impossibility of knowing God is not essen-
tial to him. It is best seen in the fragment of the Commentary of John where 
he speaks about darkness which man meets on the mystical path leading 
towards God. On the one hand: “For if someone should perceive the mass 
speculations about God, and the mass of knowledge which is incomprehen-
sible to human nature, and to other creatures too, perhaps except Christ 
and the Holy Spirit, he will know that darkness surrounds God,”143 but 
this darkness is not something final and permanent which stays and awaits 
man ascending to God at the end, because on the other hand, this darkness 
finally becomes light.144 Therefore, it seems that Origen does not want to 
admit that God is ultimately unknown, but on the contrary, he frequently 
talks about knowing or seeing God.145 But the fragment above shows well 
the aspect of his doctrine which he shared with the entire Alexandrian tra-
dition. God is incomprehensible to all creation, but is known by the Logos 
142 De Princ. I, 1, 5, 116–125. “Si quid enim illud est, quod, sentire vel intel-
legere de deo potuerimus, multis longe modis eum meliorem esse ab eo quod 
sensimus necesse est credi. Sicut enim si uideamus aliquem uix posse scintillam 
luminis aut breuissimae lucernae lumen aspicere et eum, cuius acies oculorum 
plus luminis capere quam supra diximus non valet, si uelimus de claritate ac 
splendore solis edocere, nonne oportebit nos ei dicere quia omni hoc lumine 
quod uides ineffabiliter et inaestimabiliter melior ac praestantior solis est 
splendor?” (SC 252, 96–98; tr. ANF, vol. 4, p. 243).
143 In Ioann. II, 28, 172. ᾿Εὰν γάρ τις κατανοήσῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν περὶ θεοῦ 
θεωρημάτων καὶ γνώσεως ἄληπτον τυγχάνον ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις 
παρὰ Χριστὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα γενητοῖς, εἴσεται πῶς περὶ τὸν θεόν ἐστι σκότος 
(SC 120, p. 322–324; tr. FCH, 80, p. 141).
144 In Ioann. II, 28, 174. εἶναι ἐν φωτί, ἀπαγγέλλειν παντὶ τῷ γινομένῳ φωτί (SC 
120, 324).
145 Cf. A. Louth, op. cit., pp. 70–71.
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and the Spirit.146 As we will see in the next chapter, this is fundamentally 
different from what Arius will say about the knowledge that the Son has 
of the Father. But we can also observe here the same pattern which we 
saw in Clement of Alexandria. While God is incomprehensible, the Son of 
God, who is the Logos, can be grasped by the mind, and he reveals to some 
extent the nature of God. Origen constantly tests the idea of the Logos, 
which constitutes the means to attain the knowledge of God.147 It seems 
that he never formulated an ultimate answer to this dilemma, though he 
certainly saw the difference between the unknowability of the Father and 
the knowledge which we can attain about the Logos.
146 The role of Christ as a mediator who allows man to have the knowledge of 
the Father has been well described recently, cf. J.M. Robertson, Christ as 
Mediator. A Study of the Theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea, Marcellus of 
Ancyra and Athanasius of Alexandria, Oxford 2007, pp. 34–36.
147 Cf. J.M. Dillon, op. cit., p. 226. J. Dillon notes that Origen also seems to be 
aware of the development of the Platonic concept of the possibility to know 
God.
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2.  Incomprehensibility of God in the First 
Phase of the Arian Controversy
2.1 The knowledge of God in Arius
2.1.1 The problem of Platonism of Arius
We can observe that in the 3rd century, the use of negative terms ascribed 
to God by Christian writers was expanding. But, likewise, Christians widely 
used philosophical terms and concepts to describe the relationship between 
the Father and the Son. It is also clear that Christian writers had problems, 
similar to Philo’s, concerning the Biblical doctrine of creation which had 
been absent in ancient thought, and must have been distinguished from the 
idea of the construction of the Universe already present in Plato. The situa-
tion seemed to be similar at the beginning of the 4th century when Christian 
writers became more aware of the problems with the use of the Platonic 
thought to explain the dogmas, especially given the rise of new heresies and 
most of all Arianism. We face here a difficult problem of the philosophical 
sources of Arius, which seems to be of utmost importance when one tries 
to understand the role of negative theology in his system. The question of 
what type of Platonism influenced Arius is crucial for our discussion because 
of profound differences between Middle-Platonism and Neoplatonism as 
regards negative theology. As we have seen above, for Middle Platonists, 
the supreme principle was, among other ways of describing it, the subject 
of ἀφαίρεσις, but despite all negative terms ascribed to it, the One belonged 
to the world of intellect and could be called a being. For Plotinus, as we will 
yet see in detail, the One stayed absolutely above intellect and being, and 
thus negative terms became of greatest importance to describe the principle 
which stayed totally beyond understanding. So, if Arius knew Plotinus, he 
would have encountered negative theology in a much-developed state. The 
answer to this question is complicated not only because of a small number 
of fragments from Arius’ works which have survived, but also because of 
how little we know about philosophical schools in Alexandria in the later 
part of the 3rd century. As Henri-Irénée Marrou points out, there is a gap 
in our knowledge covering the period between the passing of Plotinus in 
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244–6 AD and the time of Synesius, Hypatia, and Hierocles.148 Therefore, 
there is a problem whether the Enneads (written in Rome) were known and 
popular in Alexandria at the beginning of the 4th century. Although schol-
ars generally agree that we can trace a Platonic background in fragments 
of Arius’ works, the discussion continues whether it was Middle-Platonism 
or Neoplatonism of Plotinus.
It seems that for now the discussion on the philosophical background 
of Arius’ theology shows that the influence is twofold. On one hand, Arius 
certainly was more reliable as regards philosophical and dialectical tech-
niques than his critics.149 On the other, his doctrine was not a product of 
a dialogue or great influence of Non-Christian Platonism. As G.C. Stead 
shows, scholars have cut corners when finding Platonic sources in Arius, 
because almost all concepts and terms that he uses had been already present 
in earlier Christian tradition, and he certainly could have conceived them 
himself as the one who reasserted the traditional Christian teaching.150 Even 
if we agree that he could have seen his own teaching as a development of 
the Christian tradition, this does not mean that there is no philosophical 
background in it. Platonism is present in Arius’ doctrine because it was 
already incorporated in Christian teaching, and negative theology followed 
suit. However, one main doubt still remains, namely whether Arius was 
influenced by Plotinus. On one hand, Rowan Williams claims that such 
influence can be confirmed, and on the other hand, he sees it within the 
topic of comprehensibility of God.151 He argues not only for the influence 
of Plotinus, but also the influence of Neoplatonic philosophers who were 
148 H.I. Marrou, Synesius of Cyrene and Alexandrian Neo-Platonism, in: The 
Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, ed. A. 
Momigliano, Oxford 1963, pp. 126–150.
149 C.G. Stead agrees at this point with the conclusions of P. Henry, cf. C.G. 
Stead, The Platonism of Arius, JTS, vol. XV, pt. 1, 1964, p. 16.
150 Cf. ibid., pp. 19; 30. That also explains why other heterodox Christian writers 
of the first half of the 4th century did not perceive themselves as “Arians.” 
In their eyes, they were also defenders of the core of Christian teaching. See, 
R.P.C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God. The Arian 
Controversy, 318–381, Grand Rapids 2005, pp. 123–128.
151 R. Williams broadly argues philosophical sources of Arius in his work, Arius 
Heresy and Tradition, Grand Rapids 2002, pp. 181–234.
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contemporary to Arius, such as Iamblichus and Porphyry.152 But his claims 
were the subject of severe criticism by Christopher Stead, who claims that 
all points of influence underlined by Williams can be found already in 
Middle-Platonic texts and because of that there is no hard evidence that 
Arius knew Porphyry, Iamblichus, and even Plotinus.153 Although he found 
no arguments to absolutely exclude the possibility of such influence and in 
a revised edition of his book, Williams only makes note of Steeds’ criticism 
but does not accept it.154 However, there is yet another strong confirma-
tion of the influence of Plotinus on Arius. Raul Morltley confirms that 
the thought of Arius is well organized, so we can see it as a system, and 
this “Arius’ system is much like that of Plotinus…”155 So the question still 
remains unsolved, and cautious Williams’ remarks describe it well when 
he says “we can catch a glimpse of Arius’ metaphysics and cosmology.”156
2.1.2 Monad and Dyad – the problem of creation
The central problem of entire Arianism is the understanding of creation, 
since the main claim is that the Logos was not eternally generated but cre-
ated by the Father. Since the comprehension of this issue underlies specific 
understanding of the relationship between God and the Universe, it is also 
of utmost importance for the way the knowledge of God can be perceived. 
In his seminal article, H.A. Wolfson suggests that we can trace the origins of 
the Arian conflict in the interpretation of the beginning of the prologue to 
the Gospel of John (J: 1, 1–4). Those words were like an outline which from 
the time of Apologists began to be filled with interpretations by Christians. 
We have already seen a stage of this process in Clement of Alexandria, but 
those interpretations referred to Greek philosophy and especially Philo of 
152 Cf. ibid., pp. 31; 194; 225.
153 C.G. Steed finds four main arguments for Neoplatonic influence in Williams’ 
book, and he repels them one by one. Cf. C. Stead, Was Arius a Neoplaton-
ist?, in: Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity, Burlington 2000, 
pp. 39–52.
154 Cf. R. Williams, op. cit., pp. 262–264.
155 R. Morley, Alien God in Arius, in: Platonism in the Late Antiquity, op. cit., 
pp. 205; 215.
156 R. Williams, op. cit., p. 230.
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Alexandria.157 The main outcome of this process is the understanding of the 
Logos as the ideal pattern of creation and the perfect mind whose thoughts 
are ideas. The Prologue also introduces the two stages of existence of the 
Logos: first – the existence with God the Father; second – the Logos that 
was with God is also God through whom all things were made. As Wolfson 
suggests, we can find a similar concept in Philo who wants to harmonize 
different statements of Plato by saying of ideas that they are eternal and si-
multaneously that they are created by God.158 But the Fathers of the Church 
differed with Philo in two main points. Firstly, for them, the Logos was not 
created but generated, and secondly, the Logos was not only divine but was 
perceived as equal to God in divinity.
H.A. Wolfson points out that in the 2nd century, two interpretations 
of the status of the Logos existed simultaneously. For some Apologists, 
the Logos was eternal in the thought of God and then was generated, and 
hence was with God. Others claimed that at the beginning, before the crea-
tion of the Universe, the Logos came into being and was with God.159 For 
H.A. Wolfson, it was Irenaeus and Origen who rejected this two-staged 
theory and claimed that the Logos was eternally generated by God. While 
Irenaeus made it in opposition to the Gnostics, Origen based his claims 
on purely philosophical grounds. Origen is more important here because 
his thought is a testimony of the transition from the Philonic to Plotinian 
interpretation of the Prologue.160 At the beginning of the 4th century, both 
theories of generation of the Logos existed, and in both, the Logos was 
perceived as God, but this was changed by Arius, who gave a new meaning 
to the twofold-stage theory. H.A. Wolfson sees in Arius’ opinions refer-
ences to Philo’s interpretation of creation, especially when he claims that 
at the beginning: “For God was alone, and the Word as yet was not, nor 
157 Cf. H.A. Wolfson, Philosophical Implications of Arianism and Apollinarian-
ism, DOP, vol. 12 (1958), p. 13. H.A. Wolfson sees the philosophy of Philo 
of Alexandria as the main reference which serves to understand the problem, 
and he presents Arius as influenced in his claims mainly by Philo.
158 Ibid., p. 14.
159 The second theory is based on the understanding of the term ἦν which could 
mean not “was” but rather “became” (ἐγένετο). Wolfson points out that in 
the Septuagint the term “to be” (εἶναι) also means “to become.” Ibid., p. 14.
160 Ibid., p. 15.
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the Wisdom.”161 Then the Logos was created as the means to create the 
Universe, and thus the Logos came to the second stage of existence. At the 
first stage, the Logos is described by Arius as “a property (ἰδίαν) coexist-
ent with God,”162 while in the second stage, it is described as “the Son.” 
For A.H. Wolfson, such statements are similar to Philo’s for whom the 
Logos is primarily a property of God and then becomes a separate being.163 
Therefore, Arius simply accepted the twofold-stage theory, which was not 
usually perceived as heterodox, but the problem lay in his interpretation of 
that theory. He claimed that the only sound conclusion is that the Logos 
came to existence “out of things that were not (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων)”,164 and that 
meant that he was created by the Father ex nihilo. We shall come back to 
this important expression, but it is worth mentioning that in the eyes of 
A.H. Wolfson, Arius had two main religious reasons to make such a claim. 
Firstly, he wanted to preserve monotheism and the perception of God as 
the one, which was to be destroyed by Orthodox statements on three hy-
postases. Secondly, he defended the understanding of God as the Creator 
and not merely the craftsmen of the Universe. With respect to both, Arius 
can be perceived as the one who returns to the Old Testament and the 
Philonic conception of God. Wolfson concludes that from the philosophical 
point of view, Arius presented the anti-mythological Platonico-Aristotelian 
position and his opponents based their opinions on the Stoico-Neoplatonic 
rationalization of mythology.165 Although such conclusion based on Arius’ 
161 Orat. cont. Arian. I, 5. μόνος ὁ Θεὀς, καὶ οὔπω ἧν ὁ Λόγος καὶ ἡ σοφία (Bright, 
p. 5; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 308).
162 Ibid. I, 5. Δύο γοῦν σοφἰας.᾽εἶναι, μίαν μὲν τῆν ἰδίαν καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν τῷ Θεῷ 
(Bright, p. 5; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 309).
163 A.H. Wolfson, op. cit., p. 16. Wolfson sees other similarities between Philo 
and Arius in naming the Logos as “a co-worker” (συνεργός) of God in making 
the Universe.
164 Orat. cont. Arian. I, 5 (Bright, p. 5; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 309).
165 A.H. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 19–20. It seems that Wolfson’s conclusions are too 
general, and he is also wrong in interpreting the Orthodox position as claim-
ing that God was perceived as “consisting of three inseparable substances, 
called hypostases or persons.” (p. 19). Such an understanding of the Orthodox 
view would certainly lead to a conclusion that it endangered the unity of God, 
but it is sufficient to claim that there is one substance and three hypostases to 
undermine Wolfson’s argumentation.
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possible intentions seems to me pure speculation, Wolfson is right in point-
ing out the philosophical background of the entire controversy and the 
importance of ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων.
Wolfson’s understanding of Arius was criticized by G.C. Stead, who 
agrees that he accepted the two-stage theory of the generation of the Logos, 
but only in a certain sense. However, looking for the philosophical back-
ground of Arius in his article, G.C. Stead agrees that it was undoubtedly 
Platonism.166 He points out the beginning of Arius’ letter to Alexander, 
which contains an unprecedented cumulation of the term μονάς,167 which 
has its Platonic background, but can also be referred to Philo, and moreover 
it was already present in theological literature since it had also been used 
by Clement and Origen.168 This term was so important for Arius because it 
stressed the divine simplicity as a bare unity without any distinctions, and it 
also allowed him to argue that the Trinity cannot be understood as a kind 
of any distinctions within the being of God, but the Son and the Spirit must 
be conceived as separate and subordinate created beings.169 The Platonic 
background of the understanding of God as an indivisible monad would be 
even greater if we could read the fragment of Thalia, in which Arius seems 
to apply the term δυάς to the Logos, as the evocation of the Middle-Platonic 
Second Principle. This line reads: “Understand that the Monad [always] 
was; but the Dyad was not, before it was in existence.”170 Christopher 
Stead once again questions Neoplatonic references so strongly claimed by 
Rowan Williams171 and shows that it could simply mean “the Second” or 
166 C.G. Stead, The Platonism of Arius, op. cit., p. 17.
167 De Synodis 16, 2, 3–4. μόνον ἀγέννητον, μόνον ἀίδιον, μόνον ἄναρχον, μόνον 
ἀληθινόν, μόνον ἀθανασίαν ἔχοντα, μόνον σοφόν, μόνον ἀγαθόν, μόνον δυνάστην, 
πάντων κριτήν, διοικητήν, οἰκονόμον, ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, δίκαιον καὶ 
ἀγαθόν (Opitz, vol. 2, p. 243).
168 C.G. Stead, op. cit., p. 18.
169 Cf. ibid., pp. 18–19.
170 De Synodis 15, 3, 28. σύνες ὅτι ἡ μονὰς ἦν, ἡ δυὰς δὲ οὐκ ἦν, πρὶν ὑπάρξῃ 
(Opitz, vol. 2, p. 243; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 457).
171 Rowan Williams does not think that Stead’s arguments on “uncomplimen-
tary” understanding of δυάς forced him to change his conclusions. He under-
lines that it is not necessary to translate δυάς as Second God and says: “I am 
not sure that we need to resort to this explanation” (R. Williams, op. cit., 
p. 191).
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“Twofold”, and most of all “in Platonic circles duality implies imperfection, 
matter, the world of senses, the left hand, the female principle.” Neverthe-
less, he also finds some uses of δυάς in Philo and Chaldean Oracles,172 so 
references to Middle-Platonic principles seem plausible. Moreover, along 
this line, we have the Dyad contrasted with the Monad and that opens up 
the interpretation that Arius understood the relationship between the Father 
and the Logos in the Platonic fashion. So δυάς could be read as a being 
which is inferior to μονάς, that is the Father. The act of creation is then 
seen by Arius as the emergence of the plurality from the unity, and this is 
consistent with the general theological claim that the Logos is a creation. 
The main borderline between the Creator and the creation runs between 
the unity and the plurality, since the Logos cannot be called the Monad 
like the Father: it must belong to the created reality. If we interpret this in 
the Neoplatonic fashion, we can resolve Stead’s objection as to the Dyad 
being related to matter and imperfection, because Plotinus also claimed 
that intellectual matter existed as the cause of differentiation of ideas.173 
For Plotinus, intellectual matter is so important because it also allows for 
arguing the passivity of the second principle which is not in itself the active 
principle of multiplication. Moreover, for Plotinus, the Dyad is the first 
product of the process which comes from the One but is indefinite until it 
turns back to the Source in contemplation. Only then it becomes the Intel-
lect and differentiates itself from the One.174 Once again, at every moment 
of the process, the Intellect is shaped and acted upon by the One itself. As 
Rowan Williams notes, the Neoplatonic understanding of first principle 
serves well Arius’ purpose because it is a “sharp rejection of ‘correlativity’ 
of Father and Son.”175 As we will see below, such a view is also consistent 
with negative theology of Arius, because like the One, God the Father as 
μονάς must remain unknown and is best described in negative terms.
There is yet another mode of expressing the difference between the Fa-
ther and the Son which was used by Arius. He was one of the first who 
stressed the understanding of the act of the creation of the Son as the act 
172 C.G. Stead, op. cit., p. 19.
173 Cf. R. Williams, op. cit., p. 192.
174 Plotinus, Enn. V, 1, 5 V, 4, 2 (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 2, pp. 191–192; 235–238).
175 R. Williams, op. cit. p. 196.
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of God’s will. Although there are many aspects of the Arian teaching which 
will develop or even disappear in the second half of the 4th century, the 
problem of the will of the Father constantly reappears in the Neo-Arian 
teaching and almost all successors of Arius claim that God created the Son 
out of His will and wish (βούλημα καί θέλημα).176 Arius’ understanding of 
the generation of the Son as the act of will is proclaimed many times in 
the preserved fragments,177 and this statement can be explained by refer-
ence to Plato’s Timaeus, where he says that lesser gods have been brought 
into being (γεγένησθε) and will be preserved by divine will (βουλήσεως).178 
This fragment was of great importance in the debate on the eternity of the 
cosmos, and was rejected by the philosophers who shared the Aristotelian 
view of its eternity.179 This passage, however, was used by Christian writers 
to describe the generation of the Logos for the works of creation. We see 
such teaching in Philo and also in Christian Apologists, but Origen, who 
faced the gnostic doctrines, admits it more guardedly.180 Such a notion was 
certainly unacceptable for his critics and most of all Arius, who, by under-
lining the importance of God’s will, tried to show a partition between the 
Father and the Son. Consequently, for him, the act of creation is perceived 
as more arbitrary. There can be nothing that would restrain God in His 
act of creation – it must be perceived as absolutely free. Such a notion psy-
chologizes the act of creation and, as R. Mortley notes, it simply makes the 
gap between the Father and the Son even greater, since this act is perceived 
as “a matter of psychological autonomy, and not of nature.”181
How, then, did Arius understand the universe? Although, as we have 
seen, we can find many references to philosophical sources in the doctrine 
176 We can see such a strong emphasis of God’s will in Arius, Astorius, and Euse-
bius of Nicomedia (R. Morley, Alien God in Arius, op. cit., p. 214). We shall 
also see that this topic is of utmost importance to Eunomius.
177 Cf. e.g., De Synodis 16, 2, 8 (Opitz, vol. 2, pp. 243; 33; NPNF II, vol. 4, 
p. 458) ὑποστήσαντα ἰδίῳ θελήματι ἄτρεπτον (“He made Him subsist at His 
own will”); Epistula ad episcopos Aegipti at Libyae 12. ότε γὰρ γέγονεν, ὅτε 
βεβούληται αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς δημιουργῆσαι· (PG 25, 564 B). “For He has then origi-
nated when God has chosen to produce Him” (tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 229).
178 Tim., 41 A-B.
179 Cf. G.C. Stead, The Platonism of Arius, op. cit., p. 27.
180 Cf. ibid. p. 28.
181 R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 214.
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of Arius, they no longer seem to position the universe in the Platonic way 
as divided into a sensual and a noetic realm.182 We observe here a very 
important shift in perspective, from the Greek to the Christian worldview, 
and the dividing line now is drawn between the Creator and the creation. 
This results in a dualistic vision of the Universe, which is shared by Arius 
and Athanasius. The borderline between the Creator and the creation lies 
in a different place is both cases, but this does not change the fact that it 
was evidently a dualistic worldview.183
2.1.3 Creation ex nihilo? The problem of a “non-being”
Another issue which arises when one is studying the fragment of Arius’ 
doctrine of Creation which could be referred to philosophical sources and 
has an influence on negative speaking of God is the question of creatio ex 
nihilo. Athanasius starts his summary of the claims put forth by Arius with 
the sentence: “Arius and those with him thought and professed thus: ‘God 
made the Son out of nothing and called Him His Son’.”184 Although this 
claim was understood by almost all scholars as the statement that the Son 
was created ex nihilo, G.C. Stead put those opinions in doubt. He noted 
that the expression “ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων” alone is not enough to understand 
Arius’ doctrine in such a way. The term τὰ οὐκ ὄντα does not necessarily 
mean non-being in a sense that something does not exist,185 but can mean 
182 H. A. Wolfson suggests that it was an Orthodox Father who first dispelled the 
Platonic view of the universe while Arians still understood it as divided into 
noetic and sensual, but this opinion seems false. See H.A. Wolfson, Philosophi-
cal Implications…, op. cit., p. 7.
183 Commenting on dualism of both sides of the discussion, Stead says: “Arius’ 
divergence from Alexander and Athanasius may be indicated as follows; the 
latter are prepared to do violence to their philosophic a dualism in order 
to establish a position for the Son which is theologically and devotionally 
adequate. Arius does his best (at least initially) to establish such a position 
while keeping his basic dualism intact.” G.C. Stead, Platonism of Arius, op. 
cit., p. 23.
184 De Synodis 15, 1, 1–2. ῎Αρειος καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ φρονήσαντες καὶ λέγοντες ‘ἐξ 
οὐκ ὄντων πεποίηκε τὸν υἱὸν ὁ θεὸς καὶ κέκληκεν ἑαυτῷ υἱόν (Opitz, vol. 2, 
p. 242); Cf. Orat. cont. Arian. I, 9, (Bright, p. 9).
185 Cf. C.G. Stead, The Word “From Nothing”, in: Doctrine and Philosophy in 
Early Christianity, Burlington 2000, pp. 679–680.
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that it is indeterminate, bad, or “anything which is distinguishable from 
ὁ ὤν, the One ultimate reality.”186 It seems that both Arius and Athanasius 
understood this expression as the description of a change, since any x must 
change from something which is non-x. For G.C. Stead, this expression is 
then a strong divergence from Origen, who understood God as related not 
only to the Son but also to the world on principle, and, therefore, claim-
ing that the Logos was made by the Father from “non-being” could be a 
criticism of Alexander’s Origenistic doctrine.187 Going further down in the 
consideration of what this expression of Arius would really mean, we can 
say that the Logos pre-existed in the thought of God and then he was gen-
erated. Arius wanted to express that using the Aristotelian terminology.188 
Such an understanding is certainly based on the philosophical meaning of 
“non-being,” but I doubt that it can be applied here in such a manner. Nev-
ertheless, even if we reject it, the main purpose of the use of ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων is 
still plausible. It was a very strong claim of the transcendence of the Father 
who stays unrelated to all creations, even the Son. Since the creations can 
be called “beings,” the Creator in this sense must be totally different and 
thus He must be described as “non-being”; so, because of His remoteness 
from the world, He can be properly described only in negative terms.
The interpretation proposed by G.C. Stead can be undermined when we 
turn to one of the most philosophizing late opponent of Arius – Marius 
Victorinus. In his eyes, it is necessary to refute the claim that the Logos was 
made by God ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, because it means that the Son was generated 
de nihilo.189 But Victorinus also feels compelled to clarify fully the meaning 
of “non-being”; therefore, he defines four types of non-being. He does it 
in reply to a probably imagined character who defends the Arian position 
– Candidus,190 and the consideration of the meaning of “non-being” is the 
main part of his letter. Victorinus explains that there is:
186 G.C. Stead, The Platonism of Arius…, op. cit., p. 26.
187 Ibid., p. 26.
188 G.C. Stead, The Word “From Nothing”, op. cit. p. 681.
189 Adv. Ar. 2, 10, 34–36. “Hinc ergo exlcusus Arius, qui protulit ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν. 
Sententia eius fuit et illa ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων esse filium id est de nihilo” (SC 68, 
p. 424).
190 Since we know that Candidus is a fictitious character (cf. P. Nautin, Candidus 
l’Arien, in L’Homme devant Dieu, Mélanges offerts au H. de Lubac, t. 1, Paris 
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“[non-being] according to negation, so that absolutely and in all ways there is the 
privation of existence; according to difference from another nature; according to 
‘to be’ which is not yet but which can be and will be; according to ‘to be’ which 
is above all existents.”191
We shall come back to a more extensive explanation of the meaning of those 
four types, but for now let us note that among them only one (non-being 
according to negation) describes something which simply does not exist. 
Speaking on God the Father, Victorinus says that He is both a “non-being” 
(τὸ μὴ ὄν) and a “being” (ὂν). He is a being because He is the Father of 
a being, and because the cause must be superior to its effect, He is also a 
non-being.192 Therefore, He must be named a non-being “according to ‘to 
be’ which is above all existents,” and the best way to describe the Father is 
the term a “total pre-being” (totum προόν).193 For Marius Victorinus, the 
difference between the Father and the Son is then described by a distinc-
tion between non-being and being, but unlike Arius, he does not view this 
distinction as discontinuation but it seems to be rather the best explana-
tion of the relationship between persons which dwells inside the substance 
of God. Therefore, the Logos is described as a first being and is called an 
“absolutely perfect being” (omnimodis perfectum ὂν), which was generated 
eternally by the Father.194 Finally, he says that we can also call the Father by 
the name of Logos, “but Logos [is] silent and repose (silens et requiescens)”; 
therefore, it is better to say that “the Logos is unbegotten rather than made 
from nonexistent.”195 Marius Victorinus admits then that the Son can be 
1964, pp. 309; 317), we may ascribe the conviction of the importance of the 
explanation how to understand the Logos made from non-being to Victorinus.
191 Ad Cand. 4, 1–5. “Quod quidem intellegitur et vocatur quattuor modis: iuxta 
negationem, omnino omnimodis ut privatio sit existentis, iuxta alterius ad 
aliud naturam, iuxta nondum esse, quod futurum est et potest esse, iuxta quod 
ominia que sunt, est esse” (SC 68, p. 136; tr. Clark, pp. 63–64).
192 Ad Cand. 4, 5–10 (SC 68, p. 136).
193 Ad Cand. 2, 28 (SC 68, p. 134; tr. Clark, p. 62).
194 Ad Cand. 15, 3 (SC 68, p. 134; tr. Clark, p. 72).
195 Ad Cand. 17, 11–15. “Propterea deus et λόγος, quoniam circa deum et in 
principio fuit, sicuti et deus non genitus est λόγος, cum deus ipse λόγος sit, 
sed silens et requiescens λόγος. Ut videas necessitatem cognoscendi multo 
magis non genitum esse λόγον quam ipsum fieri ex his quae non sunt” (SC 
68, pp. 154–156; tr. Clark, p. 74).
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called the one generated from non-being, but this non-being must not be 
understood as something which does not exist. He sees the philosophical 
background of the expression ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, but simultaneously claims that 
Arius completely misunderstood it. Therefore, if G.C. Stead’s interpreta-
tion is correct, it would mean that Marius Victorinus misinterpreted this 
expression in Arius.
But there is yet another thing which for Victorinus is the effect of call-
ing the Father a “non-being.” He completely agrees with Arius that this 
is a basis of negative theology, which must be applied to the Father. Be-
cause he is above every ὂν, he is also above all knowledge (supra omnem 
cognoscentiam).196 We shall see a more detailed analysis of negative theol-
ogy of Marius Victorinus further on in this chapter, but here it has to be 
mentioned that he seems to have believed that such application of negative 
theology may be reconciled with the Orthodox view. It is then possible to 
apply negative terms to the Father, and at the same time, it may be claimed 
that the Logos is the object of positive knowledge, and such an expression 
does not destroy consubstantiality of the divine persons.
2.1.4 The attributes of God from Arius’ perspective
Arian claims regarding the transcendence of God also had a profound 
impact on the teaching on his attributes. Since God the Father is perceived 
as a monad, he is most of all simple and cannot be divided in any way. It 
is the Logos which may be perceived as the principle of multiplicity. Since 
the Son is a first creation, He also must be different in the aspect of having 
attributes which were perceived as naturally ascribable to God’s essence. 
The fragment of the Proverbs 8:22 was in this case the most problematic 
one. It is the only place in the Holy Scripture where the Wisdom of God 
says of itself: “The Lord created me at the beginning of His way for His 
works.” (κύριος ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ).197 Arius and 
196 Ad Cand. 13, 8. (SC 68, p. 148).
197 This fragment may be understood in this way only in the Septuagint trans-
lation of the Hebrew text. Other translations were proposed by Orthodox 
writers. Since at the time another version of the text existed, refutation of the 
Arian understanding of this passage may be made solely on the philological 
ground, cf. T. Stępień, Created or Uncreated Wisdom? Arguments on Christ 
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his successors interpreted this fragment by identifying the Wisdom with the 
Son and the Logos, and therefore He may be also understood as having been 
created. Since it is the only sentence in the Scripture which calls the Son 
by the name of creation, Arius cannot omit the problem of the manner in 
which we can call the Son of God the Wisdom.198 To sustain his claims, he 
must explain that the Wisdom which is the Son is different from the one that 
that Father has as an attribute of his own nature: “Accordingly, he says that 
there are two wisdoms: first, the attribute coexistent with God, and next, 
that in this wisdom the Son was originated, and was only named Wisdom 
and Word as partaking of it. ‘For Wisdom,’ saith he, ‘by the will of the wise 
God, had its existence in Wisdom.’”199 Here we see a division and, to some 
extent – a connection between the wisdoms of the Father and the Son, but 
there are two Wisdoms of God, not one. However, there is a problem of 
the meaning of the Wisdom of the Father, which is not simply an attribute 
(ἰδίων) but rather a “coexistent attribute” (τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν 
τῷ Θεῷ). It seems that on one hand Arius wanted to put emphasis on two 
wisdoms, but on the other, he also wanted the simplicity of God to remain 
intact, and thus he calls wisdom a “coexistent attribute.” But this results 
in a rather odd conception of an attribute of God being somehow different 
from God’s essence. It seems that such claims had its earlier formulation in 
the Alexandrian tradition, but Arius goes much further in the understanding 
of the Son as the one who only participates in the attributes of the Father,200 
and only thanks to that participation can be called God.201 The attributes of 
as the Wisdom of God in the Polemic of Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa 
against Eunomius, in: Sophia. the Wisdom of God, ed. Th. Hainthaler, F. 
Mali, G. Emmenegger, M.L. Ostermann, Insbruck, Wien 2017, pp. 147–155.
198 G.C. Stead notes that Arius too much relied on this fragment, and this made 
him vulnerable to the arguments of his critics, C.G. Stead, The Word ‘From 
Nothing’ in: Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity, op. cit., p. 683.
199 Orat. con. Arian. I, 5. Δύο γοῦν σοφίας φησὶν εἶναι, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ 
συνυπάρχουσαν τῷ Θεῷ, τὸν δὲ Υἱὸν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ ταύτης 
μετέχοντα ὠνομάσθαι μόνον Σοφίαν καὶ Λόγον. ῾Η Σοφία γὰρ, φησὶ, τῇ σοφίᾳ 
ὑπῆρξε σοφοῦ Θεοῦ θελήσει (Bright, p. 5; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 309).
200 Cf. C.G. Stead, Platonism of Arius, op. cit., p. 21.
201 Orat. con. Arian. I, 9; καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς ὁ Χριστός, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ καὶ 
αὐτὸς ἐθεοποιήθη· (Bright, p. 9). “Christ is not very God, but He, as others, 
was made God by participation” (tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 311).
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the Son are parallel to the Father, but they are generated. Similarly, we can 
call him the name of Wisdom, Logos, and Power only because all of them 
were given to him by the grace of God.202 Therefore, the Father gives to the 
Son what he possesses in his own nature upon with the first act of creation. 
C.G. Stead proposes to understand this as a “two-level theory” in which 
God the Father simply has wisdom, power, etc., while the Son, being the 
perfect creature, learns wisdom. This also means that the ingenerated Logos 
as well as all attributes are possessed by the Father in his indistinguishable 
unity, while in the Son as the first creation those attributes differ and are 
obtained not possessed as such.203
Despite all of the uncertainty of such reconstruction of Arius’ teaching 
on the attributes of God, we can see that it is plausible in the context of 
other parts of his teaching. As regards the Wisdom of God as well as other 
attributes, Arius wants to secure the transcendent position of the Father 
by saying that His attributes are completely different from those which are 
possessed by the Son. Therefore, even if we can know the Wisdom which 
the Son is, we cannot have a proper knowledge of the Wisdom of the Fa-
ther. It could be only the cognition based on the participation of the Son’s 
multiple names and attributes in the true attributes of the simple, remote, 
and transcendent God.
2.1.5 Negative theology of Arius
Since it expresses rather the lack of knowledge, negative language seems 
to be the best choice to speak about the Father who alone is the Creator 
of the Universe and is utterly transcendent. In the preserved fragments of 
Arius’ works, we find a very frequent use of negative terms, especially in 
the longest preserved fragment of Thalia. This text, quoted by Athanasius, 
begins as follows: “God Himself then, in His own nature, is ineffable by 
202 Orat. con. Arian. I, 9 (Bright, p. 9).
203 G.C. Stead refers here to the “to the level theory” proposed by A.H. Wolfson, 
saying that such theory can be plausible only in case of the attributes of God 
without speaking of the generation of the Logos as such. Cf. C.G. Stead, 
Platonism of Arius, op. cit., p. 20.
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all men.”204 How, then, can we even speak about such ineffable God? The 
following verses show the mode of speaking about the Father; namely, that 
we can do it only because we know the Son of God:
“And Ingenerate we call Him, because of Him who is generate by nature.
We praise Him as without beginning because of Him who has a beginning.
And adore Him as everlasting, because of Him who in time has come to be.”205
Such a mode of speaking is obviously a negative one, and we can apply one 
term to the Father because he is not of what we know about the Logos. 
Robert Mortley suggests that this implies a kind of a relationship between 
the Father and the Son. He underlines the causal meaning of “because” 
(διὰ), which is of utmost importance especially in the first verse of this 
fragment.206 We find many philosophical references to this phrase, which 
go back to Phedrus of Plato, where he speaks of the ungenerated principle, 
which is the source of any motion.207 Mortley also suggests, referring to 
Plotinus, that there is a clear link between the ἀρχὴ and the ἀγένητον in 
Platonic literature.208 This similarity is important because here unbegotten 
is used as a negation of begotten. Therefore, we observe the use of negative 
theology, which is similar to Medioplatonic aphairesis. We cannot have a 
204 De Synodis 15, 3, 9. Αὐτὸς γοῦν ὁ θεὸς καθό ἐστιν ἄρρητος ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει 
(Opitz, vol. 2, p. 242; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 457).
205 De Synodis 15, 3, 13–16: ἀγέννητον δὲ αὐτόν φαμεν διὰ τὸν τὴν φύσιν 
γεννητόν·τοῦτον ἄναρχον ἀνυμνοῦμεν διὰ τὸν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα, ἀίδιον δὲ αὐτὸν 
σέβομεν διὰ τὸν ἐν χρόνοις γεγαότα (Opitz, vol. 2, p. 242; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, 
p. 457).
206 Cf. R. Morley, Alien God in Arius, op. cit., p. 209.
207 Phaed. 245 C-E. “Now, a source is ungenerated, because everything that is 
generated is necessarily generated from a source, but there is nothing for a 
source to be generated from. For if a source were generated from anything, it 
would stop being a source. Since a source is ungenerated, it is also necessarily 
imperishable, because a defunct source can never be generated from anything 
else nor can it bring about generation in anything else, given that everything 
is generated from a source. And so it is a self-mover that is a source of mo-
tion, and a self-mover can neither perish nor be generated, or else the entire 
universe and the whole of e creation will inevitably run down and stop, and 
will never again find anything to act as a source of motion and generation” 
(tr. R. Waterfield, pp. 27–28).
208 Cf. Plotinus Enn. V, 4, 1, 18; (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 2, p. 234) II, 4, 5, 26 (vol. 
1, p. 169); R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 209.
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clear concept of the source, so we must negate our conceptions by cutting 
off what we know of a lesser being. There is one more reference to Plotinus 
here, because he also underlines that we can be taught by such negations.209 
But we must also admit that the use of negative theology in the case of 
Arius is different. Discussing the way of predication on the Good, Plotinus 
underlines that we must obtain some knowledge of the Good before we 
can look and thus: “We come to this learning by analogies, by abstractions 
(ἀναλογίαι τε καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις), by our understanding of its subsequents, of 
all what is derived from the Good, by the upward steps towards it.”210 To 
obtain this knowledge, our negative terms must necessarily contain some 
positive knowledge,211 and thus the outcome of this knowledge seems to be 
uncertain as something between the positive and the negative. R. Mortley 
suggests that the use of negative theology by Arius is different because it 
seems to be a “watertight logical argument” like a logical demonstration 
which resembles rather the negative method of Proclus.212 The goal of Arius 
here seems to lay in showing the total incognoscibility of the Father and a 
way to achieve the goal of separating the Father from the Son. So the use of 
negative theology is very important in the argumentation and serves to show 
inferiority of the Son. The Logos must not be equal to the Father since we 
can know, understand, and have a conception of the Son, while we cannot 
have any positive knowledge about the Father. Therefore, the Son must be 
a created being because our created intellects can conceive him.
For Arius, then, God the Father is not only incomprehensible, but is 
completely alien not only to our knowledge, but also to the Son. Robert 
Mortley points out in his seminal article the importance of Arius’ frequent-
ly calling God the Father “alien God” (ξένος). In Athanasius’ account, 
we read that “alien is the Son to the Father according to essence,”213 and 
209 Cf. R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 210.
210 Enn. VI, 7, 36 (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 3, pp. 229–230).
211 Enn. VI, 7, 38 (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 3, p. 232).
212 Cf. R. Morley, op. cit., p. 210.
213 De synodis 15, 3, 20. ξένος τοῦ υἱοῦ κατ’ οὐσίαν ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι ἄναρχος ὑπάρχει 
(Opitz, vol. 2, p. 242); Cf. Or. con. Arian. I, 6. Καὶ πάντων ξένων καὶ ἀνομοίων 
ὄντων τοῦ Θεοῦ κατ’ οὐσίαν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἀλλότριος μὲν καὶ ἀνόμοιος κατὰ 
πάντα τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ἰδιότητός ἐστι· τῶν δὲ γενητῶν καὶ κτισμάτων 
ἴδιος καὶ εἷς αὐτῶν τυγχάνει (Bright, p. 6). “And, whereas all beings are foreign 
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in another fragment, where Alexander sums up Arian teaching, we have 
an even stronger confirmation that the Logos is “foreign, alien from, and 
separated from the essence of God.”214 Such a peculiar vocabulary and 
radical statements caught the attention of Athanasius and provoked strong 
opposition, as the claim of total difference between the Father and the 
Son. Mortley says that although the term ξένος was almost non-existent 
in Platonic literature, we can trace many references to the second term 
used by Arius – ἀλλότριος. It was present in the negative vocabulary of 
Middle-Platonism, Valentinian Gnosticism, and once again we can find it 
in Plotinus. This word is used very often and is “a specific characteristic 
of his language,” especially in his rejection of the Gnostics.215 While the 
latter, according to Plotinus, confessed total difference and discontinuity 
between the intellectual and the material world, he wants to argue rather 
for continuity between them. There must be some link between the Soul 
and the material universe because the sensual reality is built by a rational 
design, and it must somehow correspond to the maker.216 Here, we have 
not only the confirmation of possible references to the philosophical vo-
cabulary, but also we can see that for Arius, those terms serve the same 
purpose – to show the lack of continuity between the Father and the Son, 
between the first creation and the Creator,217 and this gap can be best 
described in negative terms. A radical difference between the Father and 
the Logos is also expressed by Arius in his claims on the knowledge that 
the Son has of the Father:
and different from God in essence, so too is ‘the Word alien and unlike in all 
things to the Father’s essence and propriety,’ but belongs to things originated 
and created, and is one of these” (tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 309).
214 De decretis Niceane synodi 6, 1, 4–5. ξένος τε καὶ ἀλλότριος καὶ ἀπεσχοινισμένος 
ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίας; (Opitz, vol. 2, p, 5; tr. NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 70).
215 R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 207.
216 Enn. II, 9, 11–12 (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 1, pp. 219–221).
217 R. Mortley claims that such a view would certainly seem strange for Plotinus. 
“We can assert, then, that the separation between Father and Son envisaged by 
Arius would have been a disturbing otherness for Plotinus. He would concede 
no doubt that such a degree of otherness could exist, but would regret it, and 
probably consider it to constitute a separation only between principles which 
are very distant from each other” op. cit., p. 208.
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To speak in brief, God is ineffable to His Son.
For He is to Himself what He is, that is, unspeakable.
So that nothing which is called comprehensible does the Son know to speak about;
for it is impossible for Him to investigate the Father, who is by Himself.
For the Son does not know His own essence,
For, being Son, He really existed, at the will of the Father.
What argument then allows, that He who is from the Father
should know His own parent by comprehension?
For it is plain that for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the Unbegun is,
or to grasp the idea, is not possible.218
The Son cannot see the Father and cannot comprehend him, and cannot 
have a clear conception not only of the essence of the Father, but also of his 
own essence.219 Such is for Arius the effect of putting a borderline between 
the Creator and the creation, between those two persons. It is significant 
that in this text, the conception that the Son does not have the knowledge 
is expressed by the term καταλήψις, which has obvious Stoic reference. As 
related by Stobaeus, the main Stoic definition of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) was 
expressed as “a cognition (καταλήψις) that is secure and unshakable by 
reason.”220 The main criteria which cognition must fulfil to be knowledge 
is to be sure and secure, which is possible when the object was grasped 
218 De synodis 15, 3, 34–43. συνελόντι εἰπεῖν τῷ υἱῷ ὁ θεὸς ἄρρητος ὑπάρχει·
	 ἔστι γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ὅ ἐστι τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἄλεκτος,
	 ὥστε οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων κατά τε κατάληψιν συνίει ἐξειπεῖν ὁ υἱός.
	 ἀδύνατα γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸν πατέρα τε ἐξιχνιάσει, ὅς ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ.
	 αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν οὐκ οἶδεν,
	 υἱὸς γὰρ ὢν θελήσει πατρὸς ὑπῆρξεν ἀληθῶς.
	 τίς γοῦν λόγος συγχωρεῖ τὸν ἐκ πατρὸς ὄντα
	 αὐτὸν τὸν γεννήσαντα γνῶναι ἐν καταλήψει;
	 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ἀρχὴν ἔχον, τὸν ἄναρχον, ὡς ἔστιν,
	 ἐμπερινοῆσαι ἢ ἐμπεριδράξασθαι οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν; (Opitz, vol. 2, p. 243; tr. 
NPNF II, vol. 4, p. 458).
219 It seems that the claim of incomprehensibility of the Father not only to men 
but also to the Logos was common among Arians, cf. D.M. Gwynn, The 
Eusebians. The Polemic of Athanasius of Alexandria and the Construction 
of the ‘Arian Controversy’, Oxford 2007, p. 204.
220 Stobaeus, Ant. II, 7, 5l. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ 
ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· (Wachsmuth/Hense, pp. 73; 19–21).
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firmly by reason.221 Arius uses this term to confirm that the Son cannot 
have the grasp of the essence of the Father and even of his own essence. 
As Williams notes, it is a puzzle to scholars what was the origin of Arius’ 
claim of the Son’s ignorance of his own οὐσία, and he proposes that the 
most probable point of reference is Plotinus, who provided the conceptual 
framework to such claim.222 But there is still a possibility of the vision of 
the Father, and the lack of knowledge is not complete. In another fragment 
of Thalia, Arius claims: “I will say it expressly, how by the Son is seen the 
Invisible; by that power by which God sees, and in His own measure, the 
Son endures to see the Father, as is lawful.”223 So a kind of vision is possible, 
but it is limited; we find here another similarity to Enneads, where Plotinus 
describes how the Intellect sees the One.224 Arius and Plotinus use a similar 
language here, and the vision of the One is also possible according to the 
power (δύναμις) of the One, not the Intellect itself. Although some scholars 
understood that fragment according to the well-known doctrine that God 
is known thanks to His “powers,” Williams disagrees with that and claims 
that the knowledge of the Intellect primarily concerns the Intellect itself 
and that it comes from the One: “Thus the activity of nous, its knowing 
of itself and of the One, depends on the One’s capacity; it is ‘according to 
the One’s dunamis.’”225 However, it is impossible for the Intellect to see the 
One because the knowledge of the One is identical with its being. That is 
why going forward in the grasping of the One means getting closer to the 
Supreme Principle. That is similar to what Arius says about the knowledge 
of the Son, who sees the Father according to the δύναμις of the Father’s 
own self-perception, and while this perception is simple, the knowledge 
of the Logos is a “multiple and determinate image of the Father’s simple 
vision.”226 This view seems to be consistent with what has previously been 
221 Cf. R. Brouwer, The Early Stoic on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates, Cam-
bridge 2014, pp. 30–32.
222 Cf. R. Williams, op. cit., p. 209.
223 De synodis 15, 3, 14–15. ῥητῶς δὲ λέξω, πῶς τῷ υἱῷ ὁρᾶται ὁ ἀόρατος· τῇ 
δυνάμει ᾗ δύναται ὁ θεὸς ἰδεῖν· ἰδίοις τε μέτροις (Opitz, vol. 2, p. 242; tr. NPNF 
II, vol. 4, p. 457).
224 Cf. Enn. V, 3, 7 (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 2, pp. 215–216).
225 R. Williams, op. cit., p. 211.
226 Ibid., p. 212.
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said about the distinction of monad and dyad. As the first creation, the Son 
is the principle of multiplicity since He contains paradigms of all creations. 
Moreover, Arius seems to be quite sure what the simplicity of God means. 
It can be seen especially in the letter to Alexander. As we have seen above, 
he started this letter with a very frequent use of the term μονάς applied to 
many titles of God. He confesses that God is:
“alone Ingenerate, alone Everlasting, alone Unbegun, alone True, alone having 
Immortality, alone Wise, alone Good, alone Sovereign; Judge, Governor, and 
Providence of all, unalterable and unchangeable…”227
This term is used not only to show that any perception of God must be sim-
ple (μόνον), but it seems to be also the principle of Arius’ negative theology. 
Having refuted multiple opinions of Valentinus, Manichaeus, Sabellius, and 
Hieracas, he summarizes his teaching by pointing out that those opinions 
would have put in doubt the simplicity of God, while He: “is before all 
things as being Monad and Beginning of all.”228 Therefore, he is convinced 
that simplicity is the attribute which cannot be refuted, and we can ascribe 
it to God with certainty – God can be called by many names, but all of 
them are descriptions of his simplicity, and this is the rule which allows to 
disprove any other opinion which is contrary to it. We could even say that 
negative theology drove Arius too far, and we (and even the Logos) cannot 
know God, but simultaneously we know how to understand His simplicity.
The problem of the Son’s knowledge of the Father was one of the most 
important issues in the 4th-century theology, and “Arius’ opponents rightly 
treated his views in this area as crucial.”229 For the Orthodox, Arius’ claims 
seemed to deny any knowledge that the Son had about the essence of the 
Father, which for them had a profound soteriological effect. It contradicted 
the role of the Son as the revealer of the Father, and since the Son does not 
know his own οὐσία, even the role of the Logos as the paradigm of crea-
tion is also put in doubt.230 It is, then, evident why the Orthodox writers 
opposed such views with strong claims that since the essence of the Father 
227 De Synodis 16, 2, 3–4 (Opitz, vol. 2, p. 243).
228 De Synodis 16, 4, 8. ἀλλ’ ὡς μονὰς καὶ ἀρχὴ πάντων, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς πρὸ πάντων 
ἐστί (Opitz, vol. 2, p. 243; tr. NPNF, s. 2, vol. 4, p. 458).
229 R. Williams, op. cit., p. 209.
230 Cf. R. Mortley, op. cit., p. 208.
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was wholly communicated to the Son, He must have had a full and perfect 
knowledge of the Father which no creature can possess.231
Finally, we must conclude that the similarities between Arius’ and Ploti-
nus’ systems and modes of expression do not evidently confirm that he 
knew the Enneads. In my opinion, for Arius, the emphasizing of negative 
theology seems very useful in his demonstration of the differences between 
the Father and the Logos. Moreover, he could be convinced that such a 
strong emphasis on negative theology is aligned with the earlier tradition of 
Clement of Alexandria and even Origen. Therefore, we can say that it was a 
natural development of the Middle-Platonic negative language, which was 
certainly known to Arius since it was already incorporated in the Christian 
doctrine. However, some fragments of Arius’ writings strongly suggest that 
negative theology was very important to him and even was used as a tool 
to support his clams of the inferiority of the Son. This is quite contrary to 
what we will see in the case of Eunomius.
2.2 The transcendence and knowledge of God in Athanasius
One of the most important consequences of Arius’ theology was the view 
of God who is distinct and remote to all creation. Such discontinuity was 
something new, especially to Greek thinkers who, while claiming the need 
of negative theology, at the same time put a stress on continuation which 
must exist between the First Principle and its effects. However, this was also 
an idea that was in a sense new to Christian thinkers and could be perceived 
as drawing all conclusions from the Biblical doctrine of creation, which 
in Arius’ opinion supported the inferiority of the Son of God. Orthodox 
writers saw his claims of the creation of the Son from non-being as produc-
ing the first being from nothingness. Although they disagreed that the Son 
was created this way, radicalization of creatio ex nihilo became the fact in 
the 4th century, and both Arius and Athanasius shared that conviction.232 
231 Cf. R. Williams, op. cit., p. 208.
232 Cf. A. Louth, The Origins…, op. cit., p. 73. We see the evolution of the doc-
trine of creation even in the writings of Athanasius and his departure from 
the Origenistic view of the path of the soul to God. Because of the lack of the 
Platonic understanding of the kinship of the soul to God, also the Platonic 
doctrine of contemplation is transformed (pp. 75–76). Such a view was also 
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We can see, then, that the central problem which lay in the background of 
the discussion was the meaning of the Biblical doctrine of creation. This 
doctrine started to acquire its true Christian meaning and stood apart from 
the similar Platonic interpretation in Timaeus.
The outcome of this process, initiated by Arius’ doctrine, was a change 
in the perception of the Universe which was very important for negative 
theology. In his general description of Post-Nicaean Orthodoxy, Andrew 
Louth shows this change as a shift from the Greek to the truly Christian 
worldview. In Middle-Platonism and Neoplatonism, the world was under-
stood in a hierarchical way. The tendency to explain the process of creation 
by multiplying the elements which are in between may be observed even 
in Philo. This process had its continuation in Neoplatonism and elements 
of the noetic realm grew to vast number of beings and Gods. Although 
earlier Christian writers treated the Logos as such being “in between,” in 
the 4th century, the doctrine of creation clearly meant that: “There is no 
intermediate zone between God and the World.”233 The world, then, is no 
longer divided into sensual and intellectual, but it is seen rather as having 
two “parts” which are totally incompatible: the Creator and the creation. 
This does not mean that the division into noetic and sensual completely 
disappeared, but it lost its importance. As we shall see, Gregory of Nyssa 
frequently uses this division, but it is not central in his worldview.
2.2.1 The knowledge of the image of God
In this Christian universe seen in a new way, the transcendence of God 
must be also seen differently. The lack of continuity between the Creator 
and the creation made Him more remote than ever before. Such a kind of 
transcendence could not have appeared in any Greek view because of the 
lack of the doctrine of creation seen in such a manner. The transcendence of 
shared by other important theological figures of the 4th century, such as Euse-
bius of Caesarea, who, in his claims on the transcendence of God, frequently 
quoted Middle-Platonic Numenius of Apamea. However, J.M. Robertson 
notes that one of the primary reasons for Eusebius to confirm God’s tran-
scendence with such emphasis was his involvement in the Arian controversy, 
cf. Christ as Mediator… op. cit., pp. 39–43.
233 A. Louth, op. cit., p. 74.
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God usually affects the claims as to the possibility of knowing Him, because 
if He is so remote, the ways of attaining positive knowledge significantly 
shrink, and negative theology seems to be the only one left.234 If in the 4th 
century the transcendence of God was apparently affirmed with such em-
phasis, the result would seem to be the outburst of negative theology. We 
must not forget that Christians have the ultimate source of the knowledge 
of God, which is the Logos, but even if we admit that there is a division 
between natural knowledge and one obtained by the Revelation (which 
was non-existent in the 4th century), this would result in strengthening the 
problem of consubstantiality of the Divine Persons. The need to resolve the 
dialectical puzzle of the unknown Father and the known Logos becomes 
more important than ever. But can we say that Athanasius was aware of 
the problem, and can we observe the strengthening of negative theology 
in his writings?
To answer this question, we must note that in the writings of Athanasius, 
the problem is presented in a completely new perspective. In De Incarna-
tione, he draws the situation of man who rather worships idols, the natural 
elements and the stars, is driven by pleasures and does not want to know 
the truth, namely the Word of God. This was the state of sin and hence 
also the state of the lack of knowledge of God, which was caused not by 
the hiddenness of God, but by man turning away from Him:
“Everything was completely filled with impiety and vice, and only God was ignored 
and his Word, although he had not hidden himself invisibly from men nor given 
them knowledge of himself in one way only, but had unfolded it to them in various 
fashions and in manifold ways.”235
Athanasius enumerates the ways in which man can obtain the knowledge 
of God, and those ways are listed according to the history of Salvation of 
man. First of all, God made himself known according to the “grace of the 
Divine Image” (κατ’ εἰκόνα χάρις), and this knowledge was sufficient to 
know the truth.236 But since man was careless and did not want to know 
God by himself, He made a prevision for their carelessness and made Him 
234 Cf. J.R. Lyman, Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in 
Origen, Eusebius, and Athanasius, Oxford 1993, p. 129.
235 De Inc. 11, 38–42 (Thomson, pp. 160–161).
236 Cf. J. M. Robertson, op. cit., p. 199.
72
known by means of the creations. This, however, was not enough for man, 
who continued to “sink gradually to the worse,” and, therefore, God sent 
the law and the prophets to instruct man, since man is able to learn more 
easily of the higher things this way.237 This, however, was also not sufficient 
to make man turn away from sin and corporal pleasures. Therefore, the 
Son of God came down to this world to restore the image which had been 
contaminated and dimmed by the deeds of man: “So the Word of God 
came in His own person, in order that, as He is the image of His Father, 
He might be able to restore man who is in the image.”238 We can see that 
the whole problem of the possibility to know God is presented in a moral 
perspective. Sin is the main obstacle to obtaining the knowledge of God. 
Even if man has any natural powers to know God, he cannot make use of 
them because of the sin and turning away from God. Man had the means 
to perfect his knowledge of God because he was created in His image, but 
he did not make use of them as he was driven down by his animal nature, 
and this made God intervene and provide previsions (προενοήσατο) to help 
him. Even the way of knowing the Creator from the creations is a way 
provided by grace.
Athanasius is then very optimistic as concerns the possibility of man hav-
ing the knowledge of God, but this optimism is based on the image of the 
Logos that is in the soul, so this is never a direct cognition, and it does not 
deny the transcendence of God. Describing the state of grace in paradise, 
Athanasius confirms that God is beyond human cognition when he says:
“For God, the creator of the universe and king of all, who is beyond all being and 
human thought (ὁ ὑπερέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπινοίας ὑπάρχων), since 
he is good and bountiful…”
but he adds:
“…has made mankind in his own image through his own Word, our Saviour Jesus 
Christ; and he also made man perceptive and understanding (ἔννοιαν καὶ γνῶσιν) of 
reality through his similarity to him, giving him also a conception and knowledge 
of his own eternity, so that as long as he kept this likeness he might never abandon 
his concept of God (Θεοῦ φαντασίας).”239
237 De Inc. 12, 1–7 (Thomson, pp. 162–163).
238 De Inc. 13, 29–32 (Thomson, pp. 166–167).
239 Con. Gen. 2, 5–13 (Thomson, pp. 6–7).
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So the very act of creation is sufficient to give man the knowledge of God, 
who resides in the soul, and if man is able to preserve his soul pure without 
turning to sensual things, the soul can reflect the Logos, the paradigm of its 
creation whom it is alike.240 Such an optimistic view on man’s knowledge 
of God is possible only, thanks to the Logos and its image in the soul, and 
even in the state of primal happiness it is based on the grace of God, not on 
natural human powers. Man can realize his blessed life by: “special power 
given him by the Father’s word (ἐκ τοῦ πατρικοῦ Λόγου δύναμιν).”241 We can 
observe that such a description of Adam’s knowledge of God resembles the 
claims that Arius put forth on the Son of God, who, as we have seen, can 
know God only, thanks to the Father’s own power (δύναμις), which was 
granted to him, but Athanasius underlines that for Adam grace is given 
from the Father and the Logos.
It is worth noting that Athanasius is convinced that the place in the soul 
where this knowledge of God resides is intellect (νοῦς), and he frequently 
uses the terms like ἔννοια, κατανοεῖν and λογίζεστθαι to describe it. He 
understands the intellect not only as the eye of the soul, but for him it is 
the only source of good intentions. So the soul can preserve its pure state 
when it listens to the intellect, but when it abandons the guidance of the 
νοῦς, it becomes corrupted and unable to sustain the cleanness of the im-
age and the knowledge of God.242 It can then contemplate the image of the 
Logos that is the same with the world of the intellectual objects only when 
it is free from sensual images. Even for man in the present state of sin the 
crucial move to obtain any knowledge of God is the ascent from sensual 
to intellectual objects, but this is not possible without special assistance of 
the incarnate Logos.243
240 Cf. G.C. Stead, The Knowledge of God in Eusebius and Athanasius, in: 
Knowledge of God in Graeco-Roman World, op. cit., p. 233. G. C. Stead 
sees here the reference to the Republic 509 b, where God is said to be beyond 
human cognition, but this is contradicted in a fragment of Athanasius, which 
reads that God gave man the knowledge of His own eternity.
241 Con. Gen. 2, 13–14 (Thomson, pp. 6–7).
242 Cf. C.G. Stead, op. cit., p. 235.
243 Athanasius uses the metaphor of the mirror to describe the contemplation 
of the Logos with the pure eye of the Soul. It seems that with this metaphor 
Athanasius confirms that it is possible for man to obtain the knowledge of 
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This optimistic theory, however, also confirms the transcendence of God. 
We cannot know him directly and even in the primal state of innocence man 
was able to know God only thanks to the image which he had in himself. 
The thought of Athanasius seems to develop to the point where there is no 
possibility of any knowledge of God which can be obtained by “purely” 
natural powers, so He stays totally out of reach of human mind and thus 
is absolutely transcendent.244
2.2.2 Knowing God from the creations
This total inability of the natural knowledge of God seems to contradict 
Athanasius’ statements on the creations which reveal the Creator. Can we, 
then, call this knowledge natural? Having in mind the remark on the de-
velopment of the doctrine of Athanasius, it is worth having a closer look at 
the fragments of Contra Gentes, where he explains his way of the cognition 
of God.
Before Athanasius comes to the topic, he underlines the primary place 
of the knowledge which the soul can have based on the image of the Logos 
that is present within it. The “soul’s teaching” is insufficient because the 
possibility of seeing this image has been lost because of “external influences 
which disturb its mind.”245 Therefore, the presence of God’s actions in the 
creations could be seen as the help God gives to fallen mankind. The image 
in the soul cannot be seen, but the order of the Universe can be observed 
and the existence of God deduced therefrom. Athanasius begins with the 
statement that God “is by nature invisible and incomprehensible, being 
God even without the intervention (incarnation) of the Logos; nevertheless, 
the source of the knowledge is still the image of the Logos in the soul of man. 
Cf. A. Hamilton, Athanasius and the Simile of the Mirror, VCh, vol. 34, no. 
1 (1980), pp. 17–18.
244 G.C. Stead sees the development of the doctrine of Athanasius noticing: “As in 
the Contra Gentes, they have an ability which is sufficient, αὐταρκης, to pro-
vide the knowledge of God; but in the De Incarnatione this is not the natural 
purity of the soul, but a special gift of grace, ἡ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα χάρις, designed to 
offset its inherent weakness” op. cit., p. 237.
245 Con. Gen. 34, 27–28 (Thomson, pp. 94–95).
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above all created being,”246 and, therefore, man can miss the way to obtain 
the needed knowledge. It was necessary for man that God made Himself 
visible in His creations, and consequently He established the order of the 
Universe by means of His Word. Athanasius gives an example of a sculptor 
who, even if he does not stand next to his work, is present because sculpture 
testifies that he worked on this piece of stone. We can not only recognize the 
necessary existence of the maker, but also the character of his style since:
“…from his works that an artist is often known, even when he is not seen; and 
people can say about Phidias the sculptor that his works through their symmetry 
and the mutual proportion of their parts reveal Phidias to observers, even when 
he is not present.”247
In a similar way, the order of nature, raining in fruitful seasons, the courses 
of the stars, Sun shining at day and Moon at night, the exact number of 
days, etc., make man to admit that there must be the maker and ruler who 
is distinct from them.248 God is also the one who makes the opposites in 
nature combined and having an order, and Athanasius enlists many exam-
ples which testify to such unity in multiplicity and harmony of nature,249 
which must have been made by the wise Creator and ruler.250 But what 
the man can see in the order of nature is not exactly the God Himself but 
rather the Logos. And through Him we can see the Father Himself.251 So it 
seems that what Athanasius says here takes us back to the same image of 
the Logos which man has in his soul. Man cannot see this image because of 
sin, but the order of the universe is but another image of the Logos, which 
is independent from our nature and, therefore, can always testify to the 
existence of the Word despite the fall of man. So, once again, this view of 
the knowledge of God is very optimistic, and even the fall of man does not 
make him totally incapable of obtaining the knowledge which he must have 
246 Con. Gen. 35, 2–3 (Thomson, pp. 94–95). ἐπειδὴ ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατάληπτός 
ἐστι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπέκεινα πάσης γενητῆς οὐσίας ὑπάρχων. Ahtanasius puts a stress 
on the invisibility of God often using the argument that God is ἀόρατος but 
makes Himself visible in His works.
247 Con. Gen. 35, 2 (Thomson, pp. 94–95).
248 Con. Gen. 35, 8–12, (Thomson, pp. 94–97).
249 Con. Gen. 36, 1–35, (Thomson, pp. 98–101).
250 Con. Gen. 38, 1–7 (Thomson, pp. 102–103).
251 Con. Gen. 44, 1– 45, 5 (Thomson, pp. 120–123).
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to turn back to God. However, this is yet another help, which the Crea-
tor provided to make man know Him and this kind of natural cognition 
is possible because of the providence of God who made use of the powers 
present in human nature, since he is “good and loving to mankind. (ἀγαθὸς 
γὰρ ὢν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος).”252
Therefore, negative theology which is natural in the fallen state of the 
soul, which cannot see invisible God, is something God overcomes by Him-
self.253 This kind of speaking of God does not actually tell us anything useful 
and does not bring us closer to Him. Negative theology is rather an obstacle 
than a tool in the ascent to the Maker, and man cannot use it on his path to 
God. Therefore, what is striking here, according to Athanasius, we cannot 
have the knowledge of God based on any mystical experience. We can see it 
best in the Life of Anthony, where he makes no references to the darkness 
of Sinai.254 So there is an absence of negative theology with the simultane-
ous stress on the transcendence of God which can be overcome only by 
the Logos and its Incarnation. We can say that Athanasius is reluctant to 
employ negative theology, which seems to be the obvious consequence of 
such a frequent use of it, which we have observed in Arius. However, a 
negative language seems to be the obvious choice of speaking about God 
who is the sole Creator and Governor of the Universe and thus is utterly 
transcendent to all human concepts. Nevertheless, we can say that at the 
starting point of Athanasius’ theology, he fully agrees with Arius that God 
is utterly transcendent and incomprehensible. Therefore, we can even say 
that his attitude to the problem of the possibility of having the knowledge 
of God is apophatic.255 But Athanasius proposes a way to overcome that 
252 Con. Gen. 35, 5–8 (Thomson, pp. 94–95).
253 J.R. Lyman notes: “One can speak only negatively with assurance because of 
divine transcendence and incomprehensibility; yet what is revealed is absolute, 
for essences precede words, and the terms applied to God in Scripture reveal 
the essential divine nature” op. cit., p. 129.
254 Cf. G.C. Stead, op. cit., p. 242.
255 Cf. K. Anatolios, Athanasius. The Coherence of His Thought, London, New 
York 2005, p. 99. The author also notes that the use of negative terms by 
Athanasius refers to the Middle-Platonic rather than the Neoplatonic under-
standing of God, since he is described as a true being (τὸν ὄντος ὄντα Θεὸν), 
p. 40.
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state of unknowing by stressing on the Incarnation. For Arius, this state is 
permanent, and by denying the divine nature of the Son, he ultimately fails 
to establish his role as a mediator who passes the knowledge of God to man 
and allows him to be saved.256 Athanasius, on the contrary, simultaneously 
admits the transcendence of God while underlining and exposing the role 
of the Logos, which is God and the only means to gain true knowledge 
and return back to the unity with the Creator. Providing the knowledge of 
God to man was for Athanasius the main reason for the incarnation of the 
Logos.257 However, this also means that the Bishop of Alexandria seems to 
be successful in overcoming the contradiction between the incomprehensi-
ble Father, who must be described by negative terms, and the conceivable 
Logos, which can be described in a positive way.
2.3  Positive and negative theology reconciled  
in Marius Victorinus
Marius Victorinus is the figure of special interest for understanding the influ-
ence which the Arian controversy had on negative theology. He lived in the 
West, in the Latin speaking part of Africa, almost exactly in the same period 
when in the East, the discussion between Eunomius, Basil of Caesarea and 
Gregory of Nyssa took place.258 He not only used sophisticated Neoplatonic 
philosophy to defend the Orthodox position, but he is also an example of 
a different solution to the problem of how to reconcile negative theology 
with the Divinity of the Logos. As we have seen, for Athanasius, a negative 
language was to be overcome by the incarnation and revelation of the Logos. 
We have also suggested above that Marius Victorinus seemed to be convinced 
that negative theology can never be abandoned in our cognition of the Father.
The corpus of Theological treatises on the Trinity by Marius Victorinus 
begins with the letter of Candidus who presents Arian arguments against 
consubstantiality of the Son. Most of the scholars agree that Candidus 
was probably an invented figure, and if it is true, it was Marius Victorinus 
himself who presented his understanding of Arian arguments in this letter.259 
256 Ibid., p. 96.
257 Cf. J.M. Robertson, op. cit., p. 197.
258 Cf. P. Henry, Plotin et l’Occident, Louvain 1934, pp. 44–45.
259 Cf. P. Nautin, Candidus l’Arien…, op.cit., pp. 309; 317.
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The entire argumentation of the letter seems to be based on the statement, 
which can be found at its very beginning that God is unchangeable and, 
therefore, any claims of the generation of the Son who is consubstantial 
with the Father violate His unchangeability.
“If therefore God is unchanging and unchangeable, but whatever is unchanging 
and unchangeable is neither begotten nor begetting; if then this is so, God is un-
begotten. For begetting is begetting through alteration and through change.”260
Begetting means a change, therefore the generated Logos, since it is the ef-
fect of a change, cannot be God. Such a claim would mean that it came to 
be God ensuing from something previous and more profound than God. 
Candidus argues that such things as existence, existentiality, potentiality 
substance or being would be somehow prior to the “to be” (esse) of God.261 
The Son could neither be generated from pre-existent substance, because 
God is simple, and that would ruin His simplicity.262 Without going further 
into Candidus’ (or Victorinus’) philosophical distinctions, we can say that 
in his answer Victorinus must explain how the generation of God is not a 
change and does not ruin God’s simplicity. To show this, he rather surpris-
ingly goes into various distinctions of the kinds of being and non-being. 
Although the term “non-being” does not appear in Candidus’ letter, as we 
have seen above, it was a well-known claim of Arius that the Son was cre-
ated by the Father from non-being.
2.3.1 God as non-existent above existents
Victorinus’ answer starts, however, with a long exposition of the impos-
sibility of speaking about God. He explains that paternal intellect (νοῦς 
πατρικός) is innate in our soul, and, therefore, the heavenly spirit can arouse 
the intellectual figures which are eternally engraved in our soul. Therefore:
260 Cand. I, 1, 8–11. “Si igitur deus, inversibile et inmutabile, quod autem inversi-
bile et inmutabile, neque genitum est neque generat aliquid, si igitur hoc sic se 
habet, ingenitus est deus. Etenim generatio per inversionem et per mutationem 
generatio est” (SC 68, p. 106; tr. Clark, p. 47).
261 Cand. I, 1, 12–16 (SC 68, p. 106; tr. Clark, pp. 47–48).
262 Cand. I, 2, 8–9. “Simplex enim quiddam deus. Non igitur praeexsistente 
substantia” (SC 68, p. 108; tr. Clark, p. 48).
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“…our soul by the kind of spiritual elevation wishes to see ineffable things and in-
structable mysteries of the will or works of God. And yet, dwelling in this body it is 
difficult for the soul to understand those things, but impossible to express them.”263
Then Victorinus claims that we can know God to some extent. It is possible 
thanks to the intellect given by God, but also thanks to the help of the spirit 
which can make us know God by some kind of intellectual conceptions or 
rather analogies (figurationes intellectuales). This opinion is very similar to 
what we have seen in Athanasius, who perceived the soul and the image of 
the Logos implanted in it as the primary source of the human knowledge 
of God in a similar way. But Victorinus also tries to show that Candidus 
is too confident in man’s power to grasp the truth about God; while the 
understanding of God’s mysteries and works is difficult, expressing them 
(edicere) is utterly impossible. He supports his opinion with the quota-
tions from the Holy Scripture,264 and after yet another quotation from the 
Scripture’s teaching on the Son of God, he passes on to his demonstration.
First, he answers Candidus’ claims that God is the cause of His own 
esse265 by claiming that God is above existents and non-existents (quae 
sunt et quae non sunt)266 which He produces, but He simultaneously is 
potentially all truly existents (vere ὄν) in order to be able to produce them.267 
Therefore, God the Father must be named the “total pre-existent” (totum 
263 Ad Cand. 1, 4–12. “ineffabiles res et investigabilia mysteria dei voluntatum 
aut operationum quasi quaedam mentis elatio animae nostrae vult quidem 
videre et etiam nunc in tali sita corpore difficile intellegere solum, edicere 
autem impossibile” (SC 68, p. 130; tr. Clark, pp. 59–69).
264 Rom 11: 33, Is 40: 13.
265 Cf. Cand. I, 3, 10–14 (SC 68, p. 110; tr. Clark, p. 49).
266 There is a problem with terminology which must be mentioned here. The 
term τό μὴ ὄν in the case of Arius is commonly translated as “non-being”, as 
we have seen above. In case of Victorinus, it was translated by M.T. Clark as 
“non-existent.” This has its explanation in the complicated Latin terminol-
ogy which Marius Victorinus creates in his writings. In the text, I quote M.T. 
Clark’s translation, so I deliberately use a non-existent instead of non-being 
to preserve the sense and continuity of the text, but we have to remember that 
it is the same Greek term τό μὴ ὄν. It must be also noted that this problem of 
translation is part of a broader issue, which exceeds the scope of this study, 
of how to understand and translate the Greek term τό ὄν.
267 Ad Cand. 2, 16–25 (SC 68, p. 134; tr. Clark, p. 61).
80
προόν) which generates the Logos which is “total existent” (totum ὄν). 
Although we can describe the process of the Son this way, the very act of 
the generation of the Logos cannot be grasped properly by man’s apprehen-
sion, so Victorinus calls it not simply a motion, but rather an “ineffable 
motion” (ineloquibili motus).268 This way Victorinus tries to show that the 
generation of the Son cannot be understood as a motion which produces a 
change. The Logos that was produced that way as the “totally perfect exist-
ent” is in itself also above existents and truly existents, but is also “the first 
and universal knowledge (prima et omnis intellegentia).”269 Victorinus then 
seems to think that the Logos is simultaneously the source of knowledge 
while being also above all beings – consubstantial with the Father. In the 
next passage, he further explains what he does understand by saying that 
God is the cause of existents and non-existents. Since God is called προόν, 
He is the cause of all modes of being and thus Victorinus defines all types 
of existents and non-existents one by one.270
Non-existents play a more important role here since it is best to call God 
the name of one of them. A non-existent (id quod non est) is first conceived 
and named “by way of negation, so that absolutely and in all ways there is 
privation of existence.”271 This mode is what we commonly understand as 
something that simply does not exist. Victorinus explains that “there is no 
μὴ ὂν according to privation; but it is a kind of fiction to imagine, starting 
from existents, the privation of them, and this fiction has neither the sub-
sistence nor the existence of things which do exist.”272 Marius Victorinus 
follows here the long philosophical tradition, which goes back to Plato, of 
268 Ad Cand. 2, 25–29 (SC 68, p. 136; tr. Clark, p. 62).
269 Ad Cand. 2, 31–35 (SC 68, p. 134; tr. Clark p. 63).
270 Marius Victorinus defines the modes of being in Ad Cand. 8–8 (SC 68, 
pp. 138–142; tr. Clark, pp. 64–67). This division and its philosophical back-
ground was well described by P. Hadot, Porphyry et Victorinus, Paris 1968, 
pp. 148–167.
271 Ad Cand. 4, 2–3 “iuxta negationem, omnino omnimodis ut privatio sit ex-
sistentis” (SC 68, p. 136; tr. Clark, pp. 63–64).
272 Ad Cand. 5, 7–11 “nullum μὴ ὂν iuxta privationem, sed subintellegentia quae-
dam est, ab his quae sunt privationem eorum subintellegere, non subsistentis 
ne ipsius quidem subintellegentiae, neque sic exsistentis ut eorum quae sunt” 
(SC 68, p. 138; tr. Clark, p. 64).
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making a distinction between absolute and relative non-being.273 The first 
one is non-being in the absolute sense. The other three modes of non-being 
cannot be understood that way, and despite the fact that they are called 
“non-beings,” they refer to it only relatively. Victorinus explains that those 
are “non-existents which exist in certain way.”274 The name of non-being 
“according to difference with another nature”275 has its roots in the Sophist 
of Plato where he enlists the supreme genres, and since there is nothing else 
which can be the basis of the differentiation of those genres, we can only 
say that the one is not the other, like rest is not motion.276 The third mode 
is described “according to ‘to be’ which is not yet but which can be and 
will be.”277 To understand this mode, we must turn to Aristotle who says 
in his Metaphysics that a being which is in potentiality and not yet actual-
ized is in a sense a non-being, and it will be called properly a being after 
it passes to the state of action. This mode then serves to describe a motion 
and change.278 Victorinus, however, groups those two types saying that they 
express mainly the generation of a being, and we name them “those which 
after their birth have ‘to be’ and named, but which before their birth were 
273 P. Hadot notices that although the primal source of this distinction is Plato’s 
Sophist (237 B; 238 C), Aristotle also evokes this division of ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄν and 
μὴ ὄν τι in his Physics (I, 3, 187 a, 5), cf. P. Hadot, op. cit., p. 168.
274 Ad Cand. 5, 11 “Quaedam igitur quae non sunt quodam modo sunt” (SC 68, 
p. 138; tr. Clark, p. 64).
275 Ad Cand. 4, 2–3 “iuxta alterius ad aliud naturam” (SC 68, p. 136; tr. Clark, 
p. 64).
276 In Sophist, when searching for the definition of a Sophist the Guest from Elea 
proposes to redefine the Parmenidean definition of being which must be cor-
rected or even rejected to define the supreme genres (being, motion, stability 
<or rest, or remaining>, identity and difference), Sophist 236 D-264 B (Plato 
VII, LCL, pp. 236–263).
277 Ad Cand. 4, 4–5 “iuxta nondum esse, quod futurum est et potest esse” (SC 
68, p. 136; tr. Clark, p. 64).
278 In Metaphysics, Aristotle explains that: “But since non-being in the various 
cases has as many senses as there are categories, and besides this the false is 
said not to be and so is the potential (μὴ ὂν καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν), generation 
proceeds from the latter, man from that which is not man but potentially man, 
and white from that which is not white but potentially white, and this whether 
it is one thing that is generated or many” (Met. XIV, 2, 1098 a, 26–31).
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either within their own potentiality or within another whence they have 
begotten.”279
Most interesting is the last of the modes which is called by Victorinus a 
non-existent “according to ‘to be’ which is above all existents.”280 Although, 
as we have seen, God is above all modes of existents and non-existents, He 
can be called an existent as far as He is their cause, but Victorinus seems to 
be more inclined to call Him a non-existent in this last mode. “God is above 
ὄν, and insofar as he is above, God is called μὴ ὂν, not through privation of 
all that is His, but as another ὄν, the very one which is μὴ ὄν.”281 In another 
passage, where he summarizes his teaching on the modes of existent and 
non-existent, Victorinus comes back to the well-known Arian claim (here 
ascribed to Candidus), that the Logos was created from non-being.282 His 
answer can be given thanks to the distinctions of non-beings. Although 
God is not the cause of all types, He is also above all and, therefore, we 
can speak of him in preeminent or negative terms:
“Necessarily we say that through superiority and preeminence over τῶν ὄντων God 
is above all existence, above all life, above all knowledge, above every ὄν and the 
ὄντως ὄντα; indeed he is unknowable, infinite, invisible, without idea, insubstantial, 
279 Ad Cand. 5, 11 “ut ipsa quae sunt, quae post generationem et sunt et dicuntur 
et ante generationem aut in potentia sua aut in alio fuerunt, unde generata 
sunt” (SC 68, p. 138; tr. Clark, p. 64).
280 Ad Cand. 4, 5 “iuxta quod supra omnia quae sunt, est esse.” (SC 68, p. 136; 
tr. Clark, p. 64). It is significant that this type of non-existent was for the 
first time named by Porphyrius (P. Hadot, op. cit. p. 170), whose philosophy 
Victorinus uses to such an extent that there are large fragments of Porphy-
rius’ commentary to Parmenides which have been preserved only, thanks to 
Victorinus’ quotes.
281 Ad Cand. 4, 6–14 “Appellabimus utique omnino ὄν, quoniam eorum quae 
sunt, pater est. Sed pater eorum quae sunt, non est τὸ ὄν; nondum enim sunt 
ea quorum pater est, et non licet dicere, nefas est intellegere, eorum quae sunt 
causam ὄν appellare. Causa enim prior est ab his quorum causa est. Supra ὂν 
igitur deus est et, iuxta quod supra est, μὴ ὂν deus dicitur, non per privationem 
universi eius quod sit, sed ut aliud ὄν, ipsum quod est μὴ ὄν” (SC 68, p. 136; 
tr. Clark, p. 64).
282 Ad Cand. 12, 7–10 “Forte nunc dicis, o Candide: meus hic sermo est et 
secundum istam rationem dico ex his quae non sunt, natum esse filium dei 
secundum effectionem, non secundum generationem” (SC 68, p. 148; tr. 
Clark, p. 69).
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inconceivable, and because transcendent, he is nothing of existents, and because 
he is above existents, he has nothing from existents. God is therefore μὴ ὄν.”283
Victorinus’ answer to the Arian claim is then simple. It is true when we 
say that the Logos originated from non-being, but the problem lies in the 
understanding of non-being, since it is not something that does not exist, 
but rather the Father is non-being because he transcends all that is. It is 
worth mentioning what Pierre Hadot has noted. Although there is a long 
tradition of the classification of the modes of non-being, which especially 
flourished in the Neoplatonic tradition,284 we cannot identify the source of 
Victorinus’ own list. Its origins may be Porphyrian, but we do not have any 
preserved fragment of Porphyry which would prove it. But it is intersecting 
that Victorinus puts them in a hierarchical order from non-existent which 
simply is not, to non-existent above existent, which is more than being.285
2.3.2 Negative theology in speaking of God as the One
Negative theology appears once more in a place where in his treaty Ad-
versus Arium Victorinus describes God as the One (unum) and Monad 
(unalitas).286 Victorinus explains that by calling God the One, he means 
not the Father alone but the Father and the Son who being Two are One.287 
Pierre Hadot notes that in Victorinus’ long exposition we can trace the 
Middle-Platonic systematized methods or ways of speaking of God, espe-
cially those of Albinus and Celsus.288 In the text of Adversus Arium, we 
283 Ad Cand. 13, 5–12 “Necessario per praelationem et per eminentiam τῶν 
ὂντων deum dicemus supra omnem exsistentiam, supra omnem vitam, supra 
omnem cognosccntiam, supra omne ὂν et ὄντως ὄντα, quippe inintellegibile, 
infinitum, invisibile, sine intellectu, insubstantiale, inio cognoscibile, et quod 
super omnia, nihil de his quae sunt, ct quoniam supra quae sunt, nihil ex his 
quae sunt. Μὴ ὂν ergo deus est” (SC 68, p. 148; tr. Clark, p. 70).
284 Cf. P. Hadot, op. cit., pp. 169–170.
285 Ibid., p. 171.
286 Adv. Ar. I, 49, 9. Term unalitas is commonly translated as “monad”; tr. Clark, 
p. 171 (French - “la Monade”; tr. P. Hadot, SC 68, p. 343).
287 Adv. Ar. I, 49, 9 (SC 68, p. 342; tr. Clark, p. 171).
288 P. Hadot notes that it is possible that the systematization of theological ways 
was influenced by Stoics who developed methods of abstract cognition, op. 
cit., p. 279.
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can find the way of eminence (or anteriority), the way of negation, and the 
way which Pierre Hadot calls “transcendent synthesis.” Marius Victorinus 
offers a Latin version of the first two ways, which in Greek had technical 
forms of words beginning with: -ὑπερ or -προ (way of eminence) and -ἀ 
(negative way).289
According to the first method, God is described as being above all re-
ality. He is “before all existence, before all existentiality, and absolutely 
before all inferiors, before the ὄν itself; indeed this One is prior to the ὄν; 
it is therefore before every entity, substance, subsistence, even before those 
things which are more powerful.”290 In those terms, we see the echo of the 
long tradition which had its origin in Plato’s famous phrase ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας 
and was strengthened and had its continuation in Neoplatonism. This is 
also an answer to Candidus who defined God primarily as esse solum.291
According to the second way, Victorinus enumerates various negative 
terms. God as One is:
“infinite, invisible, wholly indiscernible for every other, both for those within it 
and those which are after it; for it alone is distinguished and defined only by its 
own existence, not by act, so that its own constitution and self-knowledge are 
not something different from it; undivided in every way, without shape, without 
quality, that is not qualified by any lack of quality yet without colour, without 
species, without form, lacking all forms, and yet not being that form itself by 
which all things are formed.”292
289 Cf. P. Hadot, op. cit., p. 280.
290 Adv. Ar. I, 49, “unum ante omnem exsistentiam, ante omnem exsistcntiali-
tatem et maxime ante omnia inferiora, ante ipsum ὄν; hoc enim unum ante ὄν; 
ante omnem igitur essentitatem, substantiam, subsistentiam et adhuc omnia 
quae potentiora…” (SC 68, p. 342; tr. Clark, p. 172).
291 Cand. I, 3, 16. “Ipse est unum et solum. Est enim esse solum. Et vero ipsum 
esse, ipsum est et vivere et intellegere” (SC 68, p. 110; tr. Clark, p. 49).
292 Adv. Ar. I, 49, 19–26. “invisibile, indiscernibile universaliter omni alteri et 
his quae in ipso et his quae post ipsum, etiam quae ex ipso, soli autem sibi 
et discernibile et definitum, ipsa sua exsistentia, non actu, ut non quiddam 
alterum sit ab ipso consistentia et cognoscentia sui, inpartile undique, sine 
figura, sine qualitate neque inqualitate, sine qualitate, quale, sine colore, sine 
specie, sine forma, omnibus formis carens, neque quod sit ipsa forma qua 
formantur omnia…” (SC 68, p. 342; tr. Clark, p. 172).
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Then Victorinus passes to the way of transcendent synthesis, which we 
have seen already when he called God totum προόν and “non-existent 
above existent.” Here, he likewise calls God by the names of: first cause of 
all existents, preknowledge of all knowledge, the strength of all powers, 
swifter than movement itself, more stable than rest itself, closer than any 
continuum, more profound than all of discontinuous, more finite than a 
body, greater than greatness, purer than incorporeal reality, power of all 
powers, more universal than every genus and species, etc.293 Those terms 
can be understood as describing God even more accurately than the negative 
way. Those are not simply negations, but they express better the One that 
is above all privation and negation; therefore, God is simultaneously called 
to be greater than the opposite things as follows: corporal-incorporeal, 
movement-rest, finite-infinite, and having and non-having qualities. Thanks 
to such a way of speaking, Victorinus can express that calling God with 
negative term does not bring us any closer to the understanding of who He 
is. If we, for example, call God infinite, one can think that infinity is some 
kind of a concept which allows our intellect to grasp His nature in some 
way, but infinity as a negative term neither describes Him nor is a kind of 
a conception. To ensure that such a mistake will never be made, Victorinus 
explains that God is simultaneously beyond infinity and is finite. Another 
aspect of using this way of speaking is the reconciliation of opposite terms; 
God is beyond each of the opposites, and, therefore, he unites them above 
them. Therefore, we can say that those terms clearly indicate that God is 
utterly transcendent, and thus He cannot be conceived in any way. Finally, 
Pierre Hadot notes that it is no longer negative theology since it lacks 
293 Adv. Ar. I, 49, 26–40. “…et universalium et partilium omnium quae sunt 
prima causa, omnium principiorum praeprincipium, omnium intellegentiarum 
praeintcllcgcntia, omnium potentiarum fortitudo, ipsa motione celebrior, ipso 
statu stabilior - motione enim ineloquibili status est, statu autem ineffabili 
superelativa motio est - continuatione omni densior, distantia universa altior, 
definitior universo corpore et maius omni magnitudine, omni incorporali 
purius, omni intellegentia et corpore penetrabilius, omnium potentissimum, 
potentia potentiarum, omni genere, omni specie magis totum, vere ὄν totum, 
vere quae sunt omnia ipsum exsistens, omni toto maius, corporali et incorpo-
rali, omni parte magis pars, inenarrabili potentia pure exsistens omnia quae 
vere sunt” (SC 68, pp. 342–344; tr. Clark, p. 172).
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privations and is a way of speaking of the One which coincides with the 
maxima. Such ultimate cognition is more than ignorance, because it does 
not oppose ignorance; therefore, it transcends both affirmation and nega-
tion.294 Therefore, it is the best way to express incompatibility of any hu-
man conception, whether negative or positive, and the best way to express 
the impossibility of having any intellectual grasp of the Ultimate Principle.
However, we must be aware that those ways of describing God are ap-
plicable to God the Father, which Victorinus affirms by saying: “This is 
God, this is the Father, preexisting preintelligence and preexistence keeping 
itself and its own happiness in an immobile movement…”295 The Son can 
be also called the One, but in a different aspect. While the Father is totally 
above our cognition: “This One whom we call the One who is One (unum 
unum) is life, which is infinite movement, creative of others, whether of 
the truly existents or of the existents, being the Logos of the ‘to be’ of all 
existents.”296 The Son is then not the same with the absolute One, with the 
Father, but rather he should be called One-One, that is the Dyad. With-
out going further into the philosophical references of this claim,297 we can 
observe once again what we have seen previously in Ad Candidum. The 
negative way is more proper when we try to describe the Father – the One 
as Monad, and positive theology plays the main role in speaking of the Son 
who is Dyad. Therefore, we can also observe the way in which Victorinus 
tries to answer Arian claims.
Arius, who frequently used the term μονάς, claimed that the absolute 
simple Father can be spoken of only in negative terms. Victorinus seems to 
agree fully with such statement. We have seen in Ad Candidum that negative 
theology should be primarily the way of speaking of the Father, whereas 
294 Ibid., p. 283.
295 Adv. Ar. I, 50, 1–3. “Hic est deus, hic pater, pracintellegentia praeexistens et 
praeexsistentia beatitudinem suam et inmobili motione semet ipsum custodi-
ens…” (SC 68, p. 344; tr. Clark, p. 172).
296 Adv. Ar. 51, 1–4. “Sed unum istud quod esse dicimus unum unum, vita est, 
quae sit motio infinita, effectrix aliorum, vel eorum quae vere sunt, vel eo-
rum quae sunt, exsistens λόγος ad id quod est esse quae sunt omnia” (SC 68, 
p. 346; tr. Clark, p. 173).
297 Pierre Hadot gives a full philosophical background of this statement in op. 
cit., pp. 285–288.
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the positive way is fitting when we speak of the Son. In Adversus Arium, 
Victorinus uses the same pattern when speaking of the two aspects of God 
as the One. But Arius claimed that since we can speak of the Logos in a posi-
tive way and understand Him, He cannot be consubstantial with the Father. 
Victorinus strongly disagrees here claiming that positive and negative ways 
of theology are the two modes of describing the same God; therefore, the 
Father and the Son are consubstantial. So he claims that the use of negative 
and positive theologies does not necessarily result in the opposition between 
the Father and the Son. Where Arius saw discontinuity, Victorinus puts a 
stress on continuity. Therefore, it is an attempt at systematic reconciliation 
between positive and negative theology in Marius Victorinus. It is remark-
able that he does all those demonstrations and distinctions in an utterly 
theoretical fashion without pointing out the meaning of negative theology 
to mystical life. So it seems that in his writings, the systematic and rigorous 
theology of Arius has met its perfect match.
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3. “You Worship What You Do Not Know”
At the middle of the 4th century AD, the discussion on consubstantiality 
of the Son of God significantly changes because of two new figures: Aetius 
and Eunomius. They represented a new approach to the problem of Divine 
generation to such an extent that their contemporaries considered them as a 
whole new group of theologians, which were called Anomeans or Eunomi-
ans. It is worth mentioning here that, if the remarks of R.P.C. Hanson are 
correct, it is hard to say that in the first half of the 4th century, there was 
a movement or group that perceived themselves as Arians.298 This time we 
have a group of the heterodox that can be distinguished by the convictions 
they shared. However, there are two main issues that they had in common 
with Arius: they denied consubstantiality of the Son of God, and, what is 
more important for the subject matter of this work, the central issue of their 
theology was the problem of how can we know God.
This new theological approach was initiated by Aetius. He was claimed 
as the first one who attached himself to the Aristotelian philosophy and, 
as H.A. Wolfson notes, the fight as to the proper use of syllogism began.299 
Aetius was also known as the author of the thesis that to know God as un-
begotten means to know his οῦσία.300 Although we have the text of Aetius’ 
main work – Syntagmation, this work is so schematic and difficult that it 
is impossible to comprehend the meaning of large parts of the text without 
references to Eunomius’ Apology, where most of his thesis was repeated 
by his disciple.301 It is, however, worth having a closer look at this text, 
as it contains interesting claims on the possibility to know God’s essence.
298 Cf. R.P.C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God…, op. cit., 
pp. 123–128.
299 H.A. Wolfson, Philosophical Implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism, 
DOP, vol. 12 (1958), p. 9.
300 R. Williams, op. cit., p. 207.
301 L.R. Wickham shows the history of the text and its two preserved variants, 
along with the problems of interpretation of the treatise: The Syntagmation 
of Aetius the Anomean, JTS vol. XIX, Pt. 2, 1968, pp. 533–535.
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3.1  “Ingeneracy” as a positive attribute  
and the essence of God
Although Syntagmation is often described as a work full of syllogisms and 
a kind of an Aristotelian turn in theology, Aristotelianism of Aetius is prob-
lematic. L.R. Wickham notes that if we try to see demonstrations which 
this work contains according to the standard definition of syllogism, none 
of the claims of Aetius is presented as a deduction from two premises. So 
we can call those demonstrations “syllogistic” only in a broader sense in 
which all deductive proofs are syllogistic.302 Moreover, all presented points 
are not introduced in a fashion where an argument logically follows from 
the previous one; it resembles rather switching from one issue to another.303 
Nevertheless, he wanted to set his work in a particular fashion, which is 
based on pure reasoning. It is significant that although Aetius wants the 
reader to be assured that his work is “based on the mind of the Holy 
Scripture,”304 he never quotes any passage from the Bible. Therefore, he 
shared a very optimistic view on the power of human mind, which alone, 
without the aid of faith, can demonstrate that the Son’s essence is different 
from the Father’s.
In Syntagmation, we find frequent claims on the transcendence of God 
the Father. He is “superior to any cause” (πάσης αἰτίας ὑπάρχει),305 supe-
rior to origination, surpasses every nature, and, therefore, God cannot be 
even called self-caused. Simultaneously, we have a precise indication of the 
essence of God. The term “ingenerate” (ἀγεννήτος) plays the central role 
because it allows to know who God is and it alone properly names His 
302 Cf. L.R. Wickham, op. cit., p. 534.
303 L.R. Wickham notes: “I am left with the impression that these are arguments 
bearing upon a particular theme, arguments which the author has devised 
and used over a number of years and which he has now strung together in 
a series.” op. cit., p. 535. A.A. Radde-Gallwitz suggests that the work of 
Aetius was the response to Athanasius’ De synodis; therefore, he wanted to 
gather arguments which would reduce his opponent’s view of ingeneracy to 
absurdity. A. Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Cesarea, Gregory of Nyssa and the 
Transformation of Divine Simplicity, Oxford 2009, p. 90.
304 Synt. Introduction, Wickham p. 545.
305 Synt. 2, p. 540; 3, p. 541 πάσης αἰτίας κρείττων ὑπάρχει; 18, p. 542 οὐσία 
κρείττων ἐστί γενέσεως; 30, p. 543 ὑπεράγει πάσης φύσεως.
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essence.306 Aetius treats “ingeneracy” as the very name which is intrinsic to 
the substance and is revelatory of the essence, which cannot be ascribed to 
God on the basis of any human observation.307 He boldly and in an explicit 
way argues that it is not only the concept of a human mind:
“If ingeneracy does not represent the substance (ὑπόστασιν) of the Deity, but the in-
comparable name is of human imagining (ἐπλνοίας ἐστίν ἀνθρωπίνης τὸ ἀσύγκριτου 
ὄνομα), the Deity is grateful to those who thought the name up, since through the 
concept of ingeneracy he has a transcendence of name which he does not bear in 
essence.”308
The word “ingeneracy” is a privation, as it signifies the one who is not 
generated, but Aetius does understand this term as negative only in a certain 
aspect. He argues that if we apply a privation to God’s essence, it would 
mean that we apply some kind of non-being to it, and he clearly confirms 
that the terms which we use are intrinsically linked with the essences which 
we name. Therefore, he claims:
“If ingeneracy is revelatory of privation in respect of God, and ingeneracy were 
non-entity (μὴ ὂντος), what kind of reasoning would deprive the non-existent of a 
non-entity? If it signifies reality (ὂν), who would part God in his real being from 
himself?”309
It seems that Aetius argues that the term “ingeneracy” cannot be predi-
cated of God only in the negative sense, because it would signify something 
which does not exist (or is non-being) in God. If “ingeneracy” is non-being, 
there is nothing “ingeneracy” can be applied to. On the other hand, if it 
designates something real, “ingeneracy” is an intrinsic property and can-
not be separated from God – it is who He is. The only possible conclusion 
is, then, to admit that “ingeneracy” is not a negative property but rather 
a positive one, and it also cannot negate any positive property, since God 
cannot lack who He is.
306 Synt. 16, p. 542.
307 Cf. DelCogliano’s discussion on his understanding of this name in: M. Del-
Cogliano, op. cit., pp. 30–31.
308 Synt. 12, pp. 541–542.
309 Synt. 19, p. 542. Εἰ στερήσεώς ἐστι δηλωτικόν ἐπὶ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον, μηδὲν 
δὲ εἴη τὀ ἀγέννητον, ποῖος λόγος ἂν ἀφαιρήσειε τοῦ μὴ ὂντος τὸ μηδέν; εἰ δὲ ὂν 
σημαίνει, τίς ἂν χωρίσειεν ὄντος θεόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀυτὸν ἑαντοῦ.
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Those explanations confirm that “ingeneracy” is a positive predicate, 
but what exactly Aetius means by that claim? R. Mortley suggests that in 
order to understand that we must turn to 4th-century Neoplatonism. He 
finds similarity of fragment 16 not only to Cratylus (as Wickham suggests), 
but also to Dexippus, who comments on Aristotle’s Categories.310 There 
is similarity between Aetius and Dexippus who discuss whether the nega-
tion of attributes can reveal substance.311 However, negation usually does 
not provide a good definition, because if one wants to define something 
in a negative way, he can enumerate what this thing is not practically in-
definitely. But Dexippus notes that there are some cases when a negative 
definition can provide a good grasp of the essence, when one can be sure 
that there are only three options. He gives an example of “indifferent” 
which can be defined as something that is neither good nor bad.312 A. 
Radde-Gallwitz notes that Aristotle’s definition of the substance is also an 
example of this kind of a negative approach, but he also observes that it is 
very unlikely that Aetius knew Dexippus’ commentary, because the latter 
does not consider using such a definition in theology. Moreover, it seems 
that Aetius completely misunderstood Dexippus’ argument.313 Therefore, 
this does not explain how to understand ingeneracy in a positive way, and 
we must investigate further.
Aetius continues his explanation in the next argument by trying to define 
what exactly can we name in God when we speak of Him in a negative way, 
310 R. Mortley, From Word to Silence, t. II, op. cit., p. 131.
311 Dexippi in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, p.  44, 16. ἵνα διὰ τῆς 
ἀποφάσεως αὐτῶν τὴν κυριωτάτην οὐσίαν δηλώσῃ. The version of the same 
problem is also commented by Simplicius, cf. A. Radde-Gallwitz, op. cit., 
p. 92.
312 This is an example, which comes from Aristotle Cat. 12 a, 20–25. ἐπ’ ἐνίων 
μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ 
ὠχρόν· ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ 
ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται, οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε 
κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον. (Bodéüs, p. 55) “In some cases there exist 
names for the intermediates, as with grey and yellow between white and black; 
in some, however, it is not easy to find a name for the intermediate, but it is 
by the negation of each of the extremes that the intermediate is marked off, 
as with the neither good nor bad and neither just nor unjust.” (tr. Barnes).
313 Cf. A.A. Radde-Gallwitz, op. cit., p. 94.
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and he does that by interrogating whether ingeneracy may be a condition/
possession314 (ἕξις) or privation (στέρησις):
“If privations are abstractions of conditions (στέρεσις ἕξεών εἰσιν ἀφαίρεσις), ingen-
eracy in respect of God is either a privation of condition or a condition of priva-
tion. If it is a privation of condition, how should what is not present be counted as 
present to God? If ingeneracy is a condition, a generate essence must have existed 
first, in order that thus acquiring a condition of being, it may be named ‘ingener-
ate’. If the generate participated in the ingenerate essence, having undergone the 
loss of its condition it will have been deprived of generation. Its essence would 
then be generate and ingeneracy would be a condition.”315
The key to understanding this fragment is the meaning of a condition (pos-
session). L.R. Wickham notes that opponents unanimously see here the in-
fluence of Aristotle.316 In Categories, when discussing quality, he described 
condition (ἕξις) and state (διάθεσις) as the first kind of quality. Those two 
differ because condition is something which can be easily changed while 
state is “being more stable and lasts longer,”317 and, therefore, the definition 
is: “It is what are easily changed and quickly changing that we call condi-
tions, e.g. hotness and chill and sickness and health and the like.”318 Aetius 
assumes that ingeneracy is a kind of quality, but we can also see why he 
uses condition instead of state, which seems to be a more reasonable choice 
when speaking about God. He wants to put a stress on changeability of 
God’s essence, since in his eyes, the Orthodox position is nothing else than 
the application of a change in his essence and it is a condition which changes 
more easily, so ingeneracy would be a contingent property of God’s essence. 
314 There is some confusion here because the term ἕξις has different translations. 
Wickham translates it as “a condition,” whereas in the fragments of Cathe-
gories of Aristotle quoted below a contradiction between ἕξις and στέρησις 
is translated as possession and privation. In both cases, the meaning of the 
word seems to be the same, because it concerns the state of having a certain 
feature or lacking it.
315 Synt. 20, p. 542.
316 L.R. Wickham, op. cit., p. 561.
317 Cat. 8 b, 27–28. μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει 
δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι· (Bodéüs, p. 39; tr. 
Barnes).
318 Cat. 8 b, 35–37. διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, 
οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· (Bodéüs, 
p. 40; tr. Barnes).
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But the argument starts with a very important “if,” which suggests once 
again that what Aetius means is that condition be treated as abstract from 
the essence of God and that is exactly what privation means. He sees two 
possibilities here: first, ingeneracy could be privation of condition; (στέρησις 
ἕξεως) second, it could be a condition of privation (ἕξις στερήσεως). By 
linking the concepts of privation and condition, Aetius wants to describe 
two kinds of movement – losing or gaining an attribute. God must either 
have lost a quality of generacy (positive condition), or must have acquired 
a negative condition of ingeneracy, which in this case is the absence of 
this quality. L.R. Wickham explains it with the example of being bald: 
“baldness is either the lost state of having one’s hair or the state of having 
lost one’s hair.”319 In the first case (privation of condition), we return to 
the conclusion of the previous argument and God who has lost the condi-
tion of being generate, cannot be something He is not. In the second case 
(condition of privation) arguments are applied to the Father and the Son. 
If the Father has acquired the condition of ingeneracy, he must have had 
the condition of generacy first, and then privation of that condition can 
be acquired, which is absurd. In the case of the Son, if he participated in 
ingeneracy, he would have lost his condition of being generated and could 
no longer be called the Son. This is also absurd since the Son cannot have 
both the generated essence and the condition of ingeneracy.
To understand better these conclusions, we must turn once again to 
Aristotle’s Categories, where he considers classes of oppositions. He says 
that one thing can oppose another in four ways: as relatives (τὰ πρός τι), as 
contraries (τὰ ἐναντία), as privation and possession (ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις), 
or as affirmation and negation (ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις).320 We can see 
that Aetius clearly refers to the third kind of opposition between privation 
and possession (or condition). But why does he classify opposition of ingen-
eracy and generacy to be the third kind? It cannot be a relative opposition, 
because in this case, opposition does not mean that they are contrary to 
one another. Aristotle gives examples of the double and the half, and of 
319 L.R. Wickham, op. cit., p. 562.
320 Cat. 11 b, 17–19 Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, 
ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις (Bodéüs, 
p. 53).
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the knowledge and the knowable. In both cases, the definition of one thing 
is possible, thanks to the other; therefore, we say that the double is called 
what it is because it is the double of something (in this case – the half). 
Similarly, we say that knowledge is defined because it is the knowledge of 
something (knowable), and, vice versa, the object of knowledge is some-
thing that could be known.321 It is obvious that ingeneracy is not what it 
is because it is ingeneracy of generacy, as the opposition in the sense of a 
relation depends on something that the two have in common.322
The second case must also be excluded because “things opposed as con-
traries, however, are never called just what they are, in relation to one 
another, though they are called contraries of one another.”323 Aristotle gives 
an example of good and bad, where good is not called good of the bad, 
and this example shows that contraries are not defined because of a third 
thing between them, as we will see below. Ingeneracy and generacy do not 
oppose each other in the fourth sense, because this is a contradiction which 
occurs in predication and, therefore, “for only with them is it necessary 
always for one to be true and the other one false.”324
The third kind of opposition may be applied to ingeneracy and generacy 
because they are the “qualities” of the essence of God, and in this kind, 
privation and possession (στέρησις καὶ ἕξις) also refer to a third thing. Ar-
istotle gives an example of blindness and sight, which are oppositions in 
connection with the eye, and says “each of them is spoken of in connection 
with whatever the possession naturally occurs in.”325 He also explains that 
privation occurs when it is entirely absent from the thing which naturally 
321 Cat. 11 b, 24–33 (Bodéüs, p. 53). Although it is not easy to differentiate be-
tween the first and the third kind of opposition, Aristotle extensively explains 
why the relative one is not the same with the opposition of privation and 
possession (Cat. 12 b, 17–13 a, 36; Bodéüs, pp. 57–60).
322 It is possible that Aetius excludes this possibility in argument 16.
323 Cat. 11 b, 33–35 τὰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα 
λέγεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται· (Bodéüs, p. 53; tr. Barnes).
324 Cat. 13 b, 3–4. ἐπὶ μόνων γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος 
αὐτῶν εἶναι (Bodéüs, p. 53; tr. Barnes).
325 Cat. 12 a, 26–29. Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον ἡ ὄψις 
καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν· καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις γίγνεσθαι, 
περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν (Bodéüs, p. 55; tr. Barnes).
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has it, and at the time when it is naturally for that thing to have it.326 Aristo-
tle’s explanations reveal to us why “ingeneracy” is not a negative predicate. 
When we call someone blind, he is really blind, and although blindness is 
in him as the lack of sight, it cannot be treated only negatively, because 
his blindness is not something non-existent in him. We can define blind-
ness because of the absence of sight which is natural, so for this definition 
to be true, we need a third thing which is the nature of the eye. Similarly, 
although we define “ingeneracy” as an opposition to “generacy,” it cannot 
be treated as a purely negative attribute. What Aetius seems to mean here 
is that God is not “ingenerate” because of the lack of “generacy,” since He 
was prior to it. Moreover, “ingeneracy” is natural to God’s essence and not 
something which God can lose.
All those arguments show also that ingeneracy cannot be treated as 
privation. Since generacy is posterior to ingeneracy, it is rather the oppo-
site – it is generacy which is the privation and loss of condition. Therefore, 
ingeneracy cannot be understood as merely a kind of quality, but is rather 
a positive attribute of God, which expresses His essence.327 Aetius confirms 
his conclusion in section 24, where he puts a stress on treating ingeneracy 
as God’s essence: “If ingeneracy is privation, privation loss of condition,” 
this would mean that we admit a change in unchangeable God,328 and in the 
next section, he also states that ingeneracy cannot be privation in the sense 
that it is something which does not belong to God.329 Therefore, it seems 
that in the end, Aetius is rather inclined to give us a negative answer to the 
question why “ingeneracy” cannot be understood as a negative predicate, 
326 Ibid. 12 a, 27–29 (Bodéüs, p. 55).
327 It is clearly stated in the next argument (21, p. 542–543) that treating ingen-
eracy as quality would mean confusion of the essence and its incidents: “If 
ingeneracy and generacy are each conditions, the essences are prior to the 
conditions, and yet the conditions, though secondary to the essences, are none 
the less qualitatively superior.” Ending his argument, Aetius says: “Since the 
ingenerate nature imports nothing into itself, how can it be a condition and 
not an essence?”
328 Synt. 24, p. 543. Εἰ τό ἀγέννητων στέρησις, ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἕζεως ἀποβολή ἐστν…
329 Synt. 25, p. 543. “If ingeneracy shows a privation which does not belong to 
God, on what grounds do we say he is ingenerate and cannot be generate?” Εἰ 
τό ἀγέννητον δηλοῖ στέρησιν ηὴ προσοῦσαν τῷ θεῷ, πῶς ἀυτὸν ἀγέννητσν εἶναι 
λέγομεν, γεννητὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι.
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because all possible cases when we treat it in a negative way can be reduced 
to unacceptable conclusions.
This also seems to be the way how Eunomius understood “ingeneracy.” 
In his Liber Apologeticus, he states that:
“He is not such [unbegotten] by the way of privation; for if privatives are privatives 
with respect to the inherent properties of something, then they are secondary to 
their positives. But birth has never been an inherent property of God. He was not 
first begotten and then deprived of that quality so as to become unbegotten.”330
Therefore, what Eunomius points out is that in the case of God, “ingen-
eracy” cannot be a negative condition, because being generated is not an 
antecedent property of God of which He could be deprived. But what 
exactly do we know when we admit that ingeneracy is the essence of God? 
Aetius seems to give an answer to this question in argument 29:
“If the ingenerate substance is indicated along with the essence of the offspring 
as its cause, since it is precisely the same in respect of all cause it is incomparable 
essence per se. It does not indicate its unapproachability externally but is per se 
incomparable and unapproachable since it is also ingenerate.”331
Because of ingeneracy of the Father, he is also incomparable and unap-
proachable (ἀσύγκριτος καὶ ἀπρόσιτος). The central problem of this passage 
is the meaning of the term ἀπρόσιτος. Some scholars see here a reference 
to the first Letter to Timothy (6: 16), where God is “dwelling in light 
unapproachable,” and, therefore, the term means “incomprehensible” or 
“unknown.” However, in his commentary, L.R. Wickham notes that such 
interpretation opposes the claims that were later developed by Eunomius, 
namely that we can know the essence of God.332 It is also inconsistent 
with earlier claims of Aetius himself who so strongly defended the asser-
tion that ingeneracy is the essence of God. It is very hard to argue that 
we exactly know who the Father is and at the same time claim that he is 
330 LA 8, 7–10: άλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ στέρηεσιν· εἴ γε τῶν κατἀ φύσιν αἱ στερήσεις 
εἰσὶ στερήσεις, καὶ ἓξεων δεύτεραι. οὔτε δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἧν τις τῷ θεῷ γένεσις, οὔτε 
προτέραν ἔχων ταύτην εἶτα στερηθεὶς γένομεν ἀγέννητος (Vaggione, p. 42–43).
331 Synt. 29, p.  543. Eἰ τῇ τοῦ γεννήματος οὐσία συνεμφαίνεται ὡς αἰτία ἡ 
ἀγέννητος ὑπόστασις, κατά πάσης ἀιτίας τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχουσα, ἀυτὸ οὐσία 
ἐστίν ἀσύγκριτος, οὐκ ἔζωθεν συνεμφαίνουσα τὸ ἀπρόσιτον, ἀυτὸ δὲ ὑπάρχουσα 
ἀσύγκριτος καὶ ἀπρόσιτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀγέννητος.
332 Cf. Wickham, op. cit., p. 565.
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incomprehensible. Therefore, L.R. Wickham’s interpretation seems to be 
sound, when he explains: “ἀπρόσιτος I think, then, means here, ‘incompara-
ble/utterly transcendent’, and, so far as the knowledge of God is concerned, 
Aetius and Eunomius held, I believe, (a) that it is false to say that the es-
sence of God is unknown – for this would imply that God is irrational, (b) 
that God’s essence is known as transcendent and unique, (c) that there is 
no knowledge of God by way of mystical communion with his essence.”
Therefore, the knowledge of the essence of the Father does not exactly 
mean that we know who he is, but rather we know that he is essentially 
transcendent and unapproachable. Although Aetius claimed that the term 
“ingeneracy” indicated the essence, the term itself means for us only His 
absolute transcendence. Such interpretation is also consistent with the next 
argument, where he puts a stress on the total transcendence of God by say-
ing that He: “surpasses every nature” and that “ingeneracy is not revelatory 
of essence.”333
It seems, then, that Aetius attempted to complete the impossible task to 
reconcile the transcendence of God with the possibility of the knowledge 
of God’s essence. It must be noted that if to know God does not mean to 
really understand his essence, the term “ingeneracy” ultimately means that 
we understand His essence as utterly transcendent. But can we say that by 
such statement we really understand what God is? It seems that we can only 
accept the name of “ingeneracy” which was revealed to us, and, therefore, 
all syllogisms in Syntagmation can be treated rather as showing the con-
sequences of rejecting this name, which, as Aetius wants to demonstrate, 
always leads to absurd conclusions.334
If Aetius really thought that we understood the essence this way, it seems 
very unconvincing, because in fact “ingeneracy” does not tell us anything 
new about what God is since it seems to be only a conception of His tran-
scendence. But it is evident that the question of what does it mean to know 
God becomes the central problem of this phase of the polemic.
333 Synt. 30, p. 543. Eἰ ὑπεράγει πόσης φύσεως ὁ παντοκράτωρ, διὰ τό ἀγέννητον 
ὑπεράγει, ὅπερ ἐστίν αἴτιον τοῖς γεννητοῖς διαμονῆς. εἰ δὲ μἠ ἔστιν οὐσίας 
δηλωηικὸν τὸ ἀγέννητσν, πόθεν ἂν ἡ τῶν γεννητῶν φύσις ἕζει τὸ διασῴζεσθαι.
334 Cf. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 32.
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3.2 Worship and knowledge – a puzzling question
In Syntagmation, we have observed a specific way of presenting arguments. 
Throughout the work, we can identify attempts to perform something simi-
lar to the Stoic procedure of reduction of non-simple arguments to the 
series of undemonstrated arguments, which need no proof because they 
are self-evident. In section 20, we find one of the arguments categorized 
as undemonstrated: “not first therefore not the second.”335 Such a way of 
presenting arguments, almost as they would be answers to the questions 
which were asked to the author, is very characteristic of the Anomean 
style.336 This reflects the missionary manner which was used in attempts to 
convince Christians that the Anomean doctrine was right. We can observe it 
also in the question which will be analysed in this fragment of our analysis.
In one of his letters, Basil provides his explanation to Amphilochus of 
Iconium, a bishop who apparently struggled with the Anomean, or rather 
(since the letter itself was written relatively late) the Eunomian missionary 
activity and wanted to know how to deal with their puzzling questions.337 
The supporters of Eunomius asked their Orthodox opponents: “Do you 
worship what you know or what you do not know?”338 There are only two 
possible answers to such a question, but the goal of the whole argumenta-
tion is to reduce these two answers to one. The obvious reply is that “We 
know what we adore,” and if such an answer is given, another question 
immediately follows: “What is the substance of what is adored?” Admitting 
ignorance of the substance causes the claim: “Then you adore what you do 
not know.”339 If the opponent’s answer at the beginning is that he does not 
335 I think that similarity can be found despite the fact that we do not have the 
full set of Stoic rules preserved, cf. B. Mates, Stoic logic, Berkeley 1961, 
pp. 77–82.
336 Cf. L.R. Wickham, op. cit., p. 536.
337 Amphilochus was Basil’s relative who had worked as a lawyer and had no 
experience in theological issues before he become the bishop of Iconium, cf. 
Kopecek, op. cit., p. 431.
338 Ep. 234, 1, 1. Ὅ οἶδας σέβεις, ἢ ὃ ἀγνοεῖς (Courtonne, p. 41; LCL 243, p. 371).
339 Ep. 234, 1, 1–6. Ἐὰν ἀποκρινώμεθα δτι ὃ οἴδαμεν τοῦτο προσκυνοῦμεν, ταχεῖα 
παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἡ ἀπάντησις· τί ἡ οὐσία τοῦ προσκυνουμένου; Ἐὰν δὲ ἀγνοεῖν 
ὁμολογήσωμεν τὴν οὐσίαν, πάλιν ἡμῖν περιτρέψαντες λέγουσιν ὅτι οὐκοῦν ὅ οὐκ 
οἴδατε προσκυνεῖτε (LCL 243, p. 371).
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know what he adores, there is no need to ask any further questions. There-
fore, the whole argumentation leads to the admission of ignorance of those 
who do not know God’s essence. This tricky question is called captious by 
Basil,340 since it both forces the opponent to answer and to admit that he is 
completely ignorant of God who he worships. A. Radde-Gallwitz notes that 
it is similar to Meno’s paradox, but here “enquire after” is replaced with 
“worship.”341 Therefore, if you know who you worship, there is no need for 
any inquiry, and if you do not know, how can you obtain any knowledge 
of who to worship, since you do not know.342 So the goal of the question 
would be to show the absurdity of the claims of the Orthodox. But I think 
there is more to it than that. Another goal of the question can be seen in 
the context of the Biblical passages to which it refers.
Despite of all claims that are present in Christian literature from the 
time of the 2nd century that Christians have the true knowledge of God, 
this question bring to mind at least two very important passages from the 
Holy Scriptures. In the dialogue between Jesus and a Samaritan woman, 
the Saviour says: “You Samaritans worship what you do not know; we 
worship what we do know, for salvation is from the Jews.”343 In the second 
fragment, when speaking at the Areopagus, St Paul says that the Greeks 
have built an altar and worshiped “an unknown God,” while this God is 
340 Ep. 234, 1, 10 (Courtonne, p. 42, LCL 243, p. 373).
341 Cf. A. Radde-Gallwitz, op. cit., pp. 123–124.
342 Cf. Meno 80 D-E. “M.: And how will you search for something, Socrates, 
when you don’t know what it is at all? I mean, which of the things you don’t 
know will you take in advance and search for, when you don’t know what it 
is? Or even if you come right up against it, how will you know that it’s the 
unknown thing you’re looking for?
 S.: I see what you’re getting at, Meno. Do you realize what a controversy 
you’re conjuring up? The claim is that it’s impossible for a man to search either 
for what he knows or for what he doesn’t know: he wouldn’t be searching for 
what he knows, since he knows it and that makes the search unnecessary, and 
he can’t search for what he doesn’t know either, since he doesn’t even know 
what it is he’s going to search for” (tr. R. Waterfield, p. 113).
343 J 4: 22. ὑμεῖς προσκυνεῖτε ὃ οὐκ οἴδατε, ἡμεῖς προσκυνοῦμεν ὃ οἴδαμεν, ὅτι ἡ 
σωτηρία ἐκ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐστίν· (tr. RSVCE). As we will see below, Gregory of 
Nyssa makes his argument against this question by referring to this passage 
of the Scripture (CE III, 1, 105–110; GNO II, 39–41).
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the one, whom the Christians adore. Therefore, he says: “For as I passed 
along, and observed the objects of your worship, I found also an altar with 
this inscription, ‘To an unknown god.’ What, therefore, you worship as 
unknown, this I proclaim to you.”344 Therefore, the goal of the Eunomian 
paradox would be rather to show that the Orthodox are like the Samari-
tans or the Greeks who worship an unknown God, whereas those are true 
Christians who know the object of their adoration. This accusation would 
have been especially painful in relation to the fragment of the Acts, because 
of all arguments so strongly confirmed by the Apologists that the Christians 
are those who really know the truth about God.
But the paradox has one assumption which will be exposed and under-
mined by the opponents. The Eunomians assume that to know God means 
to know his essence. If the Orthodox admitted that they know God’s es-
sence, they would immediately argue that it is “ingeneracy,” and this sets 
the problem of the generation of the Son in the convenient perspective of 
admitting that His substance must be different from that of the Father. 
Therefore, the question of what it means to know God becomes once again 
one of the key issues in demonstrating inferiority of the Son.
3.2.1 The distinction between “that is” and “what is”
Basil’s answer is based on undermining the claim that to know God means 
to know His essence, since “knowing has many meanings.”345 He enumer-
ates many attributes of God that we know: “the greatness of God, and His 
power, and His wisdom, and His goodness, and His providence whereby He 
cares for us, and the justice of His judgment.”346 But the knowledge of the 
attributes does not allow to know substance, and the conception (ἐννοία) 
of God which we have is the combination of our knowledge of attributes 
344 Acts 17: 23. διερχόμενος γὰρ καὶ ἀναθεωρῶν τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν εὗρον καὶ 
βωμὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐπεγέγραπτο, ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ. ὃ οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτο ἐγὼ 
καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν (tr. RSVCE).
345 Ep. 234, 1, 5–6 (Courtonne, p. 42; LCL 243, p. 371).
346 Ep. 234, 1, 6–9 Καὶ γὰρ τὴν μεγαλειότητα τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰδέναι λέγομεν καὶ τὴν 
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ᾗ ἐπιμελεῖται ἡμῶν 
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον αὐτοῦ τῆς κρίσεως, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν (Courtonne, p. 42.; LCL 
243, p. 373).
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(ἀπηριθμησάμεθα). In the following passage, Basil refutes the argument that, 
since God is simple, all attributes are of his essence. He calls such a state-
ment a sophism, which involves “countless absurdities”347 and asks whether 
all those attributes are the name of one substance: “And are His awfulness 
and His benevolence equivalent to each other. His justice and His creative 
power. His foreknowledge and His requiting, His magnificence and His 
providence?”348 Since the substance of God is one but names are different 
and even contrary to each other, they cannot be the names from which we 
can gain the knowledge of the essence. Basil says more precisely what are 
all those attributes – they are activities of God:
“But if they say substance is something else, let them not mislead us by citing its 
simplicity. For they themselves have confessed that substance is one thing and 
each of what was enumerated was another. ‘Nay, the activities are varied and the 
substance is simple.’ But we say that from His activities we know our God, but 
His substance itself we do not profess to approach. For His activities descend to 
us, but His substance remains inaccessible.”349
At the end of Letter 234, he adds that: “…from the activities is the knowl-
edge, and from the knowledge is the worship,”350 so admitting that one 
knows the activities is sufficient to confirm that one has the knowledge of 
who he worships, and this seems to be the core of Basil’s answer. By mak-
ing a distinction between substance and activities (ἐνέργειαι), he tells us 
that we can know only what the works of God are, because we can see the 
effects of his activities in the sensual world. Activities cannot give us the 
knowledge of the essence, but only of the existence of God. This distinction 
between substance and activity seems to be very important, especially in 
the context of Eunomius’ theological methodology, which he exposes in his 
347 Ep.  234, 1, 14 σόφισμά ἐστι μυρίας τὰς ἀτοπίας ἔχον. (LCL 243, p. 373; 
Courtonne, p. 42).
348 Ep. 234, 1, 16–19 Καὶ ἰσοδυναμεῖ ἀλλήλοις τὸ φοβερὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον 
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δημιουργικόν, τὸ προγνωστικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀνταποδοτικόν, τὸ 
μεγαλεῖον καὶ τὸ προνοητικόν (Courtonne, p. 42; LCL 243, p. 373).
349 Ep. 234, 1, 27–31 ̓ Αλλ’ αἱ μὲν ἐνέργειαι ποικίλαι, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ἁπλῆ. ̔ Ημεῖς δὲ ἐκ 
μὲν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν γνωρίζειν λέγομεν τὸν Θεὸν ἡμῶν, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῇ προσεγγίζειν 
οὐχ ὑπισχνούμεθα. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἡμᾶς καταβαίνουσιν, ἡ δὲ 
οὐσία αὐτοῦ μένει ἀπρόσιτος (Courtonne, p. 42; LCL 243, p. 373).
350 Ep. 234, 3, 12–13. Οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ γνῶσις, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς γνώσεως 
ἡ προσκύνησις (Courtonne, p. 43; LCL 243, p. 377).
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Liber apologetics, but it will be discussed fully in the next chapter of this 
book. Here, I would like to focus on Basil’s approach to the knowledge of 
the existence of God and its consequences.
Basil repeats three times that we can know that God exists, but two of 
those texts present a problem in the context of knowing the essence:351
“But I do know that He exists, but what His substance is I consider beyond un-
derstanding.” (᾿Εγὼ δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν οἶδα, τί δὲ ἡ οὐσία ὑπὲρ διάνοιαν τίθεμαι.)352
“Knowledge of His divine substance, then, is the perception of His incomprehen-
sibility; and that is to be worshipped which is comprehended, not as to what its 
substance is, but as to that its substance exists.” (Εἴδησις ἄρα τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἡ 
αἴσθησις αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας, καὶ σεπτὸν οὐ τὸ καταληφθὲν τίς ἡ οὐσία, ἀλλ’ ὅτι 
ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία.)353
In those passages, Basil makes a distinction between ὅτι ἔστιν οὐσία – that 
substance exists, and τι/τις οὐσία – what substance is. Looking for the source 
of this distinction, we turn to Aristotle’s Posterior analytics, where at the 
beginning of the second book, he enumerates the objects of inquiry to char-
acterize the order of demonstration, which passes from the knowledge of 
the fact to the knowledge of the essence. Those objects are the fact (τὸ ὅτι), 
the reason why (τὸ διότι), if it is (εἰ ἔστι), and what it is (τί ἐστιν).354 There 
is a lot of uncertainty in the understanding of this passage,355 but it is clear 
that Aristotle wants to explain the mode of investigation, which leads from 
the fact or the recognition that something exists to the essence of things. 
Throughout Posterior Analytics, he maintains that the perception of the fact 
ought to precede the answer to the question “what it is.” This distinction 
also corresponds to the distinction between perception and thought, and 
the knowledge of the fact and the knowledge of the reason why.356 But the 
351 The third one (2, 10–12) will be commented below.
352 Ep. 234, 2, 8–9 (Courtonne, p. 43; LCL 243, p. 375).
353 Ep. 234, 2, 12–14 (Courtonne, p. 43; LCL 243, p. 375).
354 Anal. Post. II, 1, 89 b, 23–25. Τὰ ζητούμενά ἐστιν ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅσαπερ 
ἐπιστάμεθα. ζητοῦμεν δὲ τέτταρα, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστιν. (tr. Barnes).
355 The most difficult question is the distinction between τὸ ὅτι and εἰ ἔστι since 
both concern the existence of the object. See J. Barnes commentary in: Aris-
totle, Posterior Analytics, Oxford 2002, pp. 203–204.
356 Cf. O. Harari, Knowledge and Demonstration. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 
Springer 2004, p. 130.
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perception of the fact is not equated with experience, it is rather a perceptual 
understanding which differs from experience as having universal validity, 
since it grasps typical features of particular instances. In the passages where 
Aristotle explains this kind of perception, he uses the term αἴσθησις as an 
apprehension of the universal.357 This, however, is not sufficient to have the 
knowledge of the reason why, that is the understanding of the essence. O. 
Harari underlines that perceptual understanding “is not considered full-
fledged knowledge since perceptual understanding does not capture the es-
sence of the object, according to its conceptual characterizations.”358 The 
conceptual understanding, on the contrary, is the full apprehension of an 
object which really exists, because it is the explanation of its essence.
Aristotle’s explanation of the demonstrative procedure is very similar 
to Basil’s claims about the knowledge of the possibility of knowing God. 
The two terms of Basil’s explanation (ὅτι ἔστιν οὐσία – that substance exists 
and τι/τις οὐσία – what substance is) correspond to the first and the fourth 
term from Posterior Analytics (the fact – τὸ ὅτι and what it is – τί ἐστιν). 
If he, indeed, evokes the demonstrative procedure presented by Aristotle, 
his explanation means that we cannot execute this demonstration in the 
case of God. We can only confirm that God is, but we can never pass to 
what He is. What is interesting, the perception of the existence of God can 
be made only on the basis of God’s activities, which “descend to us.” In 
Posterior Analytics, the first phase of the procedure can be understood as 
admittance of the fact which occurs on the basis of certain properties of the 
investigated thing, just like the eclipse which is the attribute of the moon.359 
It is possible that we have a similar mode of ὅτι ἔστιν in Basil’s explanation.
There is yet another thing which can be understood better in the context 
of Aristotle’s text. This is the expression of Basil’s360 that we can have the ἡ 
αἴσθησις αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας (the perception of His incomprehensibility). 
357 Cf. ibid., p. 131.
358 Ibid., p. 132.
359 See the commentary of W.D. Ross in: Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, 
Oxford 1957, p. 610. In the 5th century, Aristotle’s commentary was ascribed 
to Philoponus (the authorship is currently questioned) and the first part of the 
demonstrative procedure is understood this way, cf. 337, 18–32 (Philoponus, 
On Aristotle Posterior Analytics 2; tr. O. Goldin, Bloomsbury 2014, p. 19).
360 Ep. 234, 2, 12–13 (Courtonne, p. 43; LCL 243, p. 375).
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Is it possible that Basil says that incomprehensibility can be the object of 
sensual perception? As we have seen above, in the context of the presented 
demonstrative procedure, Aristotle uses the term αἴσθησις as perceptual 
understanding, which has universal validity. If we understand Basil’s ex-
pression this way, we can understand the perception of incomprehensibility 
as a kind of the universal grasp of the characteristic feature of God. The 
use of this term also escapes the suggestion that incomprehensibility can 
be the object of conceptual understanding, which is the grasp of essence. 
Therefore, if Basil indeed meant to use this term in Aristotle’s sense, he was 
very precise in saying that we can grasp incomprehensibility in a universal 
manner, but it is a kind of perception, not comprehension. In other words, 
we can see with some certainty that comprehension of God is impossible.
3.2.2 Faith and understanding
Another problem of Basil’s answer to Amphilochus is the question of how 
to understand faith and its relation to understanding. Having admitted that 
one can know that God exists, but His essence is beyond understanding, 
he asks:
“How then am I saved? Through faith. And it is faith enough to know that God 
is, not what He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him.”361
Basil uses here the same distinction between “that is” (ὅτι ἐστὶν) and “what 
is” (τί ἐστι) in the context of the knowledge sufficient to have faith. He re-
fers to Hebrews 11:6, where the belief in the existence of God is presented 
as needed to approach God and receive the reward.362 Basil returns to the 
problem of faith and after quoting the Gospel (9:28), he says:
“Thus worship follows faith, and faith is strengthened by power. But if you say 
that he who believes also understands, from what he believes, from this also he 
understands; or even the reverse, from what he understands, from this also he 
361 Ep. 234, 2, 10–12. Πῶς οὖν σώζομαι; Διὰ τῆς πίστεως. Πίστις δὲ αὐτάρκης 
εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός, οὐχὶ τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ἐκζητοῦσιν αὐτὸν μισθαποδότης 
γίνεται (Courtonne, p. 43; LCL 243, p. 375).
362 This is actually a paraphrase of the original text, and it also resembles other 
fragments of the Holy Scripture, cf. A. Radde-Gallwitz, op. cit., p. 125.
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believes. But we understand God from His power. Therefore we believe in Him 
whom we understand, and we worship Him in whom we believe.”363
The interpretation of Hebrews 11:6 has led to a conclusion that worship fol-
lows faith, but why in the next phrase does Basil contrast it with the statement 
that it is the understanding that follows faith, and why it is put in the manner 
of a discussion, since it starts with “if you say”? This actually is but another 
paraphrase of the Biblical text of Isaiah 7:9, which in the Septuagint version 
claims: μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνιῆτε (if you believe not, neither will you 
understand).364 Therefore, Basil evokes here another fragment of the Holy 
Scripture, which seems to contradict the one that has been quoted previ-
ously. It is evident that this fragment supports the Eunomian position that 
the knowledge of the essence is necessary since understanding is the outcome 
of faith. Basil tries somehow to combine worship with understanding in the 
last sentence of this passage, but since such explanation is not sufficient, he 
continues the topic in the next letter by asking what is first: knowledge or 
faith.365 Although it could seem confusing, the answer is clear:
“Generally, in the sciences, faith goes before knowledge, but in our own teaching, 
even if someone says that knowledge must exist before faith, we do not disagree - 
knowledge, however, commensurate with human comprehension.”366
In the sciences (ἐπὶ τῶν μαθημάτων), belief must go before knowledge, be-
cause at the beginning of the process of gaining knowledge one must accept 
363 Ep. 234, 3, 15–21. Οὕτως ἡ μὲν προσκύνησις τῇ πίστει ἀκολουθεῖ, ἡ δὲ πίστις 
ἀπὸ δυνάμεως βεβαιοῦται. Εἰ δὲ λέγεις τὸν πιστεύοντα καὶ γινώσκειν, ἀφ’ ὧν 
πιστεύει ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ γινώσκει· ἢ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀφ’ ὧν γινώσκει ἀπὸ τούτων 
καὶ πιστεύει. Γινώσκομεν δὲ ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τὸν Θεόν. ῞Ωστε πιστεύομεν μὲν 
τῷ γνωσθέντι, προσκυνοῦμεν δὲ τῷ πιστευθέντι (Courtonne, pp. 43–44; LCL 
243, p. 377).
364 Verse is translated this way only in Septuagint. In Vulgate, it has a different 
meaning: nisi credideritis, non permanebitis (if you believe not, you will not 
stand firm at all).
365 Courtonne notes that the letters to Amphilochus 233–236 had been probably 
a single memorandum which was later divided according to the questions and 
answers (Courtonne, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 39).
366 Ep. 235, 1, 12–14 ῾Ημεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι καθόλου μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν μαθημάτων πίστις 
γνώσεως προηγεῖται· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ καθ’ ἡμᾶς λόγου, κἂν λέγῃ τις προκατάρχειν τὴν 
γνῶσιν τῆς πίστεως, οὐ διαφερόμεθα (γνῶσιν μέντοι τὴν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ καταλήψει 
σύμμετρον) (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 44; LCL 243, pp. 377–379).
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the truth which he acquired, he must be convinced that it is true. Basil does 
not speak here about faith in the sense of believing in the truth about God 
which comes from the Scripture. He rather describes the general mode 
of acquiring knowledge which is present in all investigations. So this is 
rather a belief, than faith. To understand, for example, the Pythagorean 
Theorem, one must have heard about it and accept the formula as true. He 
must be convinced that it is true what he has heard to start the process of 
demonstration which leads to understanding. The difference is that at the 
beginning one accepts it as true because of the authority of someone else, 
and in the end, when one has understood the theorem, one accepts the 
truth by the authority of one’s own reason. We can see that Basil presents 
here the process of demonstration similar to the above-presented passage 
from “that is” to “what is,” from the partial or imperfect admittance of the 
truth to the perfect grasp of the essence of the thing, which can be shown 
by demonstration. Such description of the process of learning goes deep in 
the ancient tradition. We can find its traces in the famous allegory of the 
cave from Plato’s Republic. The first step on the way of going out of the 
cave, the moment of philosophical conversion, is turning away from the 
shadows to the perception of the sensual things itself. This is the moment 
“when one was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his neck 
around, walk, and look up toward the light…”367 Turning towards true 
sensual objects is described as turning from εἰκασία to πίστις, and belief is 
necessary to start upon the road which finally leads to the true knowledge 
of the ideas (νόησις) – the objects in sunlight outside of the cave.
Plato’s famous allegory was a lesson which was developed by its readers 
and interpreters, but we also have the testimony that it was known and well 
understood by the Church Fathers. Probably the best example is Augustine, 
who frequently referred to the fragment of Isaiah 7:9.368 It can be clearly 
seen in the fragment of De quantitate animae, where Augustine explains 
367 Resp. 514 A-516 C (tr. C.D.C. Reeve, Cambridge 2004, p. 207).
368 In case of St Augustine, the faith is also very often treated as religious one, 
while he frequently uses credere in meaning of natural belief necessary to 
obtain intelligere – understanding. Cf. T. Stępień, Nisi credideritis, non intel-
ligetis –Belief as a Form of Natural Cognition in Writings of St Augustine’s, 
Studia Pelplińskie vol. XLIX (2016), pp. 287–300.
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to Evodius how can we obtain the knowledge in geometry. He makes a 
distinction between trusting the word of another and trusting our own 
reason. For some persons, it suffices to accept someone else’s word because 
it saves time and effort. But the long road of reading and learning, which 
goes through many sophisms and “swamp or errors,” finally leads to the 
situation when one has the right and certain reason, free from falsehood 
and confirmed in truth.369 The difficult road to the true knowledge is very 
much similar here to the painful process of going out of the cave from the 
Republic. This also resembles what Basil means by referring to grammar:
“For in the sciences one must first take it on faith that the letter spoken is alpha, 
and later, having learned the characters and their pronunciations, grasp also the 
exact notion (κατανόησιν) of the force of such letter.”370
369 Augustinus, De quantitate animae I, 7, 12. “To trust the word of another is 
one thing; to trust our own reason is a different thing (Aliud est enim cum 
auctoritati credimus, aliud cum rationi); to take something on authority is a 
great timesaver and involves no toil. If this way has any attraction for you, 
you may read in the extensive writings of great and good men what they 
thought should be said about these subjects as a safe and easy guide for the 
unlearned; and these men aimed at securing the confidence of persons whose 
minds, being either too slow or too occupied, could find no other safe road 
to truth. Such persons, whose number is very great, if they wish to grasp the 
truth by reason, are easily taken in by sophisms that land them in the swamp 
of error from which they never or only with difficulty succeed in emerging 
and extricating themselves. For these, then, it is a decided advantage to trust a 
most reliable authority (excellentissimae auctoritati credere) and to shape their 
conduct according to it. If you think that such a way is safer, I shall not only 
offer no resistance, but shall thoroughly approve. But, if you cannot bridle 
your eager conviction of coming to the truth by reason (persuasisti ratione 
pervenire ad veritatem), you must be prepared for long, hard, and circuitous 
riding, pursuing the path where reason beckons – that reason alone which 
is worthy of the name, that is, right reason (vera ratio). Not only is it right, 
but it is also sure (certa) and free from every semblance of falsehood, if man 
can ever attain to that state where no false argument or specious pretext can 
make him betray the truth” (Trape, vol. III/2, pp. 31–32; tr. J.J. MacMahon, 
pp. 71–72).
370 Ep. 235, 1, 5–9. ᾿Επὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν μαθημάτων πιστεῦσαι δεῖ πρῶτον ὅτι ἄλφα 
λέγεται καί, μαθόντα τοὺς χαρακτῆρας καὶ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν, ὕστερον λαβεῖν καὶ 
τὴν ἀκριβῆ κατανόησιν τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ στοιχείου (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 44; 
LCL 243, p. 379).
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For Basil, just like for Augustine, this is the description of the process of learn-
ing, but this procedure taken from sciences (μαθημάτων) is different from the 
way in which we acquire the knowledge of God, where knowledge also could 
precede faith. Referring to the Romans 1:20, he says that first thing which 
we have is the notion of the existence of God (ἡ ἔννοια ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ) 
which we can have from his works. Those are invisible things (τὰ ἀόρατα), 
which are manifested in the creation of the world. Since we know that God is 
Creator, we also accept him as our Lord, which leads to worship. Therefore, 
at the end of the passage, he gives the order of these acts:
1. Knowledge of the existence of God.
2. Faith follows that knowledge (accepting that He is our Lord).
3. Worship follows faith.371
It is worth reminding what Basil said in the previous fragment: that knowl-
edge can be situated before faith in this process, but it must be “commen-
surate with human comprehension” (ἀνθρωπίνῃ καταλήψει σύμμετρον). This 
measure of comprehension expands only to the limit of knowing that God 
does exist; what is above, it lies beyond human intellect.
After the full description of the ways in which we can obtain the knowl-
edge of God, Basil comes back to the meaning of the word “knowledge” 
which has many significations (πολύσημόν ἐστι). The main objection is that 
Eunomians thought up the paradox which relies on understanding knowl-
edge only in one universal (καθόλου) way.372 But a thing may be known 
in different aspects with respect to (κατὰ): number, size, power, manner of 
subsistence, time of generation, and substance.373 Basil also shows that such 
371 Ep. 235, 1, 5–9. ᾿Εν δὲ τῇ περὶ Θεοῦ πίστει ἡγεῖται μὲν ἡ ἔννοια ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὅτι 
ἐστὶ Θεός, ταύτην δὲ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργημάτων συνάγομεν. Σοφὸν γὰρ καὶ δυνατὸν 
καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀόρατα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κτίσεως νοοῦντες 
ἐπιγινώσκομεν. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ Δεσπότην ἑαυτῶν αὐτὸν κατα δεχόμεθα. ᾿Επειδὴ 
γὰρ παντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὸς ὁ Θεός, μέρος δὲ κόσμου ἡμεῖς, καὶ ἡμῶν 
ἄρα δημιουργὸς ὁ Θεός. Ταύτῃ τῇ γνώσει ἡ πίστις ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ τοιαύτῃ πίστει 
ἡ προσκύνησις (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 44; LCL 243, p. 379).
372 Ep. 235, 2, 1–5 (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 45; LCL 243, p. 379).
373 Ep. 235, 2, 5–9. τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς 
ὑπάρξεως, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τῆς γεννήσεως, τὸ δὲ κατ’ οὐσίαν (Courtonne, 
vol. 3, p. 45; LCL 243, p. 379).
110
various meanings of the term “knowledge” are used in the Holy Scripture, 
but Eunomians “pushing all those things aside, reduce knowledge to one 
significance, the contemplation of the very substance of God.”374 The exam-
ples of two paradoxes of knowing the sand, and knowing Timothy, show 
that such a distinction of the various aspects of knowing is present in our 
cognition of sensual objects, and one may claim that one both knows and 
is ignorant of a thing in different aspects. Therefore, the final answer given 
by Basil is that we must know what can be known about God, but we must 
not go further claiming that we know what cannot be known:
“But our position is that we confess that we know what is knowable about God, 
and yet to “know” anything, on the other hand that escapes our comprehension 
is impossible.”375
3.3 You are like the Samaritans…
Since the letters commented above were probably a single letter in the form 
of a memorandum (ὑπομνηστικόν), which was circulated among the Or-
thodox, we can assume that Gregory of Nyssa knew its content. But in the 
third book of Contra Eunomium, which he wrote after Basil’s death, he felt 
that it was necessary to comment on the same paradox of worshiping the 
unknown. Perhaps, Eunomians were still active at that time, or perhaps he 
thought that some additions must be made to Basil’s position. After a long 
comment on the passage from Proverbs 8,22, which was the Biblical basis 
for Eunomius’ argument concerning the created nature of the Son,376 he 
discusses the misunderstanding of being only-begotten and offspring by his 
opponent.377 Then, Gregory begins a long passage on incomprehensibility 
of God, which is a side path of his demonstration, since coming back to the 
discussion of the meaning of the term “offspring,” he says: “The argument, 
374 Ep. 235, 3, 23–25. Οἱ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα παρωσάμενοι ἐπὶ ἓν σημαινόμενον τὴν 
γνῶσιν ἕλκουσι, τὴν θεωρίαν αὐτῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς οὐσίας (Courtonne, vol. 3, 
p. 46; LCL 243, pp. 383–385).
375 Ep. 235, 2, 13–15. Αλλ’ ἡμεῖς εἰδέναι μὲν ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, 
εἰδέναι δέ τι πάλιν ὃ ἐκφεύγει ἡμῶν τὴν κατάληψιν (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 45; 
LCL 243, p. 381).
376 CE III, 1, 4–65 (GNO II, 4–27).
377 CE III, 1, 66–102 (GNO II, 27–38).
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however, has gone beyond what was intended, by following the continual 
sequence of conclusions.”378
In this fragment, Gregory unwinds an extensive argument with much 
more radical claims on incomprehensibility of God than we have observed 
in the answer given by Basil. He starts with the statement that there is no 
interpretation (ἑρμηνείαν), outline (ὑπογραφὴν), or explanation (ἐξήγησιν) of 
the essence of God, and he can only affirm that “it is not possible to grasp 
what is in its infinite nature (ἀόριστον φύσιν) in any concept (ἐπινοίᾳ).”379 
Referring to Psalm (144/145:3,5), he says that since the things about God 
are endless, His essence is even more infinite and, therefore, it cannot be 
limited in any way.380 By means of nouns and verbs, we grasp the meaning 
of an object, and it is a kind of an enclosure and limitation. Therefore, there 
is no name that can grasp the incomprehensible (ἀπερίληπτον) and no word 
to announce the inexpressible (ἀνεκφώνητον). Naming is impossible when 
we speak of an object that is infinite by nature and, therefore, “Divinity 
is greater and higher than names can signify.”381 Infinity and lack of any 
limitation is crucial here because it is the core of Gregory’s counterargu-
ments in the next passages.
These claims on the incomprehensibility and inexpressibility of the es-
sence of God are an introduction to presenting an objection to Eunomians, 
which ridicules the ignorance of the Orthodox by saying: “You worship you 
know not what, if we do not know the essence of what we worship.”382 In 
378 CE III, 1, 111. ᾿Αλλὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον παρηνέχθη τῶν προκειμένων ὁ λόγος, τοῖς 
ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐφευρισκομένοις ἑπόμενος (GNO II, 41, 20–23; tr. Hall, 
p. 64).
379 CE III, 1, 103. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀόριστον κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπινοίᾳ τινὶ ῥημάτων 
διαληφθῆναι (GNO II, 38, 19–21; tr. Hall, p. 63).
380 CE III, 1, 104. εἰ δὲ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπεράτωτα, πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος κατ’ 
οὐσίαν ὅ τι ποτὲ καὶ ἐστὶν οὐδενὶ ὅρῳ κατ’ οὐδὲν μέρος διαλαμβάνεται (GNO II, 
38, 24–26).
381 CE III, 1, 105. κρεῖττόν ἐστι καὶ ὑψηλότερον τῆς ὀνομαστικῆς σημασίας τὸ θεῖον 
(GNO II, 39, 4–5; tr. S.G. Hall, p. 63).
382 CE III, 1, 105. ̔ Υμεῖς προσκυνεῖτε ὃ οὐκ οἴδατε, εἰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ προσκυνουμένου 
οὐκ οἴδαμεν (GNO II, 39, 13–14; tr. Hall, p. 63). In his translation, Hall con-
stantly refers to οὐσία as “being,” or in this case “essential being,” but since 
the whole argument concerns the knowledge of the essence, I changed “being” 
to “substance” in my quotations.
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this case, the accusation is not put forth in the form of a question but rather 
in the form of a statement, which is the conclusion of the paradox, and it 
confirms that its goal was to reduce two possible answers to the claim that 
the Orthodox do not know what they worship. It is also noticeable that 
in this passage, Gregory does not quote Eunomius, because this paradox 
does not appear in Liber apologeticus, and it is unlikely that it was present 
in the lost fragments of Apologia apologiae.
In his answer, Gregory first argues that since the Orthodox know what 
can be known of God, they do know what they worship. He evokes the 
fragment of Romans 11:33 saying that according to Paul not only the judge-
ments of God are impossible to trace, but also the paths of knowledge are 
inaccessible. He explains:
“It was this, we suppose, the Apostle intended to indicate when he said that the 
ways which lead to the incomprehensible are ‘past finding out’, meaning by this 
expression that this knowledge is inaccessible to human thinking, and that none 
has yet set his mind upon such an intellectual journey, or indicated any trace or 
sign of an approach to apprehending the incomprehensible.”383
The only lesson that could be learned from Paul’s words is that the essence 
of God is beyond any human concept and knowledge. This fragment could 
be read as a comment on Basil’s words that the only knowledge that we can 
have of God is His incomprehensibility, and for Gregory, the knowledge of 
incomprehensibility is sufficient to claim that “We know what we worship”:
“For this reason we affirm in our own selves the ridiculed doctrine, confessing 
ourselves not up to the knowledge which exceeds knowledge, and we say that we 
truly worship what we know.”384
383 CE III, 1, 107. τοῦτο γὰρ ἡγούμεθα τὸν ἀπόστολον σημᾶναι βουλόμενον 
ἀνεξιχνιάστους εἰπεῖν τὰς ὁδοὺς αἳ πρὸς τὸ ἀκατάληπτον φέρουσι, δεικνύντα διὰ 
τῆς λέξεως ὅτι ἀνεπίβατός ἐστι λογισμοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις ἡ γνῶσις ἐκείνη, καὶ οὔπω 
τις ἐπέστησεν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τοῦ λόγου πορείᾳ, οὔτε τι ἴχνος οὔτε 
σημεῖον καταληπτικῆς ἐφόδου τοῖς ἀλήπτοις ἐνεσημάνατο (GNO II, 40, 1–8; tr. 
Hall, p. 63).
384 CE III, 1, 108. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βεβαιοῦμεν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὸ καταχλευαζόμενον 
δόγμα, ὁμολογοῦντες ἐλάττους εἶναι κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν ὑπερβαινόντων τὴν 
γνῶσιν, καὶ προσκυνεῖν φαμεν ἀληθῶς ὅπερ οἴδαμεν (GNO II, 40, 16–20; tr. 
Hall, p. 64).
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Gregory, like Basil, confirms that we know the things about God, that is 
in this case His glory and height and from that we can only deduce His 
unimaginable greatness,385 while Basil rather thought that the outcome of 
cognition through attributes is God’s existence. Gregory of Nyssa wants to 
say that Eunomians only thinks that they know what they worship, while 
they are truly ignoramuses who do not want to admit their ignorance. 
Therefore, the truth and worship are on the Orthodox side, and Gregory 
turns their own argument against them by making an exegesis of the passage 
from John 4:22. The Samaritans were accused by the Lord of worshiping 
what they do not know because they imagined God as being tied to a certain 
place, and residing physically on the mountain on which they had their cult:
“The Samaritans, thinking that the Divinity was contained in some local limits, 
were rebuked by the words they heard: <You worship what you do not know, and 
the worship directed at God becomes unprofitable for you, for a god who is held 
to reside in a particular place is not God.>”386
Therefore, Gregory calls Eunomians “modern Samaritans” (νέους 
Σαμαρείτας), who by using the word “unbegottenness” as referring to the 
essence of God and enclosing it in a human concept, put a limit to it, 
or rather “restrict the divine substance to a sort of locality.” Therefore, 
Eunomians, while claiming the knowledge, are ignorant because they do 
not know that “the infinity of God surpasses every verbal connotation or 
definition.”387 While the Samaritans were wrong in limiting the presence 
of God to one place, “new Samaritans” are wrong in limiting the essence 
of God to one concept of human intellect.388
385 CE III, 1, 109 (GNO II, 40, 21–22).
386 CE III, 1, 110. ὡς γὰρ τοπικῇ τινι περιγραφῇ τὸ θεῖον περιέχεσθαι Σαμαρεῖται 
νομίζοντες ἐπετιμήθησαν δι’ ὧν ἤκουσαν ὅτι Προσκυνεῖτε ὃ οὐκ οἴδατε, καὶ 
ἀνόνητος γίνεται ὑμῖν ἡ λατρεία ἡ πρὸς θεὸν βλέπουσα, θεὸς γὰρ τόπῳ τινὶ 
καθιδρῦσθαι νομιζόμενος θεὸς οὐκ ἔστιν (GNO II, 41, 8–12; tr. Hall, p. 64).
387 CE III, 1, 110 οὕτως ἂν εἴη κυρίως καὶ πρὸς τοὺς νέους Σαμαρείτας εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῷ 
ὀνόματι τῆς ἀγεννησίας οἷόν τινι τόπῳ περιειλῆφθαι τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν ὑπονοοῦντες 
Προσκυνεῖτε ὃ οὐκ οἴδατε (GNO II, 41, 13–16; tr. Hall, p. 64).
388 Cf. Ch. M. Stang, Negative Theology from Gregory of Nyssa to Dionysius 
the Areopagite, in: The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Christian Mysticism, 
ed. J.M. Lang, Oxford 2013, p. 169.
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In their attempts to answer the sophism or paradox of Eunomians, both 
Basil and Gregory try to specify what kind of the knowledge of God is suf-
ficient for the Orthodox to claim that they know the one who they worship. 
Those answers were coined in specific circumstances of Anomean claims 
that “ingeneracy” is the term which expresses and fully describes the essence 
of God. However, those claims were not made merely to investigate what 
knowledge of God human intellect can have. They were used as a tool to 
demonstrate that the Son of God has a different – created – essence. Al-
though Eunomians claimed that, thanks to “ingeneracy” we can know the 
essence of God, they were very unclear in their explanation what exactly is 
the essence of God expressed by this positive feature named with a negative 
term. Therefore, while claiming the knowledge of the essence, they could 
not formulate this knowledge, since they realized that the knowledge of God 
cannot be explained in the mode similar to other “more comprehensible” 
objects. It seems that Aetius realized that human cognition has its limits, 
but as the analysis of Syntagmation has shown, he extended those limits to 
the unclear grasp of the essence as “ingeneracy.”
In the answers given by Basil and Gregory, we can see a conviction that 
Eunomian claims are not only improper as leading to wrong conclusion 
about the nature of the Son of God, but they deemed their position as simply 
unsustainable and wrong. The substance of God must remain unknown 
since human intellect is unable to make any concept of it. However, we can 
also see certain gradation of the arguments in the answers of Cappadocians. 
Basil in a more technical way expresses that we can understand that the 
substance of God exists (καταληψίας ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία), and thus we can 
have a kind of the perception of incomprehensibility (ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτοῦ τῆς 
ἀκαταληψίας). So, the knowledge of God, which is sufficient to worship, 
is the recognition of the existence of God that man gains from His works. 
Gregory goes further by saying that the attributes of God inform us rather 
about Him being totally beyond our understanding, and, therefore, to know 
God means simply to recognize His total incomprehensibility.
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4.  Ousia and Energeia (Substance and 
Activity)
The main topic of Eunomius’ Liber apologeticus (Apology) is to argue that 
generation of the Son of God is in fact creation, and, therefore, His substance 
is different from that of the Father. This thesis can be demonstrated by the 
fact that we can conceive the essence of God, that is we can know this essence 
as ingenerate. Those statements are exactly the same as what we have seen in 
Syntagmation by Aetius, but because of the dialectical austerity of this work, 
it remained relatively unknown, whereas the Apology of Aetius’ disciple was 
commonly read as a main expression of Anomean’s beliefs. Eunomius not 
only puts them in a more comprehensible manner, but he proposes a specific 
theological methodology to demonstrate his view. However, one can argue 
that ingeneracy is the essence of God only when we can show that any grasp 
of this essence is possible. If we cannot know the essence of God, any effec-
tive demonstration of the created nature of the Son is impossible, because 
there is no reason to discern whether the essences of the Father and the Son 
are different. Therefore, in Liber apologeticus, the question of the knowledge 
of God once again plays the leading role. As we have seen in the previous 
chapters, the main goal of Anomean missionary activity was to convince 
the Orthodox that they must know the essence to be able to worship God 
properly. But it must be demonstrated that such cognition is possible and 
how can we achieve it. Therefore, Eunomius puts forward his theological 
method (or methods) in his writings, and in his approach to theology, the 
distinction between substance and activity is of utmost importance.
4.1 Eunomius and the two ways of theology
The way of how Eunomius wants to defend the Anomean teaching is re-
flected in the structure of Liber apologeticus. The first approach makes 
us look at the beginning of the work, where he presents the way how he 
wants to make his exposition. He refers to the short Trinitarian Creed 
composed of three sections, which he has taken from the Fathers.389 This 
389 LA 5, 1–8 (Vaggione, p. 38).
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text was based on 1 Cor. 8:6, and we know from Basil that it was presented 
by Arius as a token of his faith to bishop Alexander of Alexandria.390 So 
he proposes, as the basis of his defence, the short text which, as Eunomius 
says, can be accepted by all who want to call themselves Christians.391 His 
method and the structure of the work would then follow the text of the 
creed, which presents Eunomius’ opinions and arguments regarding its 
contents. Therefore, the structure of Liber apologeticus can be presented 
as following the arguments on the three persons of the Trinity, with a sum-
mary and conclusion at the end.392
However, R.P. Vaggione notes that: “Yet, while this analysis clearly does 
reflect the external structure of the Apology, in other ways it is less adequate 
as a full expression of Eunomius’ meaning.”393 In the middle of the text, we 
find that he introduces a method (or methods) which he wants to follow in 
a more technical fashion:
“There are two roads marked out to us for the discovery of what we seek - one is 
that by which we examine the actual essences and with clear and unadulterated 
reasoning about them make a judgement on each; the other is an enquiry by means 
of the activities, whereby we distinguish the essence on the basis of its products 
and completed works - and neither of the ways mentioned is able to bring out any 
apparent similarity of essence.”394
This fragment is for R.P. Vaggione a basis of recognizing the structure of 
Eunomius’ work in a new way since it: “In some ways this might almost be 
taken as a summary of the contents of the treatise.”395 Therefore, the first 
part of the work after introduction would comprise chapters 7 to 20, which 
describe the first way. After that, Eunomius puts forth his explanation of 
390 Con. Eun. I, 4 (SC 299, pp. 162–163).
391 LA 6, 1–4 (Vaggione, p. 38).
392 This structure is presented by R.P. Vaggione, Introduction in: Eunomius, The 
Extant Works, Oxford 1987, p. 11.
393 Ibid., p. 11.
394 LA 20, 5–10. δυεῖν γὰρ ἡμῖν τετμηένων ὁδῶν τπὸς τὴν ζητουμένων εὕρεσιν, μιᾶς 
μὲν καθ᾽ἣν τὰς οὐσίας αὐτὰς ἐπισκοπούμενοι, καθαρῷ τῷ περὶ αὐτῶν λόγῳ τὴν 
ἑκάστου ποιούμεθα κρίσιν, θατέρας δὲ τῆς διὰ τῶν ἐνεργείων ὲξετάσεως, ἣν ἐκ τῶν 
δημιουργημάτων καὶ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ιδακρίνομεν, οὐδετέραν τῶν εἰρημένων 
εὐρεῖν ἐμφαινομένην τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὁμοιότητα δυνατόν (Vaggione, pp. 58–59).
395 R.P. Vaggione, Introduction, in: Eunomius, The Extant Works, Oxford 1987, 
p. 11.
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the two ways. The second part would comprise chapters 20 to 26, which 
is followed by a summary, conclusion, and appendix.396 R.P. Vaggione calls 
those two methods a priori and a posteriori since the first one begins with 
an analysis of the essences revealed by names (ἀγέννητος, γέννεημα), which 
leads to the understanding of the activities of the Persons, and the second 
one begins with the activities and concludes in the identification of essenc-
es.397 But can we say that the second way of dividing the structure of Liber 
apologeticus was indeed more important for Eunomius himself, or he only 
accidentally explains his methodology, while the explanation of the simple 
creed is more important?
The importance of the two methods of theology for Eunomius is con-
firmed by his Apologia Apologiae, which unfortunately has been preserved 
only in fragments quoted by Gregory of Nyssa in his Contra Eunomium. 
Gregory also recognizes those two methods as playing the key role in Eu-
nomius’ theology, since he calls them the system, or the “technology of 
blasphemy” (τεχνολογία τῆς βλασφημίας).398 A long fragment quoted by 
Gregory begins with the statement:
“Our whole doctrine is summed up in the highest and principal substance, in the 
substance which exists through it but before all others, and in the substance which 
is third in terms of origin and the activity which produced it. This same order is 
revealed whether we consider the substances themselves or approach them through 
their characteristic activities.”399
396 Ibid., p. 12.
397 Ibid., p. 11. Naming the two ways “a priori” and “a posteriori” is not very 
accurate. Since both substances and activities cannot be identified by experi-
ence, none of them can be truly a posteriori. Those ways correspond to what 
in Medieval theology was named argumentation “propter quid” – from cause 
to effects, or “quia” – from effects to cause.
398 CE I, 155, 1 (GNO I, 73, 16).
399 CE I, 151, 1–10. Πᾶς ὁ τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς δογμάτων συμπληροῦται λόγος ἔκ τε τῆς 
ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυριωτάτης οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς δι’ ἐκείνην μὲν οὔσης μετ’ ἐκείνην 
δὲ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων πρωτευούσης καὶ τρίτης γε τῆς μηδεμιᾷ μὲν τούτων 
συνταττομένης, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν, τῇ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καθ’ ἣν 
γέγονεν ὑποταττομένης, συμπεριλαμβανομένων δηλαδὴ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς 
λόγου συμπλήρωσιν καὶ τῶν ταῖς οὐσίαις παρεπομένων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις 
προσφυῶν ὀνομάτων (GNO I, 71, 28–72, 10; tr. Hall, p. 57). As I noted above, 
S.G. Hall constantly translates οὐσία as “being”; in my quotation of his trans-
lations, I change “being” to “substance” for clarity of the discussed issues.
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In this fragment, Eunomius once again returns to the two methods of the-
ology, but he adds some explanations. In the following verses, he claims 
that each of the persons of the Trinity must be perceived as an absolutely 
simple substance and, therefore, their activity must be simple. He also 
systematically explains that their activities can be defined by the effects 
which they produce:
“since the activities are defined at the same time as their works, and the works 
match the activities of those who effected them, there is surely every necessity both 
that the activities accompanying each of the substances are lesser and greater, and 
that some occupy the first and others the second rank, and in sum that they reach 
the same degree of difference as their works reach.”400
The work (ἔργων) which reveals activity and helps to discern various types 
of activities, which was also mentioned in Liber apologeticus, now has 
its place in a systematic exposition of the theological method. Eunomius 
is convinced that it also helps to discern different levels of activities, and, 
therefore, it is possible recognize different substances of the Divine Persons. 
He also insists on the substances having primary activities, which are helpful 
in grading the Persons without mixing them together:
“…should any dispute arise about the substances, to base their belief about what 
is being demonstrated and the resolution of disputed points on the primary activi-
ties peculiar to the substances, and to resolve any doubt about the activities with 
reference to the substances, and to reckon it surely more fitting and generally more 
accomplished to descend from primary to secondary things.”401
This long quotation of Gregory helps us to understand that Eunomius has a 
great confidence in his methods of theology. As we will see, Basil’s criticism 
primarily undermined the first way (from substance to activity), since he 
400 CE I, 152, 3–10. τε καὶ νοουμένης κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀξίαν, συμπεριγραφομένων 
δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, καὶ τῶν ἔργων ταῖς τῶν ἐργασαμένων ἐνεργείαις	
παραμετρουμένων, ἀνάγκη δήπου πᾶσα καὶ τὰς ἑκάστῃ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑπομένας 
ἐνεργείας ἐλάττους τε καὶ μείζους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς μὲν πρώτην τὰς δὲ δευτέραν 
ἐπέχειν τάξιν, συνόλως τε εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοσαύτην ἐξικνεῖσθαι διαφοράν, πρὸς 
ὁπόσην ἂν ἐξικνῆται τὰ ἔργα· (GNO I, 72, 12–20; tr. Hall, p. 57).
401 CE I, 154, 6–13. εἰ μὲν περὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις κινοῖτό τις ἀμφισβήτησις, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων 
καὶ προσεχῶν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνεργειῶν ποιεῖσθαι τῶν δεικνυμένων τὴν πίστιν καὶ 
τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων τὴν διάλυσιν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις	ἀμφιβολίαν διαλύειν 
ἐκ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἁρμοδιωτέραν γε μὴν καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀνυσιμωτέραν ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν 
ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τὰ δεύτερα κάθοδον (GNO I, 73, 8–15; Hall, p. 58).
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concentrated on the impossibility of having any knowledge of the essence 
based on the term “ungenerated.” Therefore, in Apologia Apologiae, Euno-
mius tries somehow to combine the two ways, but he mostly underlines the 
second way (from activity to substance) adding to it the point of defining 
activities according to their effects.
Nevertheless, it can be seen that the distinction between substance and 
activity plays the central role in Eunomius’ theology, and in obtaining the 
knowledge of God. Therefore, to understand better his claims about the 
possibility of knowing the essence of God, we must turn to the sources 
of the distinction between substance and activity which were available to 
Eunomius. It is also necessary to look for earlier uses of this distinction as 
a theological method.
4.2 The philosophical sources of οὐσία and ἐνέργεια
Although almost all scholars agree that Eunomius, just like Aetius, used 
Greek philosophy in his teaching, but there is still no clear answer to the 
question as to the extent of such influence. The question is even more 
complicated as regards the sources of Eunomius’ understanding of sub-
stance and activity. The standard approach follows the accusations which 
were made by his opponents, who frequently pointed out that he uses the 
Aristotelian language and concepts.402 Basil and Gregory frequently point 
out that Eunomius uses Aristotle’s concepts, and Basil even recognized 
that at some point, he referred to Categories.403 There are also similar 
accusations addressed against Anomeans by historians.404 But those ac-
cusations of relying too much on Aristotle and philosophical works were 
made on both sides. Therefore, scholars are very cautious in admitting 
that Anomeans could be named Peripatetics.405 M.R. Barnes also put in 
402 M.R. Barnes presents the discussion on the sources of Eunomius’ use of activ-
ity: cf. The Background and Use of Eunomius’ Causal Language, in: Arianism 
after Arius, ed. M.R. Barnes, D.H. Williams, Edinburgh 1993, p. 222.
403 Cf., Basil, Con. Eun. I, 5, 43–45 (SC 299, pp. 172–174).
404 Cf., Ephphanius, Panarion 76. 2. 2 (GCS 37, pp. 342–343); Scocrates Scho-
lasticus, HE IV, 7 (GCS NF 1, pp. 332–334).
405 M. Ludlow notes that: “…it is difficult to conclude that Aristotelianism was 
uniformly characteristic or distinctive of Aetius, Eunomius and their followers.” 
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doubt Aristotle’s influence on Eunomius’ concept of activity by pointing 
out that the Anomean does not use ἐνέργεια with the related term δύναμις, 
and, therefore, the sources of his theology must be looked for elsewhere.406 
As we will see below, the use of ἐνέργεια in the context of capacity is only 
one of many which the Stagirite exploits in his writings. I would like to 
underline that the term was coined by Aristotle, and it was used both in 
philosophical and Christian writings. Its meaning was developing, but 
ἐνέργεια was seen as a term which was especially well fitted in the descrip-
tions of the actions of God.
4.2.1 Aristotle – the origins of ἐνέργεια
Although similar concepts can be found in earlier writings, the word 
ἐνέργεια appears for the first time in the writings of Aristotle, who uses it 
very frequently.407 Aristotle himself discusses the etymology of the word 
maintaining that it is derived from “deed” or “thing done” (τὸ ἔργον).408 
Although the term is new, the combination of en with ergon can be found 
in earlier Greek texts. The meaning of it can be explained by the adjec-
tive energos which means “active, effective” or the verb energein mean-
ing “to be active or effective to operate.” Therefore, the meaning of the 
term would be “activity, operation or effectiveness.”409 But Aristotle also 
expresses difficulties in understanding this new concept, which can be 
best seen in his remarks on its definition. In a fragment from Metaphys-
ics Theta, he says:
Contra Eunomium III – Who Is Eunomius? in: Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eu-
nomium III, ed. J. Leemans, M. Cassin, Leiden, Boston 2014, p. 456.
406 Cf. M.R. Barnes, op. cit., p. 223.
407 In his writings, he uses this term 670 times, cf. J.-C. Larchet, La théologie des 
énergies divines, op. cit., p. 27.
408 Met. IX, 8, 1050 a, 22–23. ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα ἐνέργεια 
λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.
409 Cf. D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West. op. cit., p. 1. J. Beere points out that 
energeia is “merely ans abstract noun form a familiar adjective (energos)”, cf. 
J. Beere, Doing and being, op. cit., p. 155.
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“What we want to say is clear on the basis of the particular cases, by induction, 
and one should not seek a definition of everything, but should also comprehend 
some things by analogy.”410
As J. Beere suggests analogy is the key concept for the understanding of the 
term. He thinks that Aristotle simultaneously intended to exclude ambiguity 
from the understanding of what ἐνέργεια is and preserve various cases which 
this term covers. Therefore, the most suitable approach to the understand-
ing of the term should not exclude any cases and examples which Aristotle 
gives to describe ἐνέργεια in his works.411 However, we must remember that 
he focuses on the meaning of the term in Metaphysics.
In his seminal work on the topic, D. Bradshaw proposes a different ap-
proach. He wants to cover various cases of using the term by tracing the 
development of this concept in the works of Aristotle.412 His method leads 
him to present several modes of understanding ἐνέργεια in Aristotle: as an 
exercise of capacity, in its distinction with motion, as actuality, and most 
of all its use in describing the activity of the Prime Mover. This method, 
although it relies on the uncertain time sequence of the Corpus Aristoteli-
cum, is especially useful because it is able to show the development of the 
understanding of the term. It seems that both of those two approaches 
are profitable, but for the purpose of our study, we shall concentrate on 
explaining the meaning of ἐνέργεια in the context of its application to the 
activity of God.
The earliest meaning of ἐνέργεια in the Aristotelian corpus is the exercise 
of capacity. Aristotle develops here the concepts of Plato, who expressed 
similar ideas without using the term ἐνέργεια.413 We can observe such un-
derstanding in the preserved fragments of Protrepticus, which seems to be 
very important to show the use of the term by Eunomius. When explaining 
the body and soul as parts of a human being and the operations proper of 
those parts, he says:
410 Met. IX, 6 1048 a, 35–37. τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. δῆλον δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα τῇ 
ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον 
συνορᾶν (tr. Barnes).
411 Cf. J. Beere, op. cit., p. 160.
412 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 1–2.
413 Ibid., p. 3.
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“that which is composite and divisible into parts has several different activities, 
but that which is by nature simple and whose being does not consist in relation 
to something else must have only one excellence, in the full sense of the word.”414
As D. Bradshaw suggests, if ἐνέργεια simply meant activity, it would be odd 
to correlate the number of parts with the number of activities.415 The term 
also must mean the exercise of capacity because in the next part of this 
fragment, the term is linked with the possession of faculties (δύναμις).416 In 
Protrepticus, we can also observe the use of expressions κατὰ δύναμιν and 
κατ᾽ἐνέργειαν,417 which is a symptom of the development of the concept 
in the context of the levels of being. Aristotle explains that the man who 
exercises the capacity of rational thinking “lives more” than the one who 
simply possesses it, and exercising capacity rather than having it is described 
as “true being” (ὅπερ εἶναι).418 Aristotle expands this use of the two senses of 
such words as “live,” “perceive,” and “know” in his other works.419 Using 
his example of the knower, he notes that calling man a potential knower 
is ambiguous. The first kind of being a potential knower means that man 
can think because of what he is, he has such capacity as a human being, or 
as Aristotle puts it “the man falls within the class of beings that know or 
have knowledge.”420 In the second meaning, man can be called as capable 
of thinking only when he has knowledge (e.g., of grammar) and can “real-
ize this knowledge in actual knowing at will.”421 Only man who possesses 
knowledge in the second sense can fully realize this knowledge in the state 
of actual thinking.422 In the following analysis of a change from the state 
of capacity to the actual use of knowledge, ἐνέργεια is understood as the 
fulfilment of man’s nature and the path to a fuller reality. As D. Bradshaw 
414 Protrep. 64, 1–3, Τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνθέτου καὶ μεριστοῦ πλείους καὶ διάφοροί 
εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τοῦ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἁπλοῦ καὶ μὴ πρός τι τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος μίαν 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸ κυρίως ἀρετήν (tr. Barnes).




419 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 5–6.
420 De anima II, 5, 417 a, 24 (tr. Barnes).
421 De anima II, 5, 417 a, 27–28. ὁ δ’ ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν (tr. Barnes).
422 Cf. J. Beere, op. cit., p. 157.
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notes, the transition from the second to the third step does not require any 
involvement of an external agent, but it happens of itself. He also points out 
that in Physics VII, 4 Aristotle uses ἐνέργεια to explain the proper behaviour 
of the elements such as water. The term is used to describe simply being in 
a place according to the natural features of the element, or even having a 
certain dimension according to certain quantity.423
At this point, we can note that ἐνέργεια already means more than simply 
the exercise of capacity. As it also describes the levels of reality, it is intrinsi-
cally linked not only with acting, but also with the life and being of certain 
things. But to understand Aristotle’s conception, it is necessary to have a 
closer look at the relation of ἐνεργέια to change (κίνησις), because he himself 
notes “For it seems that actuality (ἐνέργεια) most of all has its being qua 
change.”424 This problem is also very important because the generation of 
the Son in Eunomius is also described as motion.
Aristotle discusses the relation of ἐνέργεια to change in the famous 
though difficult fragment of the sixth chapter of Metaphysics theta.425 The 
main problem in this distinction is the relation of both concepts to the 
end. There are two kinds of action: the first one is change and the second 
one is ἐνέργεια. Change is the kind of movement which does not have its 
limit in itself. The process of building is incomplete until it reaches the end 
(a house is built). On the other hand, ἐνέργεια is the kind of action which 
has its end in itself and is complete. Therefore, Aristotle explains:
“Of these then [it is necessary] to call some changes, and others actualities 
(ἐνέργειαι). For all change is incomplete, thinning, learning, walking, house build-
ing; these are changes and surely incomplete. For it is not at the same time that 
one is walking and has walked, nor building a house and having built a house, nor 
coming to be and having come to be, nor being changed and having been changed, 
but these are different, and so too if something is bringing about change and has 
brought about change. But the same thing at the same time has seen and is seeing 
423 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 7.
424 Met. 1047 a, 32. ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι (tr. Makin, p. 4).
425 This fragment (1048 b, 18–35) was the subject of discussions which are 
referred by J. Beere, op. cit. pp. 221–230. It is interesting that this is the 
only fragment where Aristotle explicitly contrasts the terms “energeia” and 
“change.” Although J. Beere thinks that its contents should not be treated as 
the standard Aristotelian doctrine (cf. ibid., p. 230), it seems to be useful for 
the purpose of understanding the claims of his successors including Eunomius.
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and is thinking and has thought. So I call such a thing an actuality (ἐνέργειαν), 
but that thing a change.”426
Although some actions are incomplete, they can be called actions in a way, 
but properly speaking, ἐνέργεια is the kind of action which is complete and 
has its end in itself. Therefore, change stops when it reaches the end, but it 
is not necessary for ἐνέργεια to end.427 To explain this further, D. Bradshaw 
tries to add to the remarks from Metaphysics the notions from Nicoma-
chean Ethics, where Aristotle discusses the nature of pleasure. Although 
they do not contain the distinction from Metaphysics, he argues that pleas-
ure and ἐνέργεια are intrinsically linked. Therefore, the distinction between 
change and pleasure seems to be an addition to earlier observations.428 
Aristotle rejects the notion that pleasure is a movement, because:
“But the form of pleasure is complete at any given moment, so it is clear that it is 
different from a process, and that pleasure is something whole and complete. This 
would seem true also from the fact that a process must take time, whereas being 
pleased does not, since what takes place at the present moment is a kind of whole.”429
This fragment allows us to admit that ἐνέργεια is complete at any moment 
and does not take place in time, and as D. Bradshaw suggests, it is char-
acterized not only by “its intrinsic atemporality,” but also “its teleological 
self-closure.”430
426 Met. 1048 b, 28–35. τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ’ ἐνεργείας. 
πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὴ 
κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ’ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ 
ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, καὶ 
κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν 
μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.
427 Cf. J. Beere, op. cit., p. 224.
428 J. Bradshaw quotes Aristotle saying that pleasure “completes the activity” 
(1174 b, 23), cf. op. cit., p. 9. The analysis of Nicomachean Ethics allows 
him to make a table of the main differences between change and ἐνέργεια, cf. 
p. 10.
429 Eth. Nic. X, 4, 1147 b, 5–9 τῆς ἡδονῆς δ’ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. 
δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ’ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. 
δόξειε δ’ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· 
τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι (tr. R. Crisp, p. 188).
430 D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 12.
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Until now, ἐνέργεια was presented as the type of exercising capacity 
which has a specific character. For the purpose of our study, the most 
important use of the term proposed by Aristotle is related to substance 
(οὐσία). But to understand better the meaning of this term, we must clarify 
the meaning of ἐνέργεια in its relation to actuality (ἐντελέχεια). This second 
term was also coined by Aristotle and is usually understood as “having 
completeness,” “being fully real,” or “actuality.” The first term (ἐνέργεια) 
also has that meaning, but Aristotle much more often uses ἐντελέχεια to 
express that kind of existence, than exercise of capacity,431 so actuality 
could be understood as having a more abstract sense.
In the eighth chapter of Metaphysics Theta, Aristotle argues for the prior-
ity of actuality to potency in the aspects of definition, time, and substance. 
Although Aristotle does not define what does he exactly mean by “prior 
in substance,” his explanations of the matter in this fragment suggest that 
he means “that a thing is prior in substance when it characterizes a more 
fully realized stage of natural development.”432 He gives examples of the 
man who is prior to the boy and explains that:
“everything that comes to be proceeds to an origin and an end (for that for the 
sake of which is an origin, and the coming to be is for the sake of the end), and 
the actuality is an end (τέλος δ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια), and the potentiality is acquired for 
the sake of this.”433
But priority of ἐνέργεια could be seen much better in the case of eternal 
beings. Aristotle explains:
“But indeed actuality is prior in a more proper way too. For eternal things are prior 
in substance to perishable things, and nothing eternal is potentially.”434
Aristotle talks here about heavenly bodies, and he clarifies in the next frag-
ment of this passage that they do not have potency of non-existence, and 
the only potency they have is the potency to change place (from-where to 
431 Good example is Met. V, 7, 1017 a, 35-b, 2: “Again, ‘being’ (τὸ εἶναι) and 
‘that which is’ (τὸ ὄν) mean some of the things we mentioned, ‘are’ potentially 
(δυνάμει) and others in complete reality” (ἐντελέχεια) (tr. Barnes).
432 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 20.
433 Met. IX, 8, 1050 a, 6–9 (tr. Makin, p. 11).
434 Met. IX, 8, 1050 b, 6–8. - ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀΐδια πρότερα 
τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἔστι δ’ οὐθὲν δυνάμει ἀΐδιον (tr. Makin, p. 12).
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to-where). That is why the Sun and the stars are always acting, and there 
is no fear that they would stop.435 Eternal activity of the movement of 
heavenly bodies is simply the state of their being; such ἐνέργεια is in their 
nature, or is in their nature per se. That is also why perishable things imitate 
them when their activity is intrinsically tied to their nature, like fire which 
cannot exist without burning.436 Therefore, we can assume that there are 
substances which cannot exist without their proper ἐνέργειαι, and when 
we apply this to eternal beings, their eternal existence is always realized by 
their activities. Such a description of activity of eternal beings is even more 
telling when we remember what has been previously said about ἐνέργεια 
as not happening in time and having its own end in itself. That is why it is 
also perfectly fitting to describe the actuality of the Prime Mover, which is 
pure and subsistent actuality.
This can be seen already in the famous demonstration of the necessity of 
existence of the Prime Mover, which we find in Metaphysics XII, 6, which 
Aristotle ends with the following conclusion:
“Further, even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its substance is potency; for 
there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly 
not be. There must, then, be such a principle, whose very substance is actuality.”437
Therefore, as the Prime Mover is pure actuality, it cannot undergo any change 
because he has no potency. In the next chapter, Aristotle explains that such 
“primary simple substance existing in actuality” is also the primary object 
of thought and desire.438 D. Bradshaw draws attention to the shift which 
happens in this place of the discourse. Aristotle changes here the perspective 
from the Prime Mover as the primal object of desire to “what it is like to be 
a Prime Mover.”439 He starts to treat the Prime Mover as a live being whose 
435 Met. IX, 8, 1050 b, 22–24. διὸ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, 
καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο 
δρῶντα· (tr. Makin, p. 12).
436 Cf. Met. IX, 8, 1050 b, 29–32.
437 Met. XII, 6, 1071 b, 17–20. ἔτι οὐδ’ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ’ οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις· 
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι. δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι 
ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια (tr. Barnes).
438 Met. XII, 7, 1072 a, 31–32. ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν.
439 D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 27.
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life is activity which is at the same time the supreme pleasure.440 His life also 
realizes in thinking, since he is the thought which thinks of itself. In thinking, 
he does not pass from potency to act, because he does not receive the object of 
thought, but rather possesses it; therefore, he is “active when it possesses this 
object (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων).”441 As D. Bradshaw observes, it’s only after having 
admitted that the Prime Mover is a live being that Aristotle begins to refer 
to it as God,442 whose life is the supreme activity.443
Up to this point, we can see clearly that God, described as being the 
activity of the self-thinking thought and also being the actuality in the 
fullest sense, is the best example of activity which does not involve any 
opposition to potency. Therefore, M.R. Barnes’ argument on seeking the 
sources of Eunomius’ distinction cannot be true.444 He certainly did not 
share the Aristotelian view of activity, and – as we shall see – he rejected 
some of his opinions, but the tradition of describing the operation of God 
as ἐνέργεια certainly dates back to Aristotle. Not only did he coin the term 
himself, but also made clear that ἐνέργεια is the best expression to describe 
the supreme reality in its existence and its life and his is followers, pagan 
as well as Christian, will continue to use it when speaking of God.
4.2.2 The use of ἐνέργεια in Middle-Platonism and Plotinus
Although there is some confusion about accessibility of Aristotle’s works 
in the Hellenistic period and in the 1st century after Christ, the teaching 
440 Met. XII, 7, 1072 b, 14–16. “And it is the life such as best which we enjoy, 
and enjoy for but the short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot 
be) since its actuality is also pleasure (ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου)” (tr. 
Barnes).
441 Cf. Met. XII, 7, 1072 b, 19–20.
442 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 28.
443 Cf. Met. XII, 7, 1072 b, 26–29. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ 
ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη 
καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν 
συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. “And life also belongs to 
God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s 
essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is 
a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and 
eternal belong to God; for this is God” (tr. Barnes).
444 Cf. M.R. Barnes, op. cit., p. 223.
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on ἐνέργεια was passed on and developed with respect to the exercise of 
capacity as well as the description of the perfect activity of God.445 The most 
interesting, however, seems to be the continuation and evolution of Aristo-
tle’s thought which occurred in Middle-Platonism, especially in Alexandria, 
and the most interesting character in this tradition – Philo. In his writings, 
we find probably the first use of this term in the context of the knowledge 
of God.446 Although we have already discussed his claims on God’s incom-
prehensibility in one of the previous chapters, but here we have to say more 
about the relation of incomprehensibility to the activities of God.
He frequently uses ἐνέργεια in the sense of “activity” or “characteristic 
activity,” especially when he describes the operations of the mind, senses, 
and parts of the body.447 But Philo is especially important because he uses 
the term for the first time to describe creative activity of God. For him, the 
perpetual activity of God is rather restful than laborious, which is why he 
describes His rest after six days of creation as ἐνέργεια.448 Since the activity 
of God is perpetual, he eternally creates the world by thinking the ideas. 
Philo also draws a borderline between creations and the Creator by claiming 
that since the fundamental feature of God is his activity, we cannot think 
that activity is also a characteristic of any created being. While God acts, 
creations are rather receptive and passive.449 Therefore, we can assume that 
445 D. Bradshaw refers its development in various fields of literary criticism, 
historical writing, religious thought, and science. Cf. op. cit., pp. 45–58.
446 It is not easy to find the proper place for Philo in the historical context of 
the development of ἐνέργεια, but since he was used as a source by both Non-
Christian and Christian writers, as we will see below, it seems better to show 
his teaching in the context of Middle-Platonism.
447 Ibid., p. 59.
448 Cher. 87–90. “Moses does not give the name of rest to mere inactivity. The 
cause of all things is by its nature active (δραστήριον); it never ceases to make 
all that is best and most beautiful. God’s rest is rather a working (ἐνέργειαν) 
with absolute ease, without toil and without suffering…” (Colson/Whitaker, 
vol. 2, pp. 61–64).
449 Cher. 77–78. “What deadlier foe to the soul can there be than he who in his 
vainglory claims to himself that which belongs to God alone? For it belongs 
to God to act (ποιεῖν), and this we may not ascribe to any created being. What 
belongs to the created is to suffer (πάσχειν), and he who accepts this from the 
first, as a necessity inseparable from his lot, will bear with patience what be-
falls him, however grievous it may be” (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 2, pp. 54–55).
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for Philo, the activity of God is not constrained to self-thinking, but His 
being-in-energeia means that he is even more understood as pure activity 
than as pure actuality. This allows Philo to treat the activity of God in a 
personal way, which is certainly in accord with how God is presented in 
the Holy Scripture.450
Such radical statements on the activity of God make all activities in the 
created world the activity of the Creator present in His works. That cer-
tainly opens up a new possibility of obtaining the knowledge of Him. In 
Philo’s doctrine, we observe probably the first attempt to turn the activities 
of God into path to know the Creator. But Philo makes a clear distinction 
between God’s essence and His activities. While His activities, since they are 
present in the world, are knowable, He remains totally beyond apprehen-
sion (αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ἀκατάληπτος).451 The only knowledge which man can 
obtain of God is to know that He is:
“It is quite enough for a man’s reasoning faculty to advance as far as to learn that 
the cause of the universe is and subsists. To be anxious to continue his course yet 
further, and inquire about essence or quality in God, is a folly fit for the world’s 
childhood.”452
Philo insists that only the existence of God can be known, and the knowl-
edge which we have on His activities does not allow us to know even His 
Powers through which He acts:
“But while in their essence (κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν) they [Powers] are beyond your ap-
prehension (ἀκατάληπτοι), they nevertheless present to your sight a sort of impress 
and copy of their activity (ἐνεργείας). You men have for your use seals which when 
brought into contact with wax or similar material stamp on them any number of 
impressions while they themselves are not docked in any part thereby, but remain 
as they were. Such you must conceive my Powers to be, supplying quality and 
shape to things which lack either and yet changing or lessening nothing of their 
eternal nature. Some among you call them not inaptly Forms or Ideas (ἰδέας), since 
they bring form into everything that is, giving order to the disordered, limit to 
the unlimited, bounds to the unbounded, shape to the shapeless, and in general 
450 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 62.
451 Cf. Post. 169 (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 2, pp. 428–429).
452 Post. 168–169. ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ λογισμῷ μέχρι τοῦ καταμαθεῖν ὅτι ἔστι τε 
καὶ ὑπάρχει τὸ τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον προελθεῖν· περαιτέρω δὲ σπουδάζειν τρέπεσθαι, 
ὡς περὶ οὐσίας ἢ ποιότητος ζητεῖν, ὠγύγιός τις ἠλιθιότης (Colson/Whitaker, vol. 
2, pp. 428–429).
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changing the worse to something better. Do not, then, hope ever to be able to ap-
prehend Me or any of my Powers in our essence (κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν). But I readily 
and with goodwill admit you to a share of what is attainable.”453
Philo tells us that Powers are the same as ideas or forms in the mind of God, 
and although they should be known, because they are principles of order, 
limit, shape, etc., he insists that they are unconceivable. Like God, they are 
limitless and, therefore, cannot be grasped by human intellect.454 This is 
the statement which seems to be against the entire Platonic tradition since 
for Plato, forms are the primary objects of intellectual cognition. But here, 
ideas are active powers not passive objects, and therefore each of them can 
have their own ἐνέργεια. Those activities leave behind the effects of their 
actions, and those are the only things which we can know. But Philo’s 
words also mean that any reasoning based on those effects cannot lead us 
to the knowledge of the Powers. We can clearly see only general effects of 
their actions. So the only possible conclusion is that there must have been 
some activities which caused this effect, but in our reasoning, we can barely 
go further. The second step in this reasoning can only give us a hint that 
there are some Ideas or Powers, which are the source of order, shape, and 
“general changing the worse to something better,” but that is all. This may 
give us only a conviction that someone who has those Powers must exist.
Jean-Claude Larchet sees Philo as the main source of the distinction 
between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια by later Christian writers as a way to secure 
453 Spec. I, 47–49. πεφυκυῖαι δ’ ἀκατάληπτοι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅμως παραφαίνουσιν 
ἐκμαγεῖόν τι καὶ ἀπεικόνισμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείας· οἷαι αἱ παρ’ ὑμῖν σφραγῖδες 
- ὅταν <γὰρ> προσενεχθῇ κηρὸς ἤ τις ὁμοιότροπος ὕλη, μυρίους ὅσους τύπους 
ἐναπομάττονται, μηδὲν ἀκρωτηριασθεῖσαι μέρος, | ἀλλ’ ἐν ὁμοίῳ μένουσαι-, 
τοιαύτας ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὰς περὶ ἐμὲ δυνάμεις περιποιούσας ἀποίοις ποιότητας 
καὶ μορφὰς ἀμόρφοις καὶ μηδὲν τῆς ἀιδίου φύσεως μήτ’ ἀλλαττομένας μήτε 
μειουμένας. ὀνομάζουσι δ’ αὐτὰς οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τινες τῶν παρ’ ὑμῖν ἰδέας, 
ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων εἰδοποιοῦσι τὰ ἄτακτα τάττουσαι καὶ τὰ ἄπειρα καὶ 
ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσχημάτιστα περατοῦσαι καὶ περιορίζουσαι καὶ σχηματίζουσαι καὶ 
συνόλως τὸ χεῖρον εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον μεθαρμοζόμεναι. μήτ’ οὖν ἐμὲ μήτε τινὰ τῶν 
ἐμῶν δυνάμεων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐλπίσῃς ποτὲ δυνήσεσθαι καταλαβεῖν. τῶν 
δ’ ἐφικτῶν, ὡς εἶπον, ἑτοίμως καὶ προθύμως μεταδίδωμι (Colson/Whitaker, 
vol. 7, pp. 124–127).
454 Cf. J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., p. 72.
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incomprehensibility of God.455 So it is remarkable that for Eunomius, this 
distinction can serve a completely different purpose, namely to demonstrate 
that the knowledge of the essence of God is possible. But Philo’s teaching 
of the knowledge of the activities of God is a source not only for the Fa-
thers. Most of all, it also inseminated Middle-Platonic thinkers, who treat 
this Aristotelian concept as an inherent part of their doctrines. Although it 
is not widely discussed, it is still present in the preserved writings of such 
philosophers as Numenius, Alcinous, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, and 
it evolves alongside new elements in the understanding of the nature of the 
Deity.456 It seems that the most important moment of this development may 
be observed in Alexander of Aphrodisias, who identified the Aristotelian 
Prime Mover with active intellect, but also treated such conceived Deity 
as creative in his process of thinking.457 Those additions, however, seem of 
little importance as compared to the doctrine of Plotinus, where ἐνέργεια 
occupies a prominent place in the understanding of the creative activity of 
intellectual hypostases.
To understand how the Aristotelian concept was incorporated in Ploti-
nus’ system, we must first have a look at his criticism of Aristotle’s catego-
ries of being. Plotinus discusses the kinds of being in the first three treatises 
of the sixth Ennead. The main problem is whether the set of the kinds of 
being (substance and nine accidents) from Aristotle’s Categories can be ap-
plied to the intellectual world. He reports that there are different opinions 
regarding the kinds of being, but the main question is: “Are the ten [cat-
egories of Aristotle] found alike in the Intellectual and in Sensible realms? 
Or are all found in the Sensible and some only in the Intellectual?”458 In the 
Aristotelian view, the kinds of being imply a division between substance and 
properties, since property is an “external” addition to substance of which 
it is predicated. Therefore, they could not be perceived as simple genera in 
the intellectual world where the primary characteristic of substance is its 
455 Cf. ibid., pp. 79–80.
456 The understanding of ἐνέργεια in Middle-Platonism is discussed broadly by 
D. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 64–72, and J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., pp. 38–42.
457 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 71–72.
458 Enn. VI, 1, 1, 19–20. μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐρωτητέον, πότερα ὁμοίως ἔν 
τε τοῖς νοητοῖς ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ δέκα (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 3, p. 3; tr. 
MacKenna/Page, p. 252).
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higher degree of integrity and oneness. That is why, the genera of being in 
the intellectual world are rather those which can be found in Plato’s Sophists 
(being, motion, stability <or rest, or remaining>, identity and difference).459 
A.C. Lloyd points out that this is not the case that Aristotle’s genera must 
have a different meaning in the intellectual world, they “have no place in 
the intelligible world.”460 On the contrary, the simple genera of Plato are 
proper in the intellectual world because, while they describe the substance, 
they are not its properties. What are they then? A.C. Lloyd answers: “They 
are not attributes of substance/being – otherwise it would not be simple – 
but activities of it.”461 We can see that A.C. Lloyd is not exactly right when 
he says that Aristotle’s genera have no place in the intellectual world at all. 
Since Plato’s genera are activities, the only exception seems to be activity 
itself, but it is clear that it must be predicated differently on the two levels 
of reality. While in sensual world, it can be perceived as a property, in the 
intellectual one, it is identical with substance. A crucial question here is how 
does Plotinus understand the simple genera of Plato as activities.
It is easy to understand movement as activity, but what about such gen-
era as identity, difference, remaining,462 and especially being? A.C. Lloyd 
explains once again: “Plotinus, like Aristotle, is conscious that οὐσία is a 
nominal form of the verb ‘to be’ and primarily in its existential sense.”463 
Therefore, here we should rather understand substance in the existential 
sense: the first internal activity of substance is its being substance. We can 
apply this explanation to other genres: identity is being-in-identity (or ex-
isting in identity), difference is being-in-difference, and so on. It is essential 
that those genera are simply what substance is in itself; they do not add 
anything to substance. In his criticism of Aristotle’s categories, Plotinus 
explains that when one predicates a property, which makes substance dif-
ferent, he adds something to it and it is completed “from the outside.” 
459 Soph. 236 D-264 B.
460 A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, op. cit., p. 86.
461 Ibid., p. 87.
462 The terms μονή or στάσις are often translated as stability, or rest, but I prefer 




Properties which make substance different are mostly qualities, and in his 
discussion of these qualities, Plotinus says:
“Nevertheless, we ventured to assure elsewhere that while the complements of 
substance are only by analogy called qualities, yet accessions of external origin 
and subsequent to Substance are really qualities; that, further, the properties which 
inhere in substances are their activities (ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν), while those which are 
subsequent are merely modifications (αὐτὰς ἤδη πάθη): we now affirm that the 
attributes of the particular substance are never complementary to the substance 
[as such]; an accession of substance does not come to the substance of man qua 
man; he is, on the contrary, substance in higher degree before he arrives at dif-
ferentiation, just as he is already <living being> before he passes into the rational 
species.”464
The substance of the intellectual realm possesses all qualities, because they 
are what it is, and, therefore, we can truly say that it has those qualities, but 
they do not make it substance by defining it. Plotinus explicitly says that 
those qualities are activities of substance, while in the sensual world they are 
rather passive. We can understand what Plotinus means that by referring to 
his notion of the procession of intellectual hypostases, which occurs not by 
diminishing a higher entity, but rather by the division and multiplication of 
something which hypostasis already possesses in a simpler and undivided 
way. According to this mode, we can also explain “remaining” as an activ-
ity, which is somehow hidden in the higher substance, but becomes distinct 
in the lower one. Therefore “what remains is not something alongside the 
internal activity: it is that activity.”465 Plotinus states it very clearly that all 
supreme genres of Plato could be ascribed to substance without qualifying 
or particularizing it:
“If motion is the act (ἐνέργεια) of substance, and being and the primaries (τὰ πρῶτα) 
in general are its act, then motion is not the accidental attribute (συμβεβηκός): as 
the act of what is necessarily actual [when necessarily involves act], it is no longer 
464 Enn. VI, 2, 14, 18–22. Καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἠξιοῦμεν τὰ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας συμπληρωτικὰ 
ὁμωνύμως ποιὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ’ ἔξωθεν μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχοντα ποιά, καὶ τὰ μὲν 
ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ μετ’ αὐτὰς ἤδη πάθη. Νῦν δὲ λέγομεν οὐκ 
οὐσίας ὅλως εἶναι συμπληρωτικὰ τὰ τῆς τινὸς οὐσίας· οὐ γὰρ οὐσίας προσθήκη 
γίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος εἰς οὐσίαν· ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐσία ἄνωθεν, πρὶν 
ἐπὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ζῷον ἤδη, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸ λογικὸν ἥκειν (Henry/
Schwyzer, vol. 3, p. 62; tr. MacKenna/Page, pp. 276–277).
465 A.C. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 101.
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to be considered as complement of substance but substance itself. For this reason, 
then, it has not been assigned to a posterior class, or referred to quality, but has 
been made contemporary with the being. The truth is not that being first is and 
then takes motion, first is and acquires stability [remaining]: neither stability nor 
motion is a mere modification of being. Similarly, identity and difference are not 
later additions: being did not grow into plurality; its very unity was plurality; but 
plurality implies difference, and unity-in-plurality involves identity. Substance [real 
Being] requires no more than these five constituents; but when we turn to lower 
sphere, we find other principles giving rise no longer to substance (as such) but to 
quantitative substance and qualitative: these other principles can be regarded as 
genera but not primary genera.”466
We can imagine that here Plotinus simply fully draws the conclusions of 
what Aristotle claimed on the activity of motion/change as not occurring 
in time and having its own end in itself. In the intellectual reality Aristotle’s 
genera are sufficient to describe the constitutive elements of substance. It 
is simply substance, but in the sensual realm, it is no longer substance as 
such, but rather substance with the property of quality or quantity. Such 
perception of the activity of intellectual substances tells us much about 
how Plotinus understood the intellectual cosmos. Since even remaining is a 
kind of activity, this is not a static place, but rather the world of unending 
dynamism. This can also be observed in the second aspect in which Plotinus 
describes activity. This is no longer the aspect of “activity of existence,” 
but rather activity which is creative.
This creative aspect of the understanding of activity is presented in the 
fourth chapter of the fifth Ennead. In this treaty, he wanted to explain how 
the Intellect (νοῦς) comes from the One. Plotinus starts with elaborating on 
natural activity which is present in the Cosmos. To show the productive 
nature of the One, Plotinus claims that in every productive activity which 
466 Enn. VI, 2, 15, 6–18 εἰ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὸ ὂν καὶ 
ὅλως τὰ πρῶτα, οὐκ ἂν συμβεβηκὸς εἴη ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ’ ἐνέργεια οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ 
ὄντος οὐδ’ ἂν συμπληρωτικὸν ἔτι λέγοιτο, ἀλλ’ αὐτή· ὥστε οὐκ ἐμβέβηκεν εἰς 
ὕστερόν τι οὐδ’ εἰς ποιότητα, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ ἅμα τέτακται. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὄν, εἶτα 
κεκίνηται, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὄν, εἶτα ἔστη· οὐδὲ πάθος ἡ στάσις· καὶ ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ 
θάτερον οὐχ ὕστερα, ὅτι μὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο πολλά, ἀλλ’ ἦν ὅπερ ἦν ἓν πολλά· εἰ 
δὲ πολλά, καὶ ἑτερότης, καὶ εἰ ἓν πολλά, καὶ ταὐτότης. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν 
ἀρκεῖ· ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃ πρὸς τὰ κάτω προιέναι, τότε ἄλλα, ἃ οὐκέτι οὐσίαν ποιεῖ, 
ἀλλὰ ποιὰν οὐσίαν καὶ ποσὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ γιγνέσθω γένη οὐ πρῶτα (Henry/Schw-
yzer, vol. 3, p. 63; tr. MacKenna/Page, p. 277).
135
we find in the Universe, we can find imitation of what the One does in 
producing the Intellect. This does not involve only the things which have 
cognition and choice, but all existing beings.467 Therefore, every productive 
activity is for us a path which leads to understanding the activity of the One. 
Such activity is in fact divided into two activities: internal and external, 
which Plotinus explains in this most important fragment:
“In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance (ἐνέργεια 
τῆς οὐσίας) and one which goes out from substance (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας); and that which 
belongs to substance is the active actuality which is each particular thing, and the 
other activity derives from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence 
of it, different from the thing itself: as in fire there is a heat which is the content of 
its substance, and another which comes into being from that primary heat when 
fire exercises the activity which is native to its substance in abiding unchanged as 
fire. So it is also in the higher world; and much more so there, while the Principle 
abides “in its own proper way of life,” the activity generated from the perfection 
in it and its coexistent activity (συνούσης ἐνεργείας) acquires substantial existence, 
since it comes from a great power, the greatest indeed of all, and arrives at being 
and substance: for that Principle is “beyond being.” That is the productive power 
of all things, and its product is already all things.”468
The first activity is then coexistent and identical with substance, and it is 
itself the very existence of it. The second activity comes out of substance not 
as something added to it, but rather it is a necessary consequence of the first 
one. Therefore, the second activity could be understood as the revelation of 
the very substance of the first one.469 This fact is very important because the 
only way to gain any kind of knowledge of the One can be obtained, thanks 
to what is revealed in the second activity. This concept is very similar to the 
467 Cf. Enn. V, 4, 1, 26–36 (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 2, p. 55).
468 Enn. V, 4, 2, 27–39. “᾿Ενέργεια ἡ μέν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας, ἡ δ’ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστου· 
καὶ ἡ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτό ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης, ἣν δεῖ παντὶ 
ἕπεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέραν οὖσαν αὐτοῦ· οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ μέν τίς ἐστι 
συμπληροῦσα τὴν οὐσίαν θερμότης, ἡ δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ἤδη γινομένη ἐνεργοῦντος 
ἐκείνου τὴν σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐν τῷ μένειν πῦρ. Οὕτω δὴ κἀκεῖ· καὶ πολὺ 
πρότερον ἐκεῖ μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἤθει ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος καὶ 
συνούσης ἐνεργείας ἡ γεννηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν λαβοῦσα, ἅτε ἐκ μεγάλης 
δυνάμεως, μεγίστης μὲν οὖν ἁπασῶν, εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἦλθεν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ 
ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἦν. Καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν δύναμις πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἤδη τὰ πάντα (Henry/
Schwyzer, vol. 2, p. 236; tr. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 76).
469 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 77–78.
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second method of theology of Eunomius, who also saw the activity of God 
as the way to gain knowledge of Him. A second important observation is 
the relation of activity to life. The two acts are the way in which the One 
lives its most perfect life. It is worth noting that the theory of the two acts 
is explained by the example of fire, which is also often used by Gregory of 
Nyssa in his criticism of Eunomius’ opinions, as we will see below.
One of the questions which arise here involves the problem of how the 
One can be a self-thinking thought without the duality of the subject and 
object. It seems that Plotinus was aware of the problem and tried to find a 
solution.470 Traces of such attempts can be found in the eighth treaty of the 
sixth Ennead, where he considers the will of the One. Although, as Plotinus 
observes, there are profound difficulties in forming any conception of what 
the One is, we can say:
“If then we are to allow activities in the Supreme and make them depend upon will 
(ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οἷον βουλήσει αὐτοῦ) - and certainly act cannot there be will-less 
- and those activities are to be very essence, then will and essence in the Supreme 
must be identical (ἡ βούλησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ταὐτὸν ἔσται.). This admitted, as 
He willed to be so He is; it is no more true to say that He wills and acts as His 
nature determines than that His essence is as He wills and acts. Thus He is wholly 
master of Himself and holds His very being ad His will.”471
If there is any will in the One, it also must be an activity, and it also must 
be identical with its substance. In this fragment, Plotinus persistently repeats 
that the activity of will is for the One some kind of self-establishment, and 
he ends by saying:
“The Good, then, exists; it holds its existence through choice and will (ἡ αἵρεσις 
καὶ ἡ βούλησις), conditions of its very being; yet it cannot be a manifold; therefore 
the will and essential being (τὴν οὐσίαν) must be taken as one identity; the act of 
the will must be self-determined and the being self-caused; thus reason shows the 
Supreme to be its own Author. For if the act of will springs from God Himself and 
is as it were His operation and the same will is identical with essence (δὲ ταὐτὸν 
470 Cf. ibid., pp. 87–88.
471 Enn. VI, 8, 13, 5–11. Εἰ γὰρ δοίημεν ἐνεργείας αὐτῷ, τὰς δ’ ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οἷον 
βουλήσει αὐτοῦ—οὐ γὰρ ἀβουλῶν ἐνεργεῖ—αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι ἡ οἷον οὐσία αὐτοῦ, 
ἡ βούλησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ταὐτὸν ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐβούλετο, οὕτω 
καὶ ἔστιν. Οὐ μᾶλλον ἄρα ὡς πέφυκε βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ἢ ὡς βούλεταί τε 
καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. Κύριος ἄρα πάντη ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ ἔχων καὶ 
τὸ εἶναι (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 3, pp. 256–257; tr. MacKenna/Page, p. 349).
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τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ), he must be self-established. He is not, therefore, “what he 
happened to be” but what he has willed to be.”472
The One cannot be many, and it cannot be drowned by anything else but 
itself. But here we encounter the same problem which we have seen in the 
case of intellectual activity, because there are also the subject and object of 
the will. So there is no clear answer to how can the One be simultaneously 
absolutely simple and divided into the One that wills and that is willed. 
Another question is how the activity of the will is related to the theory of the 
double activity of the thought. The text above seems to suggest that we can 
also speak of the two acts of the will: internal and external. Another solu-
tion is to admit that the first activity is the activity of the will and the second 
one is the activity of the intellect, but Plotinus does not explain clearly that 
he understood it this way. The final problem which is present here and to 
which there is no easy answer is what should be understood as first – the 
activity of the will or the activity of the intellect. Since the One is simple 
and there is no temporal succession in it, the question seems inadequate. 
But since the activity of the will is described as self-establishment, it would 
be logical to assume that such eternal act of establishment is somehow prior 
to the activity of thinking, which is creative.
This last question is of paramount importance in the context of the Ar-
ian controversy, since, as we have already seen, Arius himself conceived 
the generation of the Son by the Father as the act of will. Therefore, the 
generation of the Son which is willed by the Father is the primary activity of 
God. It is worth noticing that Eunomius is here in complete agreement with 
Arius, and he also sees generation as the act of will, but he explicitly calls it 
activity. It is yet to be determined below whether we can find any traces of 
the influence of Plotinus in Eunomius and his Cappadocian opponents, but, 
472 Enn. VI, 8, 13, 50–59. Εἰ οὖν ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ συνυφίστησιν αὐτὸ ἡ 
αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ βούλησις—ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἔσται—δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, 
συνακτέον ὡς ἓν τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ θέλειν· τὸ δὲ θέλειν <εἰ> 
παρ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ εἶναι, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι 
αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη 
δὲ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτόν· ὥστε οὐκ 
ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 3, p. 258; 
tr. MacKenna/Page, p. 349).
138
as we shall see, the problem of will and how it is related to the substance of 
God is understood by Eunomius in a completely different way.
4.3  The Holy Scripture and early Christian concepts of 
ἐνέργεια
4.3.1  The Holy Scripture on the activities of God as a way to 
know His attributes
When making his own version of the theological methods based on sub-
stance and activity, Eunomius does not only have an open philosophical 
tradition to refer to, but we must remember that ἐνέργεια is also present in 
the Septuagint version of the Old Testament and in the New Testament as 
well.473 In the Septuagint, the term is used in the second and third Book of 
the Maccabees and in The Book of Wisdom.
In the second Book of Maccabees, the term describes the mighty inter-
vention of God in the case of Heliodorus, who planned to rob the treasury 
of the Temple in Jerusalem (2 Macc: 3, 24–27; 29). In the third book, the 
activity is ascribed to the operation of the Divine Providence which pro-
tects Israel (3 Macc: 4, 21). In The Book of Wisdom, ἐνέργεια generally is 
not applied to God, but to the operations of man, elements, and produced 
objects.474 We can find it being used in a fashion already observed in Ar-
istotle, namely to describe the operation of life. In chapter 15, the term 
appears in the criticism of the pagans, who create their own gods and fail 
to recognize their Maker. Therefore, “Their heart is ashes, their hope is 
cheaper than dirt, and their lives are of less worth than clay, because they 
failed to know the one who formed them and inspired them with active 
souls (ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν) and breathed a living spirit into them.”475 We 
find similar concepts in chapter 13 (1–5), where ἐνέργεια also appears in 
473 R.P. Vaggione notes that the problem of ἐνέργεια was so important precisely 
because for the Christian writers, it was not a philosophical issue, but rather 
it was an exegesis of the Holy Scripture, cf. Eunomius of Cyzicus and the 
Nicene Revolution, Oxford 2000, pp. 130–131.
474 Cf. J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., p. 83.
475 Wis 15: 10–11. σποδὸς ἡ καρδία αὐτοῦ, καὶ γῆς εὐτελεστέρα ἡ ἐλπὶς αὐτοῦ, πηλοῦ 
τε ἀτιμότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἠγνόησε τὸν πλάσαντα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν ἐμπνεύσαντα 
αὐτῷ ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν καὶ ἐμφυσήσαντα πνεῦμα ζωτικόν· (tr. NRSVCE).
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the context of failing to recognize the Maker from the beauty of the world 
and natural activity of elements:
“…but they supposed that either fire or wind or swift air, or the circle of the stars, 
or turbulent water, or the luminaries of heaven were the gods that rule the world. 
If through delight in the beauty of these things men assumed them to be gods, let 
them know how much better than these is their Lord, for the author of beauty 
created them. And if men were amazed at their power and working (δύναμιν καὶ 
ἐνέργειαν), let them perceive from them how much more powerful is he who 
formed them. For from the greatness and beauty of created things comes a cor-
responding perception of their Creator.”476
Although this fragment does not use ἐνέργεια to describe directly the crea-
tive activity of God, it seems to suggest that there is a correlation between 
the natural activity of created beings and the activity of God. It also con-
firms that, thanks to proper recognition of the activity of created beings, 
one can recognize the existence of God. And we have certain analogy here: 
the beauty of activity found in creations can tell us the eminent degree of 
the beauty of God. As we have seen above, Philo of Alexandria presented 
similar ideas in his concept of activity.
From the perspective of the Arian controversy, the most important is a 
long fragment where Salomon describes impersonated Wisdom (7: 21–11: 
3). At the beginning of the fragment, Wisdom is characterized as follows:
“For wisdom is more mobile than any motion; because of her pureness she per-
vades and penetrates all things. For she is a breath of the power of God, and a pure 
emanation of the glory of the Almighty; therefore nothing defiled gains entrance 
into her. For she is a reflection of eternal light, a spotless mirror of the working of 
God (τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας), and an image of his goodness.”477
476 Wis 13: 2–5. ἀλλ᾿ ἢ πῦρ ἢ πνεῦμα ἢ ταχινὸν ἀέρα ἢ κύκλον ἄστρων ἢ βίαιον ὕδωρ 
ἢ φωστῆρας οὐρανοῦ πρυτάνεις κόσμου θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν. ὧν εἰ μὲν τῇ καλλονῇ 
τερπόμενοι ταῦτα θεοὺς ὑπελάμβανον, γνώτωσαν πόσῳ τούτων ὁ δεσπότης ἐστὶ 
βελτίων, ὁ γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους γενεσιάρχης ἔκτισεν αὐτά· εἰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν 
ἐκπλαγέντες νοησάτωσαν ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν πόσῳ ὁ κατασκευάσας αὐτὰ δυνατώτερός 
ἐστιν· ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν 
θεωρεῖται (tr. RSV).
477 Wis 7: 24–26. πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινητικώτερον σοφία, διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ 
πάντων διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα· ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστι τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπόρροια 
τῆς τοῦ Παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής· διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν μεμιαμμένον εἰς αὐτὴν 
παρεμπίπτει. ἀπαύγασμα γάρ ἐστι φωτὸς ἀϊδίου καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ 
Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ (tr. RSV).
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Although Wisdom is not named the activity of God, it is evident that being 
“a spotless mirror of the activity of God,” it is the best way to gain the 
knowledge of the Creator. Those fragments of The Book of Wisdom, how-
ever, are far more important in the context of the Arian controversy and the 
teaching of Eunomius. The Wisdom of God is also described and praised 
in the Proverbs (8: 1–9: 18), and this fragment contains the key verse 8:22, 
which was (in the Septuagint version) the only place in the Holy Scripture 
which could be interpreted as supporting the Arian claim as to the created 
substance of the Son of God. Anomeans repeatedly quoted Wisdom saying 
about it: “The Lord created me the beginning of His way for His works 
(κύριος ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ).”478 The combination 
of the verse with 1 Corinthians 1:24, where St Paul calls the Son of God 
Wisdom allowed Eunomians to claim that the Son is “offspring and thing 
made (γέννημα καὶ ποίημα).”479
Therefore, if we look at the fragments from The Book of Wisdom in the 
context of the teaching on wisdom in Proverbs, we discern the significance 
of the claims that Wisdom is the mirror of God’s activity. This is certainly 
one of the most important sources of Eunomius’ second way of theology. 
But, as we will see, those verses from The Book of Wisdom are significant 
not only because they speak about the way of recognizing God and Crea-
tor, but also because of the famous fragment of the Letter to the Romans 
which refers to them.
In the New Testament, the term ἐνέργεια is used in various forms to 
describe the spiritual activities of man, of Satan, but most of all is applied 
to many aspects of the operations of God, who acts in sacraments, in the 
soul of man, and in Christ. Most occurrences are to be found in Paul’s 
478 R.P. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cysiucs and the Nicene Revolution, Oxford 2000, 
pp. 83–84. Gregory of Nyssa also confirms a very frequent use of the verse: 
“However, that passage from Proverbs may perhaps be quoted to us by them, 
which the advocates of the heresy constantly quote as proof that the Lord was 
created…” Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium III, 1, 21 (GNO II, p. 10).
479 Eunomius uses this expression in Liber apologeticus, 12, 1–3 (R.P. Vaggione, 
pp. 46–48). For a full discussion on the verse and its meaning, cf. T. Stępień, 
Created or uncreated Wisdom? op. cit., pp. 147–155.
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letters.480 For our purposes, two fragments need to be mentioned. As we 
shall see, Eunomius strongly opposes the conception of identity of the ac-
tivity of the Divine Persons, but in the Gospel of John, there is passage 5: 
19 which reads: “My Father is working still, and I am working.”481 Those 
words of Jesus were understood by his interlocutors as making himself 
equal to God. They also were very often used by the Orthodox to claim 
the unity of the activity of the Divine Persons.
The second fragment that was mentioned above is a passage from Ro-
mans 1: 18–2:
“For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to 
them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal 
power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. 
So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honor him 
as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their 
senseless minds were darkened.”482
Although in this passage, the term ἐνέργεια is not present, it confirms that 
the Greeks obtained the knowledge of God from what He has made. The 
context of failing to draw conclusions from this knowledge and honouring 
God makes it very similar to the fragments of The Book of Wisdom where 
the term occurs (13: 1–5) in the context of knowing the attributes of God 
from His works which one can observe in creations. It is worth noting that 
this time, the accusation does not refer to pagans in general, but directly 
to Greeks.
It is worth noting that in his letters, St Paul now and again repeats that 
the activity of man, especially the Apostolic one, is in fact the activity in 
accordance with that of God, who Himself works. He also draws special 
attention to the activity of God in the human soul.483
480 Cf. Jean-Claude Larchet analyses the occurrences of ἐνέργεια in the New 
Testament in op. cit., pp. 86–91.
481 ὁ πατήρ μου ἕως ἄρτι ἐργάζεται, κἀγὼ ἐργάζομαι (tr. RSVCE).
482 διότι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς· ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσε. 
τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται, 
ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, διότι 
γνόντες τὸν Θεὸν οὐχ ὡς Θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ εὐχαρίστησαν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν 
τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία· (tr. RSVCE).
483 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., pp. 121–122.
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As we can see the fragments of the Old and New Testament, which use 
various forms of ἐνέργεια, certainly do not contain a systematic theological 
teaching on the activities of God. But they certainly include many elements 
which will be commented upon and developed by the Fathers,484 and they 
also explain why Eunomius insisted that his teaching comes directly from 
the Holy Scripture.
4.3.2 The Church Fathers and the sources of Eunomius’ methods
Looking for the sources of Eunomius’ notion of ἐνέργεια, we must also make 
some remarks on the earlier Christian tradition. Although the occurrences 
of ἐνέργεια are not very frequent, we can observe it being used already in 
the works of Athenagoras. He is probably the first author who tries to 
make a distinction between substance and activity and apply ἐνέργεια to 
the Logos. At the beginning of De resurrectione, he says about those who 
do not believe in resurrection:
“For such men have left no truth free from their calumnious attacks – not the 
being of God, not His knowledge, not His operations (οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ 
τὴν γνῶσιν, οὐ τὴν ἐνέργειαν), not those books which follow by a regular and strict 
sequence from these and delineate for us the doctrines of piety.”485
Although this text refers rather to those who argue for the impossibility of 
resurrection, it clearly states that there is a difference between substance, 
knowledge, and activities of God. Athenagoras also uses ἐνέργεια to describe 
the act of creation which is completed, thanks to the Son of God. There-
fore, he says that “the Son of God is the Logos of the Father, in idea and 
in operation (ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ); for after the pattern of Him and by Him 
were all things made.”486 In this fragment, Athenagoras not only explains 
the role of the Logos, but also tries to explain how the Father generates 
the Son, who is equal to him.487 It is also worth mentioning Theophilus of 
Antioch, who also shared the conviction that we can know God, thanks to 
484 Cf. J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., p. 93.
485 De resurrectione I, 2 (SC 397, pp. 214–219; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 149).
486 Libellus pro christianis 10, 2 (SC 397, p. 102; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 133).
487 Ibid. 10, 3 (SC 397, p. 102; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 133). It is worth noting that the 
activity of the Son resembles the work of the Demiurge who gives the form 
and is the source of life (J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., p. 99).
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His activities, but he claimed that we can know only His Power, whereas 
God Himself remains incomprehensible.488
We can also observe some important occurrences of ἐνέργεια in the writ-
ings of the Alexandrian Fathers. Explaining the prologue of the Gospel of 
John Clement, it says: “<all things were made through him>, according to 
continuous activity of Logos in constant identity: spiritual and intellectual 
as well as sensual things.”489 This verse is the continuation of his comment 
on J 1:1–2, and thus Clement seems to confirm identity of the activity of 
the Father and the Son. The Logos play a prime role in creation, but his 
activity does not make him separate from the Father.490 In Stromata, when 
arguing against the Gnostics that Christ is the Saviour of all things, he ex-
plains the nature of the Son from the perspective of God and His creative 
power. In his excellence and perfection, he is beyond time and place, and 
he does all things in accordance with the will of the Father. Therefore, he 
not only plays the most important role in the creation, but he also is the 
supreme ruler of the world. Therefore, he: “holds the helm of the universe 
in the best way, with unwearied and tireless power, working all things in 
which it operates, keeping in view its hidden designs.”491 Therefore, Clem-
ent calls the Son certain activity of the Father,492 and he seems to make a 
link between substance, power, activity, and the product.493
488 Cf. Ad Autol. I, 3, 2, 6–13, especially where he claims that “…if I call Him 
Power, I am mentioning His activity (δύναμιν ἐάν εἴπω, ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ λέγω)” 
(SC 20, pp. 62–64; tr. ANF, vol 2, pp. 89–90).
489 Excerpta ex Theodoto 8, 1, 2 «Πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο», κατὰ τὴν προσεχῆ 
ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγου, τά τε πνευματικὰ καὶ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά (SC 
23, p. 72; tr. Pierce/Casey, p.47).
490 Excerpta ex Theodoto 8, 1, 1 (SC 23, p. 72).
491 Strom. VII, 2, 5, 4. καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄριστα οἰακίζει, ἀκαμάτῳ καὶ ἀτρύτῳ δυνάμει 
πάντα ἐργαζομένη, δι’ ὧν ἐνεργεῖ τὰς ἀποκρύφους ἐννοίας ἐπιβλέπουσα (SC 428, 
p. 48; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 524).
492 Strom. VII, 2, 7, 7, “Now the energy of the Lord has a reference to the Al-
mighty; and the Son is, so to speak, an energy of the Father.” πᾶσα δὲ ἡ τοῦ 
κυρίου ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ τὸν παντοκράτορα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς εἰπεῖν 
πατρική τις ἐνέργεια ὁ υἱός. (SC 428, p. 56; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 525).
493 A similar view of causality will be later presented by Eunomius. Cf. M.R. 
Barnes, The Background and Use of Eunomius’ Casual Language, op. cit., 
p. 229.
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But the most interesting use of ἐνέργεια can be found in the fourth chapter 
of the eighth book of Stromata, where Clement claims that to solve any 
question, one must begin with a clear definition of the thing discussed. 
Sometimes, the object of investigation is the mere essence (οὐσία) of the 
thing, like in the case of stones, plants, and animals, in the case of which 
the activities are unknown to us (ὧν τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀγνοοῦμεν).494 In other 
cases, we know certain powers or properties of things, but we do not know 
the essences and, therefore, we must make them the object of investigation:
“But in many instances, our understanding having assumed all these, the question 
is, in which of the essences do they thus inhere; for it is after forming conceptions 
of both - that is, both of essence and activity (ἀμφοτέρων γάρ, τῆς τε οὐσίας τῆς τε 
ἐνεργείας) - in our mind, that we proceed to the question. And there are also some 
objects, whose activities, along with their essences, we know, but are ignorant of 
their modifications.”495
And he adds: “Such, then, is the method (μέθοδος) of the discovery [of the 
truth].”496 Since Clement concentrates mostly on investigating the essence 
of animals, it is obvious that activity is treated by him as a property which 
can lead us to knowledge, that the essence in question is the essence of 
animals. Then he recalls the positions of Plato and Aristotle. While the 
former called plants the animals, the latter insisted that since they do not 
possess the power of sensation, they cannot be properly called animals.497 
To resolve those antagonistic positions, one must answer the question using 
two methods of applying the term “animal”:
494 Strom. VIII, 4, 9, 1–2. εἶναι δὲ <δυνατὸν> τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν προϋπάρξασαν τοῦ 
ζητουμένου παντὸς ποτὲ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ψιλῶς ἀγνοουμένων [δὲ] τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς, 
οἷον λίθων, φυτῶν, ζῴων, ὧν τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἢ παθῶν ἢ δυνάμεων ἢ 
ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν [ἓν] τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς οὖσιν· (GCS 17, p. 85; tr. ANF, vol. 2, 
p. 560).
495 Strom. VIII, 4, 9, 3–6. ἐν πολλοῖς δέ, τῆς νοήσεως αὐτῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας 
ὑποτιθεμένης ἑαυτῇ ταῦτα πάντα, τὴν ζήτησιν εἶναι, τίνι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν οὕτω μὲν 
ὑπάρχῃ· ἀμφοτέρων γάρ, τῆς τε οὐσίας τῆς τε ἐνεργείας, τὰς ἐπινοίας ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ 
λαβόντες οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν ἐρχόμεθα. ἔστιν δὲ ὧν καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας εἰδότες 
ἅμα ταῖς οὐσίαις ἀγνοοῦμεν τὰ παθήματα. ῎Εστιν οὖν ἡ μέθοδος τῆς εὑρέσεως 
τοιαύτη· (GCS 17, p. 85; tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 560).
496 Strom. VIII, 4, 9, 6. ̓́ Εστιν οὖν ἡ μέθοδος τῆς εὑρέσεως τοιαύτη· (GCS 17, p. 85; 
tr. ANF, vol. 2, p. 560).
497 Strom. VIII, 4, 9, 3–6 (GCS 17, p. 86, ANF, vol. 2, p. 560).
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“But as there are two methods, one by question and answer, and the other the 
method of exposition, if he declines the former, let him listen to us, while we 
expound all that bears on the problem.”498
It seems that here Clement passes from the method of recognizing the es-
sence to the ways of discussion, so there is only a vague reference to the 
two methods of theology of Eunomius. But the first part of this fragment 
bears more visible reference. In the first case, we can know only the “mere 
essence” of the thing (e.g., stone), and since it is inanimate, we cannot rec-
ognize its proper activity. In the second case, since we deal with something 
which is alive, the activity can be known and therefore it is the way of 
discovering the essence. Therefore, Clement seems to be a predecessor of 
Eunomius, who considers his two methods in a more developed way and 
applies it to the essence and activity of God.499 But it is worth noting that 
this reference evokes only the second method of Eunomius: from activity 
to substance.
Origen, who is far more important because of his influence on the writers 
of the 4th century, also provides some important uses of ἐνέργεια, especially 
when he comments on Wisdom 7, where he tries to formulate a definition 
of activity:
But wisdom is also called the stainless mirror of the ἐνέργειας or working of God. 
We must first understand, then, what the working of the power of God is. It is a 
sort of vigour, so to speak, by which God operates either in creation, or in provi-
dence, or in judgment, or in the disposal and arrangement of individual things, 
each in its season. For as the image formed in a mirror unerringly reflects all the 
acts and movements of him who gazes on it, so would Wisdom have herself to 
be understood when she is called the stainless mirror of the power and working 
of the Father: as the Lord Jesus Christ also, who is the Wisdom of God, declares 
of Himself when He says, “The works which the Father doeth, these also doeth 
the Son likewise.”500
498 Strom. VIII, 4, 11, 4. ἰ δὲ δυοῖν τρόποιν ὑπαρχόντοιν, ἑτέρου μὲν τοῦ κατ’ 
ἐρώτησίν τε καὶ ἀπόκρισιν, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ κατὰ διέξοδον, ἤρνηται τὸ ἕτερον, 
ἐπακουσάτω πάντα τὰ εἰς τὸ πρόβλημα διεξιόντων ἡμῶν· (GCS 17, p. 86; tr. 
ANF, vol. 2, p. 561).
499 Cf. M.R. Barnes, op. cit., p. 230.
500 De princ. I, 2, 12, 411–425. “Sed et speculum immaculatum ἐνέργειας (id est 
inoperationis) dei esse sapitentia nominatur. Ergo inoperatio uirtutis de quae 
sit, prius intellegenda est; quae est uigor quidam, ut ita dixerim, per quem 
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Although this text was preserved only in the Latin version, it is remarkable 
that Tyrannius Rufinus left the Greek term in the translation. He probably 
thought that there was no proper Latin equivalent of ἐνέργεια.501 In this 
fragment, Origen not only explains 7: 24–26, drawing special attention 
to Wisdom being the clear mirror of the activity of God, but he also links 
the text of Wisdom with the Gospel of John 5: 19. By doing this, Origen 
confirms the unity of the activity of the Father and the Son, which was later 
rejected by Eunomius. Moreover, Origen also claims that there are multiple 
activities, such as creation, providence, or judgement, which is also impor-
tant in the context of the problem, present in Eunomius’ Apology, whether 
we can assume the multiple or only one activity of God.
The last Father which must be presented before we turn to Eunomius is 
Athanasius. As D. Bradshaw notes, in the 4th century, during the Arian and 
Neo-Arian controversy, the term ἐνέργεια became the key term to describe 
the activity of God in the world, and human soul and participation in the 
divine activities began to be understood as divinization.502 But it could be 
understood in this way only because the term became also the main way of 
describing the activities of the Divine Persons. Athanasius uses the distinc-
tion between substance and activity to demonstrate consubstantiality of the 
Divine Persons in opposition to those who denied the Divinity of the Holy 
Spirit. Saying that the three persons are the source of life, justification, and 
inoperatur pater, uel cum creat uel cum proudet uel cum iudicat uel cum sin-
gula quaeque in tempor suo disponit atque dispensat. Sicut ergo in speculo 
omnibus motibus atque omnibus antibus, quibus is qui speculum intuetur 
mouetur uel agit, isdem ipsis etiam ea imago, quae per speculum deformatur, 
actibus et motibus commouetur uel agit, in nullo prorsus declinano: ita etiam 
sapentia de se uult intellegi, cum speculum immaculatatm pateranae uirtutis 
inoperationisque nominatur; sicut et dominus Iesus Christus, qui est sapietntia 
dei, de semet ipso pronuntiat dicens quia opera quae facit pater, haak etiam 
filius facti similiter” (SC 252, pp. 138–141; tr. ANF, vol. 4, p. 251).
501 Rufinus does a similar thing in the translation of another fragment of Peri 
Archon (III, 3, 4, 151–172; SC 268, pp. 192–195), where Origen speaks about 
the activities of human soul. Here, however, he simply puts the Greek word in 
the Latin version as “energeia.” Commenting on this passage, D. Bradshaw 
notes that Origen presents the standard understanding of ἐνέργεια (op. cit., 
pp. 124–125).
502 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 154.
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sanctification, he demonstrates that the Son is equal to the Father because 
of the unity of the activity:
“This consideration shows that the activity of the Trinity is one. The Apostle does 
not mean that the things which are given are given differently and separately by 
each Person, but that what is given is given in the Trinity, and that all are from the 
one God. Him therefore who is no creature but is one with the Son as the Son is 
one with the Father, who is glorified with the Father and the Son, who is confessed 
as God with the Word, who is active in the works which the Father works through 
the Son – is not the man who calls him a creature guilty of a direct impiety against 
the Son himself? For there is nothing that is not originated and actuated through 
the Word in the Spirit.”503
For Athanasius, the activity of the Holy Spirit is then the same as that of 
the Father and the Son, and, therefore, all grace is given by the Trinity, but 
can be recognized as having the intrinsic order. There is, however, certain 
difficulty because Athanasius does not say precisely how we can draw a 
distinction between the persons while their activity is unified.504 But he 
seems to be satisfied with showing the sequence: the Father, “through” the 
Son and “in” the Holy Spirit, which we also can see in one of the preced-
ing passages:
“The Trinity is holy and perfect, confessed in the Father and the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit, having nothing foreign or external mixed with it, not composed of one that 
creates and one that is originated, but all creative; and it is consistent and in nature 
indivisible, and its activity is one. The Father does all things through the Word in 
the Holy Spirit. Thus the unity of the holy Trinity is preserved. Thus one God is 
preached in the Church, who is over all, and through all, and in all.”505
503 Ep. ad Serap. I, 31, 1–3. Μία ἄρα καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἡ τῆς τριάδος ἐνέργεια 
δείκνυται. Οὐ γὰρ ὡς παρ’ ἑκάστου διάφορα καὶ διῃρημένα τὰ διδόμενα σημαίνει 
ὁ ᾿Απόστολος· ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὰ διδόμενα ἐν Τριάδι δίδοται, καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐξ ἑνὸς Θεοῦ 
ἐστι. Τὸ τοίνυν μὴ ὂν κτίσμα, ἀλλ’ ἡνωμένον τῷ Υἱῷ, ὡς ὁ Υἱὸς ἥνωται τῷ Πατρὶ, 
τὸ συνδοξαζόμενον Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ, καὶ θεολογούμενον μετὰ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐνεργοῦν 
τε ἅπερ ὁ Πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐργάζεται, πῶς ὁ λέγων κτίσμα οὐκ ἄντικρυς εἰς 
αὐτὸν τὸν Υἱὸν ἀσεβεῖ; Οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃ μὴ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι 
γίνεται καὶ ἐνεργεῖται (Savvidis, p. 526; tr. Shapland, pp. 142–143).
504 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit. pp. 155–156.
505 Ep. ad Serap. I, 28, 2–3. τριὰς τοίνυν ἁγία καὶ τελεία ἐστὶν, ἐν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ 
καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι θεολογουμένη, οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἢ ἔξωθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον 
ἔχουσα, οὐδὲ ἐκ δημιουργοῦ καὶ γενητοῦ συνισταμένη, ἀλλ’ ὅλη τοῦ κτίζειν καὶ 
δημιουργεῖν οὖσα· ὁμοία δὲ ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι τῇ φύσει, καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ 
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The unity of the Trinity can be recognized according to one activity of the 
Persons, but here we also find traces of a distinction between the nature 
and activities of God, which has almost the same meaning as that between 
substance and activity which we find in Eunomius.
At the end of our quest for the sources of Eunomius’ understanding of 
activity, we may note that the Church Fathers did not make this concept the 
central idea in their notion of God. But we can see continuity of the tradi-
tion and systematic development of the theological idea, which becomes 
more and more important until the 4th century. Therefore, there are two 
observations to be made here. Firstly, this development seems to be linked 
with the understanding of the Trinity and evolution of Trinitarian theol-
ogy, so it appears that the growing problems of naming the oneness of 
God who exists as three Persons forced Christian writers to search for the 
terms and concepts which could express and describe the most important 
dogma of the faith.
Secondly, since the term invented by Aristotle was also present in Sep-
tuagint and especially in the Letters of St Paul, Christian writers had no 
objection to exploit it. However, we must also notice that it has various 
meanings in the Holy Scripture, and we find no solid explanation of its 
meaning, especially in early writings. There is also a very limited discus-
sion of how to understand its use when applied to the operations of God. 
But since it was present both in the Holy Scripture and the philosophical 
tradition, its meaning and importance grow in proportion to its use of 
philosophy in explaining Christian beliefs. Especially the writings of Philo, 
which were widely read by Christians, provided the most important link 
between philosophical concepts and the Father’s teachings. It is obvious that 
those two features become most important during the Arian controversy, 
when there is an urgent need to explain the relation of the Son to Father, 
and, therefore, there is also a need to find the concepts to express it. That is 
why the philosophical ideas found their new place in theological systems of 
the 4th century as never before in the history of Christian writings, despite 
ἐνέργεια. ̔ Ο γὰρ πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ· καὶ οὕτως 
ἡ ἑνότης τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος σώζεται· καὶ οὕτως εἷς θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται, 
«ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν.» (Savvidis, p. 520; tr. Shapland, 
pp. 134–135 with my own alterations).
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constant accusations from both sides of being too fond of using the Hellenic 
concepts. Therefore, during the Arian controversy, the concept of ἐνέργεια 
of God also becomes the key theological problem.
4.4 The knowledge of the Unbegotten substance in two ways
The historical analysis of the use of ἐνέργεια clearly shows that Eunomius 
could treat his two theological methods as being rooted in the Holy Scrip-
ture and Christian tradition. But since its use was not so common in the 
writings of his predecessors, it seems that it was his own idea to ascribe 
such a great role to the distinction between substance and activity. It is also 
noticeable that with a small exception of Clement of Alexandria, nobody 
before Eunomius made any attempt to build a theological method based on 
this distinction, which is crucial to obtaining the knowledge of the essence 
of God. Therefore, we can now examine the two ways of Eunomius and 
his claims that those are the ways which can give us the knowledge of the 
unbegotten essence of God.
4.4.1 The first method – from substance to activity
Eunomius begins his first way with a statement that God was not gener-
ated by Himself or any other being, because it is impossible. He claims that 
such a statement is in accordance “both with innate knowledge (τε φυσικὴν 
ἔννοιαν) and the teaching of the Fathers.”506 It is impossible that something 
existed before God, and that God existed before Himself, because then in 
both cases, we should admit that this first being was God, and the latter 
must be called a creation.507 However, these claims are obvious and nobody 
can deny it. Already at the beginning of the passage, Eunomius prepares his 
further demonstration because he does not use the term κτίζω but γίνομαι.508 
This term leads directly to ἀγέννητος and serves well the conclusion of this 
506 LA 7, 1–3 (Vaggione, p. 40).
507 LA 7, 3–11 (Vaggione, p. 40).
508 LA 7, 3 (Vaggione, p. 40).
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passage, where he says that God is “Unbegotten or rather unbegotten es-
sence (οὐσία ἀγέννητος).”509
In the next chapter, Eunomius further demonstrates why the name “Un-
begotten” is the proper name to honour God. This is not:
“only the name in conformity with human invention (κατ᾽ἐπίνοιαν ἀνθρωπίνην); 
rather in conformity with reality, we ought to repay him the debt which above all 
other is most due God: the acknowledgement that he is what he is.”510
This statement is an expression of the theory of names, which was popu-
lar with Heteroousians. They believed that the real knowledge of beings 
is a kind of the comprehension of their essences. As we have seen in the 
preceding chapter, this conviction was the basis of their missionary activ-
ity, but in this belief, they were also heirs of the philosophical tradition 
which is already well analysed by F. DelCogliano.511 Just like for Aetius the 
name “Unbegotten” is not based on any human recognition or invention 
(ἐπίνοια) or privation (στέρησις), and although Eunomius never expresses 
it, the only way by which man can know this true name is that it was 
revealed.512 Eunomius provides an explanation why this name cannot be 
obtained by privation and thus cannot be treated as a negative one. In 
a much clearer way than Aetius, he states that being generated is not a 
property of God, and, therefore, the name “Ungenerated” cannot be priva-
tion of a property that God does not have.513 The language that is used by 
Eunomius especially in this fragment was recognized by R. Mortley as a 
509 LA 8, 11 (Vaggione, p. 40). F. DelCogliano points out that the second state-
ment, that God is “unbegotten substance” is controversial, and since it does 
not follow logically from the premises, it can only be explained by Eunomius’ 
theory of names, cf. op. cit., p. 33.
510 LA 8, 1–3. οὐκ ὀνόματι μόνον κατ᾽ἐπίνοιαν ἀνθρωπίνην σεμνύνειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν, 
ἀποτιννύναι δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τὸ πάντων ἀναγκαιότατον ὄφλημα τῷ θεῷ, τῆν τοῦ 
εἶναι ὅ ἐστιν ὁμολογίαν (Vaggione, pp. 40–42).
511 Cf. DelCogliano’s analysis of the Heteroosuian claims (op. cit., pp. 38–48) and 
the discussion on their philosophical background (pp. 49–95). He concludes 
that the most probable source for Heteroousians was the doctrine of Plato’s 
Cratylus developed and modified in Middle-Platonism mainly by Philo (see 
conclusions on pp. 92–95).
512 Cf. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 32.
513 LA 8, 7–14. (Vaggione, pp. 42–43).
151
very sophisticated application of negative theology.514 His main conclusion 
is that the Neo-Arian distinguished negation from privation, because he 
recognized, developing the statements of his teacher Aetius, that the priva-
tive type of negation “carried with it a positive statement of some sort.”515
But there still remains one fundamental issue of the conception of God 
which is the outcome of negative theology. Can we say that the goal of the 
application of negative language is to demonstrate that God is open to our 
intellectual capabilities and can be comprehended at least in part? Or nega-
tive theology is rather the way to say that we cannot comprehend God at 
all, and, therefore, while speaking of Him, we can use only negative terms. 
In my opinion, the following passages from Liber apologeticus will show 
that Eunomius cannot escape from using the negative language when he 
explains how we should understand unbegotten God, but it is not enough 
to name him a negative theologian.
From this point in his Apology, Eunomius goes on in the Aetius-like 
fashion proposing the hypotheses and showing that the conclusions are 
impossible to accept. He tries to show that, if one accepts the conception 
of the “unbegotten essence,” any demonstration based on sharing or pass-
ing on this essence to any other being must lead to absurdities (ἀτοπίαις).516
The first concept which Eunomius examines is sharing the same essence 
of the Unbegotten by separation and division (διαιροῖτο καὶ μερίζοιτο).517 It 
is impossible because God cannot be the result of separation. Since division 
is the principle of corruption, so if the Unbegotten shares His essence this 
way, He would be destructible. His essence also cannot be compared to 
anything else since it has nothing in common with any other beings which 
514 R. Mortley, From Word to Silence, op. cit., pp. 135–139.
515 Ibid., p. 137. It is worth noting that R. Mortley also expresses the doubts of 
whether Eunomius himself was deliberately using the sophisticated Neopla-
tonic logic and understood all consequences of his philosophical claims. He 
says: “Eunomius’ attempt to have this two-level function of privation mean 
ontological primary and secondariness, may not be entirely convincing, but 
is nevertheless clever and shows a knowledge of contemporary philosophy” 
(p. 139).
516 LA 9, 6 (Vaggione, p. 42)
517 LA 9, 7 (Vaggione, p. 42). This fragment could be an allusion to the objection 
made to the Arian movement in general which was present at the Council of 
Nice (cf. SC 305, p. 251, footnote 5).
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are begotten, but if one does so, the name must also be common to all be-
ings which have comparative essence.518
The second topic aimed at showing the absurdity of the Orthodox claims 
which Eunomius proposes is the presentation of the various meanings of the 
sequence of substances, such as time (χρόνος), age (αἰών) or order (τάξις).519 
In the case of the latter, he simply states that implying order to God would 
be ascribing to His substance something from the outside, while there is no 
property which He does not already possess.520 Similarly, understanding 
the sequence in a manner of time and age would mean applying to God 
something which is prior to Him. What is interesting, Eunomius uses the 
definition of time which has its deep philosophical roots in Plato’s Timaeus: 
“time is a certain motion of the stars” (ὅ τε χρόνος ἀστέρων ποιά τίς ἐστι 
κίνησις).521 He explains that since the stars were created not only after the 
intelligent beings, but also after the creation of some material elements, 
as one can read in The Book of Genesis (1, 14); therefore, to imply that 
there is time in the essence of God is unthinkable, since time depends on 
the movement of created material beings. In the case of the third possibility 
(sequence of the ages), to refute it, Eunomius simply quotes Psalm 54, 20 
which reads: “God exists before the ages” and those words, as he says, are 
confirmed by “common opinion” (τῶν κοινῶν λογισμῶν).522 All those cases 
518 LA 9, 8–13. (Vaggione pp. 44–45). Although this fragment sounds like pure 
logical expressions, it is hard to find any clear philosophical references. It is, 
however, similar to what Aristotle says on the division and simultaneity in 
Categories (13, 14 b, 24–15 a, 13), and also about the division as the method 
of demonstration, which cannot be used to demonstrate either essence or of 
accidents of being in Prior Analytics (I, 32, 46 a, 32–46 b, 37).
519 LA 10, 4–5 (Vaggione pp. 44–45).
520 LA 10, 5–6 (Vaggione pp. 44–45).
521 LA 10, 5–6 (Vaggione pp. 44–45), Although the obvious reference is Timaeus 
(37 C-39 C), where Plato explains that time was created along with the uni-
verse, and it is intrinsically linked with the evolution of heavenly bodies, this 
passage of Plato was not clear. Simplicius refers that Eudemus, Theophrastus, 
and Alexander proposed a definition identical to that of Eunomius, since they 
identified time with the movement of the heavenly spheres (A. Smith, Eternity 
and Time, in: Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. L.P. Gerson, Cambridge 
1996, p. 206).
522 LA 10, 10 (Vaggione, pp. 44–45).
153
would either imply the existence of something prior to God, or a composite 
nature of his absolutely simple substance. This cannot be accepted, as well 
as the composition, which implies shape, mass, or size.523
Having excluded all cases whereby something prior to the substance 
of God must be accepted, Eunomius enumerates possible situations when 
something is equal to it. But even likening, comparison, and association 
with the substance (κατ᾽οὐσίαν ὁμοιότητος ἢ συγκρίσεως ἢ κοινωνίας) of 
the Unbegotten is impossible, because it would lead to a conclusion that 
the substance of the Son which is in such relation with the Unbegotten is 
unbegotten as well.524 It not only ends with the illogical conclusion that the 
Son is unbegotten, but also is contrary to the word of Jesus who said: “the 
Father who sent me is greater than I” (14: 28).525
At this point of his Liber apologeticus, Eunomius significantly changes 
the main line of the demonstration. He evokes the famous Arian watchword 
that the Son is “<offspring> and <thing made>” (γέννημα καὶ ποίημα), and 
he insists that those are “the words of the Saints” which resolve all the 
problems with the nature of the substance of the Son.526 But it seems that 
Eunomius is not so sure about the obvious truth of these words, because 
the subsequent chapters contain an explanation why it is necessary to admit 
that the generation of the Son must be understood as creation. He discusses 
possible ways of conceiving generation as a physical change, augmentation, 
or transformation and argues that all those must sustain the conclusion that 
the Son is a creation.527
Those arguments lead Eunomius to the exposition of the proper under-
standing of generation as applied to God. He makes here a very important 
523 LA 10, 10–11.3 (Vaggione, pp. 44–47).
524 LA 11, 4–10 (Vaggione, pp. 46–47).
525 LA 11, 11–14 (Vaggione, pp. 46–47).
526 LA 12, 1–3 (Vaggione, pp. 46–48). It is worth noticing that although Euno-
mius claims that reference is clear, it is in fact very uncertain, and Basil points 
out that Eunomius must first explain what “Saints” he had in mind (Basil, 
Con. Eun. 2, 2, 1–2; SC 305, p. 12).
527 LA 12, 7–17, 3 (Vaggione, pp. 46–55). For a complete analysis of Eunomius’ 
arguments of this fragment as well as the counterarguments of his opponents, 
cf. T. Stępień, op. cit., pp. 148–150.
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distinction between two kinds of names that we apply to God, which are 
homonyms and synonyms:
“What well-disposed person would not acknowledge that there are some words 
which have only their sound and utterance in common but not at all their significa-
tion? For instance, ‘eye’ is used of both human beings and God, but in the case of 
the one it signifies a certain bodily member while in the case of the other it means 
sometimes God’s care and protection of the righteous, sometimes his knowledge of 
events. On the other hand, the majority of words [referring to God] are different 
in their verbal expression but have the same meaning, as for instance, ‘I Am’ (Ex 
3:14), and ‘only true God’.” (J 17:3).528
Eunomius states that the names used of both simple and complex beings are 
homonymous, whereas all names used of simple beings are synonymous. 
Therefore, such names as “I Am” and “Only true God” can be applied 
to God in the same way as “Unbegotten,” since they name His unbegot-
ten substance. They simply cannot mean anything else because of God’s 
simplicity.529
But such names as “Father” and “eye” do not name the same substance 
in the case of creatures and God, so they are homonyms. Therefore, they do 
not name the substance as such, but rather the activities of God. Somewhat 
earlier, Eunomius argued that generation or creation of God cannot be un-
derstood in a sensual way, and it is exactly the “error of Greeks” (Ἑλληνικὴ 
πλανή) who thought that Divine generation must necessarily presuppose 
pre-existent matter as a kind of a receptacle of creation.530 It seems to be 
once again the reference to Timaeus of Plato, but while the first one was 
simply the quotation of the definition of time from the dialogue (or rather 
528 LA 16, 9–17, 3. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὁµολογήσειεν τῶν εὐφρονούντων ὅτι τῶν ὀνµάτων 
τὰ µὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν καὶ προφορὰν τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει µόνον, οὐκ ἔτι δὲ 
κατὰ τὴν σηµασίαν; ὡς ὀφθαλµὸς ἐπὶ τε ἀνθρώπου καὶ θεοῦ λεγόµενος, τοῦ µὲν 
γὰρ σηµαίνει τι µέρος, τοῦ δὲ ποτὲ µὲν ἀντίληφιν καὶ φυλακὴν τῶν δικαιῶν, ποτὲ 
δὲ τὴν πραττοµένων γνῶσιν· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν κεχωρισµένα τὴν 
αὐτὴν ἔχει σηµασίαν, ὡς τὸ ὢν καὶ µόνος ἀληθινὸς θεός (Vaggione, pp. 53–55).
529 Cf. F. DelCogliano, op. cit., pp. 39–40. He is right to suggest that what Eu-
nomius means here is God’s simplicity based not only on the lack of compo-
sition of bodily parts (as R.P. Vaggione’s translation suggests) but having no 
composition of any parts.
530 LA 16, 4–6 (Vaggione, pp. 52–53).
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its later interpretations) which supported his thesis, this time the teaching 
of Plato is rejected as false.531
Having expounded on homonyms and synonyms, Eunomius once again 
explains that the name “Father” has a different meaning in the case of God 
and bodily things, but this time, he uses the term ἐνέργεια:
“Accordingly, it is by no means necessary, when God is called ‘Father’, to under-
stand this activity as having the same meaning that it does with human beings, 
as involving in both cases the idea of mutability or passion; the one activity, is 
passionless, while the other involves passion.”532
The activity of God which is generation cannot involve any concepts taken 
from the bodily one, and it must be recognized as passionless. Such under-
standing of the activity of generation is possible only because the substance 
of the Unbegotten was conceived earlier as absolutely simple. Eunomius 
thinks that also such names as “spirit,” “thing made,” and “offspring” are 
homonymous, because there are many beings which can be called with those 
names, so they do not necessarily name specific essences.533
Despite all those explanations, there is very little we can say about the 
activity of God which is generation. We can confirm that it must be ab-
stracted from all bodily features and from all composition. Similarly, the 
name “Unbegotten,” although it cannot be treated as a negative predicate, 
can be described only in a negative way. Although Eunomius seems to be 
unaware that he uses negative terms, he constantly says that God is without 
composition, without equality with any other being, without any priority 
531 Plato introduces his conception of a receptacle as “third kind” (tritos genos), 
(48 E – 57 D) apart from the forms and what participates in the forms. It is 
very likely that Eunomius refers once again to Timaeus, but it is also worth 
noting that “receptacle is probably the hardest and most philosophically chal-
lenging concept in Timaeus” (A. Gregory, Plato, Introduction in: Timaeus and 
Critias, tr. R. Waterfield, Oxford 2008, p. XLIX).
532 LA 17, 4–6 (Vaggione, pp. 54–55). Οὐκοῦν οὺδὲ ὅταν λέγηται πατὴρ κοινὴν 
ἐννοεῖν χρὴ πρὸς ὰντθρώπους τὴν ὲνέργειαν, ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν συνεπινοοῦντας ταύτῃ 
ῥεῦσιν ἢ πάθος, ἐπείπερ, ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἀπαθής, ἡ δὲ μετὰ πάθους (Vaggione, 
pp. 54–55).
533 Cf. LA 17, 7–17 (Vaggione, pp. 54–55). In chapter 19 (3–24), he also explains 
that such names as “life,” “light,” and “power” should be understood this 
way, and the light, power, and life of the Unbegotten is different in the case 
of the begotten, since they name different substances.
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or posterity, and without any change and order. It is obvious that all those 
expressions are in fact negative statements explaining the name “Unbegot-
ten,” which is claimed to be a non-negative one.
It can also be seen in the fragment where Eunomius summarizes his first 
way. After the passage, which establishes the two ways, he makes a quick 
exposition of the first way by saying:
“For if anyone begins his enquiry from the essences, he finds that essence which 
transcends all authority and is wholly incapable of undergoing generation - the 
essence that gives instruction in these things to the mind approaching them with 
good will - that essence commands him to reject any comparison with another as 
being wholly foreign to the law of its nature. As a consequence he is also brought 
to recognize that its action too conforms to the dignity of its nature.”534
The substance which is found at the beginning of this way is above author-
ity, incapable of generation, and its proper understanding does not allow 
for any comparison with another. Therefore, although it is somehow known 
to man, thanks to the revealed name “Unbegotten,” it can be described 
best in a negative way. It seems that the activity of this substance, since it 
must be conformed to it, can be also described according to what we can 
say about the substance, so this passage also suggests that the best way to 
conceive the activity is negative. So, although Eunomius is usually perceived 
as a strong opponent of negative theology,535 he cannot express his view 
without negative expressions.
Since the description of the substance is practically negative, it seems 
that the only justification of the claim that we can know the essence of 
God in a positive way is the theory of names. This theory is based on 
the claim that no man can give any name to any essence. As Eunomius 
explains in the fragments of Apologia Apologiae quoted by Gregory of 
Nyssa, the words do not come from poets or authors of the Βible. Even 
the naming of animals by Adam (Gen 2: 19–20) was not the activity of 
534 LA 20, 10–15. Εἴτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐσίων ποιοῖτό τις τῆς ἐπισκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἡ έν 
ἀνωτέρω βασιλείας καὶ πάντη γενέσεως ἀνεπίδεκτος οὖσα, τούτοις τε παιδεύουσα 
τὴν μετ’ εὐνοίας προσιοῦσαν διάνοιαν, ἀπωθεῖν ὡς πορρωτάτω παρακελεύεται 
νόμῳ φύσεως τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σύγκρισιν, ἀκόλουθον καὶ προσήκουσαν τῷ τῆς 
οὐσίας ἀξιώματι παρέχουσα νοεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (Vaggione, pp. 58–61).
535 Cf. R. Mortley, From Word to Silence, op. cit., p. 135.
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man, but rather of Adam as the type of Christ.536 If the names of crea-
tions are not of human origin, the name “Unbegotten” must be even more 
precedent to human invention, since God was unbegotten even before the 
creation of man. Eunomius relies here on a rather weak claim that the 
name giver must have existed prior to named things.537 But such a posi-
tion is true only when we accept the previous assumption, that a name 
signifies and reveals the essence, so such argumentation seems to contain 
a logical flaw. Therefore, if God Himself is the sole name giver, he must 
have taught them to man. As F. DelCogliano notes, Eunomius seems to 
imagine this teaching as a kind of a dialogue between God and first hu-
man beings,538 but this is another weak point of his naturalist theory of 
names, because his explanations of how such conversation could look 
like are very unclear.539 Therefore, the entire attempt to tie the name with 
the essence is based on the naming activity of God. Although it could be 
perceived as very pious, it is very unconvincing, and Eunomius is unable 
to prove it not only on the ground of pure reasoning, but also by using 
biblical passages, which he must interpret in a very strange fashion.
Finally, we must note that the first way of theology was probably Eu-
nomius’ own invention, because it is hard to find any previous attempts 
to recognize the activity of God based on the knowledge of His substance. 
Such a method seems to be impossible to invent apart from the theory of 
names which supports it, so once again, we must assume that the entire 
demonstration relies on the theory of names, which makes the first way 
possible.
536 Gregory of Nyssa, CE II, 414–416 (GNO I, 347–348); 444 (GNO I, 356).
537 Cf. DelCogliano, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
538 Cf. ibid., op. cit., p. 46.
539 Gregory of Nyssa points this out in: CE II, 398 (GNO I, 342); II, 417 (GNO 
I, 348). It is also worth noting that Eunomius seems to think that bestowal of 
names is the work of Divine Providence and its rejection undermines the very 
existence of providence, and makes Basil equal to Epicurus: CE II, 195–196 
(GNO I, 281–282).
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4.4.2 The second method – from activity to substance
Eunomius begins the discussion on the second way by claiming that the 
starting point for the demonstration are the things that are created (τῶν 
δημιουργημάτων). Then he says:
“…is led up to the essences and from them discovers that the Son is the ‘thing made’ 
of the Unbegotten, while the Counsellor is that of the Only-begotten. Thus, having 
confirmed the difference in their activities from the pre-eminence of the Only-begot-
ten, he accepts as indisputable the proof that their essences are distinct as well.”540
So in the demonstration, the created things lead to the essences and the con-
clusion is that the Son was created by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by the 
Son, but it is the difference of the activities (τῆς ἐνεργείας διαφορά) which can 
confirm that the essences are different. Eunomius states that in order to accept 
such conclusion, there is no need to add that the Father creates through his 
own power, while the Son creates at the Father’s command.541 Although he 
is convinced that the difference between the activities is obvious, in this last 
statement he provides the real difference between them, since the Father’s 
activity is His own, whereas the Son’s is made at the command of the Father. 
Therefore, one should not ascribe the same goods to essences, actions, au-
thorities and names (οὐσίας, ἐνεργείας, ἐξουσίας, ὀνόματος) of the Father and 
the Son, because this leads to speaking of the two Unbegottens.542
In the next section Eunomius argues that neither it is possible even to 
speak of the similarity (ὁμοιότητος) of things listed above, because multiple 
fragments of the Holy Scripture read that He is the only (μόνος) God, alone 
mighty, wise, only immortal543 and He could not be “only” if His nature 
would be the same or even similar (ὁμοιότητα τῆς φύσεως) to the nature of 
any other being.
The consideration of those things leads once again to the confirmation 
of a difference between the activity of God and man:
540 LA 20, 16–19. ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀνάγοιτο, τοῦ μὲν ἀγεννήτου τὸν Υἱὸν 
εὑρίσκων ποίημα, τοῦ δὲ Μονογενοῦς τὸν Παράκλητον, κἀκ τῆς τοῦ Μονογενοῦς 
ὑπεροχῆς τὴν τῆς ἐνεργείας διαφορὰν πιστούμενος, ἀναμφισβήτητον λαμβάνει καὶ 
τῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν παραλλαγῆς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν (Vaggione, pp. 60–61).
541 LA 20, 20–22 (Vaggione, pp. 60–61).
542 LA 21, 1–4 (Vaggione, pp. 60–61).
543 LA 21, 10–22, 22, 5 (Vagione, pp. 60–61).
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“we must understand that God’s mode of action too is not human, but effortless 
and divine, and must by no means suppose that that action is some kind of divi-
sion or motion of his essence.”544
At this point Eunomius begins his most important passage concerning the 
understanding of the activity of God. He draws attention to the problem 
of the unity of activity and essence, refuting it as the opinion of Hellenes:
“This is in fact what those who have been led astray by pagan sophistries do have 
to suppose, because they have united the action to the essence and therefore present 
the world as coeval with God.”545
Eunomius underlines that the conception of the unity of substance and 
activity leads to absurdity (τὴν ἀτοπίαν) – to a conclusion that the genera-
tive action of God has no beginning and no end.546 That would mean that 
creation is coeval with God. We find similar statements rejecting the identity 
of essence and activity in one of the preserved fragments of scholia on Ae-
tius’ Syntagmation,547 to which we shall come back later, but an important 
question is why Eunomius was convinced that the claim of the identity of 
substance and activity is of Hellenic origin. The statement that this is the 
claim of those who have been led astray by Hellenic sophistries (῾Ελλήνων 
σοφίσμασιν) could simply be a kind of a rhetorical expression, but it could 
also refer to specific philosophical opinions. We have seen above that di-
rect claims on the unity of substance and activity in the case of God were 
made already by Aristotle in Metaphysics,548 and they were developed and 
extended to all intellectual substances by Plotinus.549 Perhaps, Eunomius is 
convinced that those opinions were accepted by his Orthodox opponents, 
544 LA 22, 7–9. τὴν δὲ περὶ τούτων ἔννοιαν ἀκριβῶς διακαθαίροντας καὶ τὸν τῆς 
ἐνεργείας τρόπον οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον νομίζειν, εὐμαρῆ δὲ καὶ θεῖον· οὔτοι μερισμὸν 
ἢ κίνησίν τινα τῆς οὐσίας τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡγουμένους (Vaggione, pp. 62–63).
545 LA 22, 10–12. ἅπερ ἐπινοεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ὑπαγομένους τοῖς ῾Ελλήνων 
σοφίσμασιν, ἑνούντων τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ διὰ τοῦθ’ ἅμα μὲν τῷ 0εῷ τὸν 
κόσμον ὰποφαινομένων (Vaggione, pp. 62–63).
546 LA 22, 13–15 (Vaggione, pp. 62–63).
547 Frag. I, (Vaggione, pp. 176–177).
548 Met. XII, 6, 1071 b, 17–20.
549 As it has been shown above, Plotinus made this move in the first treatise of 
the sixth Ennead, especially in VI, 2, 15, 6–18, and later on about the activity 
of will which is identical with essence VI, 8, 13, 50–59.
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and for him, this meant the rejection of God’s creative power and denial 
of His transcendence. Therefore, he accuses his opponents of the delib-
erately false teaching, which is the result of depravation of their intellect 
(κακόνοια).550
On the other hand, Eunomius states that:
“We ourselves, however, judge the activity from its effects in accordance with the 
principles enunciated just a moment ago, and do not consider it unhazardous to 
have to unite the activity to the essence. We recognize that the divine essence is 
without beginning, simple, and endless, but we also recognize that its activity is 
neither without beginning nor without ending. It cannot be without beginning, 
for, if it were, its effect would be without beginning as well.”551
The generative activity of God must have a beginning and an end, whereas 
His essence must be deprived of them. Otherwise, we would have to admit 
that the activity which is the same with the substance must be unbegotten 
and unending in itself (ἀτελεύτητον λέγειν τὴν ἐνέργειαν).552 For Eunomius, 
this leads to ridiculous conclusions that “either the activity of God is un-
productive or its effect is unbegotten.”553 Therefore, the only remaining 
option is Eunomius’ own point of view. We can also find here a difference 
with the conclusions which we have made above about Aristotle’ teaching 
of activity. He described ἐνέργεια as being atemporal and having its own 
end in itself.554 Eunomius, on the other hand, claims that the activity of the 
generation of the Son must have the point where it began, and also must 
have its end in the creation of the separate substance of the Son.
Having discussed the need of the beginning and the end of generation, 
Eunomius presents the next characteristic point of his understanding of 
ἐνέεργεια. The generative activity of God must be the act of His will:
550 LA 23, 3 (Vaggione, p. 62).
551 LA 23, 4–7. ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ μικρῷ πρόσθεν ῥηθέντα τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων 
κρίνοντες, οὐκ ἀσφαλἐς οἰόμεθα δεῖν ἑνοῦν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὴν μὲν ἄναρχον ἁπλήν τε 
καὶ ἀτελεύτητον εἰδότες, τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄναρχον — (ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἧν καὶ τὸ 
ἔργον ἄναρχον)… (Vaggione, pp. 62–63).
552 LA 23, 9–10 (Vaggione, pp. 62–65).
553 LA 23, 11–12. ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἄπρακτον εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τὀ ἔργον ἀγέννητον 
(Vaggione, pp. 64–65).
554 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 12.
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“On the contrary, we must believe that the action which is the truest and the most 
befitting God is his will (βούλησιν), and that that will is sufficient to bring into 
existence and to redeem all things, as indeed the prophetic voice bears witness: 
‘Whatever he willed to do, he did.’ God needs nothing in order to bring what 
he intends into existence; rather, at the same moment he intends it, whatever he 
willed comes to be.”555
As we have seen when discussing negative theology of Arius, he also claimed 
that generation of the Son is the activity of will. Eunomius shares the same 
opinion that the act of generation of the Son must have been wanted by 
God. After what has been said on the philosophical concepts of the activity 
of God, we can see that they presented it primarily as the activity of the 
intellect. Such activity cannot have a starting point because of substantial 
actuality of God, who is always actual, and there is no passage from potency 
to act in Him, as we have seen in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.556 Therefore, 
when Plotinus considers activity of will, he also states that this activity 
must be identical with essence and thus eternal as the One Himself. This 
activity could neither have started at some point, but here we could see the 
problem which seems to be present in his discussion. In the case of will, it 
is easier to see the starting point of activity, and it is not as spontaneous 
as thinking. Even in comparison with our own thinking and willing, we 
can see that while thinking is usually spontaneous, willing is more often 
deliberate. That is why Plotinus says that the One is not “<what happened 
to be>, but what He has willed to be>.”557
For Eunomius, the activity of God is primarily that of the will, and he 
only vaguely discusses the cognitive activity of the Father. He could have 
thought that while the philosophers discussed primarily the operation of the 
intellect of God, the true Christian view of God who creates the universe 
must be different; his primary activity should be rather that of the will. He 
555 LA 23, 16–20. ἀληθεστάτην δὲ καὶ Θεῷ πρεπωδεστάτην ἐνέργειαν ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν 
βούλησιν, ἀρκοῦσαν πρός τε τὸ εἶναι καὶ σώζεσθαι τὰ πάντα, μαρτυρούσης καὶ 
προφητικῆς φωνῆς «Πάντα γὰρ ὅσα ἠθέλησεν ἐποίησεν.» Οὐ γὰρ ἐπιδέεταί τινος 
πρὸς τὴν ὧν βούλεται σύστασιν, ἀλλ’ ἅμα τε βούλεται καὶ γέγονεν ὅπερ ἠθέλησεν 
(Vaggione, pp. 64–65).
556 Cf. Met. XII, 6, 1071 b, 17–20; XII, 7, 1072 b, 26–29.
557 Enn. VI, 8, 13, 59. ὥστε οὐκ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός 
(Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 3, p. 258; tr. MacKenna/Page, p. 349).
162
is the one who created the universe, which came to being from nothing, and 
not, as Eunomius insisted, from a pre-existing receptacle. Therefore, the 
universe is not created spontaneously, does not flow from Him, but rather 
it must have been wanted by God and created by the act of His will, which 
is the activity “most befitting God.”
But Eunomius does not stop here and explains further the character of 
the activity of will. He claimed earlier that activity must be different from 
substance, but if it is so, a question arises how exactly the ontological status 
of such activity should be understood. Eunomius tries to make it clearer 
by saying:
“Accordingly, if this argument has demonstrated that God’s will is an action, and 
that this action is not essence but that the Only-begotten exists by virtue of the 
will of the Father, then of necessity it is not with respect to the essence but with 
respect to the action (which is what the will is) that the Son preserves his similar-
ity to the Father.”558
Although Eunomius is not clear about it, we can see that the generative act 
of will, which is not identical with essence, seems to be a kind of an entity 
between the Father and the Son. Therefore, the similarity of the Son to the 
Father is not a simple similarity of one substance to another, but rather 
the similarity of the substance of the Son, to the activity of the will of the 
Father.559 Making such a claim, Eunomius tries to preserve his opinion on 
dissimilarity of substances, and based on this principle, he goes further 
with an explanation how to understand the Son as the “image” (εἰκών) 
of the Father. He uses here the same scheme by saying that the Son is not 
the image of the Father, but rather the image of the activity of the Father.
This is a very important fragment because Eunomius attempts to recon-
cile the doctrine of generation of the Son with the understanding of creation 
of all other beings, and to show what is the difference between those two 
creative acts:
558 LA 24, 1–4. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν μὲν βούλησιν ἀπέδειξεν ὁ λόγος ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ οὐσίαν 
δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ὑπέστη δὲ βουλήσει τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ μονογενής, οὐ πρὸς τὴν 
οῦσίαν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (ἥτις ἐστί καὶ βούλησις) ἀποσῴζειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα 
τὸν υἱόν ἀναγκαῖον (Vaggione, pp. 64–65).
559 As M.R. Barnes notices, this also means essence itself is deprived of any kind 
of causality, cf. Power of God. Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian 
Theology, Washington 2001, pp. 177–178.
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“The word ‘image’, then, would refer the similarity back, not to the essence of 
God, but to the action unbegottenly stored up in his foreknowledge prior to the 
existence of the first-born and of the things created ‘in him’.”560
Eunomius does not explain what he has in mind when he mentions the 
action which was stored in the foreknowledge of the Father (τὴν ἐνέργειαν 
ἐναποκειμένην ἀγεννήτως τῇ προγνώσει), but the text seems to suggest that 
there was only one activity of will, the same with creation and generation, 
and, therefore, the power of the Father (τοῦ πατρὸς δύναμιν) can be seen in 
the Son.561 In the following passages concerning the Holy Spirit, Eunomius 
also talks about the sequence of creation. The Father generated (created) 
the Son, but the Son created the Holy Spirit “at the command of the Father 
by the activity of the Son.”562 So there is an order of creating subsequent 
persons of the Son and the Spirit.563 Therefore, generation of the Son would 
be the only activity of the Father, the creation of the Holy Spirit – one ac-
tivity of the Son, and so on. Such an interpretation of creation would be 
most supportive for Eunomius’ claims as regards knowing substance from 
activity. As we have seen in the fragments from Protrepticus, Aristotle made 
similar claims as to a simple being, which, because of its simplicity, can have 
only one activity.564 But in one of the preserved fragments of the scholia, 
Eunomius clearly denies such an interpretation. It begins with rejecting the 
identity of the substance and will of God:
‘…because the will and the purpose of God are not identical (ταὐτόν) with his 
essence: the act of willing has both a beginning and an ending.’565
And in the next passage of this fragment, he adds:
560 LA 24, 10–13. οὐ πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν φέροι ἂν ἡ εἰκὼν τὴν ὁμοιότητα, πρὸς δὲ 
τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐναποκειμένην ἀγεννήτως τῇ προγνώσει καὶ πρὸ τὴς πρωτοτόκου 
συστάσεως καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κτισθέντων (Vaggione, pp. 64–65).
561 LA 24, 15 (Vaggione, p. 64).
562 LA 25, 23 (Vaggione, pp. 68–69). προστάγματι τοῦ πατρός, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ 
γενόμενον.
563 LA 25, 10–11 (Vaggione, pp. 66–67).
564 Protrep. 64, 1–3, Τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνθέτου καὶ μεριστοῦ πλείους καὶ διάφοροί 
εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τοῦ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἁπλοῦ καὶ μὴ πρός τι τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος μίαν 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸ κυρίως ἀρετήν.
565 Frag. I, 1–3 Ὅτι ἡ θέλησις καὶ ἡ βούλησις οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ· ἡ μὲν 
γὰρ θέλησις καὶ ἄρχεται καὶ παύεται (Vaggione, pp. 176–177).
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“Besides, if the purpose of God were identical (ταὐτόν) with his essence, then, 
since there is only one essence, there would have to be only one act of willing.”566
But, as Eunomius notes, this is inconsistent with the Holy Scripture which 
reads that God wills many things (Ps 113:11) and as The Book of Genesis 
states, during the days of creation, God subsequently willed the heavens, the 
Sun and the Earth (Gen. 1: 1–2). Therefore, there are multiple acts of His 
will, which does not destroy the simplicity of God since they are not identi-
cal with His substance. Those activities are different from generation, but 
we can assume that they were made through the Son. Although Eunomius 
recalls here a fragment of Genesis and claims that this teaching is clear in 
this context and confirms the multiplicity of activities of will, this does not 
solve the main problem of how those acts differ from generation of the Son. 
It seems that Eunomius was aware of the problem, and, therefore, in Apolo-
gia Apologiae, he tries to explain this distinction by calling generation and 
creation of the Spirit “characteristic activities” (παρεπομένων ἐνεργειῶν).567 
Such a concept seems to refer to earlier views of activity which is linked with 
nature in Aristotle and Philo of Alexandria. However, those activities were 
seen as flowing out of nature, and they were not purposeful in the mean-
ing in which Eunomius understands generation of the Son. Unfortunately, 
in the preserved fragments, there is no other discussion of the meaning of 
characteristic activity, and it seems that there is still no clear answer to the 
question of how and why does generation of the Son, which is in fact crea-
tion, differ from all other acts of the creative activity of God. And this is 
the crucial problem since according to Eunomius, such an activity should 
be the way to have a clear knowledge of substance.
The final question which must be asked is what we can say about the 
knowledge of God’s substance and the cognition that it is unbegotten. 
We have seen that the first way of Eunomius relies only on his theory of 
names. Undermining this theory destroys the conviction that we can have 
the knowledge of God’s essence. But what about the second way? Con-
trary to the first one, of which we noted that it was probably Eunomius’ 
own invention, the second way is presented widely in the earlier Patristic 
566 Frag. I, 4–6 εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τῇ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ βούλησις, ἐχρῆν μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς 
οὐσίας, μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θέλησιν· (Vaggione, pp. 176–177).
567 CE I, 151, 1–10 (GNO I, 71, 28–72,10; tr. Hall, p. 57).
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tradition. But here we can observe another crucial difference. Earlier ver-
sions of the second way very clearly pointed at the activities of God which 
can be perceived in the sensual world and in the soul of man, as a starting 
point for the demonstration from activity to substance. Eunomius, how-
ever, insists that this activity specifically is generation of the Son, and that 
its very name and character lead to its proper understanding. Therefore, 
it cannot be conceived in any other way but as the creative activity of 
will, and since that activity is generation, we can demonstrate from it that 
the Father is Unbegotten. However, to accept such reasoning, one must 
be convinced why this activity must be perceived as so very specific, and 
why does it differ from other creative activities. This is the key distinction 
since we no longer start from the activities of God perceived in the world, 
but from generation itself, and Eunomius seems to fail in explaining how 
he understands it.
But even if we take for granted that we start from generation, there is 
still one unsolved problem, which will be exploited by Gregory of Nyssa. 
If the activity of will is different from substance to such an extent that it 
should be rather understood as a separate entity, it cannot provide the 
clear perception of the substance of God. To preserve his own view on the 
dissimilarity of substances, Eunomius treats activity as a kind of a buffer 
between them but by doing this he weakens his claim on the knowledge of 
substance from activity.
4.5  Basil of Caesarea on language and  
comprehensibility of God
The first of the two ways of theology presented by Eunomius had one pro-
found weakness. To follow the reasoning which starts from substance and 
leads to the activity of generation, one must previously know the essence, 
which is revealed by the name (ἀγέννητος). Therefore, the effectiveness of the 
first way is based on the assumption that names give us the direct knowledge 
about substance. The polemic with this claim is one of the main topics of 
Contra Eunomium, which being Basil’s early work is at the same time one 
of the most important. The problem of names has been already analysed by 
scholars since it is the most obvious part of Basil’s response to Eunomius’ 
theory. The most important study concerning this topic has been recently 
166
presented by M. DelCogliano,568 but in order to keep the logic and adequate 
proportions of the argument, it is impossible to omit this part of the debate, 
since the connection between names and activities also must be underlined.
The audacious statement that the name ‘unbegotten’ (ἀγέννητος) reveals 
the substance of God to us was based by Eunomius on his own preconcep-
tions concerning the theory of names, so in order to abolish the Eunomian 
main claim, Basil must have also disqualified, perhaps first and foremost, 
the assumptions underlying Anomean theories. As Basil formulated his 
theory of names in response to and as part of the polemic with Eunomius, 
we cannot analyse it separately.
It was Aetius who first came up with an idea that the name ‘unbe-
gotten’ “communicates the subsistence of God (τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ θεοῦ 
παρίστησιν),”569 but it was Eunomius who provided a theoretical back-
ground for this claim. He underlines that we cannot use the same names 
in both orders – divine and mundane – and although the words used to 
describe both may be the same, they would mean different things.
“What person of sound mind would not confess that some names have only their 
pronunciation and utterance in common, but not their meaning? For example, 
when ‘eye’ is said of a human being and God, for the former it signifies a certain 
part while for the latter it signifies sometimes God’s care and protection of right-
eous, sometimes his knowledge of events. In contrast, the majority of the names 
[used of God] have different pronunciation but the same meaning. For example, 
I Am [Ex 3:14] and only true God [John 17:3].”570
The philosophical background of Eunomius’ theory was subject to vari-
ous interpretations, starting with J. Daniélou, who found Neoplatonic in-
spirations there,571 through L. Wickham572 and J. Rist,573 who listed stoic 
568 M. DelCogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names, op. 
cit.
569 Aetius, Synt. 12; M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 34.
570 LA 16, 9-17, 3 (Vaggione, pp. 53–55).
571 J. Daniélou, Eunome l’Arien et l’ exégèse néo-platonicienne du Cratyle, op. 
cit., pp. 412–432.
572 L. Wickham, The Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomean, JTS vol. 19, no. 1 
(1968), p. 558.
573 J. Rist, Basil’s “Neoplatonism”: Its Background and Nature, in: Basil of 
Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic, ed. P. Fedwick, Toronto, 1981, 
pp. 137–220.
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inspirations,574 and T. Kopecek with his arguments as to Eunomius’ links 
with Medioplatonists, especially Albinus.575 As DelCogliano noted, the 
Anomean theory was not a complete system576 and perhaps this is the 
reason why researchers encounter so many difficulties. It is, in my opinion, 
due to the fact that the entire theory was only one of the tools to prove 
that the Son is unequal to the Father as his substance is different rather 
than the goal in itself.
Following Aetius, Eunomius believed that the names applied to the Fa-
ther and the Son reveal their substance: “substance is the very same as that 
which signified by His name, granted that that the designation applies prop-
erly to the essence.”577 As DelCogliano remarks, both Aetius and Eunomius 
used the words ὑπόστασις and οὐσία in this context. According to them, real 
knowledge about οὐσία could be acquired through God’s names. So, as the 
consequence, the difference in names means difference in substance.578 As 
a matter of fact, at the beginning, Eunomius claimed that names operate in 
fundamentally different ways in the divine and mundane context,579 but he 
changed his mind when answering Basil’s arguments and started to claim, 
as Gregory of Nyssa refers, that not only the name of God, but any other 
name reveals the substance, which means that he based the theory of names 
on the fact that God Himself had given all names and therefore there is a 
natural connection between an object and its name.580 In opposition to the 
biblical account, Eunomius claimed that it was impossible for man to name 
thing as this is the role of God Himself to give names according to the na-
ture of beings. So Eunomius finally connected the theory of names with the 
theory of the origin of names, which is an example of the naturalist theory.
574 For a short resume of the history of interpretation, Cf. D. Birjukov, Strate-
gies of Naming in the Polemic between Eunomius and Basil of Cesarea in the 
Context of the Philosophical Tradition of Antiquity, Scrinum vol. IV (2008), 
pp. 104–121.
575 T.A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism, op. cit., pp. 321, 328–332.
576 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 35.
577 LA 12, 7–9. οὐχ ἕτερον μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν νοοῦντες, ἕτερον δε τι παρ᾽ αὐτὴν 
τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀλλ᾽αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἣν σημαίνει τοὔνομα, 
ἐπαληθευούσης τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῆς προσηγορίας῾ (Vaggione, p. 49).




When undermining the value of human cognition, Eunomius wrote that 
every cognition with human effort is done κατ´ἐπίνοιαν, so each act of con-
ceptualization involves a manipulation of an item and some kind of fabri-
cation.581 “Unbegotten is based neither on invention nor on privation.”582 
So Eunomius denied that we can know God by conceptualization (μήτε 
ἐν ἐπίνοιαν),583 but still we can know the notion, the concept (ἐννοία) of 
unbegottenness. Eunomius at the same time boasts of the knowledge of the 
οὐσία and denies human competence of cognition.
Basil’s answer is systematic as he deals with the heterodox theses point by 
point. He begins with the disqualification of his opponent’s views regarding 
conceptualization,584 the method of creating names, as Eunomius believed 
that it was not a proper way to think of, speak of, and worship God. In 
his opinion, “Expressions based on invention have their existence in name 
and utterance only, and by their nature are dissolved along with the sound 
[which make them up].”585 Eunomius claims that the things that are said by 
way of conceptualization (κατ´ἐπίνοιαν) do not exist only in names and have 
no link to the nature but are “something completely false and non-existent 
like the fictional centaurs and Chimaera that appear in the mythologies.”586 
According to Basil, conceptualization can give us certain knowledge. This 
is the knowledge based on sensual cognition: “through conceptualization 
into the things out of which it is constituted: color, shape, solidity, size, and 
so forth.”587 But he admits also that using his imagination, man can create 
notions that have no connection with reality but
“The term ‘conceptualization’, however, is far from being restricted only to vain 
and non-existent imaginations. After an initial concept has arisen for us from sense 
perception, the more subtle and precise reflection on what we have conceived is 
called conceptualization.”588
581 A. Radde-Gallwitz, op. cit., p. 99.
582 LA 8, 10–11 (Vaggione, p. 42).
583 LA 8, 14 (Vaggione, p. 42).
584 Cf. Rousseau, Basil of Caesarea, Berkeley 1994, pp. 108–116.
585 LA 8, 3–5 (Vaggione pp. 42–43).
586 Con. Eun. I, 6, 5–9 (SC 299, p. 184; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz p. 97).
587 Con. Eun. I, 6, 25–29 (SC 299, p. 184; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz p. 98).
588 Ibid.
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As A. Radde Gallwitz remarks, each concept devised through ἐπίνοιαν is 
at least potentially meaningful, but it is not necessary for it to have a refer-
ent beyond itself, in the real world. Basil understands that the conditions 
for meaningfulness are much lesser than the conditions for reference.589 
Additionally, D. Birjukov noted that the views on the language structure 
presented in the polemic with Eunomius correspond with Aristotle’s three-
fold scheme: sound–thought–subject.590
For Basil, it is not only an adequate way to talk about the mundane 
reality, but about the divine one as well.
“When our Lord Jesus Christ spoke about himself to make known both the Divin-
ity’s love of humanity and the grace that comes to humanity from the economy, 
he did so by means of certain distinguishing marks considered in connection with 
him. He called himself ‘door’, ‘way’, ‘bread’, ‘vine’, ‘shepherd’, and ‘light’, even 
though he is not a polyonym. All these names do not carry the same meaning 
as one another. For ‘light’ signifies one thing, ‘vine’ another, ‘way’ another, and 
‘shepherd’ yet another. Though our Lord is one in substrate, and one substance, 
simple and not composite, he calls himself by different names at different times, 
using designations that differ from one another for the different conceptualizations 
(ἐπινοίαις διαφερούσας). On the basis of his different activities (ἐνεργειῶν διαφορὰν) 
and his relation to the objects of his divine benefaction, he employs different names 
for himself. For instance, when he calls himself ‘the light of the world’, he points 
out the inaccessibility of the glory in the divinity.”591
So the conceptualization of Christ describes Christ’s activities and his rela-
tions with the created world and the humanity. The names are different 
589 Cf. A. Radde-Gallwitz, op. cit., pp. 143–144.
590 Cf. D. Birjukov, op. cit., p. 116; Cf. Aristotle, De interpretatione, 16 а, 26–29.
591 Con. Eun. I, 7, 4–19 (SC 299, pp. 188–190). Ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς 
ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λόγοις, τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὴν ἐξ οἰκονομίας 
χάριν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραδηλῶν, ἰδιώμασί τισι τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρουμένοις 
ἀπεσήμαινε ταύτην, θύραν ἑαυτὸν λέγων, καὶ ὁδὸν, καὶ ἄρτον, καὶ ἄμπελον, καὶ 
ποιμένα, καὶ φῶς, οὐ πολυώνυμός τις ὤν·οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα εἰς ταυτὸν 
ἀλλήλοις φέρει. Ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ σημαινόμενον φωτὸς, καὶ ἄλλο ἀμπέλου, καὶ ἄλλο 
ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἄλλο ποιμένος. Ἀλλ’ ἓν ὢν κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ μία οὐσία καὶ 
ἁπλῆ καὶ ἀσύνθετος, ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἑαυτὸν ὀνομάζει, ταῖς ἐπινοίαις διαφερούσας 
ἀλλήλων τὰς προσηγορίας μεθαρμοζόμενος. Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν 
διαφορὰν, καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ εὐεργετούμενα σχέσιν, διάφορα ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα 
τίθεται. Φῶς μὲν γὰρ ἑαυτὸν τοῦ κόσμου λέγει, τό τε ἀπρόσιτον τῆς ἐν τῇ θεότητι 
δόξης τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ διασημαίνων (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, p. 99).
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as different are His activities that can be recognized. Further on, Basil lists 
some other names of God, such as ‘creator’, ‘wise’, ‘provident’, ‘invisible’, 
and ‘unchangeable’592 that can be derived from certain passages of the 
Scripture which are treated as encapsulating basic notions about God.593
“For we say that the God of the universe is ‘incorruptible’ and ‘unbegotten’, desig-
nating him with these names according to various aspects. Whenever we consider 
ages past, we find that the life of God transcends every beginning and say that 
he is ‘unbegotten’. Whenever we stretch our mind forward to the ages to come, 
we designate the one who is without boundary, infinite, and comprehended by 
no terminal point as ‘incorruptible’. Therefore, just as ‘incorruptible’ is the name 
we give him because his life is without an end, so too is ‘unbegotten’ the name 
given because his life is without a beginning, when we consider each through 
conceptualization.”594
According to Basil, with the help of all available means of cognition, that is, 
sense perception, common sense, and scriptural tradition, man can, through 
the process of conceptualization, create notions about the earthly phenom-
ena and spiritual matters.
“And if anyone should examine each of the names one by one, he would find the 
various conceptualizations, even though for all there is one substrate (οὐσιαν) as 
far as substance (ὑποκειμένου) is concerned.”595
Basil does not agree with Eunomius that we can treat different names as 
equivalent to the essence and as a consequence, basing on God’s simplicity, 
to each other. On the contrary, he claims that:
“For if he [Eunomius] does not consider anything at all by way of conceptualiza-
tion so as to avoid the appearance of honoring God with human designations, then 
592 Cf. Con. Eun. I. 7, 35 (SC 299, p. 192).
593 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 171.
594 Con. Eun. I, 7 (SC 299, p. 192). Ἄφθαρτον γὰρ καὶ ἀγέννητον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν τῶν 
ὅλων λέγομεν, κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις προσ-αγορεύοντες. 
Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τοὺς κατόπιν αἰῶνας ἀποβλέψωμεν, ὑπερεκπίπτουσαν πάσης 
ἀρχῆς εὑρίσκοντες τὴν ζωὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀγέννητον αὐτὸν λέγομεν· ὅταν δὲ τοῖς 
ἐπερχομένοις αἰῶσι τὸν νοῦν ἐπεκτείνωμεν, τὸν ἀόριστον καὶ ἄπειρον, καὶ οὐδενὶ 
τέλει καταληπτὸν προσαγορεύομεν ἄφθαρτον. Ὡς οὖν τὸ ἀτελεύτητον τῆς ζωῆς 
ἄφθαρτον, οὕτω τὸ ἄναρχον αὐτῆς ἀγέννητον ὠνομάσθη, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρούντων 
ἡμῶν ἑκάτερα (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, p. 100).
595 Con. Eun. I, 7, 27–29 (SC 299, p. 190; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, 
p. 100).
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he will confess this: that all things attributed to God similarly refer to his substance. 
But how is it not ridiculous to say that his creative power is his substance? (…) 
In other words, how is it not ridiculous to regard every activity (πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν) 
of his as his substance?”596
But as M. DelCogliano comments, Basil viewed conceptualization as an 
intellectual process that made the accurate and useful knowledge of a thing 
possible without comprehension of the thing’s essence.597 Basil’s theory is 
a part of larger ‘notionalism’ in which all names signify primarily notions, 
which in turn provide information about non-essential properties of the 
objects that bear the names.598 But even though they provide much less than 
Eunomius claimed, they are still useful for human cognition.
“There is not one name which encompasses the entire nature of God and suffices 
to express it adequately. Rather, there are many diverse names, and each one con-
tributes, in accordance with its own meaning, to a notion that is altogether dim 
and trifling as regards the whole but that is at least sufficient for us.”599
If names created through conceptualization do not give us the knowledge 
about οὐσία, what is the knowledge that they provide? In order to answer 
this question, Basil among others distinguishes relational and absolute 
names.600
“Who does not know that some names are expressed absolutely and in respect 
of themselves, signifying the things which are their referents, but other names are 
said relative to others, expressing only the relation to the other names relative to 
which they are said? For example, ‘human being’ and ‘horse’ and ‘ox’ each com-
municate the very thing that is named. But ‘son’ and ‘slave’ and ‘friend’ reveal 
only the connection with the associated name.”601
596 Con. Eun. I, 8, 19–35 (SC 299, p. 194; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, 
p. 101).
597 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 164.
598 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 2.
599 Con. Eun. I, 10, 1–5 (SC 299, p. 204). Ἓν μὲν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὄνομα ὃ πᾶσαν 
ἐξαρκεῖ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν περιλαβὸν, ἱκανῶς ἐξαγγεῖλαι· πλείω δὲ καὶ ποικίλα 
κατ’ ἰδίαν ἕκαστον σημασίαν, ἀμυδρὰν μὲν παντελῶς καὶ μικροτάτην, ὡς πρὸς τὸ 
ὅλον, ἡμῖν γε μὴν ἐξαρκοῦσαν τὴν ἔννοιαν συναθροίζει (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-
Gallwitz, p. 105); Cf. Ep. 234, 1 (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 41).
600 Cf. Con. Eun. II, 9, 11–13 (SC 305, p. 36).
601 Con. Eun. II, 9, 11–18 (SC 305, p. 36). Ἐπεὶ τίς οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι τῶν ὀνομάτων 
τὰ μὲν ἀπολελυμένως καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ προφερόμενα τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτοῖς 
πραγμάτων ἐστὶ σημαντικὰ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερα λεγόμενα τὴν σχέσιν μόνην ἐμφαίνει 
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According to D.G. Robertson, this distinction is made to strengthen the 
argument for the view that names cannot fully express substance; since 
absolute names cannot adequately express substance, then even less can 
relative names do so.602 But they still give us a kind of knowledge about 
the relationships in which those beings participate. Those relationships 
(especially between the Father and the Son) become for Basil the modes of 
being of those persons. The Father is from the very beginning situated in a 
relationship with the Son. We can link this way of thinking with Aristote-
lian inspiration.603 And, as D.G. Robertson remarks, Basil underlines that 
we should not mistake relative terms with contraries as Eunomius does.604
But the most convincing arguments against the close association of names 
with substance are given by Basil when he discusses the distinction between 
common and proper names, that is names given to individual beings. This 
division is inherited from Stoics, whose definitions included two types of 
names: common names and proper names.605
“But what sane person would agree with this logic that there must be a difference 
of substances for those things whose names are distinct? For the designations 
of Peter and Paul and of all people in general are different, but there is a single 
substance for all of them. For this reason, in most respects we are the same as one 
another, but it is only due to the distinguishing marks considered in connection 
with each one of us that we are different, each from the other.”606
τὴν πρὸς ἃ λέγεται; Οἷον, ἄνθρωπος μὲν, καὶ ἵππος, καὶ βοῦς, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον 
τῶν ὀνομαζομένων παρίστησιν· υἱὸς δὲ, ἢ δοῦλος, ἢ φίλος, μόνης τῆς πρὸς τὸ 
συνεζευγμένον ὄνομα συναφείας ἐστὶ δηλωτικά (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gall-
witz, p. 142).
602 D.G. Robertson, Relatives in Basil of Caesarea, SP 37 (2001), p. 279.
603 Cf. B. Sesbüé, Introduction, in: Basil de Césarée, Contre Eunome, op. cit., SC 
299, p. 81.
604 Cf. D.G. Robertson, Relatives in Basil of Caesarea, op. cit., p. 286; Con. Eun. 
II, 27, 26–33 (SC 305, p. 114).
605 D.G. Robertson. A Patristic Theory of Proper Names, AGPh, vol. 84 (2002), 
p. 4.
606 Con. Eun. 2, 4, 27–31 (SC 305, p. 20). Καίτοι γε, εἴπερ ἀληθὲς ἦν, ὅτι ὧν τά 
ὀνόματα διενήνοχεν, ἐναντίως ἔχουσιν αἱ οὐσίαι, ἐχρῆν δή που καὶ Παῦλον καὶ 
Πέτρον καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς ἀνθρώπους ἅπαντας ἑτεροουσίους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ 
δὲ τοῦτο οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἀμαθὴς καὶ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως ἀνεπίσκεπτος ὥστ᾽ἂω εἰπεῖν 
προαχθῆναι. (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, p. 134).
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Individual designations are based on the distinguishing marks which are in 
an obvious way external to the common substance, and names are not the 
‘semantics’ (σημαντιαί) of substance.
Proper names refer to the qualities and features that individual men have, 
and according to those qualities and features, we are able to distinguish 
men from each other. It is, then, obvious that different names for objects 
which have common substance do not all have the same meaning. While 
analysing this fragment, D.G. Robertson remarks that in contrast to his 
opponent, Eunomius thinks that names mean substances understood as 
individuals.607 But Basil uses this very important distinction to show that 
there are properties that mark out distinction (ἰδιώματα) between the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the simple and undivided divine substance, 
and such words as ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ which are relational, similar to ‘mas-
ter’ and ‘slave’.608 So proper names are linked with relational names here.
“So, then, what I have said makes it clear that in the case of both ‘Father’ and 
‘Son’ the names do not communicate substance (οὐχὶ οὐσίαν παρίστησι) but instead 
are revelatory of the distinguishing marks (ἰδιωμάτων).”609
Basil reminds that even the Bible shows us different properties – names of 
God610 and on various examples, he explains that combinations of many 
different names can give us some notions about the divinity.
“If anyone wants to accept that which is true, namely, that begotten and unbe-
gotten are distinctive features that enable identification and are observed in the 
substance, which lead to the clear and unconfused notion of the Father and the 
Son, then he will escape the danger of impiety and preserve logical coherence in 
his reasoning. (…) For example, the divinity is common, whereas fatherhood and 
sonship are distinguishing marks: from the combination of both, that is, of the 
common and the unique, we arrive at comprehension of the truth.”611
So in Contra Eunomium, Basil discusses four kinds of names in order to re-
fute Eunomius’ theory of names, which are proper names, absolute names, 
relative names, and finally names that M. DelCogliano calls “derived” 
607 Cf. D.G. Robertson, A Patristic Theory of Proper Names, op. cit., p. 11.
608 D.G. Robertson, Relatives in Basil of Caesarea, op. cit., p. 277.
609 Con. Eun. II, 5, 1–3 (SC 305, p. 22; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, p. 136).
610 Cf. Con. Eun. I, 8, 27–45 (SC 299, pp. 194–196).
611 Con. Eun. II, 28, 27–37 (SC 305, pp. 118–120; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gall-
witz, p. 174).
174
names, because they name conceptualizations. And in each case, Basil ad-
vances a consistent notionalist theory in which a name gives rise to a mental 
notion whose content is the properties of substance.612 For Eunomius, terms 
have immediate access to substance; for Basil, it is the clue to the under-
standing that the notions are between names and beings. The terms that the 
humans have devised by reflecting on more basic concepts of God are all 
that can be known in this life, but still it is not a full and adequate portrait 
of God.613 Each name contributes in its own way to our understanding of 
God, and owing to this argumentation, Basil’s theory of names will support 
theological epistemology and create the possibility for a more comprehen-
sive knowledge of God than that Eunomius’ claimed to possess.614
It must be also remarked that in his polemic with Eunomius, comment-
ing on his Apology, Basil omitted chapters 21–24. When we look at those 
missing chapters, they are entirely devoted to problems connected with 
substance and activity. In my opinion, Basil did it deliberately, probably 
because he could not find counterarguments good enough to reject Eu-
nomius’ teaching. We do not know what was the exact text of Apologia 
Apologiae, but we know that the issues presented in the chapters omitted 
in Basil’s Contra Eunomium returned and were dealt with in Gregory’s 
interpretation.615
4.6  Gregory of Nyssa on knowing the activities and the 
essence of God
Answering Eunomius, Basil of Caesarea focused his criticism on the theory 
of names. From the fragments of Apologia Apologiae quoted by Gregory 
of Nyssa, we know that Eunomius tried to defend his position once again 
and, therefore, Gregory also formulated arguments against his theory.616 
However, in Contra Eunomium, the Cappadocian turns his attention to 
612 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 189.
613 Cf. A. Radde-Gallwitz, op. cit., p. 17.
614 Cf. M. DelCogliano, op. cit., p. 152.
615 Cf. K. Kochańczyk-Bonińska, Basil the Great’s References to Eunomius, VP 
37 (2017) vol. 68, pp. 125–126.
616 See especially CE II, 414–416 (GNO I, 347–348); 444 (GNO I, 356).
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Eunomius’ understanding of the distinction between substance and activity, 
which was only mentioned in Basil’s work.
The Anomean’s claim on the activities of God was one of the main fac-
tors which inspired Gregory of Nyssa to develop the theory of the Divine 
ἐνέργεια to the extent which is hard to find in the earlier Christian thought.
4.6.1 The ontological status of God’s activities
After a long exposition about the historical situation of the controversy and 
the accusations which Eunomius formulated against Basil’s cowardliness, 
Gregory of Nyssa begins his discussion with a quotation from Apologia 
Apologiae, in which the opponent sustained his claims on the two ways of 
theology.617 The discussion on the understanding of activity of God fills a 
large piece of the central part of the first book of Contra Eunomium.
Gregory first turns to the criticism of the names of the Divine Persons 
which are absent in Eunomius’ passage. He recognizes that the absence of 
the names “Father” and “Son” is deliberate because one can immediately 
recognize the natural relationship (τῆς φύσεως συγγενές) of the Persons and 
thus it would undermine Eunomius’ reasoning.618 After a long exposition 
concerning superiority of the Father and inferiority of the Son, Gregory 
once again quotes Eunomius: “the activities which accompany the substanc-
es and the names appropriate to them being of course treated together”619 
and presents his understanding of this passage:
“He applies the terms activities of substances, I assume, to the powers effective 
of the Son and the Holy Spirit, by which the first substance produced the second 
and the second the third, and he says that the names of the works effected are 
simultaneously applied as belonging to the works.”620
617 CE I, 151, 1–154, 13 (GNO I, 71, 28–73, 15).
618 CE I, 159, 1–5 (GNO I, 75, 1–6).
619 CE I, 205, 1–3. συμπεριλαμβανομένων δηλαδὴ καὶ τῶν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἑπομένων 
ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις προσφυῶν ὀνομάτων (GNO I, 86, 17–19; tr. Hall, 
p. 65).
620 CE I, 206, 1–6. ἐνεργείας οὐσιῶν ὀνομάζει τὰς ἀποτελεστικάς, ὡς οἶμαι, τοῦ υἱοῦ 
καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος δυνάμεις, δι’ ὧν ἡ πρώτη οὐσία τὴν δευτέραν εἰργάσατο 
καὶ ἡ δευτέρα τὴν τρίτην, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἀποτελεσθέντων ἔργων προσφυῶς 
συγκατεσκευάσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις φησίν (GNO I, 86, 22–27; tr. Hall, p. 65).
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Gregory suggests that Eunomius mistook activities for powers (δυνάμεις), 
but what is more important he states here that the entire question lies in 
an examination of the status of the activities, that is:
“how the activities accompany the substances, and what they are in their own 
nature, whether something other than the substances they accompany, or part of 
them and of the same nature; and if they are something else, how or whence they 
originate, and if they are the same thing, how they come to be cut off and, instead 
of “coexisting” with them, accompany them externally.”621
Gregory complains that it is not possible to identify what Eunomius really 
means when speaking of activities: whether they are the effect of free choice 
or they follow the substance out of the necessity of nature (ἀνάγκης τινὸς 
φυσικῆς), as combustion accompanies the nature of fire. However, he rejects 
the second option because this would mean that activity is a kind of an ac-
cident of the subject (συμβεβηκὸς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ), which in this case could 
not be understood as a simple one.622 But such conclusion leads to an even 
greater confusion, because activity which is the effect of the intended choice 
(ἐκ πρόνοιας) of God at the same time accompanies (ἕπεται) substance like 
the external consequence.623 Gregory notes that normally we do not say 
that the activity of a worker follows him, but rather:
“one who speaks of the activity comprehends in the word whatever is active in it, 
and the one who mentions the agent, precisely by what he leaves unsaid, indicates 
also the activity.”624
It can be shown by the examples of naming “metalworker” and “builder,” 
where the name denotes both person and the activity which he performs and 
those two are conceived together.625 So even the activity which does arise 
621 CE I, 207, 1–6. πῶς ἕπονται ταῖς οὐσίαις αἱ ἐνέργειαι, τί οὖσαι κατὰ τὴν 
ἰδίαν φύσιν, ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας αἷς παρέπονται ἢ μέρος ἐκείνων καὶ τῆς 
αὐτῆς φύσεως· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο, πῶς ἢ παρὰ τίνος γενόμεναι, εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτό, πῶς 
ἀποτεμνόμεναι καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ “συνυπάρχειν” αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν παρεπόμεναι (GNO 
I, 87, 3–8; tr. Hall, p. 65).
622 CE I, 208, 2–11. (GNO I, 87, 10–18).
623 CE I, 209, 1–3. (GNO I, 87, 19–20).
624 CE I, 209, 7–10. ἀλλ’ ὁ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἰπὼν τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν κινούμενον τῷ λόγῳ 
συμπεριέλαβε, καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος μνησθεὶς καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν πάντως κατὰ τὸ 
σιωπώμενον αὐτῷ συνεσήμηνε (GNO I, 87, 25–88,3; tr. Hall, p. 65).
625 CE I, 210, 1–5 (GNO I, 88, 4–8).
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from the necessity of nature cannot exist without substance that performs 
it. Therefore, activity cannot be treated as subsistent (ψιλὴν ἐνέργειαν), 
since it is the motion of nature (φύσεως	κίνησις) and what subsists is active 
substance (ἐνεργὸν	οὐσίαν).626 Understanding the activity as subsistent leads 
to a contradiction, because on one hand, it must be something dependent 
on the will of the Father, and on the other, it is also independent. After a 
discussion on the greater and lesser understanding of substances,627 Gregory 
returns to the implication of the independence of activity when commenting 
on Eunomius’ words:
“the activities are defined at the same time as their works, and the works 
match the activities of those who effected them, there is surely every ne-
cessity both that the activities accompanying each of the beings are lesser 
and greater, and that some occupy the first and others the second rank.”628
Using the example of a leatherworker and his tool, Gregory shows that 
for Eunomius activity is a kind of a tool (ὄργανον) with which the Father 
creates the Son and the Son creates the Holy Spirit.629 Therefore, it must 
be: “A kind of quasi-substantial power, which subsists by itself and appar-
ently operates by voluntary motion,”630 and this leads to a conclusion that 
there are some entities between the Divine Persons. So, in the Trinity, the 
Holy Spirit must be placed not in the third but in the fifth place.631 Such a 
position leads to absurdity, and, therefore, Eunomius simply must admit 
that activity is non-hypostatic (ἀνυπόστατον), and for Gregory, this means 
626 CE I, 211, 7–9 (GNO I, 87, 15–18). It is worth noting that the definition of 
activity as the “movement of nature” comes from Aristotle. Cf. Met. IX, 8, 
1050 b, 29–32; De gen. anim., 734 b, 19–735 a, 2.
627 CE I, 225–241 (GNO I, 92, 12–97, 21).
628 CE I, 242, 4–9. συμπεριγραφομένων, φησί, τοῖς ἔργοις τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν 
ἔργων ταῖς τῶν ἐργασαμένων ἐνεργείαις	παραμετρουμένων, ἀνάγκη δήπου πᾶσα 
καὶ τὰς ἑκάστῃ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑπομένας ἐνεργείας ἐλάττους τε καὶ μείζους εἶναι, καὶ 
τὰς μὲν πρώτην, τὰς δὲ δευτέραν ἐπέχειν τάξιν (GNO I, 97, 24–98, 1; tr. Hall, 
p. 70).
629 CE I, 245, 1–246, 4 (GNO I, 98, 20–99, 1).
630 CE I, 247, 1–2. δύναμίς τις οὐσιώδης καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑφεστῶσα καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν 
ἐργαζομένη δι’ αὐτεξουσίου κινήματος. (GNO I, 99, 8–9; tr. Hall, p. 71).
631 CE I, 249, 1–3 (GNO I, 99, 20–21).
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that the activity of generation is simply non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν),632 which can 
produce only another non-being.633
Gregory summarizes his point in the fragment of Refutatio confessionis 
Eunomii, in which he also gives a definition of activity:
“Every activity is contemplated as exertion in the party who exhibits it, and when 
it is completed, it has no independent existence. Thus, for example, the activity 
of the runner is the motion of his feet, and when the motion has stopped there is 
no longer any activity. So too about every pursuit the same may be said; - when 
the exertion of him who is busied about anything ceases, the activity ceases also, 
and has no independent existence, either when a person is actively engaged in the 
exertion he undertakes, or when he ceases from that exertion. What then does 
he tell us that the activity is in itself, which is neither substance, nor image, nor 
person? So he speaks of the Son as the similitude of the impersonal, and that which 
is like the non-existent surely has itself no existence at all. This is what his juggling 
with idle opinions comes to, - belief in nonentity (τὸ μὴ ὄν)! for that which is like 
nonentity surely itself is not.”634
Thus activity exists only as an exertion (σπουδαζόμενον) of someone who 
performs it and cannot have existence of its own. Since it cannot in itself 
be a substance, an imprinted image or a person (οὔτε οὐσίαν οὖσαν οὔτε 
χαρακτῆρα οὔτε ὑπόστασιν), when separated from the one who performs its 
activity can only be named as non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν). Eunomius’ understand-
ing of activity leads to a contradiction that it is separate and has its own 
existence, while simultaneously it is dependent. Therefore, one must accept 
632 CE I, 251, 1–3 (GNO I, 100, 6–9).
633 CE I, 253, 1–7 (GNO I, 100, 23–101, 4).
634 Refutatio confessionis Eunomii 159, 4–160, 10. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἐν μὲν τῷ 
ἐκπονοῦντι τὸ σπουδαζόμενον θεωρεῖται, περαιωθέντος δὲ τοῦ σπουδαζομένου 
καθ’ ἑαυτὴν οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν· οἷον ἐνέργεια τοῦ δρομέως ἡ διὰ τῶν ποδῶν ἐστι 
κίνησις, παυσαμένης δὲ τῆς κινήσεως οὐκέτι ἔστιν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια. 
οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἔστιν ἐπιτηδεύματος τὸ ἴσον εἰπεῖν, τῇ σπουδῇ τοῦ περί 
τι πονοῦντος συναπολήγειν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν *** ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς δὲ οὐκ οὖσαν 
οὔτε ἐνεργοῦντός τινος τὴν προκειμένην ἑαυτῷ σπουδὴν οὔτε εἰ τῆς σπουδῆς 
ἀπολήξειε. τί οὖν λέγει εἶναι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν οὔτε οὐσίαν οὖσαν 
οὔτε χαρακτῆρα οὔτε ὑπόστασιν; οὐκοῦν τοῦ ἀνυποστάτου αὐτὸν εἶπεν ὁμοίωμα· 
τὸ δὲ τῷ ἀνυπάρκτῳ ὅμοιον οὐδὲ αὐτὸ πάντως ἔστιν. αὕτη τῶν καινῶν δογμάτων 
ἡ τερατεία, τὸ πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ τῷ μὴ ὄντι ὅμοιον οὐκ ἔστι πάντως. 
(GNO II, 379, 26–380, 10; tr. NPNF II, vol. 5, p. 124, with my own altera-
tions).
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Gregory’s position that activity cannot exist apart from the substance that 
performs it.635
4.6.2 The criticism of the second way of Eunomius
It seems that demonstrating the dependence of activity on the substance 
could only strengthen the demonstrative power of Eunomius’ second way 
of theology. If activity is so deeply linked with the substance, it would seem 
that we can indeed know the substance when we know the activity. But 
Gregory does not think so, and he addresses his criticism against Eunomius’ 
second way.
The activity which is the exertion of a substance cannot give us any 
knowledge of the substance itself. Gregory considers two possible ways of 
understanding the relationship between the two. First, when “substance and 
activity are found to possess the self-same characteristics and properties.”636 
This position, however, must be refuted because there would be no differ-
ence between the divine substance and generation, and this would mean 
that Eunomius agrees with the Orthodox. That is why, he must sustain the 
second possibility, that substance and activity have different properties. In 
this case, it is impossible to recognize the substance on the basis of activity:
“If the definition of substance and activity is not the same, but each means some-
thing different, how can conclusions to discussions be reached on the basis of 
things strange and alien? It is as if in an argument about human nature, discussing 
whether man is a laughing animal or capable of literacy, someone took as an il-
lustration to prove his point the construction of a house or ship, which the builder 
or shipwright built, and were then to assert by this clever argument that we know 
the substances by the activities, and that the activity of a man is the house and 
the ship. Is this then the way we learn, you silly thing, that man is broad-nailed 
and able to laugh?”637
635 Cf. G. Maspero, Energy, in: The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, ed. 
L.F. Mateo-Seco, G. Maspero, Leiden, Boston 2010, p. 260.
636 CE I, 419, 6–7. τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς γνωρίσμασί 
τε καὶ ἰδιώμασιν εὑρισκομένων (GNO I, 149, 1–2; tr. Hall, p. 96).
637 CE I, 420, 1–421, 3. εἰ δὲ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὁ λόγος, 
ἀλλὰ διάφορον ἐφ’ ἑκατέρου τὸ σημαινόμενον, πῶς διὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ ἀλλοτρίων 
αἱ ἀποδείξεις τοῖς ζητουμένοις ἐπάγονται; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, πολυπραγμονουμένης 
τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οὐσίας καὶ ζητουμένου εἰ γελαστικὸν ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ	
γραμματικῆς δεκτικόν, εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ προτεθέντος παραλαμβάνοι οἰκίας ἢ	
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In this case, the product of the activity by which it has been made cannot 
give us the knowledge of the substance. A ship or a house built by man does 
not lead us in any demonstration to conceive what human nature is. The 
same objection can be made with respect to any activity and movement (τινα 
κίνησιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν) of man, but also when we consider the activity which 
is intrinsically linked with nature, or as Gregory puts it: “what the activity 
by its nature actually is.”638 The example of such activity is the movement 
of wind, since there is no wind when air does not move. The effects of 
wind’s activity could be a dune or a scatter of dust, but those things cannot 
explain the nature of wind.639 As we can see, Gregory does not only ques-
tion the possibility of knowing substance from activity, but he goes even 
further arguing that it is not true that the product matches the activity. He 
uses the example of a smith, who in making a gimlet does not use all of his 
abilities and skills, but only to such extent which is necessary to make this 
tool. Therefore: “similarly the one brought into being by the activity reveals 
the extent of the activity (τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἐνεργείας) in himself.”640 But the 
question in this case does not concern how great the activity is but rather 
the very substance of the one who acted (τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος ἡ οὐσία)641 and, 
therefore, Eunomius’ method fails. Gregory gives us yet another argument 
of why this method cannot be sound. It must be rejected even if we admit 
that we can have the knowledge of substance, thanks to activity. Since 
πλοίου κατασκευήν, ἣν ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἐτεκτήνατο, ἔπειτα ἰσχυρίζοιτο 
τῷ σοφῷ τούτῳ λόγῳ, ὅτι ταῖς ἐνεργείαις	τὰς οὐσίας γνωρίζομεν, ἐνέργεια δὲ τοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου ἡ οἰκία καὶ τὸ πλοῖον. ἐκ τούτων ἄρα καταλαμβάνομεν τὸ πλατυώνυχον 
καὶ γελαστικὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἁπλούστατε (GNO I, 149, 3–15; tr. Hall, 
p. 96).
638 CE I, 421, 5–6. αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργοῦν τί ποτε κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν· (GNO I, 149, 
17–18; tr. Hall, p. 96).
639 CE I, 422, 1–5 (GNO I, 149, 19–23). Gergory makes a similar objection in the 
third book of Contra Eunomium, where he considers God as a judge. Mak-
ing a judgement is the activity, which allows us to claim that God is a judge, 
but it does not give us the knowledge of the substance of God. Similarly, the 
knowledge of generation can lead us to a conclusion that God is ungenerated, 
but this does not mean that we gained the knowledge of the substance of God 
(CE III, 5, 57–59; GNO II, p. 181).
640 CE I, 424, 11–12 (GNO I, 150, 14–15).
641 CE I, 425, 1–3 (GNO I, 150, 16–18).
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Eunomius cannot name any specific activity of the Holy Spirit, his substance 
would be incomprehensible and, therefore, also the activity of the Son, the 
Onlybegotten himself, the activity of generation, and finally the substance 
of the Father.642 Gregory concludes:
“Hence there is a clear proof that on our opponents’ own evidence the substance 
of the Father is absolutely beyond apprehension.”643
Gregory of Nyssa then not only repudiates Eunomius’ argument concern-
ing the relationship between substance and activity, but also shows that 
the sequential conception of the Trinity makes it futile. Therefore, neither 
the product nor the activities can be a starting point for any demonstration 
which gives us the apprehension of the substance of God.
4.6.3 The activity of generation and other activities of God
In the next paragraphs, which we cannot follow in full because some frag-
ments are missing, Gregory refers to the last part of Eunomius’ exposition 
on the two ways of theology. He claimed that we can resolve the doubts 
about activities in reference to the acting substance.644 It seems that here 
Eunomius does not speak directly about his first method, because he does 
not mention the theory of names, but he proposes rather to make his dem-
onstration even firmer by taking a step back from the recognized substance 
to activity. In his polemic, Gregory points out that any demonstration must 
start from the commonly accepted statement (ὁμολογούμενον),645 and since 
the substance of God is unknown, it is not possible to start any reasoning 
from it. But the Father is not only the one who generated the Son, but is 
also the Creator of the Universe. Since there are various opinions on the 
nature of the sky, the earth and the sea it is impossible to claim that the 
nature of God can be understood. Eunomius himself claimed that God is 
642 CE I, 426, 1–427, 10 (GNO I, 150, 25–151, 15).
643 CE I, 428, 8–429, 1. ὡς ἐκ τούτων σαφῶς ἀποδείκνυσθαι καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐχθρῶν 
μαρτυρίας τὸ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι πάντη τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν (GNO I, 151, 
23–25).
644 CE I, 154, 10–11, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις	ἀμφιβολίαν διαλύειν ἐκ τῶν οὐσιῶν 
(GNO I, 73, 12–13).
645 CE, I, 431, 1–9 (GNO I, 152, 7–16).
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immaterial, invisible, without shape, unbegotten, immune to decay, etc.,646 
so Gregory asks:
“How then will one who has accepted such an idea of the one who was active be 
led on to the knowledge of the nature of the sky? How will he pass from invisible 
to visible, from incorruptible to what is subject to decay, from unbegotten being 
to what is constituted in time, from what always abides to what has acquired 
temporal existence, and frame his notion of the matter in question on the basis of 
all that is contrary to it?”647
This is a very important fragment since Gregory points out that there are 
other activities of God which we can recognize in the sensual world. This 
is not only creation, but also providence, about which he speaks in the 
next passages,648 and in the case of those activities, the knowledge of the 
substance of God from them is even more doubtful. It is not even possible 
to pass from visible effects to the invisible substance of the cause. As we 
have seen above, Eunomius was unable to solve the problem of those other 
activities, and Gregory rightly points out that he avoids speaking of them, 
as in the case of providence.649 Neither can we be certain how Eunomius 
understood those other activities of God; whether the Father could have 
other activities of his own, or they were all performed through the Son. 
Nevertheless, since for Eunomius, no activity was the same with the essence 
of God, there was no possibility of admitting that there is any “internal” 
one. Naturally, when the Orthodox claimed that activity is the same with 
essence, and that the Three Persons have one activity, such ἐνέργεια must 
be internal. Gregory uses the term in the plural when he wants to describe 
the various operations of God, and in the singular when he speaks of the 
single activity of the Divine Persons.650
646 CE I, 435, 1–10 (GNO I, 150, 4–14).
647 CE I, 436, 1–7. πῶς οὖν ὁ τοιαύτην περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος λαβὼν τὴν διάνοιαν 
πρὸς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φύσεως ἐναχθήσεται; πῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἀοράτου τὸ 
ὁρατόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου τὸ φθορᾷ ὑποκείμενον, ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτως ὄντος τὸ ἀπὸ 
χρόνου τὴν σύστασιν ἔχον, ἐκ τοῦ εἰσαεὶ διαμένοντος τὸ πρόσκαιρον κεκτημένον 
τὴν ὕπαρξιν, καὶ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου ποιήσεται 
κατανόησιν; (GNO I, 153, 14–21; tr. Hall, p. 98).
648 CE I, 439–445 (GNO I, 154–156).
649 CE I, 446–447 (GNO I, 156).
650 J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., pp. 188–189.
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It seems that Gregory of Nyssa recognizes fully the consequences of the 
unity of internal activity of God. In another passage from the second book 
of Contra Eunomium, he refutes Eunomius’ opinion that only the Father is 
incorruptible while the Son merely makes himself indestructible. Therefore, 
in the case of the Son, indestructibility is the outcome of activity, while 
for the Father, it belongs to him “not on the basis of activity.”651 Gregory 
briefly answers: “For my part, if true Life acting is an activity, and if to 
live for ever, and never to suffer destruction, mean the same thing.”652 Life 
is then the activity which acts of itself (ἡ ὄντως ζωὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐνεργοῦσα), and 
it must be the same life in the Father and in the Son, since both are not 
susceptible to destruction and there is no more or less in being destructible 
and indestructible.653 As we can see, Gregory has no objection to speak 
about multiple activities in the substance of God; there is generation as the 
activity of the Father, but there is also life as the activity of the Trinity. This 
Life must be understood as absolutely simple with no addition, variation 
of quantity and quality, or change.654
651 CE II, 367, 1–2. περὶ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ πατρὸς διαλέγεται ὡς οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργείας 
προσούσης αὐτῷ (GNO I, 333, 24–25; tr. Hall, p. 141).
652 CE II, 367, 3–6. ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν ἡ ὄντως ζωὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐνεργοῦσα 
καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ σημαινομένῳ τό τε ἀεὶ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε εἰς φθορὰν 
διαλύεσθαι οὔπω τῷ λόγῳ προστίθημι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδίοις ταμιεύσομαι τόποις (GNO 
I, 333, 26–29; tr. Hall, p. 141).
653 CE II, 370, 4–6. εἰ δὲ ἀνεπίδεκτος φθορᾶς ὡσαύτως ἑκάτερος καὶ οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον 
οὔτε τὸ ἧττον ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀφθαρσίᾳ καταλαμβάνεται, πῶς δείκνυσι τοῦ 
πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν μονογενῆ υἱὸν τὸ ἀσύγκριτον (GNO I, 334, 17–19).
654 CE II, 489, 4–14. εἰ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς μία ζωὴ εἰλικρινὴς πάσης συνθέσεως καὶ 
διπλόης κεχωρισμένη καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπόκειται πρᾶγμα παρὰ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ ζωήν (πῶς 
γὰρ <ἂν> ἐν τῷ ἁπλῷ μίξις ἀλλοτρίου πράγματος ὑποπτεύοιτο; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι 
ἁπλοῦν εἴη τὸ μεθ’ ἑτέρου νοούμενον), ἁπλῆ δὲ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσία, ἁπλῆς 
δὲ ζωῆς κατ’ αὐτὸν τόν τε τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὸν τῆς ἁπλότητος λόγον οὐδεμία τίς ἐστι 
διαφορά, οὔτε ἐπιτάσεως οὔτε ὑφέσεως οὔτε τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἑτερότητος 
τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἐμποιούσης, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὰ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐννοίαις συμβαίνοντα 
καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προσηγοριῶν ὀνομάζεσθαι (GNO I, 369, 5–15). “If then 
he too is one absolute Life devoid of all composition and reduplication, and 
there is no underlying reality beside the life of the Son (for how could any 
admixture of alien reality be suspected in what is simple? what is perceived 
as so associated would no longer be simple), and if the being of the Father is 
also a simple life, and according to the principle of life and simplicity there 
is no diversity in the simple life, no addition, no subtraction, no variation of 
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Probably the best example of the unity of activity is the discussion on the 
will of the Father and the Son. As we have seen Eunomius was consistent in 
arguing that the Son was generated by the sole act of the will of the Father, 
and this act was most befitting God. The activity of the will was treated as 
something in between the two persons and the main basis to discern them. 
But for Gregory, the activity of the will serves best to explain the unity of 
the substance of the Father and the Son:
“We are taught that the Only-begotten is begotten; nothing is unbegotten except 
the Father. Therefore of necessity the word of truth compels us to hold that there 
is nothing between the Father and the Son. But where no separation is conceived, 
close conjunction is surely acknowledged; and what is totally conjoined is not 
mediated by voice and speech. By ‘conjoined’ I mean that which is totally insepa-
rable; for the word ‘conjunction’ does not imply a kind of bodily affinity in what 
is essentially intelligent, but the union and commingling of wills (διὰ τῆς ταὐτότητος 
τῶν θελημάτων ἕνωσίν) between one intelligent being and another.”655
To show the unity of will, Gregory uses the example of a mirror, in which 
the image only reflects the original object but does not move or bend on 
its own. Similarly, the will of the Son reflects in every aspect the activity 
of the will of the Father.656 But what is even more important is that in the 
following passages, he provides the arguments that show how inaccurate 
was Eunomius’ position on the activity of will which produces external 
effects. In this part of Contra Eunomium, he begins his long exposition of 
how to understand the act of creation, which is in fact his own explanation 
of the quotation from the Scripture which Eunomius used to support his 
quantity or quality generating change, it must follow that those things which 
coincide in the same thoughts should also be named with the same appella-
tions” (tr. Hall, p. 169).
655 CE I, 214, 1–12. νεωτέρα γὰρ ἡ κτίσις τοῦ λόγου. γεννητὸν τὸν μονογενῆ 
ἐδιδάχθημεν, ἀγέννητον πλὴν τοῦ πατρός ἐστιν οὐδέν. οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μηδὲν 
εἶναι μέσον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ νοεῖν ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος συναναγκάζει. 
ὅπου δὲ διάστασις οὐκ ἐπινοεῖται, τὸ συνημμένον πάντως ὁμολογεῖται, τὸ δὲ διὰ 
πάντων συνημμένον φωνῇ καὶ λόγῳ οὐ μεσιτεύεται. συνημμένον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν 
πᾶσιν ἀχώριστον. οὐ γὰρ σωματικήν τινα συμφυΐαν ἐπὶ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως τὸ 
ὄνομα τῆς συναφείας ἐνδείκνυται, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν διὰ τῆς 
ταὐτότητος τῶν θελημάτων ἕνωσίν τε καὶ ἀνάκρασιν (GNO I, 287, 22–288, 3; 
tr. Hall, p. 105).
656 CE II, 215, 3–12 (GNO I, 333, 6–17).
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view. He wants to support his theory of names by making a reference to 
the beginning of the Book of Genesis (1: 1–16) “where God is declared to 
have said something” and to Psalm (18/19: 2–3) where: “The heavens tell 
God’s glory, and the firmament proclaims his handiwork; day to day brings 
forth word, and night proclaims knowledge to night.” But explaining the 
second passage, Gregory says that the heavens and all creations indeed tell 
the glory of God, but:
“This is not articulate speech, but through the visible things it imparts to our minds 
the knowledge of the divine power more than if speech proclaimed it in sound. 
The heaven, then, tells a tale but does not speak, and the firmament announces 
God’s creation without the need of a voice, the day puts forth a word and there 
is no speech…”657
Creation then can give us the knowledge about the power of God (τὴν 
γνῶσιν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως), about his wisdom, and the beauty of His design, 
which for the human mind is more than speech in the literal sense. But 
much more interesting is what Gregory wants to say about God who cre-
ates by telling the words of creation. We cannot understand it in a human 
way, because in God the verb “say” does not mean speech but is rather 
an intellectual notion.658 There is also no time sequence and passage from 
potency to act:
“It is not like other beings whose nature includes the power to act, where one 
observes both the potential and the accomplished action. We say for instance that 
the one who is skilled in the science of shipbuilding is potentially a shipbuilder, 
but he is effective only when he displays his science in practice. It is not however 
like that with the blessed Life: rather, in that Life what is thought is in its entirety 
action and performance, the will passing instantly to its intended goal.”659
657 CE II, 225, 1–5 ταῦτα λόγος μὲν ἔναρθρος οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐντίθησι δὲ διὰ τῶν 
φαινομένων ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ διὰ φωνῆς 
ὁ λόγος ἐκήρυσσεν. ὥσπερ τοίνυν διηγεῖται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ οὐ φθέγγεται, καὶ 
ἀναγγέλλει τὸ στερέωμα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ποίησιν καὶ φωνῆς οὐ προσδέεται. καὶ ῥῆμα 
προΐεται ἡ ἡμέρα καὶ λαλιὰ οὐκ ἔστιν (GNO I, 291, 9–14; tr. Hall, p. 108).
658 CE II, 227, 2–5 (GNO I, 292, 3–8).
659 CE II, 230, 1–9. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷς τις πρακτικὴ δύναμις ἐκ φύσεως 
ἔνεστι, τὸ μὲν δυνάμει θεωρεῖται τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐκπλήρωσιν, ὡς 
φέρε εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ μὲν εἶναι ναυπηγόν φαμεν τῇ δυνάμει τὸν τὴν ναυπηγικὴν ἔχοντα 
τέχνην, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ τότε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων δείξῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ οὕτως καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῆς μακαρίας ζωῆς. ἀλλ’ ὅλον ὅτιπέρ ἐστιν ἐν ἐκείνῃ νοούμενον ἐνέργεια καὶ 
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So, there is no difference in God, his activity is always in the entirety as his 
Life is his Will, and producing external effects does not cause any sequence 
and intermediate entity between Him and His effect. Therefore, neither any 
internal nor external activity does involve any diversity in God. It is worth 
mentioning here that in the third book, Gregory also discusses the divine 
will, and he also points out that we cannot comprehend the divine will in 
a human way. Therefore, the Father could not have changed his mind and 
decided that he wanted to generate the Son, since his will always stay the 
same:
“God however, being a single Good with his single and uncompounded nature, | 
looks perpetually to the same goal and never changes in response to impulses of 
choice (τῆς προαιρέσεως); rather, he always both wills what he is and, of course, 
is what he wills, so that in both ways he is properly and truly called Son of God: 
both because his nature has goodness in itself, and because his purpose has never 
fallen short of the best, so that he might be given this designation by some meta-
phorical usage.”660
The activity of will is always coeternal with the substance of God, and, 
therefore, the Son cannot become a Son, but must always be. We cannot say 
that God becomes who He is, but rather “wills what He is and, of course, 
is what He wills” (βούλεται ὅπερ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐστὶ πάντως ὃ καὶ βούλεται), and 
this definition of will resembles the one which we have seen in Plotinus, who 
also understood the activity of will this way, as identical with the essence of 
the self-establishing One.661 We can also notice that Gregory’s understand-
ing of the internal and external activity of will resembles Plotinus’ theory of 
double activity; however, we must remember that in his view, the productive 
activity of the One was performed as the activity of the intellect not the will. 
πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, ἀμέσως τοῦ βουλήματος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ πρόθεσιν τέλος μεθισταμένου 
(GNO I, 292, 1–9; tr. Hall, p. 109).
660 CE III, 1, 125, 1–9. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἓν ὢν ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἁπλῇ τε καὶ ἀσυνθέτῳ τῇ 
φύσει πάντοτε πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ βλέπει καὶ οὐδέποτε ταῖς τῆς προαιρέσεως ὁρμαῖς 
μεταβάλλεται, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ καὶ βούλεται ὅπερ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐστὶ πάντως ὃ καὶ βούλεται, 
ὥστε δι’ ἀμφοτέρων υἱὸς θεοῦ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι, τῆς τε φύσεως ἐν 
ἑαυτῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐχούσης τῆς τε προαιρέσεως οὐκ ἀπερρωγυίας τοῦ κρείττονος, 
ὡς μὴ ἂν ἐκ καταχρήσεως αὐτῷ τὴν φωνὴν ταύτην ἐπικληθῆναι (GNO II, 45, 
27–46, 7; tr. Hall, p. 67).
661 Enn. VI, 8, 13, 5–11. (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 3, pp. 256–257); VI, 8, 13, 50–59 
(vol. 3, p. 349).
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Therefore, it seems that in Gregory, we observe a Christian modification of 
this theory. In the following paragraph, we will see yet another modifica-
tion of this kind, but to summarize this part, we must conclude that by his 
discussion with Eunomius, Gregory constructed the conceptual framework 
which became the basis of his claims on incomprehensibility of God.662
4.6.4 Activities and incomprehensibility of God
The distinction between internal and external activities is so important be-
cause Gregory rightly observes that while the activities which are present in 
creations are comprehensible, the single activity of the Divine Persons stays 
beyond the abilities of human intellect since it is the same with the Divine 
substance.663 In Contra Eunomium, one of the most interesting places where 
incomprehensibility of the internal activity of God can be seen is the frag-
ment where Gregory defines eternity:
“The eternity of the divine life, if one were to apply some definition to it, is some-
thing like this. It is apprehended as always in being (ἀεὶ μὲν ἐν τῷ εἶναι) but does 
not allow the thought that it ever was not or will not be.”664
The concept of understanding eternity as life which is present in its entirety 
is a reference to Plotinus, who also defined eternity in the same way as end-
less life.665 But Gregory does not simply quote Plotinus. In the Enneads, 
662 There is also another very important topic in Gregory’s thought related to the 
problem of understanding activity. Gregory re-established the understanding 
of the power of God, and the triad substance, power, and activity also dem-
onstrated the unity of the power and substance of God. This aspect, however, 
is well shown by: M.R. Barnes, cf. op. cit., pp. 260–307.
663 Cf. J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., p. 192.
664 CE I, 666, 1–4. Τὸ ἀΐδιον τῆς θείας ζωῆς, ὡς ἄν τις ὅρῳ τινὶ περιλαβὼν ὑπογράψειε, 
τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἀεὶ μὲν ἐν τῷ εἶναι καταλαμβάνεται, τοῦ δὲ ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ποτὲ 
μὴ ἔσεσθαι τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται (GNO 1, 217, 26–29; tr. Hall, p. 217).
665 Enn. III, 7, 5, 25–28. Καὶ εἴ τις οὕτω τὸν αἰῶνα λέγοι ζωὴν ἄπειρον ἤδη τῷ πᾶσαν 
εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν αὐτῆς τῷ μὴ παρεληλυθέναι μηδ’ αὖ μέλλειν -ἤδη γὰρ 
οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶσα- ἐγγὺς ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὁρίζεσθαι (Henry/Schwyzer, vol. 1, p. 343). 
“and if someone were in their way to speak of eternity as a life which is here 
and now endless because it is total and expends nothing of itself, since it has 
not past or future…he would be near to defining it” (McKenna/Page, p. 121). 
D.L. Balás analyses Gregory’s understanding of eternity in Contra Eunomium 
and his dependence on Plotinus in: Eternity and Time in Gregory of Nyssa’s 
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eternity is identified with second hypostasis – Intellect (νοῦς) and, there-
fore, just like Intellect, it can be understood.666 Gregory of Nyssa, however, 
defines eternity as the life of God Himself, and therefore it is completely 
beyond comprehension. He uses the example of a circle which has no be-
ginning. If we extend our intellect from the present, as from the centre of 
the circle towards the infinity of the divine life:
“…we may well be drawn round in the same sort of circle by what is impossible 
to apprehend (ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας), as we perceive that the divine life is continu-
ous and unbroken in every direction and can appreciate that there is no limit 
anywhere.”667
Gregory then transforms the thought of Plotinus, and because eternity is 
the attribute of God, it cannot be comprehended, just as the activity of the 
life of God is beyond our capability of understanding. Therefore, one can 
only say that God’s eternity means the fullness of His life which is without 
priority or posterity, but this does not mean that anyone can understand 
what this life is in itself. Life which is the same with the substance of God 
must then be seen as incomprehensible.
As we have seen above, Gregory also insisted that even if we can know 
the activity, this knowledge cannot give us the understanding of the essence 
of the one who acts. By the example of the smith who makes the gimlet, 
Gregory argued that making external product does not involve the full 
potential of the maker, and therefore also activity is not an actualization of 
full potency of essence,668 so we cannot conceive the essence from activity 
even in case of man. In another place, he explains that it is infinitely less 
possible to understand the substance of God if we start reasoning from His 
external activities.
In Contra Eunomium II, Gregory recalls Eunomius’ claims that the word 
“Unbegotten” measures the infinite nature with a single title while not being 
Contra Eunomium, in: Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie, ed. H. Dörie, 
M. Altenburger, U. Schramm, Leiden 1976, pp. 128–155.
666 Cf. A. Smith, Eternity and Time, op. cit., pp. 198–203.
667 CE I 668, 7–10. …καὶ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας ἐν κύκλῳ περιελκόμεθα, 
συνεχῆ καὶ ἀδιάστατον αὐτὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὴν θείαν ζωὴν ἁπανταχόθεν 
καταλαμβάνοντες καὶ οὐδὲν πέρας κατ’ οὐδὲν μέρος ἐπιγνῶναι δυνάμενοι (GNO 
I, 218, 14–17; tr. Hall, pp. 131–132).
668 CE I, 424, 11–425, 3 (GNO I, 150, 14–18).
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said conceptually, but at the same time, expressing the nature of God.669 
Referring to Basil, he clarifies how to understand the positive and negative 
names of God:
“Our position therefore – I am adopting my master’s teaching – is that we have a 
faint and slight apprehension of the divine Nature through reasoning, but we still 
gather knowledge enough for our slight capacity through the words which are 
reverently used of it. We claim that the meaning of all these names is not uniform, 
but some denote things that appertain to God, others those that are absent.”670
After this opening, Gregory presents various names which are positively 
ascribing something to God (eternity, justice, goodness, etc.) and negatively 
saying on what God is not (indestructible, unbegun, immortal etc.). Some of 
those names are opposites; they indicate what does or what does not apply 
to God, but their meaning is the same (such as God is good and God has 
no evil).671 Therefore, when we say that God is Unbegotten, we say nothing 
more that He is the Beginning of all things, but we express it in a different 
form, and, therefore, there is nothing special in the name “Unbegotten”, 
which for Eunomius was the most suitable one to express the nature of 
God.672 Gregory concludes that there is no use in multiplying words, since 
we say nothing new, and because it is only reverence to the sounds with-
out turning attention to their meanings. Referring to the teaching of Basil, 
Gregory states that the proper reasoning is:
“…to perceive quite clearly that the manner of existence of the essential nature of 
the Divinity is intangible, inconceivable, and beyond all rational comprehension. 
Human thought, investigating and searching by such reasoning as is possible, 
reaches out and touches the unapproachable and sublime Nature, neither seeing 
669 CE II, 125,1–129, 3 (GNO I, 262, 16–263, 20).
670 CE II, 130, 1–131, 3. Οὐκοῦν εἴρηται παρ’ ἡμῶν (οἰκειοῦμαι γὰρ τοῦ διδασκάλου 
τὸν λόγον) ὅτι τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀμυδρὰν μὲν καὶ βραχυτάτην ἔχομεν διὰ τῶν 
λογισμῶν τὴν ἀντίληψιν, ἀποχρῶσαν δ’ ὅμως τῇ βραχύτητι τῆς δυνάμεως ἡμῶν 
διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν λεγομένων εὐσεβῶς τὴν γνῶσιν ἐρανιζόμεθα. 
τούτων δέ φαμεν τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ μονοειδῆ πάντων εἶναι τὴν σημασίαν, ἀλλὰ 
τὰ μὲν τῶν προσόντων τῷ θεῷ (GNO I, 263, 21–28; tr. S.G Hall, p. 87).
671 CE II, 134, 1–4 (GNO I, 264, 18–23).
672 CE II, 135, 1–136, 10 (GNO I, 264, 24–265, 10).
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so clearly as distinctly to glimpse the Invisible, nor so totally debarred from ap-
proaching as to be unable to form any impression of what it seeks.”673
The best way to obtain any knowledge of God is to start with a negative 
conviction that the Divine nature is beyond our capability of understand-
ing it. Such an approach can give man some kind of a “touch of sublime 
Nature,” and Gregory explains it further by saying that we can only know 
that the nature of God is incomprehensible:
“By the reach of reason its goal is to discover what that is which it seeks, and in 
a sense it does understand it by the very fact that it cannot perceive it, inasmuch 
as it acquires clear knowledge that what it seeks is beyond all knowledge.”674
This kind of “touch” of the incomprehensible Divine nature can make 
reason truly convinced of what is compatible or incompatible with it, and, 
therefore, reason can devise true names, but it can never perceive what 
this nature is in itself. By the very conception of those compatible and 
incompatible things, reason can know that “that which rests beyond every 
evil, and is perceived as possessing every good, must surely be such as is 
unutterable in word and inaccessible to thought.”675 The final conviction 
which awaits man on his way to God is the “apprehension that he exists” 
(νοουμένων ὅτι ἔστι).676
All those explanations do not tell us what exactly we name when we 
apply names to God. Negative terms simply indicate what does not apply 
673 CE II, 138, 2–11. δι’ ἧς ἔνεστι τοὺς μὴ κεκαλυμμένους τῷ αἱρετικῷ προκαλύμματι 
σαφῶς διϊδεῖν ὅτι τὸ θεῖον, ὅπως ἂν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἔχῃ, ἀνέπαφόν τέ ἐστι καὶ 
ἀκατανόητον καὶ πάσης ἀντιλήψεως τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν ὑψηλότερον, ἡ δὲ 
ἀνθρωπίνη διάνοια πολυπραγμονοῦσα καὶ διερευνωμένη δι’ ὧν ἂν ᾖ δυνατὸν 
λογισμῶν ἐπορέγεται καὶ θιγγάνει τῆς ἀπροσπελάστου καὶ ὑψηλῆς φύσεως, οὔτε 
τοσοῦτον ὀξυωποῦσα ὡς ἐναργῶς ἰδεῖν τὸ ἀόρατον οὔτε καθάπαξ ἀπεσχοινισμένη 
τῆς προσεγγίσεως ὡς μηδεμίαν δύνασθαι τοῦ ζητουμένου λαβεῖν εἰκασίαν (GNO 
I, 265, 24–266, 2; tr. Hall, p. 89).
674 CE II, 139, 1–4. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν τι τοῦ ζητουμένου διὰ τῆς τῶν λογισμῶν ἐπαφῆς 
ἐστοχάσατο, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι κατιδεῖν τρόπον τινὰ κατενόησεν, οἷόν 
τινα γνῶσιν ἐναργῆ τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν γνῶσιν τὸ ζητούμενον εἶναι ποιησαμένη (GNO 
I, 266, 3–6; tr. Hall, p. 89).
675 CE II, 140, 6–9. ὅτι τὸ παντὸς μὲν κακοῦ πόρρωθεν ἱδρυμένον, ἐν παντὶ δὲ 
νοούμενον ἀγαθῷ πάντως τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον λόγῳ τε ἄρρητον εἶναι καὶ 
λογισμοῖς ἀνεπίβατον (GNO I, 266, 11–14; tr. Hall, p. 89).
676 CE II, 141, 9 (GNO I, 266, 22).
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to Him, so they name rather an absence of an attribute and “the statement 
does not by the words provide information about what is spoken of. What 
it is not, we learn from the sounds; what it is, the meaning of the words used 
does not show.”677 Gregory provides a catalogue of negative statements and 
says that they are true, but they do not tell us what it is (τί δέ ἐστιν) that we 
speak of. However, this is not only the problem of speaking of God, but it 
is the very nature of negative statements that does not allow us to identify 
of what we speak. Similarly, if we multiply negative statements with respect 
to man (not inanimate, not insensible, not winged, not four-footed, and not 
aquatic), it would neither describe what man is. Therefore:
“On exactly the same principle, though many such things are said of the divine 
Nature, by which we learn what we must understand God to be; but what in itself 
it essentially is, the words do not teach us.”678
Due to the weakness of our reason, we are inclined to multiply words to 
discern the nature of God from what it is not, and that it is also the reason 
why the “unbegottenness” cannot be counted as one and true name. The 
very multiplication of negative statements tells us that we still do not have 
a proper name which denotes the substance. Therefore, although they are 
true, negative statements cannot name anything in God.
Since negative names can tell us only what God is not without pointing 
at any real thing, what about positive names? They also cannot name the 
substance of God, but rather His activities:
“…what is named by those who speak of him is not what he actually is, for the 
nature of him who is ineffable; but he gets his titles from the actions he is believed 
to perform for our lives. So in this particular case, the word just used: ‘God’, we 
say, thinking as we give him the title of one who supervises, observes, and with 
his vision penetrates hidden things.”679
677 CE II, 143, 3–5. οὐ μήν τι περὶ οὗ λέγεται διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁ λόγος παρίστησιν. 
τί μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, δι’ ὧν ἠκούσαμεν ἐδιδάχθημεν, τί δέ ἐστιν, ἡ τῶν εἰρημένων 
οὐκ ἐνεδείξατο δύναμις (GNO I, 267, 6–9).
678 CE II, 144, 6–9. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον πολλῶν τοιούτων περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν 
λεγομένων, ἐν οἷς χρὴ τὸν θεὸν ὑπονοεῖν εἶναι μανθάνομεν, αὐτὸ δὲ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι 
κατ’ οὐσίαν διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐ διδασκόμεθα (GNO I, 267, 14–17).
679 CE II, 149, 1–7. ὀνομάζεται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἐπικαλουμένων οὐκ αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν 
(ἄφραστος γὰρ ἡ φύσις τοῦ ὄντος), ἀλλ’ ἐξ ὧν ἐνεργεῖν τι περὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἡμῶν 
πεπίστευται τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει, οἷον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου 
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Even the name “God,” which is the most common one, is presented as 
describing the activity of vision or seeing, and, as it is explained in another 
place, using this name we: “have learnt some partial activity of the divine 
Nature, we have not by this word come to hold in mind the divine Sub-
stance itself.”680
In the passage presented above, one thing is noticeable. For Gregory of 
Nyssa, positive names which refer to activities can be recognized primarily 
by what God does in human life. That is why the activities are so important, 
because they are the testimony of God who is constantly present on the 
way of man to Him. This is no longer a theoretical problem of how can 
we demonstrate the existence or power of God from creation, but rather 
the explanation of His effective presence in spiritual life of every man. And 
Gregory strongly claims that these names are applied not to the concepts 
but to real things. He explains:
“If we cannot first explain what is being said about God before we think it, and if 
we think it by means of what we learn from his actions, and if before the act there 
exists the potency, and the potency depends on the divine will, and the will resides 
in the authority of the divine Nature – does that not make it clear to us that it is 
a matter of applying to the realities the terms we use to indicate what happens, 
and the words are a kind of shadow of the realities, matching the movements of 
things which exist?”681
The chain of things leads from the name of activity to the divine Nature, 
through the activity itself, the power of God, and His will. Therefore, naming 
λεγόμενον· θεὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν λέγοντες τὸν ἔφορον καὶ ἐπόπτην καὶ διορατικὸν τῶν 
κεκρυμμένων νοοῦντες ἐπικαλούμεθα (GNO I, 268, 25–269, 2).
680 CE II, 586, 4–6. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τούτου μερικήν τινα τῆς θείας φύσεως ἐνέργειαν 
διδαχθέντες τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἐν περινοίᾳ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης οὐκ ἐγενόμεθα· 
(GNO I, 397, 19–21; tr. Hall, pp. 191–192). In those fragments, Gregory uses 
the false etymology of name God (θεός) that it comes from the word vision 
(θεάομαι).
681 CE II, 150, 5–13. εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρότερον ἑρμηνεύομέν τι τῶν περὶ θεοῦ λεγομένων, 
πρὶν ἂν νοήσωμεν, νοοῦμεν δὲ δι’ ὧν ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν διδασκόμεθα, προϋφέστηκε 
δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις, ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐξήρτηται τοῦ θείου βουλήματος, τὸ δὲ 
βούλημα ἐν τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τῆς θείας ἀπόκειται φύσεως, ἆρ’ οὐ σαφῶς διδασκόμεθα 
ὅτι ἐπιγίνονται τοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ σημαντικαὶ τῶν γινομένων προσηγορίαι καὶ 
ὥσπερ σκιαὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶν αἱ φωναί, πρὸς τὰς κινήσεις τῶν ὑφεστώτων 
σχηματιζόμεναι; (GNO I, 269, 6–14).
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an activity, we can only name what we have understood of the real activity 
of God, while His substance remains unknown.
Since Contra Eunomium was probably one of the earliest works of Greg-
ory of Nyssa, it seems plausible that during the polemic with the Anomean, 
he constructed a solid conceptual basis for his negative theology. The state-
ment that we can know only the activities of God, not His substance, is the 
crucial one, because thanks to it Gregory could demonstrate not only the 
fact of incomprehensibility of the essence of God, but also that our names 
which we use are the names of real things – His activities, and, therefore, 
Gregory will rely on this distinction throughout his whole theological ca-
reer.682 We can also notice that by his exposition of the nature of negative 
names, Gregory of Nyssa proposes probably the strongest formulation of 
negative theology. He realizes that when we say that God is infinite, incor-
ruptible, unbegotten, etc., our claim is true, but for him, negative statements 
do not name any reality present in God Himself. Since positive names refer 
only to activities, and negative ones refer to nothing that we can conceive, 
our language and comprehension can never reach God in His substance.
682 A full catalogue of passages in which he uses the distinction between energies 
and substance to demonstrate the incomprehensibility of God was made by 
J.-C. Larchet, op. cit., pp. 199–203.
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5.  The Development of Negative Theology in 
the Latter Half of the 4th Century
The reaction to Eunomius’ claims on comprehensibility of the substance of 
God goes much deeper than the responses of Basil and Gregory. Moreover, 
in the latter half of the 4th century, we can observe not only the reaction to 
Eunomius,683 but also a deeper penetration of the field of negative theology 
that would influence Christian theology for good, even when the risk of 
the Neo-Arian heresy disappeared. The main authors, apart from Basil the 
Great and Gregory of Nyssa, who are the most obvious participants in the 
polemic with Eunomius, are Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom. 
Their writings were to a large extent provoked by the Eunomians’ teaching 
and are analysed here in this context. But before we turn to those two im-
portant figures, we must first discuss certain aspects of the negative theology 
of Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa which have not been mentioned 
in the preceding chapters but seem important in order to fully expose the 
extent of negative theology in their writings.
5.1 Basil of Caesarea’s incomprehensibility of οὐσία
The first remark that should be made at the beginning, which is absolutely 
clear in the context of the anti-Eunomian polemic, is the fact that for all 
the participants in the discussion, God is without doubt the οὐσία, and they 
never seriously considered that God could exceed the categories of exist-
ence.684 We should always keep it in mind as the multiplicity of Neoplatonic 
similarities,685 especially pointed out in various studies may obscure this 
obvious truth. It is perfectly obvious for Basil that the substance of God 
is incomprehensible for creatures. We can find many places where Basil 
683 Cf. V. Losski, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Cambridge 1973, 
p. 21.
684 It is still not very clear how does Basil understand οὐσία in Contra Euno-
mium, and in my opinion, further studies should be conducted. Cf. David G. 
Robertson, Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of Caesarea, 
VCh, vol. 52, no. 4 (Nov. 1998), pp. 393–417.
685 Cf. B. Sesbüé, Introduction, in: Contre Eunome, SC 299, p. 9.
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admits the same idea in quite similar words both in Contra Eunomium and 
Homilies in Hexaemeron, so he is consistent at the very beginning as well 
as the end of his writing activity. The two following passages are a very 
good example of this claim:
“I think that comprehension of God’s substance transcends not only human beings, 
but also every rational nature. Now by ‘rational nature’ here, I mean one which 
belongs to creation.”686
“It is to be expected that the very substance of God is incomprehensible to every-
one except the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit.”687
But, as a matter of fact, in his argumentation, Basil goes even further and 
claims that we have no knowledge not only about the substance of God 
but about the substance of the created world as well.688 Although we rec-
ognize creatures and we are encouraged by Basil to contemplate them and 
even admire them and their Creator, the accidents cannot provide us any 
knowledge about the essence:
“In the same way we shall counsel ourselves with regard to the essence of earth 
[the context is an exegesis of Gen 1,1]. We will not meddle about its essence proper 
(ἥτις ποτέ ἐστι), nor waste our thoughts searching for the substrate itself (αὐτὸ τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον), nor try to find some nature devoid of qualities, existing in such a 
way on its own account. For we are well aware that whatever is seen around it 
(περὶ αὐτήν) has been rendered fully by the account of being as completive of the 
essence (συμπληρωτικά τῆς οὐσίας). You arrive at nothing [therefore] if you try to 
take away by reason each of the qualities it possesses. If you take away black, 
686 Con. Eun. I, 14, 1–3. Οἶμαι δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπους μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαν λογικὴν 
φύσιν ὑπερβαίνειν αὐτῆς τὴν κατάληψιν. Λογικὴν δὲ νῦν τὴν ἐν τῇ κτίσει λέγω 
(SC 299, p. 220; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, p. 112).
687 Con. Eun. I, 14, 14–17. Πᾶν γάρ που τὸ ἐναντίον, εἰκὸς αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν 
ἀπερίοπτον εἶναι παντὶ, πλὴν εἰ τῷ Μονογενεῖ καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι· ἐκ δὲ τῶν 
ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀναγομένους ἡμᾶς (SC 299, p. 220; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-
Gallwitz, p. 113).
688 Con. Eun. III, 6, 5–10. Νῦν δὲ μυρία οὐ τῶν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι ἀποκειμένων 
ἡμῖν μόνον, οὔτε τῶν νῦν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ἀποκέκρυπται, ἀλλ’ οὔτε τῶν 
ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι τρανὴ καὶ ἀναντίῤῥητός ἐστιν ἡ κατάληψις (SC 
305, p. 166). “But the truth of the matter is that there are countless things of 
which we do not have clear and incontrovertible knowledge – not only those 
things reserved for us in the age to come and those now hidden in the heavens, 
but also those things that belong to our bodily existence” (tr. DelCogliano/
Radde-Gallwitz, pp. 192–193).
197
cold, depth, density, the qualities associated with taste a substance possesses, or 
any other that may be seen around it, the substrate will be nothing.”689
The impossibility of knowing any substance at all, not only God’s substance, 
is Aristotle’s thesis formulated in book VII of Metaphysics.690 Aristotle pre-
sents the process of abstractions which in the end gives us no knowledge 
about the ousia and states that “it is beyond us to say what else [it] is.”691
The attention that Basil pays to utter incomprehensibility of the essence 
is of course a reaction to Eunomius’ concept of rationality which was ex-
pressed as cognoscibility of God’s essence.692 In order to explain that the 
lack of knowledge about the very substance is not equivalent to complete 
ignorance, in his later writings, Basil says that although we know ourselves, 
even our own substance is out of our reach. We also do not have any knowl-
edge of our own essence, but we still know ourselves:
689 In Hex. I, 8 (SC 26, p. 120; tr. Schaff, p. 230).
690 Cf. Met. VII, 3, 1029 a, 9–26. “The statement itself is obscure, and further, 
on this view, matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it is be-
yond us to say what else is. When all else is taken away evi-dently nothing 
but matter remains. For of the other elements some are affections, products, 
and capacities of bodies, while length, breadth, and depth are quantities and 
not substances. For a quantity is not a substance; but the substance is rather 
that to which these belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth 
are taken away we see nothing left except that which is bounded by these, 
whatever it be; so that to those who consider the question thus matter alone 
must seem to be substance. By matter I mean that which in itself is neither 
a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the 
categories by which being is determined. For there is something of which each 
of these is predicated, so that its being is different from that of each of the 
predicates; for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, 
while substance is predicated of matter. Therefore the ultimate substratum is 
of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise 
positively characterized; nor yet negatively, for negations also will belong to 
it only by accident” (tr. Barnes).
691 Met. 1029 a, 10–11. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὕτη οὐσία, τίς ἐστιν ἄλλη διαφεύγει· (tr. Barnes).
692 Cf. Con. Eun. II, 22, 39–43. ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ταπεινῶν καὶ σαρκικῶν νοημάτων 
ἐν τοῖς περὶ Θεοῦ δόγμασι καθαρεύειν, γέννησιν δὲ τῇ ἁγιωσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀποθείᾳ 
τοῦ Θεοῦ πρέπουσαν ἐννοεῖν· (SC 305, pp. 90–92). “He knows that when it 
is a question of doctrines about God he should purify words of lowly and 
fleshly concepts and think of the begetting that is suitable for the holiness and 
impassibility of God” (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, p. 164).
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“For thus and in this sense I both know and am ignorant even of myself. For I 
know myself, who I am, but I do not know myself, insofar as I am ignorant of 
my substance.”693
Basil introduces here a paradox that will be in fact crucial for the theologi-
cal knowledge. One may know and not know at the same time: καὶ οἶδα 
καὶ ἀγνοῶ.694 In order to correct the Eunomian mistakes, Basil uses nega-
tive theology, but he avoids the error of agnosticism, sees the risks of this 
method, and distances himself from this method when limited only to the 
alpha privativum technique. Basil employed alpha privatives to say what 
God is not, i.e., ἄρρητος - unspoken, ἀιδής - unseen, ἀθάνατος - immortal, 
ἀπαθής - not suffering and so on, but he remarks that even privative forms 
used in the descriptions give us knowledge about what God is not695 and 
what kind of attributes cannot be connected with Him.
Simultaneously, Basil uses natural theology based on contemplation of 
nature696 and positive theology based on the Bible.
“Again, we say that God is ‘good’, ‘Just’, ‘Creator’, ‘Judge’, and all such things. 
So, then, as in the case of the terms we just spoke about which signified a denial 
and rejection of what is foreign to God, so here they indicate the affirmation and 
693 Ep. 235, 2. ̓ Επεὶ καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ οἶδα καὶ ἀγνοῶ. Οἶδα μὲν 
γὰρ ἐμαυτὸν ὅστις εἰμί, οὐκ οἶδα δὲ καθὸ τὴν οὐσίαν μου ἀγνοῶ (Courtonne, vol. 
3, pp. 45–46; tr. LCL 243, p. 381).
694 Cf. Ep. 235, 2 (Courtonne, vol. 3, pp. 45–46).
695 Cf. Con. Eun. I, 9, 34–41. ῾Ως τοίνυν τὸ ἄφθαρτον τὸ μὴ προσεῖναι τῷ Θεῷ 
φθορὰν σημαίνει· καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον τὸ ὑπερβαίνειν αὐτὸν πᾶσαν τὴν διὰ τῶν 
ὀφθαλμῶν κατάληψιν· καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῦ τριχῆ διαστατὴν 
τὴν οὐσίαν· καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον τὸ μηδέποτε διάλυσιν αὐτῷ προσγενήσεσθαι· οὕτω 
φαμὲν καὶ τὸ, ἀγέννητον, δηλοῦν τὸ γέννησιν αὐτῷ μὴ προσεῖναι. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδὲν 
τούτων στερητικὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο (SC 299, pp. 90–92). “Just as ‘in-
corruptible’ signifies that no corruption is present to God, and ‘invisible’ that 
he is beyond every comprehension through the eyes, and ‘incorporeal’ that 
his substance is not three-dimensional, and ‘immortal’ that dissolution will 
never happen to him, so too do we also say that ‘unbegotten’ indicates that no 
begetting is present to him. So, then, if none of the former terms is privative, 
then neither is the latter” (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, pp. 103–104).
696 Cf. In Hex. I, 8 (SC 26, p. 118).
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existence of what has affinity with God and is appropriately considered in con-
nection with him.”697
But what exactly can we know about God? This problem is developed by 
Basil later on, and most probably, it was related to the discussion and at-
tacks of the Eunomians who accused Basil of ignorance.698 We can know 
God’s attributes699 that are common to the divine essence. Because we can 
recognize God from His activities in the created world, we know Him as 
the Creator of the world and the source of all beings. It is God’s will to let 
us gain the knowledge about Him.700 In this process, Christians refer to a 
697 Con. Eun. I, 10, 28–33, Πάλιν, ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ 
δημιουργὸν, καὶ κριτὴν, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ̔ Ως οὖν ἐπ’ ἐκείνων ἀθέτησίν τινα 
καὶ ἀπαγόρευσιν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐσήμαινον αἱ φωναὶ, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα 
θέσιν καὶ ὕπαρξιν τῶν οἰκείων τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πρεπόντως περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρουμένων 
ἀποσημαίνουσιν (SC 299, p. 206; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, pp. 105–
106).
698 Cf. Ep. 234, 2: Therefore, we know that the saying is of mockers: “If you 
are ignorant of the substance of God, you worship what you do not know” 
(Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 43; tr. LCL 243, p. 375).
699 Cf. Ep. 234, 1. Καὶ γὰρ τὴν μεγαλειότητα τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰδέναι λέγομεν καὶ τὴν 
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ᾗ ἐπιμελεῖται ἡμῶν 
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον αὐτοῦ τῆς κρίσεως, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν. ῞Ωστε ἐπηρεαστικὴ 
ἡ ἐρώτησις. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ τὴν οὐσίαν μὴ φάσκων εἰδέναι ὡμολόγησε τὸν Θεὸν μὴ 
ἐπίστασθαι, ἐκ πολλῶν ὧν ἀπηριθμησάμεθα συναγομένης ἡμῖν τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ 
ἐννοίας (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 42). “For instance, we say that we know the 
greatness of God, and His power, and His wisdom, and His goodness, and His 
providence, whereby He cares for us, and the justice of His judgment, not His 
very substance. Therefore the question is captious. Fore he who says that he 
does not know the substance has not confessed that he does not know God, 
since the concept of God is gathered by us form the many attributes which 
we enumerated” (tr. LCL 243, pp. 371–273).
700 Cf. Con. Eun. I, 14, 14–20. Πᾶν γάρ που τὸ ἐναντίον, εἰκὸς αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν 
οὐσίαν ἀπερίοπτον εἶναι παντὶ, πλὴν εἰ τῷ Μονογενεῖ καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι· ἐκ 
δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀναγομένους ἡμᾶς, καὶ διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων τὸν ποιητὴν 
ἐννοοῦντας, τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας λαμβάνειν τὴν σύνεσιν. Τοῦτο 
γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὃ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανέρωσεν (SC 299, 
pp. 220–222). “It is to be expected that the very substance of God is incom-
prehensible to everyone except the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit. But 
we are led up from the activities of God and gain knowledge of the Maker 
through what he has made, and so come in this way to an understanding of 
his goodness and wisdom. For what can be known about God is that which 
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very unique starting point on the way of cognition of the image of God 
in man.701 We do not search God as an abstract idea; we search God who 
reveals Himself in created beings. The divine names reveal His energies 
which descend towards the created world, yet they do not lead man closer 
to His inaccessible essence.
Negative theology in Basil’s thought is inseparably connected with the 
positive and eminent way. His theology is not so mystical as Gregory’s, but 
it is radically opposite to the rationalism of Eunomius.702 Basil reminds his 
readers that the aim of Christian life is not knowledge but salvation. The 
very first step along this way is epistemological humility.
“But I do know that He exists, but what His substance is I consider beyond un-
derstanding. How then am I saved? Through faith. And it is faith enough to know 
that God is, not what He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him. 
Knowledge of His divine substance, then, is the perception of His incomprehen-
sibility; and that is to be worshipped which is comprehended, not as to what its 
substance is, but as to that its substance exists.”703
If we give up the illusory desire to possess the knowledge of God’s essence 
and concentrate on natural theology, which will lead us to the knowledge 
of God’s existence, the next obvious step provoked by our admiration of 
the divine activities in the world will be faith and worship.704 Knowledge, 
God has manifested [Rom 1.19] to all human beings” (tr. DelCogliano/Radde-
Gallwitz, p. 113).
701 Cf. Aghiorgoussis, Image as Sign (Sēmeion) of God, GOThR, 21 (1976), 
p. 21.
702 Cf. B. Sesboüé, Introduction in Basil de Césarée, Contre Eunome, SC 299, 
p. 92.
703 Ep. 234, 2: ̓ Εγὼ δὼ ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν οἶδα, τί δὲ ἡ οὐσία ὑπὲρ διάνοιαν τίθεμαι. Πῶς 
οὖν σώζομαι; Διὰ τῆς πίστεως. Πίστις δὲ αὐτάρκης εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός, οὐχὶ 
τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ἐκζητοῦσιν αὐτόν μισθαποδότης γίνεται. Εἴδησις ἄρα τῆς θείας 
οὐσίας ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας, καὶ σεπτὸν οὐ τὸ καταληφθὲν τίς ἡ 
οὐσία, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 43; tr. LCL 243, p. 375).
704 Cf. Ep. 235, 1. „Εν δὲ τῇ περὶ Θεοῦ πίστει ἡγεῖται μὲν ἡ ἔννοια ἡ περὶ τοῦ ὅτι 
ἐστὶ Θεός, ταύτην δὲ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργημάτων συνάγομεν. Σοφὸν γὰρ καὶ δυνατὸν 
καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀόρατα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κτίσεως νοοῦντες 
ἐπιγινώσκομεν. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ Δεσπότην ἑαυτῶν αὐτὸν καταδεχόμεθα. ̓ Επειδὴ γὰρ 
παντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὸς ὁ Θεός, μέρος δὲ κόσμου ἡμεῖς, καὶ ἡμῶν 
ἄρα δημιουργὸς ὁ Θεός. Ταύτῃ τῇ γνώσει ἡ πίστις ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ τοιαύτῃ πίστει ἡ 
προσκύνησις” (Courtonne, vol. 3, p. 44). “But in faith in God, the notion of 
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faith, and worship constitute for Basil three stages of the relationship with 
God. In this perspective, the discovery of existence of God the Maker is 
the very first step705 to recognize His goodness and wisdom, to discover 
God who reveals His actions in the Holy Bible and the created world. The 
culmination and final aim of this path is to worship God.
But the relationship between faith and knowledge seems to be more 
complex in Basil’s case. In Letter 234, those terms seem to be mixed:
“So worship follows faith, and faith is confirmed by power. But if you say that the 
believer also knows, he knows from what he believes; and vice versa he believes 
from what he knows. We know God from His power. We, therefore, believe in 
Him who is known, and we worship Him who is believed in.”706
In this and other texts, Basil seems to treat knowledge and faith interchange-
ably as two terms referring to cognition. Georgios Martzelos recalls one 
more text and another type of the relationship between εἴδησις and πίστις. 
In Homilia in illud Attende tibi ipsi, faith precedes the knowledge of God. 
As the knowledge of God cannot be achieved by means of sensual organs, 
the existence of God precedes, and this notion we gather from His works. For 
it is by perceiving His wisdom and power and goodness and all His invisible 
qualities as shown in the creation of the universe, that we come to a recogni-
tion of Him. Thus we also accept Him as our Lord. For since God is maker 
of the whole universe, and we are a part of the universe, God is therefore 
our maker also. And faith follows this knowledge, and worship follows such 
faith” (tr. LCL 243, p. 379).
705 Cf. Con. Eun. I, 14, 42–46. Πιστεῦσαι γὰρ δεῖ πρῶτον, ὅτι ἔστι Θεὸς, καὶ τοῖς 
ἐκζητοῦσιν αὐτὸν μισθαποδότης γίνεται. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐξερεύνησις, ἀλλ’ ἡ 
τοῦ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁμολογία τὴν σωτηρίαν ἡμῖν παρασκευάζει (SC 299, pp. 222–224). 
“One must first believe that God exists and that he rewards those who seek 
him [Heb 11.6]. For it is not the investigation of what he is, but rather the 
confession that he is, which prepares salvation for us.” (tr. DelCogliano/
Radde-Gallwitz, p. 113).
706 Ep. 234, 3. Οὕτως ἡ μὲν προσκύνησις τῇ πίστει ἀκολουθεῖ, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπὸ 
δυνάμεως βεβαιοῦται. Εἰ δὲ λέγεις τὸν πιστεύοντα καὶ γινώσκειν, ἀφ’ ὧν πιστεύει 
ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ γινώσκει· ἢ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀφ’ ὧν γινώσκει ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ πιστεύει. 
Γινώσκομεν δὲ ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τὸν Θεόν. Ὥστε πιστεύομεν μὲν τῷ γνωσθέντι, 
προσκυνοῦμεν δὲ τῷ πιστευθέντι (Courtonne, vol. 3, pp. 43–44; tr. LCL 234, 
p. 377).
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but by means of intellect, which is equipped through faith.707 We can see 
that despite the complex relationship708 of those two realities (εἴδησις and 
πίστις), both should be treated as mutually complementary tools on the way 
to knowing God. Basil’s theology leads us to other than rational cognition 
of God. Only in worship do faith and knowledge find their aim and their 
deeper meaning and significance.709 At the very end of Contra Eunomium 
when speaking about the nature of the Holy Spirit, Basil gives us the per-
spective of cognition that is reserved for Christians whom he encourages:
“to be convinced that experience and exact comprehension of him is reserved 
for us in the subsequent age, when, passing beyond the vision of the truth that 
comes dimly in a mirror, we will be deemed worthy of contemplating face to face 
[1 Cor 13:12].”710
707 Cf. G. Martzelos, The Significance of the Distinction between the Essence and 
Energies of God according to St. Basil the Great, p. 155; Basil, Homilia in il-
lud Attende tibi ipsi. Ἀσώματον ἐννόει τὸν θεὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης σοι ψυχῆς 
ἀσωμάτου, μὴ περιγραφόμενον τόπῳ· ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲ ὁ σὸς νοῦς προηγουμένην ἔχει 
τὴν ἐν τόπῳ διατριβήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συναφείας ἐν τόπῳ γίνεται. 
Ἀόρατον τὸν θεὸν εἶναι πίστευε, τὴν σεαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἐννοήσας, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ 
σωματικοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἄληπτός ἐστιν. Οὔτε γὰρ κέχρωσται, οὔτε ἐσχημάτισται, 
οὔτε τινὶ χαρακτῆρι σωματικῷ περιείληπται, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν γνωρίζεται 
μόνον. Ὥστε μήτε ἐπὶ θεοῦ ζητήσῃς τὴν δι’ ὀφθαλμῶν κατανόησιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ 
ἐπιτρέψας τὴν πίστιν, νοητὴν ἔχε περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν κατάληψιν (PG 31, 216 A).
708 Cf. also Con. Eun. I, 7, 19–23. καὶ ὡς τῇ λαμπρότητι τῆς γνώσεως τοὺς 
κεκαθαρμένους τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς καταυγάζων· ἄμπελον δὲ, ὡς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ 
κατὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐῤῥιζωμένους ἐπ’ ἔργων ἀγαθῶν καρποφορίαις ἐκτρέφων· (SC 
299, pp. 222–224). “He also calls himself this because he illuminates those 
who have purified the eye of their soul with the splendor of his knowledge. 
He calls himself ‘vine’ because he nurtures those who have been planted in 
him by faith so that they may bear the fruits of good works” (tr. DelCogliano/
Radde-Gallwitz, p. 99).
709 Cf. G. Martzelos, op. cit., p. 156; Cf. Basil Ep. 234 and 235 (Courtonne, vol. 
3, pp. 41–47).
710 Con. Eun. 3,7, 38–40. Εὐσεβοῦς γάρ ἐστι διανοίας τὰ ἀποσιωπηθέντα ἐν ταῖς 
ἁγίαις Γραφαῖς εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐπιφημίζειν τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, πεπεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν 
ἐμπειρίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκριβῆ κατάληψιν εἰς τὸν ὕστερον ἡμῖν ἀποκεῖσθαι αἰῶνα, 
ὅταν, διαβάντες τὸ δι’ ἐσόπτρου καὶ αἰνίγματος ὁρᾷντὴν ἀλήθειαν, τῆς πρὸς 
πρόσωπον θεωρίας ἀξιωθῶμεν (SC 305, p. 174; tr. DelCogliano/Radde-Gallwitz, 
p. 196).
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5.2  Negative theology and mystical experience  
in Gregory of Nyssa
In Contra Eunomium, Gregory of Nyssa refers to Basil as his teacher on 
the incomprehensibility of God.711 So, if it is not only a rhetorical figure, 
he thinks of himself as the continuator of his brother’s theology also in the 
field of negative theology, and, therefore, Basil’s thought seems to be one of 
the factors which pushed Gregory to develop further negative speaking of 
God. But before we look more closely at the negative theology of Gregory 
of Nyssa, especially in its mystical dimension, it is worth making some 
remarks on negative language in general.
It must be pointed out that although Gregory constantly underlines the 
ineffability of God’s essence, he never denies the possibility of speaking 
about God.712 We have observed in the preceding chapter that he makes 
an effort to secure the position that names which we multiply indeed say 
something about God, and our naming Him is not pointless. A good ex-
ample of this is his discussion of the descriptive character of the lack of 
properties. Although Gregory of Nyssa strongly criticizes Eunomius as re-
gards the positive meaning of the name “Unbegotten,” he very often uses 
negation (στέρησις) to define some properties or even entities. Among those, 
we find darkness, ignorance, and evil. C. Stead argues that Gregory is not 
systematic, and, therefore, many problems arise with respect to his use of 
negation. Most of all, he does not express how negation is related to other 
categorical terms.713 It can be seen when Gregory considers the problem of 
what knowledge and ignorance are (ἡ γνῶσις καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια). This is important 
for him since he constantly repeats that living in God is the life of the soul, 
and this life is to know God. On the contrary, the lack of knowing God 
is the alienation from Him and evil. A very significant example of this is 
a fragment of On Infants’ Early Deaths.714 Knowledge and ignorance can 
711 Cf. CE II, 138, 1–11 (GNO I, 265, 24–266, 2).
712 Cf. G. Maspero, Trinity and Man, op. cit., p. 31.
713 Cf. C. Stead, Ontologie und Terimniologie bei Gregor von Nyssa, in: Gregor 
von Nyssa und die Philosophie, ed. H. Dörie, M. Altenburger, U. Schramm, 
Leiden 1976, p. 114.
714 Inf. (GNO III/2, 80, 25–81, 22).
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be both counted as relations (τὸ πρός τί), and, therefore, they cannot be 
understood as substances, but they also cannot be seen as equal:
“If, then, knowledge is not a substance, but a perfected operation of the soul, it 
must be conceded that ignorance must be much farther removed still from any-
thing in the way of substance; but that which is not in that way does not exist at 
all; and so it would be useless to trouble ourselves about where it comes from.”715
Although ignorance must somehow exist in the subject because it is a re-
lation, Gregory is not sure how to describe its ontological status. It must 
exist, but it has no existence (ὕπαρξις) of its own, since it is the “negation 
of the operation of knowing.” (γνῶσιν ἐνεργείας ἀναίρεσις).716 Therefore, 
in the case of the soul, a negative attribute refers to some kind of reality, 
whereas in the case of God, it merely states the absence or inconvenience 
of something which is denied of Him in a negative statement.717
This fragment is significant because, although Gregory does not use the 
term στέρησις, it shows the same problems which we have seen in Aetius and 
Eunomius who wanted to convince their opponents that “unbegotten” is 
not a negative predicate. But we can certainly see here an attempt to define 
the ontological status of a feature which can be characterized in a negative 
way, and this discussion very much resembles Aristotle’s statements on 
blindness as the negation of the operation of seeing.718 The case of igno-
rance is then a good example of how Gregory treats philosophical sources. 
Although he often expresses his disapproval of philosophy, especially in the 
715 Inf. (GNO III/2, 80, 16–20). εἰ οὖν ἡ γνῶσις οὐσία οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ περί τι τῆς 
διανοίας ἐνέργεια, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ ἄγνοια πόρρω τοῦ κατ’ οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡμολόγηται. 
τὸ δὲ μὴ κατ’ οὐσίαν ὂν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως. μάταιον τοίνυν ἂν εἴη περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος 
τὸ ὅθεν ἐστὶ περιεργάζεσθαι (tr. NPNF II, vol. 5, p. 36).
716 Inf. (GNO III/2, 80, 23–24).
717 Cf. CE II, 143, 3–5. οὐ μήν τι περὶ οὗ λέγεται διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁ λόγος 
παρίστησιν. τί μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, δι’ ὧν ἠκούσαμεν ἐδιδάχθημεν, τί δέ ἐστιν, ἡ 
τῶν εἰρημένων οὐκ ἐνεδείξατο δύναμις (GNO I, 267, 6–9).
718 Top. I, 106b, 13–20. Aristotle discusses in this passage the contradictory op-
posites saying that the lack of seeing could have two meanings. If somebody 
does not possess the power of seeing, it is the privation of the power, but in 
case of having this power, it is simply the privation of the activity (ἐνεργέια) 
of seeing.
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context of the discussion with Eunomius, he does not refrain from using 
philosophy when it serves his theological purposes.719
The passage presented above contains yet another characteristic feature 
of Gregory’s negative theology. It is almost always presented in the context 
of having a life in God or even more often as part of a mystical doctrine. 
Although the discussion with Eunomius would seem to direct the issue to 
purely doctrinal and theoretical considerations, incomprehensibility of God 
is the fundament for understanding the path to man’s unity with God. As 
we saw above, even considering the name “God,” Gregory talks about it 
as describing the activities which He performs in the human soul. This is 
significant because in the majority of his works, the passages on the ineffa-
bility of God constitute a starting point to the discussion of His activities.720 
So the problem of the incomprehensible substance of God and the personal 
dimension of the work of His activities are intrinsically linked.
When characterizing the mystical doctrine of Gregory of Nyssa, A. Louth 
points out that the most important feature of his teaching is a radical divi-
sion between the Creator and creations. This gap is so deep that it leads 
Gregory to the denial of the possibility of ecstasy.721 I would argue that not 
only the radical doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was the cause of such claims, 
but also the teaching of the role of the Divine activities devised during the 
discussion with Eunomius led Gregory to such conviction.
Usually the path to God is divided into three stages,722 and at each of 
these stages, we can find elements of negative theology, because the most 
important aspect of each is to remove false conceptions of God. Gregory 
describes it his commentary on the Song of Songs, when he talks about the 
719 Cf. C. Stead, Ontologie und Terimniologie bei Gregor von Nyssa, op. cit., 
p. 107. He also notes that on one hand Gregory’s philosophical conceptions 
are original and forceful, but on the other, they “are confused by his habit of 
citing received philosophical opinions at second hand, without criticizing the 
term in which they are framed” (p. 117).
720 Cf. G. Maspero, Trinity and Man, op. cit., p. 31.
721 Cf. A. Louth, The Origins…, op. cit., p. 79.
722 Gregory follows Origen in describing the spiritual growth by the correspond-
ing books of the Holy Scripture: infancy with Proverbs, youth with Ecclesias-
tes, and maturity with the Song of Songs. But those three stages can be also 
characterized as light, cloud, and darkness, cf. A. Louth, op. cit. pp. 80–81.
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ascent of Moses. The first transition which must take place is from dark-
ness to light: “…the first withdrawal from false and erroneous notions 
about God takes the form of a transition from darkness to light.”723 But 
in this context, what is called darkness means the false notions which we 
can obtain from the sensual world. From this point, the vision of the soul 
and its knowledge only becomes more and more accustomed to darkness:
“More attentive apprehension of hidden realities, which leads the soul 
to the invisible realm by way of what appears, is like a cloud that casts a 
shadow on everything that appears but yet induces and accustoms the soul 
to look upon what is hidden. But the soul that has made its way through 
these stages to higher things, having left behind whatever is accessible to 
human nature, enters within the innermost shrine of the knowledge of God 
and is entirely seized about by the divine darkness; and in this darkness, 
since everything that appears and is comprehended has been left outside, 
only the invisible and the incomprehensible remain for the soul’s contempla-
tion – and in them God is, just as the Word says concerning the Lawgiver: 
‘Moses entered into the darkness where God was’ (Exod 20:21).”724
Getting closer to the mystery of God means leaving behind everything 
that is “accessible to human nature.” Therefore, we can say that the knowl-
edge which man has of God from His activities must be abandoned at this 
stage. In a similar passage from The life of Moses, Gregory explains that 
the ascent of Moses teaches us that the soul must leave behind not only 
what the senses observe, but also the notions of intellect:
723 In Cant. XI ἡ πρώτη ἀπὸ τῶν ψευδῶν καὶ πεπλανημένων περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεων 
ἀναχώρησις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ σκότους εἰς φῶς ἐστι μετάστασις (text and tr. Norris, 
pp. 340, 1–2).
724 In Cant. XI, ἡ δὲ προσεχεστέρα τῶν κρυπτῶν κατανόησις ἡ διὰ τῶν φαινομένων 
χειραγωγοῦσα τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀόρατον φύσιν οἷόν τις νεφέλη γίνεται τὸ 
φαινόμενον μὲν ἅπαν ἐπισκιάζουσα πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρύφιον | βλέπειν τὴν ψυχὴν 
χειραγωγοῦσα καὶ συνεθίζουσα, ἡ δὲ διὰ τούτων ὁδεύουσα πρὸς τὰ ἄνω ψυχή, ὅσον 
ἐφικτόν ἐστι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει καταλιποῦσα, ἐντὸς τῶν ἀδύτων τῆς θεογνωσίας 
γίνεται τῷ θείῳ γνόφῳ πανταχόθεν διαληφθεῖσα, ἐν ᾧ τοῦ φαινομένου τε καὶ 
καταλαμβανομένου παντὸς ἔξω καταλειφθέντος μόνον ὑπολείπεται τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῆς 
ψυχῆς τὸ ἀόρατόν τε καὶ ἀκατάληπτον, ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ὁ θεός, καθώς φησι περὶ τοῦ 
νομοθέτου ὁ λόγος ὅτι Εἰσῆλθε δὲ Μωϋσῆς εἰς τὸν γνόφον οὗ ἦν ὁ θεός (Norris, 
pp. 340, 2–12).
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“For leaving behind everything that is observed, not only what sense comprehends 
but also what the intelligence thinks it sees, it keeps on penetrating deeper until 
by the intelligence’s yearning for understanding it gains access to the invisible and 
the incomprehensible, and there it sees God. This is the true knowledge of what is 
sought; this is the seeing that consists in not seeing, because that which is sought 
transcends all knowledge, being separated on all sides by incomprehensibility as 
by a kind of darkness.”725
Since even an intellectual notion must be rejected then, there is no concept 
which can truly refer to God. Also contemplation is for Gregory only a 
necessary stage of knowledge, which corresponds to the way of the cloud, 
whereas the ultimate knowledge is the “non-seeing.”726 Therefore, this doc-
trine differs not only from Plato, but also from Origen and Evagrius.727 But 
it is worth asking whether one can find any answer in Gregory on how to 
understand this kind of knowledge above knowledge or seeing without 
seeing. We can find a very interesting attempt to explain this kind of seeing 
God in the Homilies on Beatitudes. At the beginning, Gregory notices the 
profound problem of the ambiguity which can be found in the Holy Scrip-
ture. The sixth beatitude promises seeing God to those of the pure heart 
(Mt 5:8), but simultaneously, there are passages which deny such a possi-
bility. Gregory quotes the Gospel of John (1:18), the first letter to Timothy 
(6:16) and once again returns to the figure of Moses.728 This contradiction 
goes even further because when Moses says that no one can see God and 
stay alive (Ex 22:20): “Nevertheless life eternal is to see God, and this is 
ruled impossible by the pillars of the faith, John and Paul and Moses.”729 
Gregory then once again points out the intrinsic relationship of having the 
725 De Vita Moysis II, 163, 1–8. Καταλιπὼν γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον, οὐ μόνον ὅσα 
καταλαμβάνει ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα ἡ διάνοια δοκεῖ βλέπειν, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ 
ἐνδότερον ἵεται, ἕως ἂν διαδύῃ τῇ πολυπραγμοσύνῃ τῆς διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἀθέατόν 
τε καὶ ἀκατάληπτον κἀκεῖ τὸν Θεὸν ἴδῃ. ̓ Εν τούτῳ γὰρ ἡ ἀληθής ἐστιν εἴδησις τοῦ 
ζητουμένου καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ὑπέρκειται πάσης εἰδήσεως 
τὸ ζητούμενον, οἷόν τινι γνόφῳ τῇ ἀκαταληψίᾳ πανταχόθεν διειλημμένον (SC 1, 
pp. 210–212; tr. Malherbe/Ferguson, p. 94).
726 Cf. N. Russell, The doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 
Oxford 2004, p. 231.
727 Cf. A. Louth, op. cit., p. 83.
728 De Beat. VI, 1 (GNO, VII/2, 137, 13–20).
729 De Beat. VI, 1 (GNO, VII/2, 137, 23–24; tr. Hall, p. 66).
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knowledge of God and participating in His life. Therefore, seeing God is 
necessary not only because man is constantly longing to see Him, but also 
because otherwise there is no possibility for the soul to have the unending 
life and to possess God since in the biblical meaning “to see” means “to 
possess.”730 Since Moses and Paul deny the possibility to see God:
“then it would appear that what is proposed by the Word in the present Beatitude 
is an impossibility. What good is it to us to know how God is seen, if the possibility 
of it is not also given to our understanding.”731
Therefore, the Lord demands something which is beyond our nature, and 
to answer this dilemma, Gregory first turns to his doctrine of divine activi-
ties. While: “what the divine nature might be in and of itself transcends 
all conceptual comprehension, being inaccessible and unapproachable to 
speculative thoughts,”732 there are other means to see and comprehend 
this nature.733 We can somehow see the artificer through the beauty of his 
works, but this is rather the apprehension of the skill and craftsmanship of 
the Maker, not his very nature. Therefore: “He who is by nature invisible 
becomes visible in his operations (ἐνεργείαις), being seen in certain cases by 
the properties he possesses.”734
Although the problem seems to be resolved, Gregory does not stop here 
because he realizes that the beatitude promises the real seeing of God, not 
only His activities, so there must be something more that was promised 
in the beatitude, because “the Lord does not say that knowing something 
about God is blessed, but to possess God in oneself.”735 But what does it 
mean to possess God? For Gregory, this means that if the heart of a man 
730 De Beat. VI, 2 (GNO, VII/2, 137, 10–14).
731 De Beat. VI, 2. ἀδύνατον ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τὸ τῷ μακαρισμῷ νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου 
προκείμενον. τί οὖν ἡμῖν τὸ κέρδος ἐκ τοῦ γνῶναι πῶς ὁ θεὸς ὁρᾶται, εἰ τὸ δυνατὸν 
τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ μὴ πρόσεστιν (GNO, VII/2, 139, 3–6; tr. Hall, p. 67).
732 De Beat. VI, 3 ῾Η θεία φύσις αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ὅ τι ποτὲ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐστὶ, πάσης 
ὑπέρκειται καταληπτικῆς ἐπινοίας, ἀπρόσιτος καὶ ἀπροσπέλαστος οὖσα ταῖς 
στοχαστικαῖς ἐπινοίαις (GNO, VII/2, 140, 15–17; tr. Hall, p. 68).
733 De Beat. VI, 3 (GNO, VII/2, 141, 1–3).
734 De Beat. VI, 3 ῾Ο γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀόρατος, ὁρατὸς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις	γίνεται, ἔν τισι 
τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν καθορώμενος (GNO, VII/2, 141, 25–27; tr. Hall, p. 69).
735 De Beat. VI, 4. ὅτι οὐ τὸ γνῶναί τι περὶ θεοῦ μακάριον ὁ κύριος εἶναί φησιν· ἀλλὰ 
τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ σχεῖν τὸν θεόν (GNO, VII/2, 137, 13–15; tr. Hall, pp. 69–70).
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is pure, the soul can hold the image of God and can see God in this image. 
Thus, the Word in his blessing seems to comfort the soul longing for God 
by saying:
“You men who have some longing for the vision of what is really good, when you 
hear that the divine majesty is exalted above the heavens, its glory inexplicable, its 
beauty ineffable, its nature inaccessible, do not fall into despair of being able to 
see what you desire. The measure of what is accessible to you is in you, for thus 
your Maker from the start invested your essential nature with such good. God has 
imprinted upon your constitution replicas of the good things in his own nature, 
as though stamping wax with the shape of a design.”736
Despite all negative statements of the impossibility of any comprehension 
of the substance of God, Gregory seems to find a positive aspect of our 
knowledge. Although man is constantly longing for God, always desiring 
to know God, whom he could not know,737 Gregory seems to admit that 
seeing God in the image is real, but this is only the participation in God, 
while His substance in itself remains incomprehensible. As A. Louth points 
out, this is not an alternate way of seeing God different to seeing in a cloud, 
but it is rather the positive side of the same experience.738
Therefore, we can say that what Gregory’s claims about seeing God 
shows best the unity of his doctrine. We can constantly see his struggle to 
preserve absolute incomprehensibility of God, whose nature can be known 
only in His activities, but at the same time, he always wants to convince his 
readers that such statements do not make God inaccessible to man. There-
fore, in his mystical doctrine, he speaks about the real vision of invisible 
and incomprehensible God present in the soul of man, thanks to his image.
736 De Beat. VI, 4. ῏Ω ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοις ἐστί τις ἐπιθυμία τῆς τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ 
θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ἀκούσητε ὑπὲρ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἐπῆρθαι τὴν θείαν μεγαλοπρέπειαν, 
καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῆς ἀνερμήνευτον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἄφραστον, καὶ τὴν φύσιν 
ἀχώρητον· μὴ ἐκπίπτετε εἰς ἀνελπιστίαν τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι κατιδεῖν τὸ ποθούμενον. 
τὸ γάρ σοι χωρητὸν, τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ κατανοήσεως μέτρον ἐν σοί ἐστιν, οὕτω τοῦ 
πλάσαντός σε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εὐθὺς τῇ φύσει κατουσιώσαντος. τῶν γὰρ τῆς 
ἰδίας φύσεως ἀγαθῶν ὁ θεὸς ἐνετύπωσε τῇ σῇ κατασκευῇ τὰ μιμήματα, οἷόν τινα 
κηρὸν σχήματι γλυφῆς προτυπώσας (GNO, VII/2, 142, 24–143, 9; tr. Hall, 
p. 70).
737 This is the famous doctrine of Gregory which J. Daniélou calls epektasis, cf. 
Platonisme et Théologie Mystique, Paris 1944, pp. 309–326.
738 Cf. A. Louth, op. cit., p. 89.
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5.3 Unknown God of Gregory of Nazianzus
The complex teaching about God’s cognoscibility can be found in Grego-
ry’s orations, among which the most famous are the so-called Theological 
Orations.739 They are also important for us since they were a response to 
the Neo-Arian teaching. As we are informed, Eunomians were present in 
Constantinople and they were a real problem for the community and their 
bishop.740 The Theological Orations constitute an attempt to deal with 
theological controversies, including God’s cognoscibility. But in order to 
present complete Gregory’s teaching on the human knowledge about God, 
we should also take in consideration other orations, in particular Oration 
20 (On Theology, and the Appointment of Bishops), Oration 38 (On the 
nativity of Christ), and Oration 40 (On Baptism), as well as Oration 45 
(On Holy Pascha).
Gregory confronts Eunomius on several levels, and some of his argu-
ments are directly while others – indirectly addressed to them. We find in 
Gregory’s teaching the same elements as in his predecessors, the statements 
in common with Basil and Gregory of Nyssa that we know that God exists 
but we do not know anything about His οὐσία.
“No man has yet breathed all the air, no mind has yet contained or language 
embraced God’s essence in its fullness”741
It is obvious that we cannot comprehend what is the very nature of God if 
we cannot understand even our own nature and the nature of the created 
world. Gregory calls for some moderation in the striving at full compre-
hension. Not to acknowledge the limits of our reason is, he says, “to be 
739 Cf. Or. 27–31 (PG 36, 12–172).
740 Cf. Or. 27, 1 (PG 36, 12 A). “There are people, believe me, who not only 
have ‘itching ears;’ their tongues, also and now, I see, even their hands itch 
and attack my arguments” (Wickham/Williams, p. 218) Or. 20, 10 (PG 35, 
1077 A). “All of this is what our abusers argue; all of this belongs to those 
who rashly attack everything we say.” and “I am constantly repeating the 
same argument, since I fear for the crude and material style of your thought” 
(tr. B.E. Daley, Gregory of Nazianzus, New York 2006, p. 103).
741 Or. 30, 17 (PG 36, 126 C; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 274).
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fetched in an abyss of nonsense with no halting place.”742 Natural theology 
is limited to a discovery of God’s existence from the beauty and order of 
visible things.743
After a long description of various problems that we are not able to re-
solve, Gregory ascertains that “if you do not fully grasp these things, of 
which your own sense faculties are witnesses, how do you suppose you can 
know with accuracy what and how great God is? This is really a lot of 
foolishness!”744 Neither our mind nor language can grasp God’s οὐσία.745 For 
Gregory of Nazianzus, God’s essence is unknowable not only to an ordinary 
man but also to biblical heroes such as Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Jacob, Elijah, 
and Peter.746 According to F. Norris, the assertion that the divine nature is 
incomprehensible is the most often repeated one in Theological Orations.747
Gregory points out that if we do not know visible things, the invisible 
ones are even more above our range. In Gregory’s teaching, we observe the 
antinomy between what is sensual and spiritual even more clearly than in 
Basil.748 It is our bodily existence that makes a contact with God difficult.
742 Or. 28. 8 (PG, 36, 36 B; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 228). Cf. also C.A. Beeley, 
Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God. In Your 
Light We Shall See Light, Oxford 2008, p. 111.
743 Cf. Or. 28, 13 (PG 36, 41 C-43 A).
744 Or. 20, 11 (PG 35, 1080 A; tr. Daley, p. 104).
745 Cf. Or. 30, 17 (PG, 36, 125 B). “Our starting-point must be the fact that the 
God cannot be named. Not only will deductive arguments prove it, but the 
wisest Hebrews of antiquity, so far as can be gathered, will too. The ancient 
Hebrews used special symbols to venerate the divine and did not allow any-
thing inferior to God to be written with the same letters as the word ‘God’ on 
the ground that the divine should not be put on even this much of a level with 
things human” (tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 274). Or. 30, 17 (PG, 36, 125 B-C). 
“No man has yet breathed all the air; no mind has yet contained or language 
embraced God’s essence in its fullness. No, we use facts connected with him 
to outline qualities which correspond with him, collecting a faint and feeble 
mental image from various quarters” (tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 274).
746 Cf. Or. 28, 17–20 (PG 36, 48 C-53 A).
747 Cf. F. Norris, Introduction [in:] Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning. The Five 
Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianz. intr. and com. F.W. Norris, tr. 
L. Wickham, F. Williams, Leiden 1991, p. 40.
748 Or. 37, 11 (PG 36, 296 B). Ἡ σὰρξ τῷ κόσμῳ προσέδησεν, ἀλλ’ ὁ λογισμὸς πρὸς 
Θεὸν ἀνήγαγεν· ἡ σὰρξ ἐβάρησεν, ἀλλ’ ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπτέρωσεν·ἡ σὰρξ ἔδησεν, ἀλλ’ 
ὁ πόθος ἔλυσεν.
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“That may be the reason this corporeal gloom stands barrier between us and God 
like the cloud of the time between Hebrews and Egyptians, being, it may be, too, 
the ‘darkness which he made his hiding place, meaning our grossness, through 
which few but briefly peer.’”749
According to J. Pelikan, accepting those limitations of human reason, func-
tioning within them, and not allowing the reach of reason to exceed its 
grasp is not a sacrifice of the intellect, nor an abdication of the rational 
philosophical activity.750 Gregory in various places mentions the reasons 
of God’s incomprehensibility. According to Beeley, for Gregory, the in-
comprehensibility of God is the necessary result of the infinitude of God’s 
being and the finitude of creaturely existence, including human thought.751
“God is the most beautiful and exalted of the things that exist (τῶν ὄντων) – unless 
one prefers to think of him as transcending being (ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν), or to place 
the sum total of existence (τὸ εἶνα) in him, from whom it also flows to others.”752
In his discourse of divine incomprehensibility, he compares the greatness 
and magnitude of God the Creator to a theologian’s ability to know him.753 
Via eminentiae seems to be a necessary complement of negative and posi-
tive ways of speaking about God. Therefore, He not only surpasses all 
things in magnitude and greatness, but He is the “supreme nature” (φύσις 
ἀνωτάτω).754 So God is not only supremely great and beautiful but He is 
even more supreme to the category of greatness and other categories, as 
well as time and space.755 In Oratio 28, Gregory preaches that God’s nature 
is not simply “greater” than our ability to understand, or even “above 
749 Or. 28, 12 (PG 36, 41 B). διὰ τοῦτο μέσος ἡμῶν τε καὶ θεοῦ ὁ σωματικὸς οὗτος 
ἵσταται γνόφος, ὥσπερ ἡ νεφέλη τὸ πάλαι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων καὶ τῶν Ἑβραίων. καὶ 
τοῦτό ἐστιν ἴσως, ὃ ἔθετο σκότος ἀποκρυφὴν αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἡμετέραν παχύτητα, δι’ 
ἣν ὀλίγοι καὶ μικρὸν διακύπτουσιν (tr. Wickham/Williams, pp. 230–231).
750 Cf. J. Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of 
Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism, London 1993, 
p. 50.
751 Cf. C.A. Beeley, op. cit., p. 94.
752 Or. 6, 12 (PG 35, 737 B). ὅτι κάλλιστον μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑψηλότατον Θεὸς, 
εἰ μὴ τῷ φίλον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ἄγειν αὐτὸν, ἢ ὅλον ἐν αὐτῷ τιθέναι τὸ εἶναι, 
παρ’ οὗ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις (tr. Beeley, op. cit. p. 95).
753 Cf. C.A. Beeley, op. cit., p. 94.
754 Cf. Or. 31, 10 (PG 36, 144 B).
755 Cf. C.A. Beeley, op. cit. p. 95.
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all things” (ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα), in the sense of being superior to them on their 
own terms, but He is “first and unique” (πρώτης καὶ μόνης) in an absolute 
sense,756 and in Oratio 25, God’s existence is presented as a kind radically 
different from our own.757
In his polemic with Eunomians, Gregory first of all put points that not 
everybody can be called a theologian and dispute about divine matters.758 
He begins Theological Orations with a presentation of his theological 
method. As an answer to the theories produced by Eunomians,759 Gregory 
points to the Orthodox theology and reminds its fundamental conditions.
“Discussion of theology is not for everyone, I tell you, not for everyone – it is 
no such inexpensive or effortless pursuit. (…) It is not for all men, but only for 
those who have been tested and have found a sound footing in study, and more 
importantly, have undergone, or at the very least are undergoing, purification of 
body and soul.”760
The idea that the knowledge of God is closely related to morality was 
rather absent in the Eunomian doctrine but was constantly present from 
the beginnings of a philosophical inquiry.761 Here, not only unknowability 
of God, which is clearly the essence of the dispute, distinguishes the Ortho-
dox from heretics, but also an inseparable connection between the practice 
and the possibility of practising theology. Gregory bases the necessity of 
transformation and detachment from mundane matters directly on Platonic 
assumptions that the similar clings to the similar. In Oration 20, Gregory 
encourages the faithful:
756 Cf. Or. 28, 31 (PG 36, 72; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 244).
757 Cf. Or 25, 17 (PG 35, 1224 A).
758 Cf. Or. 27, 3 (PG 35, 1224 A).
759 Cf. Or. 20, 1. “When I see the endless talkativeness that haunts us today, the 
instant sages and designated theologians, for whom simply willing to be wise 
is enough to make them so, I long for the philosophy that comes from above; 
I yearn for that ‘final lodging,’ to use Jeremiah’s phrase, and I want only to 
be off by myself” (PG 35, 1065 A-B; tr. Daley, p. 98).
760 Or. 27, 3 Οὐ παντός, ὦ οὗτοι, τὸ περὶ θεοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, οὐ παντός· οὐχ οὕτω 
τὸ πρᾶγμα εὔωνον καὶ τῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων. προσθήσω δέ, οὐδὲ πάντοτε, οὐδὲ 
πᾶσιν, οὐδὲ πάντα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὅτε, καὶ οἷς, καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσον. οὐ πάντων μέν, ὅτι τῶν 
ἐξητασμένων καὶ διαβεβηκότων ἐν θεωρίᾳ, καὶ πρὸ τούτων καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα 
κεκαθαρμένων (PG 36, 14 D-16 A; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 218).
761 We can see it already in Letter VII of Plato (Ep. VII 326 B-C).
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“Approach it by the way you live: what is pure can only be acquired through 
purification. Do you want to become a theologian someday, to be worthy of the 
divinity? Keep the commandments, make your way forward through observing the 
precepts (τὰς ἐντολὰς φύλασσε): for the practical life (πρᾶξις) is the launching-pad 
for contemplation (θεωρία).”762
As Jean Plagnieux observes, it is impossible to separate Gregory’s doctrine 
of God from his doctrine of the means by which God is known.763 The con-
cept that what is unclean cannot be unified with what is pure is constantly 
repeated in Gregory’s orations:764
“For one who is not pure to lay hold of pure things is dangerous, just as it is for 
weak eyes to look at the sun’s brightness.”765
“Therefore, the first requirement is to purify oneself, then to associate oneself with 
the One who is pure.”766
As in many other cases, it is a good example how biblical and philosophical 
influences intermingle in an author’s work without the possibility to identify 
the exact source of direct inspiration. Both in pagan as well as Christian 
philosophy, there is a common idea of purification which leads to theosis.767 
Just to point one though crucial passage of the sixth blessing which was so 
762 Or. 20, 12. Διὰ πολιτείας, ἄνελθε· διὰ καθάρσεως, κτῆσαι τὸ καθαρόν. Βούλει 
θεολόγος γενέσθαι ποτὲ, καὶ τῆς θεότητος ἄξιος; τὰς ἐντολὰς φύλασσε· διὰ τῶν 
προσταγμάτων ὅδευσον· πρᾶξις γὰρ ἐπίβασις θεωρίας· ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ 
φιλοπόνησον (PG 35, 1080 B; tr. Daley, p. 104).
763 Cf. J. Plagnieux, Saint Grégoire de Nazianze théologien, Paris 1952, p. 109.
764 Cf. Ch. A. Beeley, p. 66. The most important studies of Gregory’s doctrine 
of purification are: H. Pinault, Le platonisme de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze: 
Essai sur les relations du christianisme et de l’hellénisme dans son oeuvre 
théologique, Paris 1925; J. Plagnieux, Saint Grégoire de Nazianze théologien, 
Paris 1952 and C. Moreschini, Luce e purificazione nella dottrina di Gregorio 
Nazianzeno, Augustinianum, vol. 13, no. 3 (Dec. 1973), pp. 535–549; T. Spid-
lik, Gregoire de Nazianze. Introduction a I’ etude de sa doctrine spirituelle, 
Rome 1971.
765 Or. 27, 3 (PG 36, 16 A). μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ ἅπτεσθαι καθαροῦ τυχὸν οὐδὲ ἀσφαλές, 
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὄψει σαθρᾷ ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος (tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 218).
766 Or. 20, 4 (PG 35, 1069). Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καθαρτέον ἑαυτὸν πρῶτον, εἶτα τῷ 
καθαρῷ προσομιλητέον (tr. Daley, p. 100). And nearly exactly in the same 
words in Or. 39, 9 (PG 36, 344 B; tr. Daley, p. 131) and similar Or. 2. 39, 
71; 17. 12; 18. 3; 30. 20).
767 Cf. H. Pinault, op. cit., p. 113.
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important for Gregory of Nyssa: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will 
see God” (Mt 5.8).768 We can find similar assumptions in Plato’s Phaedo: 
“it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.”769 As Beeley notes, Plato’s 
doctrine of purification became widely influential in later Hellenistic tradi-
tions, and Plotinus,770 whom Gregory with much probability read, strove 
to popularize the modified Platonic doctrine of purification.771
Gregory also describes the means of purification which are first of all 
mindfulness of God (μεμνῆσθαι θεοῦ), meditation, and worship.772 After 
purification comes illumination which precedes a mystical union. Gregory 
continues the scheme introduced by Origen, who applied this distinction 
to the three protocanonical books of Wisdom ascribed to Solomon: Prov-
erbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs, where ethics is assigned to Prov-
erbs, physics assigned to Ecclesiastes, and enoptics assigned to the Song of 
Songs.773 There are three stages that the soul must pass through progres-
sively: first ‒learning virtue; next – adopting a right attitude to natural 
things; and then – ascending to the contemplation of God. Illumination is 
conditioned by purification and proportionate to it.
“Where there is fear, there is observation of the commandments; where the com-
mandments are observed, there is a cleansing of the flesh, that cloud that blocks 
the soul’s vision and keeps it from seeing clearly the rays of divine illumination; 
but where there is cleansing, there is also illumination, and illumination is the 
fulfilment of desire for those eager to share in the greatest things—or in the great-
est Thing, or in That which is beyond the great!”774
Gregory’s primary concept for God’s nature is light, and he frequently refers 
to the knowledge of God as illumination or coming to share in the divine 
light.775 The ultimate aim of human existence is participation in God.776 
768 μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν Θεὸν ὄψονται.
769 Phaedo 67 B: μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι.
770 E.g. Plotinus, Enn. 1.2.7: Καὶ γὰρ ἡ νόησις ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία, τὸ δὲ πρὸς 
αὐτὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, τὸ δὲ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἡ οἰκειοπραγία, τὸ δὲ οἷον ἀνδρία ἡ 
ἀυλότης καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ μένειν καθαρόν.
771 Cf. C.A. Beeley, op. cit., p. 75.
772 Cf. Or. 27, 4 (PG 36, 16CD; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 219).
773 Cf. A. Louth, The Origins…, op. cit., p. 57.
774 Or. 39, 8 (PG 36, 343 A; tr. Deeley, p. 131).
775 More about illumination, see B.E. Deeley, op. cit., pp. 104–108.
776 Cf. Or 30, 4 (PG 36, 108 B).
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Those who are purified, he says, will come to know that the Trinity as well 
as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are known by one another.777
In Oration 21, Gregory gives a very suggestive account of theosis. It may 
be even interpreted as the possible ascent of the soul to God, even in the 
present life, a type of the soul’s ascent to deification, but in other Orations, 
Gregory remarks that this union and knowledge is possible only in future 
life.778 We must remember that just like for Gregory of Nyssa, each stage 
of ascent relies on some kind of negation: negation of impurity, negation 
of our concepts of the Divine, etc.
Gregory gives his clearest statement on the positive knowledge of God 
in the Epiphany orations, and in the anti-Eunomian context of Oration 28, 
he naturally emphasizes the incomprehensibility of God showing that in the 
Orthodox faith, there is place for both knowing and absolute mystery – that 
there is no space for easy answers and that an apological attitude often leads 
us to certain simplifications. We can observe that Gregory himself tries to 
avoid such traps of common patterns of thinking. When commenting on 
the use of negation in theology, he omits its long philosophical tradition 
with respect to privation779 and very clearly explains that although it is not 
a mistake to define God in the categories of negation when we attribute to 
Him, such terms as incorporeal, ingenerated, and immutable,780 it would 
not help us in any way to define who He is and what His essence is. Nega-
tive theology should be accompanied by positive assertions.781 “A person 
777 Cf. Or. 25, 17 (PG 35, 1221 C-D). Γενοῦ τι τῶν εἰρημένων πρότερον, ἢ τοιοῦτος, 
καὶ τότε γνώσῃ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων γινώσκεσθαι. Νῦν δὲ δίδασκε 
τοσοῦτον εἰδέναι μόνον, μονάδα ἐν Τριάδι, καὶ Τριάδα ἐν μονάδι προσκυνουμένην, 
παράδοξον ἔχουσαν καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν (tr. Beeley, p. 102).
778 Or. 20, 12 (PG, 35, 1080 C). “Yet I consider this to be nothing else than to 
share in what is purest and most perfect; and the most perfect of all things 
that exist is the knowledge of God. Let us, then, hold on to what we have and 
acquire what we can, as long as we live on earth; and let us store our treasure 
there in heaven, so that we may possess this reward of our labor: the full il-
lumination of the holy Trinity – what it is, its qualities and its greatness, if I 
may put it this way – shining in Christ himself, our Lord, to whom be glory 
and power for the ages of ages. Amen” (tr. Daley, s. 105).
779 Cf. R. Mortley, From Word to Silence, op. cit., p. 108.
780 Cf. Or. 28, 9 (PG 36 C-37 A; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 228).
781 Cf. Or. 28, 9 (PG 36, 37 A-B; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 229).
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who tells you what God is not but fails to tell you what He is, is rather like 
someone, who asked what twice five are, answers “not two, not three, not 
four, not five…”782 In his apology of God’s incomprehensibility, Gregory 
shows the need to use also positive theology against the Eunomian doctrine.
A similar paradox is found when the figure of Moses is being recalled. He 
is the one who ascends the Mountain to meet God and who has left all of the 
impurity below. According to Ch. A. Beeley, Gregory is largely responsible 
for creating the image of Moses as a primary model of Christian growth and 
the vision of God. This archetype was first used by Origen and Gregory of 
Nyssa, and Pseudo-Dionysius followed Gregory Nazianzen’s work. The mo-
tif itself became standard in Eastern and Western spirituality.783 The figure 
of Moses is used here to underline the absurdity of Eunomius’ claim, since 
even Moses who prayed to comprehend God could only see His averted 
figure and not His face.784
But still according to Gregory, the main aim of human existence is par-
ticipation in God who is the greatest reward for all efforts. In the life to 
come, He can draw those who are purified and lightened to Himself and 
let them know God without any of the limitations of the present state of 
782 Or. 28, 9 (tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 229).
783 Cf. C.A. Beeley, op. cit., p. 65.
784 Or. 28, 3. ἐπεὶ δὲ προσέβλεψα, μόλις εἶδον θεοῦ τὰ ὀπίσθια· καὶ τοῦτο τῇ πέτρᾳ 
σκεπασθείς, τῷ σαρκωθέντι δι’ ἡμᾶς θεῷ Λόγῳ· καὶ μικρὸν διακύψας, οὐ τὴν 
πρώτην τε καὶ ἀκήρατον φύσιν, καὶ ἑαυτῇ, λέγω δὴ τῇ τριάδι, γινωσκομένην, καὶ 
ὅση τοῦ πρώτου καταπετάσματος εἴσω μένει καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν χερουβὶμ συγκαλύπτεται, 
ἀλλ’ ὅση τελευταία καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς φθάνουσα. ἡ δέ ἐστιν, ὅσα ἐμὲ γινώσκειν, ἡ ἐν 
τοῖς κτίσμασι καὶ τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ προβεβλημένοις καὶ διοικουμένοις μεγαλειότης, 
ἤ, ὡς ὁ θεῖος Δαβὶδ ὀνομάζει, μεγαλοπρέπεια. ταῦτα γὰρ θεοῦ τὰ ὀπίσθια, ὅσα μετ’ 
ἐκεῖνον ἐκείνου γνωρίσματα, ὥσπερ αἱ καθ’ ὑδάτων ἡλίου σκιαὶ καὶ εἰκόνες ταῖς 
σαθραῖς ὄψεσι παραδεικνῦσαι τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπεὶ μὴ αὐτὸν προσβλέπειν οἶόν τε, τῷ 
ἀκραιφνεῖ τοῦ φωτὸς νικῶντα τὴν αἴσθησιν (PG 36, 36 B-C). “Peering in I saw 
not the nature as it abides within the first veil and is hidden by the Cherubim, 
but as it reaches us at its furthest remove from God, being, so far as I can 
understand, the grandeur, or as divine David calls it the ‘majesty’ inherent in 
the created things he has brought forth and governs. All these indications of 
himself which he has left behind him are God’s ‘averted figure’. They are, as 
it were, shadowy reflections of the Sun in water, reflections which display to 
eyes too weak” (tr. Wickham/Williams, pp. 225–226).
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human existence.785 But Gregory claims that even in the present state, we 
may be conducted to the knowledge of God but it is God’s not human act. 
He is sceptic about the possibility of knowing God by our own means,786 
but limitations of human intellect do not separate Christians from God 
since “faith, in fact, gives fullness to our reasoning.”787
785 Cf. Or. 38, 7 (PG 36, 317 C). “For he contains the whole of being in himself, 
without beginning or end, like an endless, boundless ocean of reality; he ex-
tends beyond all our notions of time and nature, and is sketchily grasped by 
the mind alone, but only very dimly and in a limited way; he is known not 
directly but indirectly, as one image is derived from another to form a single 
representation of the truth: fleeing before it is grasped, escaping before it is 
fully known, shining on our guiding reason – provided we have been purified 
– as a swift, fleeting flash of lightning shines in our eyes. And he does this, 
it seems to me, so that, insofar as it can be comprehended, the Divine might 
draw us to itself – for what is completely beyond our grasp is also beyond 
hope, beyond attainment – but that insofar as it is incomprehensible, it might 
stir up our wonder, and through wonder might be yearned for all the more, 
and through our yearning might purify us, and in purifying us might make 
us like God; and when we have become this, that he might then associate 
with us intimately as friends – my words here are rash and daring! – uniting 
himself with us, making himself known to us, as God to gods, perhaps to the 
same extent that he already knows those who are known by him” (tr. Daley, 
p. 120).
786 Cf. Or. 39, 8–10 (PG, 36, 344 D-345 A). “For the same Word is both fear-
ful to those who are unworthy on account of its nature, yet on account of 
its loving kindness also accessible to those who are converted in the way we 
have described, who have driven out the unclean, material spirit from their 
souls, and have swept and adorned their own souls by self-examination and 
who, besides fleeing from evil, practice virtue and make Christ to dwell within 
them entirely, or at least as much as possible. [When we have done this] and 
so enlightened ourselves with the light of knowledge, then let us speak of the 
wisdom of God that is hidden in a mystery and enlighten others. Meanwhile, 
let us purify ourselves and be initiated into the Word, so that we may do as 
much good to ourselves as possible, forming ourselves in God’s image and 
receiving the Word when he comes – not only receiving him, in fact, but hold-
ing onto him and revealing him to others.” (tr. Daley, in: Beeley, pp. 69–70, 
with my own alterations).
787 Or. 29, 21 (PG 36, 104 A; tr. Wickham/Williams, p. 260).
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5.4 John Chrysostom against Eunomius
John Chrysostom wrote twelve homilies against the Anomeans, which can 
be divided into two series. The first five, which deal with God’s incompre-
hensibility, were preached when he was a priest in Antioch788 and were ad-
dressed both to the Heterodox and the Orthodox. This is the reason why 
they are not so theologically and philosophically sophisticated as Basil’s and 
Gregory’s texts, unlike even Gregory of Nazianzus, whose Orations were full 
of theological and philosophical analyses, John Chrysostom presents a more 
pastoral attitude. But it does not mean that Chrysostom was not aware of all 
the nuances of the controversy. On the contrary, we find many proofs that 
he deliberately simplified his teaching.789 Additionally, John Chrysostom, as 
J. Daniélou mentioned in his introduction to the critical edition, quotes not 
only the thoughts of Gregory and Basil, but includes his own ideas as well.790 
The aim of the homilies is apologetic: “The time I spend on these arguments 
will both increase your knowledge about the Anomoeans and will make my 
prize of victory over those heretics a brighter one.”791 We can also observe 
that to provide better reception, John uses mainly biblical examples.
The general content of the homilies is similar to the predecessors in the 
polemic: divine essence is incomprehensible792 not only for human beings 
but also for angels.793 John declares it in many places in a beautiful style:
“Let us call upon him, then, as the ineffable God who is beyond our intelligence, 
invisible, incomprehensible, who transcends the power of mortal words. Let us 
call on him as the God who is inscrutable to the angels, unseen by the Seraphim, 
788 Cf. St. John Chrysostom, On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, tr. P.W. 
Harkins, Washington 1984, p. 22.
789 Cf. Von Ivanka who sees some analogy with the scepticism of the New Acad-
emy in the conviction that man can only know the sensible world (Hom. II, 
209 nn). E. von Ivanka, Vom Platonismus zur Theorie der Mystik, Scholastik, 
11 (1936), pp. 178–185.
790 Cf. J. Daniélou, Introdution, in: SC 28bis, p. 25.
791 Hom. IV, 8–12 (SC 28bis, p. 228; tr. Harkins, p. 115).
792 Cf. Hom. V, 251–257 (SC 28bis, p. 292). “But why do I speak of the essence 
of the angels when we do not even know well the essence of our own souls? 
Rather, we do not have any knowledge whatsoever of that essence” (tr. Har-
kins p. 149).
793 Cf. Hom. IV, 302–309 (SC 28bis, p. 252).
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inconceivable to the Cherubim, invisible to the principalities, to the powers, and 
to the virtues, in fact, to all creatures without qualification, because he is known 
only by the Son and the Spirit.”794
Not only divine essence but also divine economy is inaccessible for the 
people.795 Man is unable to know even the created word796 and his own 
soul, so how can he comprehend angels797 or the reality that is above him.798 
In his attitude, we can observe the lack of the trust in human cognition 
typical of the authors of the latter half the 4th century, which is according 
to J. Daniélou a commonplace between pagan and Christian philosophy 
in the late Antiquity.799 What Chrysostom underlines is the fact that even 
pretending that we can know the essence of God is true ignorance, mad-
ness, and even blasphemy800 – the blasphemy which does not harm God 
but its author.801 In order to visualize the absurdity of heretical views802 to 
ordinary listeners, he uses simple examples:
794 Hom. III, 53–59 (SC 28bis, p. 190; tr. Harkins, p. 97).
795 Cf. Hom. I, 280–281 (SC 28bis, p. 124).
796 Cf. Hom. II, 473–480 (SC 28bis, p. 180). “But we do not know what the 
essence of the sky is.” (tr. Harkins, p. 91).
797 Cf. Hom. III, 194–196 (SC 28bis, p. 202). “And why do I speak of that blessed 
essence of God? A man cannot even look upon the essence of an angel without 
fear and trembling” (tr. Harkins, p. 105); Hom.V, 257 (SC 28bis, p. 292). 
“But why do I speak of the essence of the angels when we do not even know 
well the essence of our own souls? Rather, we do not have any knowledge 
whatsoever of that essence” (tr. Harkins, p. 149).
798 Cf. Hom. V, 249–266 (SC 28bis, p. 292).
799 Cf. J. Daniélou, Platonism et théologie mystique, Paris 1953, p. 131.
800 Cf. Hom. V, 371–373 (SC 28bis, p. 302); Hom. I, 188–190 (SC 28, p. 116). 
“I urge you, then, to flee from the madness of these men. They are obstinately 
striving to know what God is in his essence. And I tell you that this is the ulti-
mate madness” (tr. Harkins, p. 59); Hom. II, 163–165, (SC 28, pp. 154–156; 
tr. Harkins, p. 79).
801 Cf. Hom. III, 32–41 (SC 28bis, pp. 188–190). “In the same way, the man who 
hurls blasphemies at that blessed essence of God would never do any harm 
to it. God’s essence is much too great and far too high to receive any hurt. 
The blasphemer is sharpening his sword against his own soul because he has 
become so arrogant toward his benefactor” (tr. Harkins, p. 96).
802 Cf. Hom. I, 190–195 (SC 28bis, p. 116). “Not only is it clear that the proph-
ets do not know what his essence is but they do not even know how vast his 
wisdom is. Yet his essence does not come from his wisdom, but his wisdom 
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“How great is the distance between the knowledge which is going to be 
given to us and the knowledge which we now have? How great is the dis-
tance between a complete and perfect man and an infant at the breast? For 
that is the degree of superiority of the knowledge to come in comparison 
to our present knowledge.”803
John compares an attempt to pretend of having full knowledge of divine 
essence with Adam’s pride in paradise. The first man lost everything that 
he had received from God because he exceeded the set limits. Similarly, 
the Anomeans who claimed to have obtained perfect knowledge, which 
is impossible here on earth, would lose any possibility to know God in 
eternity.804
John explains that the impassable barrier in our cognition is based on 
the difference in nature:
“…for the distance between God and man is as great as the distance between the 
potter and the clay. Rather the distance is not merely as great but much greater. 
The potter and the clay are of one and the same substance. It is just as Job said: ‘I 
admit it as for those who dwell in houses of clay because we are ourselves formed 
from the same clay.’”805
The distance between the essence of God and the essence of man is so great 
that according to John neither words can express it, nor the mind can 
measure it.806 It means that the exact knowledge of God is possible only 
for those who share the same nature with Him. When Chrysostom com-
ments on the text that nobody knows the Father, he explains that the term 
“nobody” is always used to express the exclusion of creatures alone.807 The 
comes from his essence. When the prophets cannot perfectly comprehend 
his wisdom, how mad and foolish would the Anomoeans be to think that 
they could” (tr. Harkins, p. 59); Hom. II, 159–165 (SC 28bis, pp. 154–156). 
“Does this require refutation? Must I prove it not the mere utterance of the 
words enough to prove, godlessness of the Anomoeans? In these words we the 
obvious folly, an unpardonable madness, a new kind of piety and godlessness. 
(..)You miserable Anomoeans! Think of who you are and in things you are 
meddling” (tr. Harkins, p. 79).
803 Hom. I, 120–123 (SC 28bis, p. 106; tr. Harkins, p. 56).
804 Cf. Hom. I, 175–179 (SC 28bis, p. 114; tr. Harkins, p. 59).
805 Hom. II, 336–341 (SC 28bis, p. 170; tr. Harkins, p. 85).
806 Cf. Hom. II, 347–350 (SC 28bis, p. 170; tr. Harkins, p. 85).
807 Cf. Hom. V, 64–74 (SC 28bis, p. 276; tr. Harkins, p. 139).
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knowledge about God exceeds our spiritual powers,808 and he emphasizes 
the vanity of our human nature which is worthless compared not only with 
the excellence of God809 but even with angels.810 For Chrysostom, God is 
not only unknowable (ἀκατάλητος), but also inaccessible (ἀπρόσιτος), which 
is in this context even stronger.
“However, he did not say: ‘Who dwells in incomprehensible light,’ but: ‘in unap-
proachable light,’ and this is much stronger than ‘incomprehensible.’ A thing is said 
to be incomprehensible when those who seek after it fail to comprehend it, even 
after they have searched and sought to understand it. A thing is unapproachable 
which, from the start, cannot be investigated nor can anyone come near to it. We 
call the sea incomprehensible because, even when divers lower themselves into its 
waters and go down to a great depth, they cannot find the bottom. We call that thing 
unapproachable which, from the start, cannot be searched out or investigated.”811
808 Cf. Hom. III, 35–38 (SC 28bis, p. 188; tr. Harkins, p. 98).
809 Cf. Hom. II, 296–300 (SC 28bis, p. 166; tr. Harkins, p. 83); Cf. Hom. II, 
166–177, (SC 28bis, p. 156). “You are only a man, and the bare names we 
call a man are enough to prove how excessive your madness is. A man is dust 
and ashes, flesh and blood, grass and the flower of grass, a shadow and smoke 
and vanity, and whatever is weaker and more worthless than these. And do 
not think that what I am saying is an accusation against nature. I am not the 
one who says this, but it is the prophets who are expressing their thoughts on 
the lowliness of man. Nor are they seeking to heap dishonor on humankind 
but they are trying to check the conceits of the foolish. Their aim is not to 
disparage our nature but to discourage the folly of those who are mad with 
pride” (tr. Harkins, p. 79).
810 Cf. Hom. III, 182–193 (SC 28bis, p. 202). “And the fact is that we do not 
know God in the same way in which those powers above know him. Their 
nature is far more pure and wise and clear-sighted than man’s nature. The 
blind man does not know that the sun’s rays are unapproachable as does the 
man who can see. So we do not know the incomprehensibility of God in the 
same way as these powers do. The difference between a blind man and a man 
with sight is as great as the difference between us men and the powers above. 
So, even if you hear the prophet say: ‘I saw the Lord,’ do not suspect that he 
saw God’s essence. What he saw was this very condescension of God. And 
he saw that far less distinctly than did the powers above. He could not see it 
with the same clarity as the Cherubini” (tr. Harkins, pp. 104–105).
811 Hom. III, 124–133 (SC 28bis, pp. 196–198; tr. Harkins, p. 100). Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ 
φῶς οἰκῶν ἀκατάληπτον εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ ἀπρόσιτον, ὃ τοῦ ἀκαταλήπτου πολλῷ μεῖζόν 
ἐστι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκατάληπτον λέγεται, ὅταν ἐρευνηθὲν καὶ ζητηθὲν μὴ καταληφθῇ 
παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων αὐτό· ἀπρόσιτον δέ στιν, ὃ μηδὲ ἐρεύνης ἀνέχεται τὴν ἀρχήν, 
μηδὲ ἐγγὺς αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τις δύναται. Οἷον ἀκατάληπτον λέγεται πέλαγος, εἰς ὃ 
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Just like Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, John defends believers 
against the Eunomian accusation of not knowing God812 and reminds that 
“All that we are required to know is that God exists; we are not asked to 
be busybodies and be inquisitive about his essence.”813 He makes a distinc-
tion between the knowledge we can receive from the revelation and human 
inquiries about the truth and understanding of divine mysteries.814
“Paul said this because on the one hand he knows that God exists, whereas, on 
the other, he does not know what God is in his essence. He knows that God is 
wise but he does not know how great his wisdom is. He knows that God is great 
but he does not know how or what his greatness is. He also knows that God is 
everywhere present but he does not know how this is so. He knows that God 
provides for all things and that he preserves and governs them to perfection. But 
he does not know the way in which God does all these things. Therefore, he said: 
‘Our knowledge is imperfect and our prophesying is imperfect’.”815
καθιέντες ἑαυτοὺς οἱ κολυμβηταὶ καὶ πρὸς πολὺ καταφερόμενοι βάθος, τὸ πέρας 
ἀδυνατοῦσιν εὑρεῖν· ἀπρόσιτον δὲ ἐκεῖνο λέγεται, ὃ μήτε τὴν ἀρχὴν ζητηθῆναι 
δυνατόν, μηδὲ ἐρευνηθῆναι.
812 Cf. Hom. V, 366–369 (SC 28bis, p. 302). “What is the wise objection and 
argument of these Anomoeans? They say: ‘Do you not know what you are 
adoring?’ First and foremost, we should not have to reply to this objection 
because the Scriptures afford such strong proof that it is impossible to know 
what God’s essence is. But since our purpose in speaking is not to arouse their 
enmity but to correct them, come, let us show that being ignorant of God’s 
essence but contending obstinately that one does know his essence, this is 
really not to know him” (tr. Harkins, p. 153).
813 Hom. V, 385–386 (SC 28bis, p. 304; tr. Harkins, p. 154).
814 Cf. Hom. I, 156–167 (SC 28bis, pp. 110–112). “I, too, know many things 
but I do not know how to explain them. I know that God is everywhere and 
I know that he is everywhere in his whole being. But I do not know how he is 
everywhere. I know that he is eternal and has no beginning. But I do not know 
how. My reason fails to grasp how it is possible for an essence to exist when 
that essence has received its existence neither from itself nor from another. I 
know that he begot a Son. But I do not know how. I know that the Spirit is 
from him. But I do not know how the Spirit is from him. [I eat food but I do 
not know how it is separated into phlegm, into blood, into juice, into bile. 
We do not even understand the foods which we see and eat every day. Will 
we be inquisitive, then, and meddle with the essence of God?]” (tr. Harkins, 
pp. 57–58).
815 Hom. I. 290–301 (SC 28bis, p. 126; tr. P.W. Harkins p. 65).
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John does not hesitate to use privation or negation to describe God, and that 
fact can be clearly associated with not only Plato’s, Philo’s, and Clemet’s in-
spiration, but also with the Bible.816 We can see it in the use of such terms as: 
invisible ἀόρατος,817 unspeakable ἄρρητος,818 unreachable ἀπρόσιτος,819 im-
possible to contemplate ἀθέατος, and many others.820 The negative language 
is complemented by the transcendent descriptions with ὑπερ.821 Like his 
predecessors, John believes that Christians will achieve the full knowledge 
of God in future life, but in the present state, they are not left without help 
as God can be seen by men or angels only by condescension (συγκατάβασις) 
and accommodation (ἐπιμετρέω). In his Third Homily, when John describes 
the knowledge of angels, he presents the definition of condescension:
“Yet they did not see the pure light itself nor the pure essence itself. What they saw 
was a condescension accommodated to their nature. What is this condescension? 
God condescends whenever He is not seen as He is, but in the way one incapable 
of beholding Him is able to look upon Him. In this way God reveals Himself by ac-
commodating what reveals to the weakness of vision of those who behold Him.”822
According to John Chrysostom, God wants to be known by His creation 
but everything that was revealed to us about Him is very distant from the 
true knowledge about His nature.823
816 Cf. e.g. Rom 1: 20; 2 Cor 9: 15.
817 Cf. Hom. ΙΙΙ, 54 (SC 28bis, p. 190).
818 Cf. Hom. IV, 61 (SC 28bis, p. 232).
819 Cf. Hom. III, 124 (SC 28bis, p. 196).
820 Cf. Hom. III, 45 (SC 28bis, p. 191). J. Daniélou, Indroduction, in: SC 28bis, 
pp. 17–18.
821 Cf. Hom. ΙΙ, 192 (SC 28bis, p. 158); Hom. ΙΙ, 297 (SC 28bis, p. 166).
822 Hom. III, 162–166 (SC 28bis, p. 200). Τί δέ ἐστι συγκατάβασις; Ὅταν μὴ ὡς 
ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς φαίνηται, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁ δυνάμενος αὐτὸν θεωρεῖν οἷός τέ ἐστιν, οὕτως 
ἑαυτὸν δεικνύῃ, ἐπιμετρῶν τῇ τῶν ὁρώντων ἀσθενείᾳ τῆς ὄψεως τὴν ἐπίδειξιν” 
(SC 28bis, p. 200; tr. Harkins, pp. 101–102).
823 The same motif was used by Cyril of Jerusalem: “‘What?’, someone will say. 
‘Doesn’t Scripture say that the angels of the little ones “always behold the face 
of my Father in heaven’” (Mt 18.10)? But the angels see God not as he is, but 
according to their capacity. For Jesus himself said: ‘Not that anyone has seen 
the Father, except the one who is from God, he has seen the Father’ (Jn 6.46). 
The angels see according to their capacity, and the archangels according to 
their ability; the Thrones and Dominations more than the first, but still fail 
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In the thought of all authors presented in this chapter, we could observe 
same schemes of demonstrating the incomprehensibility of God. The basic 
truth of the impossibility to know the essence of God is always defended, 
but there are different accents as well. While Basil the Great and Gregory 
of Nyssa present a more speculative attitude, for Gregory of Nazianzus and 
especially for John Chrysostom, a pastoral approach is more natural. But 
this does not mean that such pastoral care was less important, since the 
Anomeans were effective not only in the field of doctrinal demonstrations, 
but also in their missionary activity.
Finally, it is worth adding that those four writers are the most famous 
ones, and, therefore, they are the best examples of a rapid development 
of negative theology in the late 4th century. But they certainly are not all 
writers who contributed to the growing interest in negative theology in 
the latter half of the 4th century. Among others worthy of mentioning is 
Cyril of Jerusalem824 and Didymus the Blind, who also accepted the basic 
outcome of the debate, namely that the essence of God is incomprehensible.
to do him justice.” Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. VI, 6 (PG 33, 548 B), in. Cyril of 
Jerusalem, ed. tr. E. Yarnold, London, New York, 2000, p. 117.
824 It is worth quoting at least one quote from Cyril of Jerusalem’s orations which 
shows that negative theology was commonly present at that time: “For we do 
not say as much as needs to be said about God, but as much as human nature 
can grasp and our weakness can bear. We do not explain what God is; we 
admit with a good grace that we do not know the exact truth about him. For 
in what concerns God the height of knowledge is to admit one’s ignorance” 




Our discussion showed clearly that in the later 4th century, we can ob-
serve a significant growth of the importance of negative theology. This 
was certainly caused by the Anomean thesis that the substance of God is 
comprehensible. However, since for all Christian writers the basic refer-
ence is the Holy Scripture, both the opponents and the supporters of nega-
tive theology could certainly find the source of their opinions in the Old 
and the New Testament. As we have seen, the Bible is ambiguous on the 
topic of comprehensibility of God, who reveals Himself but simultaneously 
hides His face. Therefore, there was not one and only interpretation of the 
Christian doctrine on how to know God, and in the Early Church both 
positions could see themselves as being in accordance with the Orthodoxy. 
For Apologists, who opposed pagan conceptions of God, a confirmation 
that Christians possess true knowledge revealed in the Holy Scripture was 
coherent with the claims that pagans have a false conception of God, whose 
true nature is incomprehensible. Similarly, we have observed that later 
Clement of Alexandria sustained strong aphairetic claims, while for Origen 
incomprehensibility of God was merely a marginal issue. It must be noted 
that the works of Philo of Alexandria were held in high esteem especially 
by Clement of Alexandria but also by later Christian writers, but their influ-
ence exerted a special mark in the case of negative theology.
The situation of the ambiguous attitude of Christians to negative theol-
ogy continues at the beginning of the 4th century. If our reconstruction of 
the claims of Arius is right, we can assume that for him negative theology 
was an important idea in arguing on the difference between the Father and 
the Son. While the Son, who is also Logos and Wisdom, is known to us, 
Father stays beyond the powers of human intellect and remains unknown. 
Because of such difference in comprehensibility, Arius could argue on the 
similar, but not the same essence of the Son of God. It is also significant that 
Athanasius, the most important opponent of Arius, has a significantly more 
positive attitude to the possibility of knowing God by man, but because of 
the strong division between the Creator and creations, he saw this possibil-
ity as the effect of the perfection of God’s revelation in Christ rather than 
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in the power of human intellect, weakened by the fall into sensual things, 
caused by sin.
Another opponent of Arius – Marius Victorinus was also a Neoplatonic 
who rejected negative theology, so using Neoplatonic sources he tried to 
establish the ultimate mode of speaking of God as transcendental synthe-
sis, in which negative and positive theologies were somehow reconciled, 
since this transcendent mode of speaking is above affirmation and negation. 
Thanks to such reasoning, Marius Victorinus was able to reject the opposi-
tion between two mode theologies as the way of showing dissimilarity of 
the Father and the Son.
The problem of the comprehensibility of God became a fundamental is-
sue upon the rise of the Neo-Arian movement of Anomeans. However, the 
doctrine of the first important Heteroousian – Aetius – was rather pointed 
at showing inconsistencies and contradictions of the Orthodox convic-
tions. He also focused the discussion on the positive meaning of the main 
name of God, which was “Ingeneracy.” Although we find those topics in 
the writings of his disciple Eunomius, he shifted the Anomean doctrine to 
an entirely new level.
Eunomius popularized Anomean opinions, and it seems that he also 
played a paramount role in establishing the most troublesome way of the 
discussion with the Orthodox by coming up with the question which led to 
a paradox: “Do you worship what you know, or what you do not know?” 
The question itself focuses the discussion on the problem of the compre-
hensibility of God, and, therefore, to answer it the Orthodox were forced 
to enter into the discussion on the possibility of knowing the essence of the 
one who is worshipped by Christians. There is also another very important 
aspect which this question introduces. It shows that for the Christians of 
the 4th century, comprehensibility of God was not a theoretical issue but 
had a fundamental impact on the practical issue of proper worship of God.
Eunomius not only focused on showing the contradictions in the claims 
of the opponents, but also proposed new ways to demonstrate the com-
prehensibility of the essence of God. As we have seen, the key concept 
in his theological methods was the idea of activity of God. Therefore, to 
understand Eunomius’ doctrine, it was necessary to trace the problem of 
ἐνέργεια from its beginnings. This historical view allowed us to see that 
Eunomius had predecessors in using this term, and he could be convinced 
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that by placing ἐνέργεια in his system he only made the exegesis of the 
passages from the Holy Scripture. But it was Eunomius who ascribed such 
great importance to activities of God, and it seems that the two ways of 
theology based on the relationships between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια were his 
own invention. Whereas the second way (from activity to substance) was 
in a sense already present in earlier writings, the first way (from substance 
to activity) was rather entirely his own invention.
It is significant that the opponents of Eunomius (mainly Gregory of Nys-
sa) do not undermine the importance of the relationship between οὐσία and 
ἐνέργεια in their polemic. The first method of Eunomius, since it depended 
on the previous knowledge of essence, thanks to the theory of names, which 
stated that the name “Unbegotten” signified and to some extent was the es-
sence of God, was entirely unacceptable for the Orthodox. Especially, Basil 
of Caesarea noted that undermining the theory of names will effectively 
invalidate Eunomius’ first way. If one demonstrates that it is impossible to 
know the essence, thanks to the name “Unbegotten,” argumentation con-
cerning the character of the activity of generation from essence is pointless.
Gregory of Nyssa, especially in the first book of his Contra Eunomium, 
focuses on the second method, which leads from activity to substance. But 
this time the method itself is not the object of criticism. Gregory concen-
trates rather on explaining that although the method is not invalid, Euno-
mius did not understand it correctly. At this point, we have observed that 
Gregory argued for two kinds of the activities of God. Internal activities 
that are eternal and infinite acts which take place in the essence of God are 
completely incomprehensible since they are identical with the substance. 
Therefore, generation of the Son also cannot be comprehended by any act 
of human intellect. But there are also external activities, by which we can 
recognize God’s presence in the creations. Here Gregory agrees that they 
can give us certain knowledge, but it is the comprehension of the activities 
only, not of the essence of God. As we have seen Gregory is convinced that 
the knowledge which we can obtain is true because it is the knowledge 
of activities. Therefore, the doctrine of activities allows him to secure the 
validity of human knowledge, while at the same time he was able to draw 
a clear borderline beyond which any intellectual perception is impossible.
In the case of Gregory, we could see once again that the problem of 
the comprehensibility of God is not only a theoretical issue, but is closely 
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related with the way of man towards unity with God. The concept of ac-
tivities is so important because the first place where God reveals himself is 
the soul of man. Therefore, the activities present in human soul are indis-
pensable when man enters the way towards unity with God; they assure 
him that God is present and that he is on the right path. It is indispensable 
since the ascent of the soul is infinite, and all the time the soul merely gets 
closer to God and never reaches Him. Gregory then shows that total incom-
pressibility of God is the fundamental truth of mystical life, which cannot 
be conceived without accepting insufficiency of the constantly performed 
efforts to know God to whom the soul ascends.
The examination of the thought of two other figures of the 4th century: 
Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom allowed us to observe that the 
incomprehensibility of God was the strongest sign of being Orthodox at 
that time. The best way to reject the doctrine of Eunomians and to weaken 
their missionary activity was to argue on the impossibility of knowing the 
essence of God, and, therefore, it became the main topic of the orations of 
Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom.
There is another common feature of those doctrines which can be ob-
served in all four authors presented in the last chapter. Although for the 
purpose of the polemic they constantly repeat the truth of the incomprehen-
sibility of God, we can also notice the effort to show that negative theology 
does not conclude in making spiritual life pointed at nothingness. Admitting 
the insufficiency of human reason is a necessary statement on the limits of 
intellect, but not on the absence of the object of belief. Even for Gregory 
of Nyssa, who is certainly “most negative” of them, God, who can never 
be fully reached, is constantly present in the cloud and in darkness. But 
this effort to show that God is present and reachable to some extent is the 
symptom of certain uneasiness, that going too deeply into negative theology 
would result in missing God on the mystical path.
The two fundamental effects of the 4th-century debate on the compre-
hensibility of God can be seen in a later development of Christian theology. 
Especially thanks to the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, the claim on the 
incomprehensibility of the essence of God will settle for good in Christian 
thought. Gregory formulated the strongest negative theology until his time 
and found that equally strong negative statements could be found earlier. 
But it was not the end of the development of negative theology. Thanks 
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to the new understanding of apophatic statements presented by Proclus, 
Christian negative theology will flourish in the writings of Dionysius the 
Areopagite, who seemed to be under Gregory’s influence.825
Another outcome of the debate can be seen in a further development 
of the concept of the Divine activities. Although after the Cappadocians 
the interest in the topic significantly diminished, it gained a new life in the 
system of the same Dionysius the Areopagite.826 Thanks to the thought of 
the unknown author of Corpus Dionysiacum, the doctrine of activities 
became the fundament of the Eastern theological tradition because of its 
development in Maximus the Confessor and in the Middle Ages in Gregory 
Palamas.827
Therefore, it seems that Christian theology and especially Christian mys-
ticism owe much to the debate between Eunomius and the Cappadocians. 
But the importance of the debate goes beyond Christian theology and has 
much to offer also to natural theology, philosophy of religion, and even 
metaphysics. Because of a growing interest in negative theology in those 
field of studies, it seems that one of the most important debates on this 
topic which took place as long ago as in the 4th century AD is still worth 
taking into account.
825 Cf. Y. de Andia remarks on similarities between Gregory and Denys the Are-
opagite in: Henosis. L’Union à Dieu chez Denys l’Aréopagite, Leiden, New 
York, Köln 1996, pp. 17–18; 306; on the stages of mystical life: pp. 356–360; 
371–373; especially on the divine darkness: pp. 334–342.
826 Cf. D. Bradshaw, op. cit., p. 179.
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